CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001000190001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 Tune 1952 /
OCI No. 6415
Copy No. 2 6 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
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T IS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN"ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
EASTERN EUROPE
I_ Czechoslovakia attempts to overcome worker shortage in
the Ostrava eav n us ryccomex4 The fifth brigade of
Prague workers in two weeks let on 3 June for Ostrava, the
center of Czech heavy industry in Moravia. More workers
are scheduled to go there from Prague shortly.
On 2 June, Rude Pravo published an editorial stressing
Ostrava's importance as tie "key raw material and technical
base of the new Socialist epoch," and calling` attention to
the serious shortage of skilled manpower in the area. It
asked regional committees and youth organizations in all
parts of Czechoslovakia to send their best workers and
technicians to Ostrava. F_ I
Comment: A continuing shortage of industrial raw
mater aps, especially coal and raw steel, has led the Czech
press and radio to carry on an intensive campaign to re-
cruit labor for the industrial centers of Northern Bohemia
and Moravia. Major stress has been placed onrefuting the
stigma attached to recruitment for "volunteer labor
brigades" and on countering the habit of plant managers to
assign their worst workers to such brigades as punishment.
2. Czech Minister of Light Industries complains of the
failure~`o ie scrap metal collection drive: ois male-k,
zech Minister o g n us r es, complained over Prague
Radio on 5 June of the failure of the scrap metal collect-
ion drive, which by the end of April had reached only about
50 percent of the quota, set at about twice that for last
year. Malek stated that huge quantities of scrap exist
and blamed the shortage on local political administrations
who failed to establish collection centers as required by
the Czech Government.
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Comment- the scrap
metal a.very plan for 1951 called for-810,000 tons of
iron and 46,000 tons of non=ferrous metals. It is known
that-sorap metal of all sorts is in very short supply in
industrial warehouses and that the Czech Center for Mat-
erial Supply has issued stringent restrictions on. `its use
by industrial enterprises.
On the other hands in April the Czech trade delegation
in West Germany suddenly dropped its demands for German
delivery of 25,000 tons of scrap, stating that Czecho-
slovakia was able to import the scrap from an unnamed source.
In view of this and of Malek?s claim of the existence of
"huge quantities of scrap," it is possible that the short-
age in Czech industry is due to administrative failure
rather than to an actual lack of scrap metal in the country.
3. Hungarian Ministr, criticized for bauxite production
failure-. sca ng a or a n e Hungarian ommun s
-
pe on
a..~..
rd.m way - -
- -
Mining for the failure of the bauxite mines to meet their
quotas for the first quarter of 1952..
In view of the importance of Hungarian bauxite to
Soviet planning, the US Legation in Budapest believes that
serious repercussions against the Ministry are likely.
It notes that a delegation of Soviet production experts
visited u for several mmonthe
Comment-0 All bauxite mines in Hungary are owned by
a join ~ungariann-Soviet corporation and almost half of
their production goes to the USSR. Hungary accounted for
more than one-third of the Soviet Orbit's total bauxite
production in 1950.
4. New Rumanian judicial cyst
m resembles that of USSR:
The Rumanian Grand National Assem
establish a "unified court system"
correspond with the ad,mini ,tratiye
of the country.
y as passe ITTS-T-0
which is intended to
and economic divisions
.Comment o The new Rumanian court organization ap-
proximates at of a Soviet Republic.
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The Rumanians have also set up a commission to draft
a new constitution which undoubtedly ;will resemble more
closely the Soviet Conetitution.than does thearesent
basie law.
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FAR EAST
50 Rhee may be replaci chiefs of staff. American Charge
Lightner reports the rece,:pt o information that President
Rhee is planning to replace all. three chiefs of staff, and to
conduct an extensive shake-up of the top levels of the South
Korean Army.
A report that the President has directed the Army Chief
of Staff to transfer six of his ranking officers suggests
that Rhee is putting such a plan into effect o
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Comment. Recent information has indicated that all
three chiefs of staff have been alienated by Rhee?s redsaat
behavior a
7. Communists plan. Pacific 00peace" conference for September
Delegates from 20 Asian and. American countries, meeting it
Peiping from 3 to 6 June, set the last week of September
1952 as the date for a.Communist-sponsored P?peaceP conference
of 500 representatives of Pacific states.
The September conference, according to Peiping?s pre-
liminary statement, will call upon Pacific countries to
oppose Japanese ?Bremilitarization, PO to "settle " eacefull.y49
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the Korean conflict, and to "solve reasonably" the conflicts
in Indochina and Malaya.
Peiping's pronouncements suggest that the Soviet bloc
does not anticipate major developments in Korea or Southeast
Asia in the next four months. They also support previous in-
dications of a temporary shift of emphasis in Asian tactics
awa from the use of military force.
8. American missionaries imprisoned in.China may be
release : Three Catholic priests, the first er cans to
be released from Chinese Communist prisons since December
1951, have arrived in Hong Kong. Since 10 May, a total'of 15
Americans, 12 of whom are priests, have been given exit
permits and have left China.
Comment: More than 200 missionaries, representing
severalcountries are imprisoned in China. Premier Chou
25X1 En-lai told I lalmost all of them
would be re ease in anout T EX wee s.
Although it remains doubtful that the majority of the
imprisoned missionaries will be freed by the end of June,
the current releases and the sudden increase in the number
25X1 of issued exit permits are favorable signs.
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11. Letourneau expected to ask considerable increase in
American aid next year:
rend mister Resident a ourneau will _request in as ington
in mid-June only a small increase in American aid for Indo-
china in 1952, but will seek assurances, if not commitments,
of a substantially larger contribution for 1953.
Frances's total 1953 budget for Indochina operations is
expected to equal about 144 billion dollars, of which.France
would be "unable" to finance more than one billion. The
French "presumably" expect the United States to make up the
difference.
Comment-. The anticipated request for 1953 reflects no
increase over 1952 in the French financial effort, but a rise
of nearly 300 percent in the American share. Such an increase
would absorb the bulk of the additional 300 million dollars of
over-all American support proposed by France early in May.
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25X112. Viet Minh viewed,as war-wear -. 25X1
Viet Minh forces nave
weakened by heavy losses. and are ecoming war-weary 25X1
General Salan, commander of French forces, is optimistic
about the. military situation in Vietnam.
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Comment: A deterioration in the Viet Minh position
brought about by recent French clearing operations in the
Tonkin delta, a continuing improvement in the French logistic
position thanks to American aid, and the failure of the Viet
Minh to attempt a major offensive since February may be cited
as causes for this reported optimism.
The Viet Minh is expected, however, to utilize the rainy
season to train its forces, bring units up to strength, and
stockpile supplies from China. Prior to the Viet Minh's.
heavy offensive in northwestern Tonkin last September and its
sustained campaign from December to February, similar reports
of weakness were received.
1947 Coup Party extends grip on Thai Government machinery:
The American. Embassy reports that the recently reorganized
National Economic Council. is made up almost entirely of cabinet
members and includes nearly all of the important Coup Party
leaders in the Cabinet.
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Meanwhile, it is reported that the Minister of Industries
has resigned in disgust over Coup Party corruption and inter-
ference with the administration of his department. He is said
to have made reconsideration of his resignation conditional
upon a promise of Coup Party non-interference with his work.
The Embassy comments that these are the latest incidents
of a long process by which the Coup Party has eliminated al-
most, all of the capable government servants and replaced them
with its greedy cbhortsa
regarded as civil wa,ro The 1`ellow-traveling Burma orkers
an Peasants Party has called for the repeal of the High
16. Burmese fellow-travelers insist Communist insurrection be
Treason Act, which provides for capital punishment of poli-
tical prisoners o The party argubs that the Communist uprising
in Burma is civil war, not rebellion, and therefore that all
captured or surrendered personnel should be treated as
prisoners of ware
Comment. Burmese Government leaders have publicly
reject mmunist peace feelers and the army is conducting
its most intensive anti-Communist.campaign since early 1950.
However, during the whale insurrection, no Communists are
known to have been executed under the Nigh Treason Act
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17. French firm awarded contract to drill for oil in
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.;central Afghanistan. Political considerations were reportedly
the deciding factor, since the King felt thata French com-
pany would be less objectionable to the USSR than an American
one.
awarded a contract to drill or oil at Sar-i-Pul in north-
The American Embassy believes that it will be at least
25X1 six months before drilling begins.
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Comment: The USSR would find French exploration for
oil less than one hundred miles from the Soviet border almost
as distasteful as American. The presence of any Westerners
in the area might invoke a Soviet protest or demand for
rights in other parts of Afghanistan. The USSR is already
negotiating for the installation of oil'storage tanks on the
outskirts of Kabul, and has-'informally offered the Afghan
Government assistance in drilling test holes.
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WESTERN EUROPE
20, East Germans reportedly centralize control in "inner cabinet"'-
25X1 an astGerman nner
cabinet" with top East German Communist Waiter Ulbridt as chair-
man-has been organized directly under the Soviet Control Com-
mission to "coordinate measures for the protection of the German
Democratic Republic." Werner Eggerath9
State Secretary for Coordination and Control, is a member of the
group.
The first orders issued by the cabinet were reportedly to
put the People's Police under Deputy Minister of Interior Johannes
Warnke 9 and to start the recruitment of labor gangs for con-
25X1 structing barriers along the zonal border.
Comment: Premier Grotewohl announced last week the establish
mentve economic coordinating agencies in East Germany.
Eggerath?s announced appointment as head of one of these agencies 9
plus his elevation from the presidency of,Thuringia to cabinet
rank 9 probably gives him extensive powers of control o The emphasis
on economic coordination suggests that heavier armaments pro-
duction is envisaged for East German remilitarization,
The reported consolidation of control in the hands of an
may be in preparation for granting the government ostensible full
sovereignty.
"inner cabinet" of the most reliable and efficient Communist
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21. Heavy weapons issued to East German Alert Police-. The issue
of Sov et weapon t t ?e~ Est`? an~~n der o ce HVA) units
has been confirmed, each unit receiving four 128=mm mortars 9
twelve 45-mm antitank guns, twelve 76-m m field guns, and four
76-mm antiaircraft guns. Two units have also received 2,000
Soviet-model 1944 carbines, and a third has received an unknown
number of T=34 tanks. a similar 25X1
issue of heavy weapons nas Deem Mae to reur o er units,
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American military observers in Europe comment that the geo-
graphical spread of the units known to have received heavy weapons
suggests that all 24 units may be being so equipped. They note
that there has been no significant increase in the personnel or
the scope or intensity of training, and that the HVA is still
dependent on the Soviet forces for logistical support.
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, CommentThe issuance ?. of heavy -weapons and::reliable
reports accelerated recruiting add to evidence that HVA ex-
pansion may be imminent. The Free German Youth, a Communist youth
organization, is the source of the most reliable recruits.
228 Communist China in arrears onpayments due to East Germany
The gist erman a ne approve an appropriation on 22 May o
nearly 3:9 million marks (approximately ten million dollars, at the
official rate of exchane) to the DIA (German Import-Export
25X1 Corporation)
s appropriation was required because of "failure.
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Comment: This appropriation to the Import-Export Corporation
suppor s recent reports that the Chinese are in arrears on their
payments to Eaat German exporters. The unpaid balance due from
China, as well as the disappointing quality of imports from China,
has prolonged the negotiations for a new Sino-East German agree-
ment covering 1952 trade. Althouth.the USSR is said to be
bringing pressure on. the East Gershs to sign such a pact and
negotiations have been underway for several months, no agreement
has been announced, .
238 Adenauer optimistic on early West German ratification of
treaties: Chancellor ennauer believes that the growing support
of coalition partners will ensure ratification of the EDC
treaty and the contractual agreement before the summer recess
of Parliament. The recess, however, will have to be postponed
until August,
25X1 the Constitutional
Court issue will first have to be settled and the government's
position in the Senate strengthened. Furthermore, ` `:?Senate
approval of the agreement is an "indispensable prerequisite" for
early ratification.
Comment- West. German ratification might be delayed by such
possi eeVelopments as Allied-Russian unity discussions, the
eruption of the Saar issue, or attempts by coalition groups to
indulge in last-minute log=rolling.
248 MIGa154ype aircraft overfly West Germany. Two M]IG-15mtype
a i:rc on 4 June overflew es an territory in the
Maierhof vicinity of the GermanCzechoslovak border area. The
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planes headed in an easterly direction, turned north at Maierhof,
approximately 60 miles northeast of Munich and 50 miles inside
Germany, circled over Weiden, 15 miles from the border, at 1000
feet, turned west and disappeared into Czechoslovakia. The air-
craft markings were described as a "half-filled red circle "\ I
Comment; Although the overflight may represent an inten-
tional bor- er violation, it is more probable that the aircraft
became lost while on a training mission and, after orientation at
Weiden, returned to Czechoslovakia. A Czech airfield, approxi-
mately mately 80 miles east of Maierhof, is known to be capable of
handling high-performance aircraft.
26.
Czech delegates withdraw visa applications for Paris peace
meet inga a zec ore gn Office-
as withdrawn I_Ts_____appIIcaT ion
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Confer-
for 15 French visas for delegates to the "International scheduled
ence on the Peaceful Solution of the German
to-be held from 13 to 15 June in Panris, accordin to inform tion
bass
E
m
received from the French
-------------
t from
?
a
Couracil will be
Comment : This report coinci es
Prague ~YorldPeace
~~a plenary session held in Berlin from 1 to 5 July. The Paris meeting may have been
cancelled or merged with the Berlin iof closehave,created
demonstrations culminating in the an atmosphere that is not conducive to Communist meetings in Paris.
The :Council agenda for the Berlin meeting calls for discussion
the peaceful solution of the German and Japanese problems- the
immediate cessation of theT w in is agendaesuggestshthatmfurtherrpressure
and the fight for peace. reementso
will be exerted against the ratification of the Germany agreements.
27. Dutch strongly o pose appointment of Juin as SACEUR: The
ce to ra~r can Embassy 11
11 Secre ary enera o t e -ffu--Fc-" ore gn
itle would be
for Mast
rshalrJuinifeven
.officials in The Hague that
retained over-all command.-
though France should General obtain Ridgway the
He said that the Netherlan~st~se o"most anxious" ther countriestonathed the
closer military association wit
Continent, as opposed to the NATO powers, which the Dutch feel
would be the effect of JuinPs owithin suchstruga
for development power would place between the Germany Netherlands France and at the same time
weaken Its link with the United States and Great Britain.
General added that the appointment of Juin as
support of the
The Secretary
e
r
is
SACEUR would certainly weakene atr
com
it
when
mun
ty
C
om
European Defense
;
Comment: Distrust of Faenshf?ra Dutchi~e~~ct~~ce?toisend
was one~~he important rea discussions until
an official delegate to the Defense Community
rf for theto NettheherClands'
last fall. This same fear was also etbasis
insistence on obtaining a British defense
munityo
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LATIN AMERICA
29, Argentina has reportedly prepared a crystal coffin for
Senora a Peron: crystal coffin has been prepared for Senora
e Peron, in accordance with a plan to emulate the USSR and .
display her in the same manner that Lenin is displayed, according
to US Embassy sources in Santiago, Chile. The plan is based on
the opinion that Peron is losing political strength and that if
Evita, after death, can be raised to the emotional plane of a
national saint, a revolution may be temporarily avoided.
Many believe that the majority of the alleged plots against
Peron are:Peronista-planned for the purpose of permitting a
25X1 display of his invincibilit
Comment: It is quite possible that Peron has widely
publicizea fictitious plots in order to strengthen security
measures against the numerous small groups reported to be
plotting independently against him. Consequently, a strong at-
tempt to oust the government could result in considerable chaos
25X1 and bloodshed. Senora de Peron?s physical condition is now
extremely critical.
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314 Bolivian president's views on nationalization reported:
Press ent Paz Estenssoro favors the eory of nationalization
of mines, but realizes that local technicians are not qualified
to operate them efficiently. In contrast, Vice President Siles
and Minister of Mines Lechin favor outright nationalization.
Paz recognizes that Lechin is troublesome and therefore is
deciding the best way to deal with him in the near future.
Despite the resentment of certain army officers, Paz believes
that he must rebuild the army as a force against the armed
miners who are loyal to Lechin and whom he considers to be a
menace to the government.
Comment: A government monopoly on all mineral exports was
decreed on 3 June. The official Banco Minero will be the sole
exporter of minerals, and producers will be paid only in
bolivianos. In the meantime a commission has been named to
study nationalization of the "big three" tin mines and. to report
its findings within 120 days.
Juan Lechin has accused Paz of temporizing on the issue of
nationalization and has threatened to lead a revolt against Paz
if the latter does-not act shortly. The new export monopoly may
be in response to these threats.
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TOP SECRET
9 June 1952
CIA No. 49682
Copy No. 46
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Rele, 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO0 0190001-1
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN TIM MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC9 SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY L4W.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
2. Little progress being made in Sudanese-Egyptian talks: Little
progress is e ng ma a in t o current tat s n lexan ria between
a Sudanese delegation and Egyptian officials. The Egyptian Prime
Minister has emphasized that recognition of Farouk?s title as
King of the Sudan would be subject to Sudanese self-determination.
The Sudanese have stated that they do not like either the Egyptian
constitution for the Sudan or the one recently introduced into 25X6
the Legislative Assembly by the British Governor General.
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Comment: The major concession that the Sudanese could
gain from Britain would be the setting of a definite and
early date for full independence.
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