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July 8, 1952
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Approved For Rele 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000090001-1 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY 8 July 1952 OCI No. 6435 Copy No. 280 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re- ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. State Dept. review completed SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01 090001-1 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. GENERAL Japanese admission to COCOM: At a 4 July meeting with American represen a ivies -n London, British officials argued strongly for immediate admission of Japan to COCOM insisting that the United States' proposal to set up a separate Far Eastern controls organization to include Japan is impractical and undesirable. The British officials indicated that Britain would under no circumstances discuss Hong Kong controls in an exclusively Far Eastern group, and that in the event of a Korean settle- ment they would strongly favor relaxing controls on trade with mainland China to the level maintained against the USSR and the Satellites. The US Embassy in London states that unless Britain can be persuaded to accept the American position, particularly on the desirability of stricter controls in the Far East in the post-Korea period, the resultant open disagreement during forthcoming COCOM discussion of the Japanese request for admission will considerably reduce the chances for gaining the support of other COCOM members. (S London 73, 4 July 52) Comment: Britain's position on this issue is in large part a erm ned by its desire to protect the British economic position in South and Southeast Asia by deflecting Japanese competition toward mainland China. 2. Swiss firm reportedly trying to arrange large trans- 25X1C shipment o clean copper to Orbit. According to 25X1C t e w 9- firm MEXIS is trying to arrange the transshipment of 2,000 tons of Chilean copper to the Orbit through Spanish and Swiss intermediaries and the falsification of bills of lading. A Chilean export license for this copper has been approved on the basis of a written statement by the Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : C&-RDP79T01146AO011000J00~ 1-11 y 52 Approved For Rele*Amg 2002/05/20 :'CIA-RDP79T01146A00090001-1 SECRET Spanish Ambassador to Chile that the copper was destined for the exclusive use of Spanish industry. To protect the identity of the real purchasers9 a Swiss businessman has been asked to participate in the financing of the deal. IM XiS has pointed out to hiss that a similar 3 000 -ton transaction was facilitated earlier with a bribe 25X1 25X1A1 Comment,. In early 19529 IMEXIS was believed to be pro- mcoting^ a nu ber of Chilean copper deals 9 one of which involved possible lO?5O0-ton shipment to Finland. A recent Chilean radio broadcast reports the local press is demanding the government investigate transshipments through Italy and Switzer- land 3. WPC to make a major effort to turn united States public opinioxi aig if rea.rmamen pea era a e plenary seas on which met last week in Berlin hinted at an intensive campaign during the next few months to in- fluence United States public opinion against rearmament President Joliot-Curie declared that preparations for a Third World Peace Congress to be held in Vienna beginning 5 December would "organize" public opinion in such a manner as to make war impossible. The election period was mentioned by another speaker as an ideal time to approach US Congressmen 9 labor leaders, and other Americans. The Council echoed Soviet proposals to the UN in demanding an official definition of aggression and a study of means to relieve world tension, and also repeated familiar Soviet propaganda. points on Germany, Japan and germ warfare, A bold extension of the BW charges was made by a former Munich Town Councilor who claimed that Adenauer secretly asked for germ warfare equipment for West German troops. (Factual data from- R FBIS Berlin 9 l-5 July 52) 40 Hungarian Party Central Committee directed to return to mi.lita.n , comuna. ,m- a Huniii-I a arty men ra omm .tee 1,t Ft-7-9- meet g oaf=28 June heard Marton Horvath9 Politburo member and editnr of the party newspaper9 demand a return to militant comman:ism. Horvath9 according to the US Legation in SECRET 2 S July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01 0090001-1 Budapest, forecast a sharper attack against the church, Social Democrats and kulakso At the same meeting Minister of Defense Farkas, also a member of the Politburo, blamed the difficulties of the youth organization, Disz, on the church and other alien influences. The American Legation interprets Horvath,s remarks as a call for a turn to the left in the face of popular opposition, and for a resumption of collectivization after the harvest. It noted that party Isader Rakosi?s comments at the meeting went unreported, (S Budapest 10 and 1.1, 3 July 52 Comment: The speeches of Horvath and Farkas probably forecast a party line in assessing blame for the current economic difficulties in Hungary. The Social Democrats, the church and the kulaks would provide useful scapegoats. The absence of any mention of Rakosi is interesting in view of repeated rumors that he is soon to be purged. Disz has been a target of growing criticism since winter. A Soviet delegation made an investigation of its organization this spring. Subsequently there was a rumor that a principal leader of the organization had disappeared 5. Hungarian deportations linked with current anti-clerical uaeiei3ferom campaign: The epor a ion of two ~:s 0 c in northeastern Hungary to the Hortobagy prairie was confirmed by a western diplomatic source. The writs to the Security Police reportedly accused the families of rumor- mongering and excess of religion. The US Legation in Budapest points out that the deporta- tions serve the triple purpose of providing homes for party faithful, increasing the supply of forced labor, and weakening the influence of the church, (C Budapest 7, 4 July 52) Comment: Deportations from Miskolc, a city in the interior, obviously are not explicable in terms of frontier defense re- quirements, like the previous deportations reported on the Yugoslav and Austrian borders. Deportations for religious reasons accord with the growing attack by the Hungarian Commu- nist Party on the clergy, who are even accused of violation of the church-state agreement, 6. Poland expects better grain crop this year: Polish Politburo mem er .man Za,m rows i~ia~nornal convention of y 5~ Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO0110009000 TZI Approved For Rele2 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AOOIIW090001-1 SECRET peasants correspondents on 29 June that the government expects grain crops to be better this year than last, This statement is substantiated by American Embassy reports that favorable weather conditions since 15 May will apparently bring a fair crop of grain sown last fall9 and a very heavy stand of spring- sown grain, (R Warsaw 11 9 3 July 52) Comment.- The prolonged drought last summer and autumn left 1nsu. -cient subsoil moisture in many areas to withstand dry spells o The difficulty and uncertainty produced by this condition may ,.vow have been largely overcome by moisture ac- quired during the cool, wet period between 15 May and 1 July, which has been succeeded by warm and sunny weather. 7 Yugoslavs reported ready for military talks with Turks and Greekss o ` e ua 'l acv pie ?nnm+aer s yea c engage n n ary Ta s with Turkey and presumably Greece 9 if those countries commit themselves to a strong defense of Thrace. The Turkish Foreign Minister says he was so informed during the last week in June by the Yugoslav Ambassador. The Foreign Minister stated that he wa doing all in his power to impress Turkey ?s allies with the importance of defending Thrace. (S Ankara 29, 5 July 52) Comment.- A. ;military planning agreement with Greece and Turkey ~a~ 5-ul be of considerable advantage to Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs have not hitherto shown a willingness to begin such talks. While Greece and Turkey want to provide for the defense of Thrace 9 a difficult military problem, the latter is proceeding cautiously, and obviously desire ; a NATO commitment promising additional sea and air support before it negotiates with Yugo- sllavia o 8. Belgrade to extend social security system to agricultural c02L lee _ ves o one rn a~ ~, EF~5 Y e the i o regime aal s to provide social. security coverage to members of peasant working cooperatives in the near future b Yugoslav officials point to this measure and the payment of rent on land contributed to collectives by individual members as positive measures designed to "?eliminate peasant unrest" in the working cooperatives. There is no indication that the social security plan will be extended to either private peasants or to members of the general type (producer) cooperatives. ((R Belgrade Joint Weeka 279 5 July 52) 9D0O y 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CA-RDP79T01146AO011000 Approved For ReleAst 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO1146AO01'+ 0090001-1 Comment; The planned extension of an additional induce- ment o co ective members to remain in the socialized sector is doubtless a reaction to continued peasant opposition to the regime?s agrarian policy and to collectivization in particular, The regime hopes, however, to alter this basic opposition by discriminating in favor of collectives by offering various subsidies and capital equipment, thus proving the more practical advantages of rural socialization even to the satisfaction of the "most conservative peasant." 5 g Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090~~1 52 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00f 0090001-1 FAR EAST 90 Resumption of Japanese-Korean negotiations probable: The Japanese Foreign ce has a v se Ambassador Murphy that arrangements are proceeding with-the South Korean Mission in Tokyo for the resumption of Japanese-Korean discussions without the formality of a general conference. The essence of the Japanese approach will be an insistence that the Koreans drop the package deal and settle the various problems separately. Korean Minister Kim confirms that he expects to open con- versations, probably on 17 July, to see "whether any problems can be settled separately." (S Tokyo 60, 3 July; C Tokyo 65, 5 July 52) Comment: After reaching tentative agreement on such issues as nationality and the treatment of Koreans in Japan, the ne- gotiators recessed in April unable to agree on their respective property claims. In the past, Korean negotiators have re- fused to consider the conclusion of anything less than a package deal, llo Inner Mongolian capital moved to Suiyuan: The Inner Mon- golia ui onomous ver meat was cove on 1 July to Kueisui, Suiyuan Province, by order of the Chinese Communist 25X1 6 S July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100090001-1 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO1146AO01V 090001-1 SECRET Central People?s Government In Peiping. (R FBIS ticker9 Peiping, 4 July 52) Comment. This is the second time that the seat of the I , a Chinese Communist puppet regime, has been moved westward. Originally located at Wangyehmiao in western Manchuria, the Mongol capital was moved to Kalgan in Chahar Province in the spring of 1950. Neither Kalgan nor Kueisui is located within the boundaries of IMAG. Kalgan and Kueisui are the capitals of Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces which are both included in the North China District. In line with Peiping?s long-range policy for closer integration of Inner Mongolia with China proper, this move, like the previous one, was probably designed to bolster the influence of Yun Tse9 IMAC?s Chairman and a member of the Chinese Communist Central Committee. The Yun Tse clique, predominant in Inner Mongolian politics, consists largely of Suiyuan Mongols, and `dun Tse is concurrently a Vice Chairman of the Suiyuan Military and Administrative Committee. With the IMAG capital situated where his followers are strongest, Yuan Tse0s effectiveness among the Chinese-hating Mongols may be enhanced. Also, the move may presage a cleanup of Prince Te Wang9s guerrillas, based In the mountains north of Kueisui. These guerrillas have been able to create considerable disorder and they have embarrassed the Communists. In late 1951 and again in early 1952 Chinese Communist troops in Suiyuan reportedly mutinied and joined up with Te Wang's Mongol forces. The in- stallation of pro-Communist Suiyuan Mongol leaders in Kueisui could facilitate the elimination of this chronic nuisance. 12. Moslem revolt in northwestern China rAnnrtAd: Two Iffhinals north- ern Kansu Province report that 10,000 Moslems rebelled about two months ago. The uprising was crushed in approxi- mately four weeks. General reports that according the rebels are merely inactive now9 and were not completely defeated by the Chinese Commu- nists. (S Hong Kong 16, 4 July 52) Comment* This is the first confirmation of previous repor s Tn he Hong Kong press that there is unrest amore the Moslems of northwestern China. SECRET 25X1 7 8 July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A00't 090001-1 25X1. I edly took pace south of where the rebellion purport- The difficult terrain of northwestern China is favorable for guerrilla operations. This area, however, is almost in- accessible, and insurgents could expect little or no outside assistance. 13. Thai armed forces alerts reportedly still in effect: The American Embassy in Bangkok as een re lab y informed that the Thai police alert, called. to deal with an anticipated Chinese demonstration, was cancelled on 27 June by Police Di- rector General Phao but that the armed forces alerts are still in effect. The Embassy comments that the apparent lack of coordi- nation between the Defense Ministry and the police indicates that the armed forces alerts were called independently and for different reasons than the police alert. (C Bangkok 18, 3 July 52) Comment : Premier Phibun previously had appointed an "emergenstaff headquarters," headed by Phao's chief rival,. Deputy Commander in Chief General Sarit, to control the armed forces and the police during the alert period. 14. Junior officers in Thailand transferred to provinces: The Amer can mass, in Bang o reports a T a army of- ficers, ranking from captain to colonel, have been transferred from Bangkok garrisons to provincial posts. The Embassy comments that Deputy Commander in Chief General Sarit is attempting by means of the transfers to re- move distrusted officers from the Bangkok political scene. (C Bangkok 18, 3 July 52) Comment: There have been several recent reports that disaf ecte Thai junior officers have been conspiring to overthrow the present government. On the other hand, Sarit may be "purging" supporters of his rival, General Phao 25X1 25X1 8 8 July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100090001-1 Approved For Relearn 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A001090001-1 SECRET 15, Thai Government takes firm stand with Parliament,. The American Embassy in a,ng o reports at e T -ai eernment has responded to restiveness among elected members of the legislature by publicly threatening reprisals against MP's who obstruct the passage of government-sponsored bills or talk too much. At the same time, the Minister of Interior broke an earlier government promise to sponsor a bill legalizing po- litical parties by stating that he would oppose any such legislation on the grounds that it was unnecessary. The Embassy anticipates considerable parliamentary agitation as a result of the Interior Minister's statement. (C Bang- kok 18, 3 July 52 ) Comment,. Although the government ostensibly enjoys the suppoof the overwhelming majority of both appointed and elected Members of Parliament, there have been other re- cent indications of unrest among the elected members and the ruling oligarchy may have difficulty in maintaining a solid pro-government bloc. 16. Leaders in Thailand absent from American Embassy 4th July reception: Tfie ea ng mem ers o ddory na.n i rm ~tary c que, including Premier Phibun and Generals Phao and Sarit, did not attend the 4th of July reception given by the American Embassy in Bangkok. The clique was represented only by the relatively unimportant commander in chief of the Thai Navy and his chief of staff. (C Bangkok 31, 5 July 52) Comment,. The leaders atten a massy functions ingly cool toward Official of the ruling group, who frequently in the past, have become increas- American personnel in Thailand. There have been other recent indications that Thai leaders have become less enthusiastic over Thailand's strongly anti-communist, pro-American orientation. 17 Burmese seeking to repatriate Chinese Nationalists,. An official of- d e urrraese ore gn ice n or me a Embassy in Rangoon that Defense Minister Ba Swe, while expecting that insurgency in Burma will be largely eliminated by fall, fears that public pressure will then force him to attack the Chinese Nationalists in Kengtunga Ba Swe says he is anxious to avoid such action and is willing to repatriate the Nationalist troops through Rangoon. Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0011000900& Auly 52 Approved For Rely 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01060090001-1 SECRET The Foreign Office official asked for American aid in arranging a mission to Formosa to discuss the matter. (S Rangoon Weeka 27, 6 July 52) Comment. While the Burmese armed forces have recently achieved some local successes against the insurgent Commun- ists, there are no indications of a victory by the end of this summer. The Burmese Government has rejected all previous pro- posals to repatriate the Chinese Nationalists. Reversal of this policy probably resulted from a realization that a major offensive against the Nationalists in Kengtung to assuage public opinion would leave the way open for suc- cessful insurgent operations in central Burma. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 18. New oil field reported near Tehran. The American in charge of the oil drilling operations of the Iranian Oil Company at Qum in north-central Iran, ninety miles south of Tehran, reports that his drillers struck what appears to be a sizeable deposit of oil on 2 July. He says that all signs indicate that the strike is in or close to new oil fields, the extent of which cannot yet be determined. (S Tehran 38, 3 July 52) Comment. Discovery of oil by the Iranian Oil Company would furnish Prime Minister Mossadeq with a lever in his dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Because of Qum?s location, such a discovery would cer- tainly interest the Russians, both as a possible future source of oil and as a means of penetrating the Iranian economy. 10 8 July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO1146AO01 0090001-1 WESTERN EUROPE 19, Plans for stepped-up Sovietization of East Germany partially confirme - The Socialist Unity arty congress, sc e u e or 9 to 1Z July, reportedly will move to introduce the Kolkhoz system in agriculture, to begin a new party purge, and to replace the five state governments with 14 new districts. Party leaders allegedly plan also to approve the "eventual" resignation of East German Premier Otto Grotewohl, probably on grounds of ill health. (S Berlin 24, 4 July 52) Comment: Party leaders had earlier been reported to be plan- ning acct on at the July congress to strengthen their control over East Germany. Gradual curtailment of the functions and authority of the state governments has already begun, and American observers in Frankfurt. believe these governments may ultimately be eliminated. This, however, is not expected to occur before the ratification of the Allied-West German contractual agreement. The probable eclipse of Grotewohl, ostensibly on grounds of. 20, ill health, has been previously predicted. military trainng- report hat the Eaas Germ-an ariamen will meet secretly from to 10 July to adopt a law for universal military training. 25X1 C reportedl ?to approve universal Effective 11 July the boundaries of the western sectors of Berlin reportedly will be treated as national borders and "hermeti- ca l ly sealed. 25X1 A Comment: Other sources report that the Socialist Unity Party congress, riding on 12 July, will announce the new plans for conscription. reports indicate that in mid-June the Soviet Control Commission was considering a policy of reducing contact between East and West Berlin, and a start appears to have been made last week toward creating a security zone around Berlin. 21. Swiss offer East German Government de facto recognition: Switzer an has of erect tine a 1 Gorman Government de facto recog- nition, through the exchange of trade missions, instead of the 1]1 S July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Rele 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO1146A001480090001-1 SECRET formal recognition it demands in return for concessions on nationalized Swiss property. The Swiss have assured Britain France intends to support American protests against any uch action, but the British Foreign Office states it will t k a e no action as long as Switzerland withholds full recognition. (S London 48, 5 July 52; C Paris 128, 5 July 52; C Berlin 7, 1 July 52) Comment: East Germany will probably accept the de facto recognT on, which would be a substantial political victory, since no other Western nation has yet made even this concession. Switzerland exchanged Ministers with the West German Federal Republic earlier this year. 22. France denies plans for shipment of steel rails to East Germany: a Frenc Foreign f ice has dense reports t at East ermaany is purchasing 80,000 tons of steel rails from the Schneider Creusot company. This company, it states, does not manufacture rails and has negotiated for neither direct nor indirect delivery of rails to the German Democratic Republic. The Foreign Office knows of no such negotiations by any French company, and states that it is "fully cognizant" of its obligation to consult COCOM before granting an export license for such material, (S Paris 91, 3 July 52; S Bonn 29, 3 July 52) Comment: were the'source 25X1 of the or gin: a such a shipment of rails was planned. 23. Pinay considered not hostile to EDC: Reporting that Premier Pinay seems g a to accept t e support of both the advocates and the opponents of the European Defense Community treaty in the government's drive for creation of a European political authority, the American Embassy in Paris rejects rumors that he is secretly bent on sabotaging the treaty. The Embassy considers that his recent overtures to the pro-government Gaullists, who hope that political integration will postpone or even defeat the defense treaty, were merely intended to promote a split in De Gaulle's party. It believes that Pinay is refraining from public endorse- ment of the treaty in order to be sure that a battle over ratifi- cation must be joined and.can be won. SECRET 12 8 July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Relea12002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001-090001-1 The government's proposal that the prospective coal-steel pool assembly work out a plan' for a European political authority was designed to improve the government's position before such a battle is entered. (C Paris 108, 4 July 52) 24, Austria again proposes taking treaty issue to the UN: Austr an ere gn inis er rubers urged Amer can officials that serious consideration be given to raising the issue of the Austrian state treaty in the UN General Assembly this autumn. Gruber said he planned to discuss the problem with the Turks and Egyptians, and might perhaps visit several South American countries later this summer to attempt to enlist their support. His idea is that one or more of the smaller powers might place the treaty question on the General Assembly's agenda, with the view merely of obtaining a resolution urging that the occupation be eas,_ded and a treaty concluded at an early date. The American officials reminded Gruber that one of the reasons why the United States had opposed such action last year was that the new abbreviated treaty proposal had not been submit- ted to Moscow. They said that the case might now be re-examined. It was agreed that Gruber would raise the problem with Britain and France so that they would be prepared for discussions with the United States. QC Vienna'22, 2 July 52) 25, Pro used Dutch shipbuilding for USSR receives generally un- favorale 0C M response. T e a. s .legate is the only COOM represern .five agree ng with the Dutch argument that the Nether- lands would receive "highly important goods" from the USSR in exchange for four cargo ships, and that the only alternative to such a transaction is a cessation of Dutch-USSR traded Both the French and the British delegates strongly oppose the transaction unless substantial changes are made In the speed, range and equip- ment of the vesgelso France, however, will drop its objections if the Netherlands concludes that export of the ships is the only solution to its difficult trade situation with the USSR. The Belgian delegate states that approval of the Dutch transaction would probably make it impossible for Belgium to refuse a similar Soviet offer. The American COCOM delegate thinks that the Netherlands may revise the ships' specifications to secure at least partial COCOM approval of the exchange. (S Paris 127, 5 July 52) 25X1 SECRET 13 8 July 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100090001-1 Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A0014WO90001-1 Comment., Denmark may have supported the Dutch presentation in th pe of securing like support, should the question of its release of a tanker to the USSR receive COCOM consideration. Dutch Government officials have previously stated that the ships are not of strategic importance and that, under its agree- ment with COCOM, the Netherlands is not bound to embargo vessels in, this category. 20. Swiss firm reportedly willing to sell Czechs strategic equip- ment or weapons research., Due r e o , a wins firm, Is reportedly w 1T ng to sell Czechoslovakia two complete electronic ballistic measuring instruments for guns up to 37?mm, at a total price of 89,500 Swiss francs, The company will fill this order, as well as others for expensive equipment, if the Czechs will allow Emile Buehrle, the company's owner, to reopen the company's subsidi? 25X1A ary which has been nationalized in Czechoslovakia 25X1A Comment., There have been numerous reports that Buehrle, a highly successful and opportunistic Swiss industrialist, is ship- ping strategic equipment to the Orbit. None of these reports has been confirmed. He would, however, be free to ship some strategic items. to the Orbit without violating Swiss export regulations. The instruments ordered by the Czechs would be an important contribution to their capabilities for weapons research. 27 Policy of eliminating Communist influence from schools may cause trou le n annama., m a ssa or ey was re a y n ormed that six professors have been dismissed in line with President- elect Remon-'s policy of eliminating Communist influence from the University and other schools in Panama. The Ambassador comments that this action will precipitate a tense situation and test the capacity of the government to take strong measures. QC Panama City ,8, 3 July 52) Comment: The government is believed to have strong evidence linking certain faculty members to Communist-inspired agitation among Panamanian student groups. The dismissal of these profes- sors is likely to cause a strong reaction in the non-Communist Students' Federation, though the strong policy now adopted by the the government may tend to discourage a general student strike. 14 Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A0011000900(8I-lTuly 52 16 /t~ Approved For ReleaseO02/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO1146AO0110 0001-1 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY TOP SEC tET SUPPLEMENT 8 July 1952 CIA No. 49?6 Copy No, bb TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables) Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100090001-1 Approved For Release 02/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO1146AO0110Q 0001-1 TOP SECRET on one ~rencn propo~aa _ at the Sclau~a~aa Plaxn reate supranational political authorityfl a eign Office osfficial stated, thatD while Britaina to assent to the development of a "new power" channel a accceptance of a European federation reversal of traditional British policy. Great Britain intends to comment that such a ,develop- meant is premature and to urge the acceptance of Foreign Secretary Eden ?s plan for bringing supranational institu- tions within the "loose" framework of the Council of Europe o (S SSS London 77 , 5 July 52)) Com sent o Although France desires British participation in European unity plans fl Foreign. Minister Schuman has evidently decided to restrict th.e task of establishing a political authority to the Schuman Plan ccountries o In this wa.y France would block discussion of the participation of other countries in the coal-steel and defense com- munities and avoid delaying the implementation of these two bodies a TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 189 USC, SECSO 793 AND 7949 THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Commeninng countries c British For would have across a would be Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100090001-1 52 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 :CIA-RDP79T01146A001100090001-1 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 :CIA-RDP79T01146A001100090001-1