CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001100100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
9 July 1952 -
OCI No. 6436
Copy No.
280
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current. Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 139 USC, SECS. 793 AND 7949 THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
EASTERN EUROPE
1. Chan a in Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia does not mean
change in policy: Soviet , Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1ex?
an er Boggomolov was appointed on 6 July to replace Anatoly Lavren-
tiev as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Lavrentiev was named Soviet
Ambassador to Rumania. (U New York Times, 6 July 52)
Comment: Lavrentiev9 also a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
was appoin ed Ambassador to Czechoslovakia during the Slansky purge
last November. The unusual shortness of his stay in Czechoslovakia
and the timing of his appointment to the Rumanian post support his
reputation as Soviet trouble-shooter in the Satellites.
Bogomolov has been in the Soviet diplomatic service since
before the war and held the posts of Ambassador to the various
exile governments in London and to France from 1944 to 1950. He
is considered one of the most capable Soviet diplomats and is be-
lieved to possess considerable authority in matters affecting
Russian foreign policy. The shift in Soviet Ambassadors to Czech-
oslovakia is not, therefore, considered as an indication of lessen-
ing Soviet interest or pressure in that country.
2. Attempt made to divert MSA tinplate shipment to Soviet bloc:
On June 24 a s Peer Trieste attempted to divert tons o
tinplate paid for by MSA to two Austrian firms which are suspected
of previous transshipments to the Soviet bloc. The shipment was
consigned from a New York trading firm to an Austrian firm in
Vienna. (S Trieste 20, 7 July 52)
Comment: Sizable quantities of other MSA-financed shipments
of straateg items to Western European firms are believed to have
gone eventually to the Soviet Orbit, but it has seldom been pos-
sible as in this case to establish clearly the method of rerouting
or reshipment used.
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3. Hungarian officials boycott US Legation Fourth of duly re-
ception: n y one Hungarian ore gn Mice official atten e
We Furth of duly reception at the US Legation. Twelve had been
invited and not more than four of these were genuinely unable to
come. Not-one of the thirteen local residents who claim American,
citizenship appeared o Oa} the other hand, four members of the
Russian Embassy attended, as well as members of the other Satellite
missions. (C Budapest 14, 5 July 52)
Comment: Last year most of the Hungarian officials accepted
invitations to attend the reception, and so did about 25 Hungarian-
Americanso
The boycott by the Hungarian officials may be significR:nt, in.
view of the report of 26 May that preparations were in progress for
a state trial involving Hungarians who had been connected with the
US Legation.
4. Rumania appoints new Ambassador to the USSR: The Presidium
of the Grand National Assembly has appointed i Dalea as Ruman-
ian Ambassador to the USSR. (R FBIS Bucharest, 7 July 52)
Comment: Dalea has been Vice President of the Rumanian State
Controlission since November 1949 and a member of the Central
Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party since February 1948. On 1
April 1947, he spoke on behalf of the Rumanian. Communist Party on
the occasion of the ratification of the 1947 Soviet-Rumanian Trade
and Navigation Agreement, which he hailed as a "consolidation of
Rumania's national independence."
5. Yugoslav leaders display concern over less hostile Soviet
policy: The Tito regime as finally been ores o a m t pu licly
1iaT the tactics of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia have changed
significantly during the past six months. The embarrassing reduc-
tion of Cominform pressure on Yugoslavia is explained by leaders of
the Yugoslav Communist Party as an effort to undermine Yugoslav unity
and support for the party and at the same time to isolate Yugoslavi
from the West by fostering the myth that the Yugoslav-Cominform
break is not irreparable.
Consequently, American officials believe that the Yugoslav
leaders, needing a foreign threat to divert popular attention from
domestic problems, played up the allegedly aggressive character of
Italian maneuvers witn respect to. Trieste. In addition, the recent
stress on the need for more party discipline and increased activity
may in part be an attempt to counter the demoralizing effects of
decreased Cominform pressure and of closer relations with ?'monarcho-
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fascist" Greece. (S Belgrade Desp 1119, 6 June 52)
Comment: In a speech early in July, Marshal Tito accused
Moscowwo attempting "in all possible ways to create a gap in
Yugoslav-Western relations" by attempting to show the West that
there is collusion between Moscow and Belgrade. For example,
certain Austrian and Italian news organs have been spreading "sen-
sational reports" of secret Soviet=Yugoslav conversations.
The relatively mild hostility displayed by orbit delegates
in the recently adjourned sixth meeting of the Danubian Commission
towards Yugoslavia's representations illustrates this new Soviet
policy of deceptive moderation.
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6, Japan requests American support for UN application: A
Japanese Fore gn office representative has advised m assador
Murphy that his government is concerned lest the United States
be put in a position, in the public's mind, of denying Japan's
membership in the UN by opposing a Soviet simultaneous admis-
sion proposal. The Japanese Government, therefore, hopes
that the United States will support a "package proposal" if
Japan is included. He added that his government has no in-
tention of making a deal with the USSR to secure its support
of the application: (C Tokyo 79, 7 July 52)
Comment: The Soviet Union has.consistently vetoed the
UN applications of a number of non-Communist nations, and has
offered a package deal including the simultaneous admission
of five Soviet Satellites as the price of admission for the
nine non-Soviet candidates. If Japan were included in such
a proposal, and the deal were subsequently blocked by the
United States, the USSR would be provided with an effective
propaganda theme for use in Japan in view of widespread-popu-
lar interest there in UN membership.
7. France agrees to repatriate Chinese Nationalist internees:
The Frenc overnment has agree in principle, o the repatr a-
tion of the Chinese Nationalist troops interned in Indochina.
The Foreign Ministry has informed the Chinese Minister in
Paris that the first step would be to repatriate "sick or
invalid" internees, after a check by the International Red
Cross on their health and on their choice of repatriation
to Formosa or the Chinese mainland.
It was emphasized to the Chinese Minister that, if the
repatriation process were publicized by the Taipei government,
the whole plan would be dropped. (C Paris 157, 7 July 52)
Comment: France has been reluctant to repatriate to
Formosa a estimated 30,000 interned Nationalist troops
because of fear of provoking the Chinese Communists. The
French Government, however, has been anxious to reduce the
financial burden of maintaining the internees, and may be
attempting to induce the Chinese to reverse their recent de-
cision to vote in favor of raising the Tunisian issue before
the United Nations.
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25X6
army-
_
f -
The American onsu in anoi comments that severe refac o
ficials, including a ranking military officer, recently ex-
pressed doubts of the potential of the Vietnamese National
Army.. Among the reasons given were the shortage of officers,
resentment at French control of the army, and absence of a
nationalistic spirit among Vietnamese recruits,
French officials question potential of
These opinions, the Consul observes, merit considera-
tion in the light of Letourneauls recent statement that France
will begin to withdraw its troops from Indochina before the
end of this year. (S Hanoi 21, 7 July 52)
Comment.- Although French military and political policy
in In ochina is keyed to the creation of a Vietnamese Na-
tional Army, many French and Vietnamese officials in Indo-
china have previously voiced-doubts that an effective army
can be developed.
Report of Thai Army commander?s death false.- The re-
cent report that Genera in9 ai r-my commaia er, died
on 30 June has been denied. Rumors of his death in Bangkok
official circles may have resulted from a recent operation
undergone by Phind
25X1A
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25X1 C
Burmese Premier not
retire
25X1C Prime Minister U Nu is not likel to re -
re voluntarily w in the near future.
it possible, however, that the Defense Minister, U Ba Swe, may
seek to force Nu?s retirement and assume the premiership him- 25X1C
25X1 C self
Comment: The popular Nu, a devout Buddhist, has periodi-
cally contemplated retirement to a monastery during his,five-
year tenure as Prime Minister; it was recently reported that
he would retire within a month.
Ba Swe, an ambitious opportunist and a leading figure
in the ruling Socialist Party, is considered to be Nu?s only
likely successor.
25X1X
12. Burmese drive against Karen-held wolfram mines reported
halts :
reports that fierce resistance by well-armed Karens has forced
the government to postpone its major offensive against the
important Mawchi Mine area in Eastern Burma. The Karens, armed
with automatic weapons and antitank guns, inflicted a severe
defeat upon government armored car units which penetrated
to within 11 miles of the area. (S Rangoon 27, 5 July 52)
Comment: Karen control of the mine area has given them
access to important stockpiles of valuable wolfram ore, which
they reportedly have been smuggling to nearby Thailand in ex-
change for arms and ammunition.
The Burmese Defense Minister, U Ba Swe, had given this
operation the highest priority during the monsoon season.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1 C
13. New Egyptian Premier reportedly opposed to negotiations 25X1C
25X1C with Ur-eat ri a n at-MY--time-
r me Minister irry Pas a has
reaffirmed his belief that internal reforms should precede
negotiations with the British. He is also opposed to amend-
ing the constitution until after new elections, 25X1A
25X1A
Comment: Other reports have also indicated that Sirry's
main efforts may be focused on domestic issues. It is probable,
however, that Sirry will not make substantial progress toward
solving Egypt's domestic or foreign problems,
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14, East Germany makes new moves against interzonal traffic:
New moves have been taken recently by the Communists to isolate
East Germany more completely from the West. On 1 July,150 West
Germans on the Cologne-Berlin train who were bound for East
Berlin or points within East Germany were refused entry into
East Germany at the Helmstedt crossing-point because they did not
possess special People's Police passes. Other passengers, headed
for West Berlin, were permitted to proceed without passes.
The East Germans also closed a rail crossing point for local
traffic near Eisenach on 1 July. Passengers are, however, being
carried by other means.
The Zerben lock on the important Mittelland Canal linking
West Berlin with West Germany was closed for "repair".on 7 July
with the announcement that it would be reopened on 4 August. This
action does not seriously affect canal traffic, as an alternate
route is available.
Since 5 July, East German authorities at the interzonal
border have also been turning back all rail shipments of potatoes
bound for West Berlin which have not been sprayed. The "invasion
of American potato bugs" is used as an excuse for this move, which
a:ffects'about 350 carloads of potatoes each week. (C Berlin 44,
7 July 52; R Bonn 23, 2 July 52)
Comment: The blocking of passenger traffic is an extension
of a dune East German regulation on travel documentation which
was at first applied only to West Berliners traveling to their
near-by property in East Germany. With the rail crossing-poi
near Eisenach closed, there are now six such crossing-points
available for German traffic.
Closing of the one Mittelland lock follows an East German
announcement that the whole route would be closed from 1 to 18
July; the canal, however, is still open to traffic.
15, West German conscription to be delayed until 1954: Theodor
Blank 9 t e est ermai=~'~inse? ~v a ense y" ec ared in a
recent speech that conscription for the Federal Republic?s con-
tingent in the European Army would not begin until early 1954?
Volunteer cadres will be formed next year, the time depending
upon the final ratification date of the EDC treaty.
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Blank said that one fifth of the 500,000=man contingent will
consist of professional commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
He also said that for the next five years only a small fraction
of the age classes to be conscri ted can be exam (C Bonn
Unnumbered, 29 June;
Comment: West Germany actually has a fairly large reservoir
of manpower in relation to the size of its projected defense units.
There are approximately 750,000 men between the ages of 18 and 21
who can meet military physical standards. It is from this group
that the West German contingent will probably be drafted. Based
on World War II performance, the Federal Republic could theoreti-
cally put a total of 3.6 million men into the field.
16. Swiss electorate rejects program for financing rearmament:
In a spec a re eren um w ss voters ave turns down the govern-
ment's proposal for financing the five-year 1.4-billion-franc
extraordinary rearmament program, However, the defeat of this
measure will not slow down the country?s rearmament.
The US Legation in Bern attributes the referendum?s results
largely to widespread opposition against provisions providing for
increased income and wine excise taxes. It comments that the Swiss
electorate apparently wants the government to honor its 1950 promise
not to alter provisional tax laws before 19540 (R Bern 24, 7 July
52)
Comment: The method of increasing taxes has been a highly
controvcrs al question since Parliament approved rearmament plans
in:1950. In April 1951 Parliament rejected the executive branch?s
plan for financing rearmament, but finally approved a modified
version in March 1952, Subsequently, a Socialist proposal for a
capital levy was rejected by the voters in a referendum in May
1952, A Communist-sponsored measure to abolish sales taxes, which
would have undermined fiscal stability and jeopardized the re-
armament program, was decisively defeated in April in another
.nationwide referendum,
The conservative, disciplined, and hitherto well-managed Swiss
economy has made the average citizen unaware of the danger of in-
flation inherent in deficit financing of national programs.
8
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
9 July 1952
CIA No. 49727
Copy No.4 8
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS9 TITLE 18, USC9 SECS. 793 AND 7949 THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WESTERN EUROPE
1. French Government presses for answer on US military aid:
Foreign n s er Schuman and Defense Minister even have s ressed
their fear that American delay in replying to Pleven's 6 May re-
quest for additional financing of French military production will
have serious consequences,
Schuman states that the government is being severely criti-
cized for accepting the Lisbon NATO commitments, and Pleven is
under "intense pressure" from the cabinet to explain what budget-
ary changes might be required as a result of the American answer.
(S S/S Paris 143 and 153, 7 July 52)
Comment: Pleven had hoped to avoid the consequences of a
military u get inadequate to cover France's NATO commitments.
Since Washington has decided to finance less French military pro-
duction than Pleven had requested, the Defense Minister can be
expected to carry out his threat to curtail expenditures for basic
military installations. This would further delay the NATO build-up
on the Continent.
9 Jul 52
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