CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001100160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 0/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146A0 146AGW1 0016
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
17 July 1952
OCI No.. 6442
Copy NO. 28 0
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01100160001-3
le 5~
 Y
Approved For Release 00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AQ 1100160001-3
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. Ambassador Kennan comments on Soviet policy in Rumania%
Ambassa or ennan, in commenting on the-Bucharest assignment
of A. 1. Lavrentiev, says that Moscow is placing the situation
in the hands of its ace troubleshooter for the Satellite area.
...In the Ambassador's opinion, Rumania's strategic position is
the key factor. The Kremlin would like to make the Dobrudja
area a direct defensive responsibility of the Soviet army, but
leave the Western area a Rumanian responsibility in order to
avoid Soviet military contact with the Yugoslavs.
Ambassador Kennan feels that the appointment of Bughici
as Rumanian Foreign Minister signifies a virtual Soviet take-
over of the Bucharest Foreign Ministry and that Rumania is
quietly being changed into a Soviet constituent republic, al-
though for the present without formal incorporation. He notes
that Lavrentiev was previously assigned to Rumania in 1940 to
arrange for the separation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
and their subsequent annexation by the USSR,
The Ambassador concludes by noting that while three Deputy
Foreign Ministers have recently left Moscow, only one replace-
ment has been announced. In his opinion this may presage a
shake-up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which Vishinsky's
position will bear watching. (
25X1A
2. Local. party officials criticize their Republic party sec-
t e Ta z i Republic entral
retaries. the June plenum of
Zaommittee, a party secretary of the Stalinabad city committee
criticized the secretaries of the central committee of the
Communist Party of Tadzhikistan for failure to pay sufficient
attention to industrial problems and for "uansatisfactory
:election of executive cadres," (U Joint Press Reading
`:1 vice, Pravda, 18 June 52)
1 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For Release 10/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146A01 00160001-3
Comment: There have been other recent instances of the
work 05T-"secretaries and members of the Buro of the Republic
Party organization by officials of lower party units. In the
June plenary session of the Belorussian central committee a
secretary of the Mogilev city party committee criticized the
Belorussian Party Buro for not yet having implemented a 1949
decision of its own. In the June plenary session of the
Kirgiz central committee a secretary of the Talas Oblast stated
that "responsibility for errors and distortions on the ideologi-
cal point is borne primarily by the secretaries and the Buro of
the central committee of Kirgiz Republic.
This procedure seems to represent a definite pattern of
criticism on the Republic level. It may well be that these
local party officials were actually selected by representatives
of the All-Union Central Committee organs to speak out against
their Republic Central Committee.
EASTERN EUROPE
Orbit reportedly to dump lumber on European market:
Soviet Orbit lumber an woo pro ucts wi soon be dumped on
the European market, according to persistent rumors in Austrian
trade circles. The volume of Austrian lumber exports in the
first half of 1952 is running about 10 percent below the same
period in 1951. 25X1A
Comment: It is unlikely that the USSR will undercut world
market prices, which are currently about 30 percent below 1951.
The Russians have been reluctant to increase timber exports in
1952 trade agreements with western countries unless strategic
goods were offered in exchange.
4. Failures charged in mechanization of Hungarian coal mines:
A par ty i.rec a campaign o uncover failures in mine mec an-
ization in Hungary has revealed that machines are lying idle or
awaiting repair in seven coal mines inclbding the important
Tatabanya mines in northwestern Hungary. The directors of two
"model" enterprises stated that the machinery was unsuitable
because of soil moisture. Mine technical leaders and rightist
Social Democrats were charged with causing miners to boycott
machinery in one northwestern mine. Much of the machinery is
Soviet-made.
2 17 4016 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AO0160001-3
 Approved For Release 000/08/29: CIA-RDP79T01I 46A '1100160001-3
The Soviet delegates to the recent Hungarian miners union
congress stated in a recent interview that the mechanical back-
wardness of Hungarian mining was comparable to that of Russia
in the earl period of the First Five Year Plan.
25X1A ) 25X1A
Comment: These developments indicate increasing concern
probably Sooviet-inspired, over the failure of the mines to meet
coal demands of the Five Year Plan. The widespread disuse of
Russian-made machinery implies that it is unsuited for the damp
soil conditions prevailing in Hungarian mines.
25X1X
5. 7FX1X -desires strategic talks with the United States:
25X1X that American-Yugoslav conversations on
strategic and operational questions were "highly desirable."
25X1X agreed that Britain and France should be included. He
25X1X added that M government also wished to consider the participa-
tion of Greece and Turkey, but he stressed that he did not wish
to deal with an "organization." ) 25X1A
Comment: Yugoslavia has clearly indicated its wishes to
avoid irec contact with NATO. This is the first official
Yugoslav statement of willingness to engage in talks which
presumably will lead to limited joint planning.
3 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100160001-3
 Approved For Releas 000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AW1100160001-3
SECRET
6. Possible change in Japanese Communist strategy indicated:
The lack of widespread Communist violence in Japan on July,
30th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Communist
Party, supports recent indications of a possible shift in
party strategy away from militant tactics, according to CINCFE.
These indications include a reported Communist directive to
avoid violence on the anniversary day, and a speech by a pro-
minent Communist urging the crowd to refrain from action which
might provoke the police.
The authority for this shift, according to CINCFE, may
be a message which appeared in the Cominform Journal on 4
July from Kyuchi Tokuda, fugitive JCP leader. The message
criticized the party?s "struggles by force" and its negiect of
such forms of struggle as election campaigns. (S CINCFE
Telecon, 16 July 52)
Comment: The publication of Tokuda's message in the
Comin orm Journal shows Soviet endorsement of a policy emphasizing
peaceful activity. This may represent a recognition of the
unfavorable consequences to the Japanese Communist Party of
the recent disturbances in Japan, Moreover, this development
supports previous indications of a possible general shift of
emphasis from military to political action by other East Asian
Communist movements.
Break between Rhee and Home Minister Yi indicated: Home
Minister Yi om-so was reporte y g ven a severe tongue-
lashing by President Rhee at the State Council Meeting on 16
July. According to Ambassador Muccio, the President made it
plain that he alone is running South Korea. Muccio also reports
that, at the same meeting, Rhee made the extraordinary state-
ment that he is no longer leader of the Liberal Party and has
no connection with it.
The Ambassador comments that Rhee may be encouraged by his
recent victory in the political turmoil and feel safe enough
to shake free of dependence on the party which he originally
organized with reluctance. Having done so it would be easier 25X1A
to disavow and remove Yi from power. ( )
Comment: Recent reports from Pusan, perhaps inspired by
Yi, have in icated that he might be Rhee's running mate in the
coming presidential-vice presidential elections.
4 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For Release4000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146A1 100160001-3
SECRET
25X1A
Yi's control of the police, his power in the Liberal
Party, and his supporters in the Youth Corps make him the
second most powerful South Korean politico,
8, South Korean Government impedes implementation of US-ROK
tungsten agreement: Since the signing of the US-ROK tungsten
agreemen ovethree months ago, the Korean Government has
consistently impeded implementation of this program for in-
creasing the production of tungsten in South Korea and its
export to the US. Notwithstanding the fact that South Korea
will derive considerable needed foreign exchange from the
operation, Rhee,according to the the US Embassy, has hamstrung
fulfillment of the agreement by failing to select an American
management company which would be mutually acceptable. Such
a company, specifically called for in the agreement, is to
install machinery, initiate mining operations and train Korean
nationals for future operations.
The President, however, now maintains that a management
company is not necessary, and he has attempted to replace it
with a group of four or five US engineers, headed by a
crony of Rhee's,
American observers state that this unauthorized action is
undoubtedly motivated by Rhee's desire to avoid any business-
like controls, which would be instituted by a management
company, in order to siphon off a certain amount of profit for
South Korean political "insiders." Meanwhile, it is estimated
by US Army authorities that it will take at least a year after
the selection of a management company to import and install
the necessary equipment to begin the mining operations. (C
9, Peiping Radio urges Japanese Communists to be militant:
Peiping Radio, commenting on a 30tfi anniversary of the
Japanese Communist Party, asserts that the militant program
adopted by the JCP in October 1951 is "the only way out" for
the party, (R FBIS - 15 July 52) 25X1A
Comment: This broadcast should be viewed against the
background of the current Cominform Journal, in which the
fugitive Secretary General of the JCP rebukes the present
party leadership for paying "insufficient attention" to poli-
tical forms of action.
5 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For ReleaseO000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146 146AGO1 10016
SECRET
The apparent conflict between these messages is reflected
in several Asian countries. "Armed struggle" is still offi-
cially prescribed as the "main form" of Communist action in
East Asia. Nevertheless, several Asian Communist movements have
shifted their tactics in the past year to emphasize political
rather than military forms of action. The shift now extends
to all Communist movements in East Asia outside the mainland.
Burmese Communist chief reported retreating toward India
The leader of The Burma Communist Party, akin Tfian Tun,
with 300 followers is reliably reported to have crossed the
Irrawaddy River about 100 miles southwest of Mandalay in late
June. The report states that the Communists have proceeded
toward the mountains of western Burma and that if they are
blocked in an attempt to escape by turning to the north, they
will try to reach Manipur Province in India. If not interned,
they will later infiltrate back into Burma, 25X1A
25X1A
Comment: This unconfirmed report indicates that the
Burmese Amy during the past months has successfully dispersed
large concentrations of Communists in their base area of north-
central Burma. The reported route of Than Tun's flight
suggests an intent to circle around Burmese forces and establish
a new Communist base in upper Burma near the China border.
Other reports, however, state that Than Tun fled
eastward into the Shan foothills after government forces over-
ran his headquarters in the Pyinmana area in May. Recent
Communist raids on towns and communications, in central Burma
and elsewhere in the country, are evidence that the party still
maintains organized forces,
:
6 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For Releas 00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1I 46 1100160001-3
SECRET
11, Belgrade condemns Italian Trieste appointment: The authori-
tative Yugoslav news organ, or a, condemns Rome's appointment
of Professor Diego de Castro to the post of political adviser to
the Anglo-American Military Government in Trieste, It charac-
terizes the appointment as "one of the groB -Yugoslav
provocations" undertaken by Italy, (R FBIS 15 July 52~5X1A
Comment: Yugoslav officials associate De Castro with
Italian Irredentist elements. He is a member of the National
Liberation Committee, an organization dedicated to the liberation
of Italians residing in Istria. It will doubtless provide a basis
for continued Yugoslav intransigence on Trieste,
Rome's appointment of De Castro was leaked through the press
before A.M.G. had the opportunity to accept or reject him. Both
the British and American Ambassadors informed Premier de Gasperi
on 11 July that the appointment of De Castro might prejudice
Italian-Yugoslav relations on Trieste. De Gasperi refused to
withdraw the nomination.
7 1'7 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For ReleaseV000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AU 146AW1 100160
SECRET
25X1X
25X1X
makes unusual plea for US aid:
o rants as strong y urged that the Hite States re-
corisideX?,its decision not to finance French military production
to`the extent requested by Defense Minister Pleven in Ma o He
twice expressed his personal disappointment to 25X10
during.-the Bastille Day reception.
notes that very rarely inter-
25X1A
venes insmatters of this nature and interprets his action as an
25X1A
indication of the government?s "serious concern."
Comment, intervention highlights the
Frenc Government?s reluctance to publicize its bad budgetary
position.,
140 Economic Commission for Europe believed hoping to seize
the?ECE secretariat may be planning to seize the initiative in
East--West trade gained by the Soviet Union as a result of the
Moscow. Economic Conference. The delegate recommends a firm
stand against a proposed September meeting on East-West trade,
fearing that such a conference might develop into a series of25X1A
fruitless meetings.
Comment: in June
that hoped that meetings between Western and Eastern European
trade experts might result in intensified bilateral negotiations
rather than a general conference on trade. Myrdal holds that
the.p"roposed meeting would test the genuineness of Soviet trade
offers and would also offset the propaganda benefits of the
Moscow Economic Conference.
e merican elegateto t e
conomie.Commission for Europe believes that Chairman Myrdal of
8 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For Releas 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146 146)WO1 10016
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
17 July 1952
CIA No. 49745
Copy N6e 4,^G
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For Ruse 20001 2%y&,I RDP79T0'6A001100160001-3
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
to Figure for Communist POW's willing to be repatriated
Communists o`n 13 July that the final screening of all POW's
who would resist repatriation had been completed. The new
figure is 83,000, broken down into 76,600 Koreans and 6,400
Chinese. 25X1A
Comment: The previous figure submitted by the UN on the
basis! o ncomplete screening was 70,000. It is not expected,
however, that the revised figure will prove any more acceptable
to the Communists since the major gain is in the number of
Koreans while the principal stumbling block in the negotiations
is the future disposition of the Chinese.
2, British approval of NATO Southern Europe command reorgani-
zation'su ject to reservations,. ritis approval in the Stand-
ing 'roup of the proposed changes in the ground and air force
command structure of Admiral Carney's Southern Europe command
under SHAPE is subject to strong reservations by the British
Chiefs of Staff. Britain retains the right to review the whole
question in the light of future developments, particularly when
the settlement of command arrangements in the Middle East and
the Mediterranean comes up. The Chiefs of Staff hold that the
proposed changes are only a partial solution of the southern
flank command problem, and point out that naval command arrange-
ments are still unresolved.
25X1A
TOP SECRET
1 17 July 52
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 100160001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AO01100160001-3?
TOP SECRET
'!NCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded or declassi-
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
c
CIA CONTROL NO.
9 y-
DOC. NO.
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
OFFICE/DIV.
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
By (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
OFFICE
App
BVed For R
I
~'~e 2000/08/29:
CPS-
O11 ~46A00 ~il'ET.[-~}
110016
FORM 26 uat PREVIOUS [DITIONS.
v
8-73
TOP SECRET