ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW 23 MARCH 1978

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CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5
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March 23, 1978
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Hpproye Economic Intelligence Weekly Review Marrh X'97"', copy N 562 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/ Consultants PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL ... - This Information has been Authorized for Release to ... Classified by 015319 Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: ? 5B(l), (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on: date impossible to determine Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 SECRET NOFORN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW 25X6 25X6 The recent confab culminated in a resolution on LDC debt and develop- ment that drew plaudits from representatives of the developed and most of the developing countries. UNCTAD Meeting Glosses Over North-South Differences ................................ 4 Brazil: Future Superpower in Agriculture .......................................................... Although short-run prospects for export earnings have been dampened by severe drought and sagging world prices for coffee and cocoa, Brazil's agricultural future looks especially bright because of tremendous natural resources and vigorous government development efforts. Copper: LDC Developments Threaten Established Producers ........................... 1 The movement of copper-mining LDCs into the smelting and refining stages foreshadows substantial reductions in the copper industries of the major developed countries. Soviet Computers: A New Generation Emerges ............................................... 21 The USSR, while on the threshold of a major new advance in computer technology, will find it extremely difficult to reap short-term economic gains from the breakthrough. i SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 25X6 k Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 25X6 UNCTAD MEETING GLOSSES OVER NORTH-SOUTH DIFFERENCES To the surprise of most observers, the meetings of the L'NCTAD Trade and Development Board on 6-11 March culminated in a resolution on LDC debt and development that drew plaudits from representatives of the developed and most of the developing countries. The resolution: ? Sets out principles for treating individual debt problems and commits donor countries to consider measures to adjust terms of past aid loans or take other equivalent actions to improve assistance flows. ? Calls for the creation of an intergovernmental group of experts to recommend features of future operations regarding LDC debt. ? Acknowledges that there will be further plenary review of the debt question at UNCTAD sessions in early 1979. This low-key formulation contrasts markedly with past strident demands of the LDC leadership for universal debt relief. We believe that the UNCTAD resolution papers over persistent differences within and between the two groups and that these could easily reemerge in further exchanges. The current constructive phase, which will probably last at least until the UNCTAD preparatory meeting of January 1979, is based on an unusual convergence of separate interests in the North-South dialogue. ?, As a group, the developed countries appreciate the willingness of the Ll)Cs to avoid rhetoric and to stick to technical discussions on the debt issue. ? Developing country leadership was trying to appear as cooperative as possible to encourage unilateral adjustments by donors of debt terms (or Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 other debt-related actions), several of which have already taken place or have been proposed. Debt at the UNCTAD Meeting No substantial agreement was reached on the proposals that previously had constituted the basis of group positions. The developing countries had called for generalized debt relief and for the establishment of guidelines that would link eligibility with LDC development goals. The developed countries had tabled a proposal at last spring's Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) that laid out features to guide the treatment of individual debt problems and had suggested procedures to provide additional external support for low-income LDCs experiencing chronic balance-of-payments problems of which debt is an element. As anticipated, the LDCs still were unable to accept the CIEC proposal. They could not, however, agree among themselves on renewing earlier demands for generalized debt relief and, spurred by opposing pressures within the group, approved a carefully worded comprimise, acceptable to developed countries. The resolution, adopted by consensus, reflects fairly broad acceptance by donor countries of the principle of retroactive terms adjustment, acknowledges that some individual LDCs suffer debts problems and provides for future review of actions taken under the resolution. On the other hand, it lends some support to the developed countries' commitment to case-by-case evaluation of debt situations, distinguishes between debt crises and cases calling for longer term measures, and commits donors only to seek an improvement in net flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Most donor countries have stressed that terms adjustment is an aid enhancement, not a debt rescheduling device, and that beneficiaries would be determined within the context of donor country aid programs. The favorable donor country position on terms adjustment was a factor in LDC acceptance of the basic concepts for dealing with future debt problems of individual nations. While the concepts are modest, and in some cases self-evident, they, represent a departure from what up to now had been a sterile North-South debate. (t. Factors Underlying the Joint Resolution The groundwork for conciliation in both camps was laid by: LDC differences. Since the original demands of the Manila Declara- tion of January 1976, the G-77 has successively modified its debt package in attempts to strengthen an elusive consensus. Support for the package varies from moderate endorsement by interested African and South Asian countries Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 to open hostility from the Latin American group and others who fear for their credit standing in capital markets. Some of the poorer countries that stand to gain from initial steps toward debt relief are no longer willing to maintain unrealistic postures such as those of the G-77 in debt discussions at the CIEC. In addition, many countries are directing their energies toward other North-South issues, such as the suspended Common Fund talks, recognizing that political and economic gains from the debt discussions may not meet earlier expectations. Stepped-up pressures from such disaffected participants at UNCTAD meetings in December and January shifted the focus of G-77 lobbying toward generalized relief only of official ODA debt for the poorest LDCs. This shift gained momentum because the chairman of the meeting (Sri Lanka) and major spokesmen for the G-77 (Pakistan, Zaire, and Egypt) privately opposed more sweeping demands.. Moves by developed countries. Recent action by individual donors on debt relief measures and the favorable donor-country position on terms adjustment have convinced many LDCs that they are riding a wave of favorable changes in creditor policies that does not preclude future demands. Even before the session, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Switzerland had moved to cancel debts owed them by this group. The United Kingdom and West Germany, which were already seriously considering some debt measures, as well as Denmark and Belgium, pledged at the March meetings to move forward on selective reajustment of terms. UNCTAD ambitions. The UNCTAD Secretariat has campaigned vigorously for a larger part in decisions on world economic issues. The failure of last November's Common Fund talks and other North-South discussions has led the Secretariat to seek to enhance its conciliatory role in such exchanges. At a preparatory meeting last December, UNCTAD officials worked hard to identify common points between the developed and developing countries' positions on debt. UNCTAD Secretary General Corea's attempts to persuade disaffected LDCs to send ministers to the March meeting highlighted his desire for positive accomplishments at the debt talks. These efforts at conciliation may have had a substantial influence on some of the poorer African countries. World economic conditions. Renewed economic growth, relatively stable oil prices, and stronger markets for several important LDC exports have at least temporarily eased balance-of-payments strains in many non- OPEC LDCs since the debt relief demands of 1976. Nonetheless, in view of the substantial debt service payments due this year and next and an expected Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 deterioration of the non-OPEC current account, the G-77 will have consider- able reason to renew broader demands for debt relief in the near term. This month's meeting leaves uncertain the future role of the debt issue in the North-South dialogue. While the resolution of the UNCTAD Board is the first agreement of its kind in the short history of the North-South debt debate, it leaves untouched a variety of G-77 demands that could be raised in the future: (a) relief of official obligations for each interested LDC, (b) refinancing of commercial credits, (c) readjustment of the terms of multilateral loans, and (d) creation of an international institution specially charged with oversight of work on debt problems. Reemergence of these demands will depend on progress on other issues in the North-South dialogue, the initiatives of developed countries on debt relief outside the UNCTAD setting, and world economic conditions affecting LDC current account positions. (Secret Noforn) 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 25X6 BRAZIL: FUTURE SUPERPOWER IN AGRICULTURE Tremendous natural resources and strong government support for agricultural development should make Brazil the next superpower in world agriculture. Short-run prospects for increased export earnings have been dampened by severe drought and weakening world prices for cocoa and coffee. Record earnings for coffee, cocoa, and soybeans made Brazil the world's third largest exporter of agricultural commodities in 1977-behind the United States and France. Agricultural sales totaled $6.7 billion. 55 percent of Brazil's export earnings. Coffee sales reached a peak of $2.6 billion; soybean and soybean products posted a $2.1 billion total. Cocoa accounted for another $530 million and sugar for $465 million. Brazil was able to capitalize on strong world markets for coffee and cocoa, while soybeans and soybean product earnings were up due to an ambitious agricultural development program started in the early 1970s. Brazil's continued efforts to become the world's largest cocoa producer sustained production in the face of adverse weather. Expansion of soybean production resulted in a record crop of 12 million tons, nearly eight times the level of 1970. Sugar production reached a new high of 7.5 million tons, while the massive coffee rejuvenation program-begun after the severe Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Brazil: Earnings from Principal Agricultural Exports Commodity 1976 1977 Brazilian CIA' TOTAL ............................................ 5250 6700 6624 5805 Coffee .......................................... 2398 2641 3100 2550 Soybeans ...................................... 1738 2132 1580 1700 Sugar ............................................ 306 463 450 450 Cocoa ............................................ 289 531 396 320 Corn .............................................. 165 136 180 Negl. Cotton .......................................... 7 41 100 100 Rice .............................................. 12 83 75 Negl. Tobacco ........................................ 161 186 220 220 Wool .............................................. 45 53 66 65 Beef .............................................. 16 40 57 50 Other ............................................ 113 394 400 350 frost in 1975-enabled production to recover to almost double the 1976 output. Wheat production reached a new high of 3 million tons as the government pushed ahead toward its goal of self-sufficiency. Prospects for 1978 The severe drought that has plagued southern Brazil since the beginning of 1978 threatens to reverse the trend in the 1970s of steadily rising agricultural exports. Wheat production has already slipped because of unfavorable weather, forcing Brazil to boost imports by almost 1 million tons. The corn and rice crops almost certainly are being slashed by drought; export sales from these commodities will be negligible. The reduction in the soybean crop and potential damage to coffee production could be most damaging of all to short-term economic prospects. The forecast of soybean production has been lowered from 12.5 million tons to the current USDA estimate of 10.5 million to 11.0 million tons. Despite this marked reduction, a jump in world prices is unlikely; the United States had a bumper 1977 soybean crop, Argentine output is up, and US planting intentions for 1978 are higher. Brazil's export earnings from the sale of soybeans and soybean products could drop more than $400 million compared with 1977. A continuation of the drought would also hurt coffee earnings: Even though a large reduction in the current crop-below recent estimates of 20 million to 21 million bags-would itself help bolster world prices, the world outlook is dominated by Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 decreased consumption and sagging prices. This, coupled with historically low Brazilian stocks, implies that Brazil's coffee sales may be off by about $100 million in 1978. A prolongation of the drought would curtail Brazil's future production by damaging the younger coffee trees. Sugar production is likely to reach another new high of 8.9 million tons when the current harvest is completed in April. Although Brazil has the potential to increase exports to 3 million tons, it is limited by an export quota under the International Sugar Agreement. Low sugar prices and the quota limitation will prevent Brazil from increasing sales. Cocoa production once more has been curbed by inclement weather and probably will remain at last year's level. Lower prices and strong domestic consump- tion suggest a reduction in export sales by about $200 million in 1978. Government Programs to Date Despite the anticipated cut in agricultural exports in 1978, Brazil's recent agricultural record cannot be matched by any other country. From 1970 to 1977, earnings from agricultural exports rose from $1.8 billion to $6.7 billion. Production of soybeans increased nearly sevenfold; cocoa, by 17 percent; corn, by one third; wheat, by nearly 120 percent; and rice by 45 percent. Rapid expansion of the citrus industry enabled Brazil to become the world's largest exporter of frozen concentrated orange juice. Brazil now places second only to the Soviet Union in total sugar output and has maintained its position as the world's largest coffee producer and exporter. 1970 .................................. 1509 643 201 4593 14216 1374 1971_ ............................... 2077 1415 182 5117 141.30 1844 1972 .................................. 3666 1440 167 5648 14891 2132 1973......... ........................ 5012 870 162 6163 14109 691 1974 .................................. 7876 1650 246 6959 16284 1928 1975 .................................. 9892 1380 273 7400 16354 2820 1976.. - .............. ......... ..... 10810 557 258 6200 17885 1555 1977 .................................. 12000 1020 235 7500 18800 3000 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Several factors account for Brazil's success. Abundant farm land, a favorable climate for growing a wide variety of commodities, and massive domestic and foreign investment in agriculture are important elements. But even more important are the myriad government programs aimed at developing agriculture. The emphasis on agriculture has been especially pronounced during the past two to three years under President Geisel's administration. Government programs now cover most facets of production and trade, including (a) minimum prices for agricultural products; (b) credit arrangements for production inputs such as seed, machinery, and fertilizer; (c) funding for agricultural research and extension; (d) development of rural infrastructure; (e) tax incentives for production and exports; and (f) export subsidies for certain commodities. The government is also active in regulating exports and export prices for several commodities even though most exports are made by private companies or cooperatives. Government involvement in agricultural development is best illustrated by the magnitude of the increase in agricultural credits. In 1974, credit for the agricultural sector totaled $6.5 billion; by 1976, this amount had more than doubled, to $13.5 billion. During the same period, annual fertilizer usage increased from 1.4 million tons to 2.3 million tons, largely because of increased availability of credit. Although crop yields have risen slightly, production increases have occurred largely through the rapid expansion of farmland. Area planted to grains and soybeans increased from 29 million hectares in 1970 to 39 million hectares in 1977. Soybean plantings alone increased by 5.6 million hectares. Most of this increase resulted from the development of new lands in southern Brazil. Sugarcane planted area has doubled, with expansion occurring largely in the northeast where a doubling of cocoa plantations is also under way. The availability of new land in southern Brazil is rapidly diminishing. Develop- ment of the Cerrados, Brazil's central plateau region, is now progressing. Government efforts in this area include an initial investment of $1.6 billion to develop 3.7 million -hectares for production of wheat, corn, coffee, and soybeans. This project could add an additional 40 percent to soybean planted area. Government Targets Ahead Current government policies will sustain the strong push for agricultural development and diversification, with the major emphasis on soybeans. A large portion of the Parana coffee area destroyed by frost has already been planted to soybeans, and additional large tracts will be planted as part of the massive 23 March 1978 SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 development program for the central plateau. If the soybean component of the project succeeds, Brazil will produce 20 million tons of soybeans by 1985. The loss of the Parana coffee area is being offset by extensive plantings elsewhere of high-yielding varieties; new plantings are mainly in frost-free areas. Brasilia is also emphasizing the expansion of sugar and cocoa production. An ambitious development program begun in the early 1970s should raise sugar production to 10 million tons by 1980. This expansion will support a major program to convert sugar to alcohol for use in automobile engines. This program, to cost $1.6 billion in its initial stages, is to result in the annual product of 4 billion liters of alcohol (the equivalent of 43,000 b/d of oil) to help reduce Brazil's oil import bill. In addition, Brazil hopes to expand its role as a major sugar exporter by exploiting its new export quota of 2.35 million tons under the International Sugar Agreement. Brazil's exports of sugar averaged only 1.7 million tons in 1974-76. Another goal of the Brazilian government is to become the world's largest cocoa exporter by 1990. Brazil now ranks as the world's number two producer along with the Ivory Coast, behind Ghana. A total of $41 million was spent on cocoa research, extension, and infrastructure development in 1975, and sizable sums probably were spent in 1976 and 1977. Credit extensions to cocoa producers totaled almost $100 million in 1975. Successful development of the Amazon Valley and rejuvenation of production in the traditional producing area of Bahia could result in a cocoa crop of 700,000 tons by 1990 compared with production of 235,000 tons in 1977. Considerable attention has also been paid to expanding production of grain crops. The government views increases in corn and rice output as necessary to meet expanding domestic needs as well as to garner large foreign exchange earnings. As for wheat, the goal is to attain self-sufficiency in the next five years. We doubt this can be achieved, given the continued strong increase in domestic consumption. Implication of Agricultural Development Brazil will expand its position as a major competitor of the United States in agricultural exports and as a key supplier of US agricultural import heeds. Barring major crop failures, Brazil will cut into US export sales of soybeans and products; increases in this world market share could be tempered by higher domestic demand. Brazil probably must face up to greater import demand for wheat as the government's drive for self-sufficiency in wheat production runs into domestic opposition because of the lower cost of imported wheat. As for the traditional export crops, the coffee industry will become even more influential in international markets since both world and Brazilian stocks are at historic lows. Brazil also is in a strong position to achieve its Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 goal of becoming the number one cocoa exporter by 1990. Brazilian emergence as a spokeman for LDC commodity producers foreshadows more frequent confrontations with the United States over international commodity issues. (Confidential) COPPER: LDC DEVELOPMENTS THREATEN ESTABLISHED PRODUCERS The expansion of smelting and refining stages in the copper mining LDCs foreshadows reductions in the copper industries of the major developed countries. Producers in these countries are faced with sky-rocketing pollution abatement costs, high wage bills, slow product demand growth, and rising imports of cheaper LDC refined copper. Phaseout of capacity in some of the major industrial countries, including the United States and Japan, could be moderated by protectionist measures and/or relaxation of environmental constraints. Market Depressed Refiners in developed countries are whipsawed by weak demand, world overca- pacity, record stocks, and low prices. Free World consumption of refined copper has never returned to the record high of 6.9 million tons of 1973; meanwhile capacity has increased by 1.3 million tons. The world market price in the London Metal Exchange (LME) has fallen by more than 50 percent, from a record $1.38 per pound in April 1974 to less than 60 cents, while stocks of refined copper have risen to a record 2 million plus tons. The effects of the depressed market since 1973 on the US industry have been particularly severe: (a) production is down 18 percent since 1974, (b) consumption is down 20 percent, (c) exports are down 41 percent, and (d) imports are up 91 percent. Fifteen nations account for 90 percent of Free World copper mining and refining: ? The United States is by far the largest producer, mining and refining about one-quarter of total output. Although self-sufficient in terms of capacity, the United States usually imports about 10 percent of its annual consumption of refined copper. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Copper Wire Bar LME us 1S MAR 57.9 615 8 MAR 56.0 61.5 FES 78 55.3 633.6 MAR 77 $8.5 72.8 1-16 MAR11 1974 1975 1978 1977 1978 ? Six LDCs-Chile, Peru, Zambia, Zaire. the Philippines, and Papua New Guinea-account for nearly one-half of Free World mine output (copper content) and one-quarter of refined output. The six export most of their production to developed countries, shipping concentrates and blister copper as well as refined copper. ? Canada, Australia, and South Africa together mine more than 20 percent of Free World copper and refine about 12 percent. Approximately two- thirds of their output is refined domestically and the rest is exported to other developed nations for refining. The three consume about one-half of their refined output and export the remainder. ? Four developed countries-Japan, Belgium, 4 lest Germany, and the united Kingdom-mine almost no copper but refine 30 percent of Free World output. Their inputs are obtained from the six copper exporting LDCs, Canada, and South Africa. All except Belgium consume their entire refined output. The Appeal of Vertical Integration LDCs view expansion of their smelting and refining stages as an attractive means of increasing their export earnings and developing their industrial base. Vertical Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 integration is facilitated by low investment costs and high value added. Ore producing LDCs find that a small additional investment of $2,500 per ton in smelting and refining capacity can expand the value of product by about one-third. This gain, coupled with the richer ore bodies, cheaper labor, and fewer environmental con- straints, is attracting foreign capital to the LDCs. Copper Processing Stages Mine Ore0.3 Percent to 6 Percent hopper Concentrates 20 Percent to 35 Percent Copper Smelted Metal (Blister) 98 Percent Copper Refined Metal 99.9 Percent Copper Status of the Major LDC Exporters The degree of present LDC vertical integration varies: the Philippines and Papua New Guinea process some of their mine output through the concentrate stage and export both ores and concentrates. At the other extreme, Zambia exports nearly all of its output as refined copper. Peru possesses enormous copper reserves and has an ambitious expansion program, which eventually will make it one of the world's largest copper producers. In November 1976 the new Cuajone mine began producing at an annual rate of 150,000 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 SECRET Free World: Trade in Refined Copper Total exports .......................................................... 2,543.0 2,788.8 2,496.7 2,620.4 LDCs ........................................................................ 1,320.7 1,433.2 1,397.7 1,532.6 Chile ...................................................................... 387.8 487.8 5041 594.7 Peru ...................................................................... 270 38.5 36.9 122.1 Zambia ................................................................ 672.1 649.8 616.1 712.4 Zaire .................................................................... 229.2 252.0 224.0 74.0' Other .................................................................... 4.6 5.1 16.5 29.4 Developed countries .............................................. 1222.3 1,355.6 1,099.0 1,087.8 Australia .............................................................. 48.2 70.5 91.5 76.2 Belgium .............................................................. 319.4 288.9 248.6 307.5 Canada ................................................................ 290.0 282.8 319.6 313.2 Japan .................................................................... 24.1 278.5 21.7 29.3 South Africa ........................................................ 27.5 15.2 26.6 34.6 United Kingdom ................................................ 66.1 35.0 15.7 12.3 United States ...................................................... 173.3 113.3 156.2 102,3 West Germany .................................................... 119.5 116.0 97.3 66.3 Other .................................................................... 154.2 155.4 121.8 146.1 Total imports ........................................................ 2,627.4 2,712.8 2,330.7 2,727.3 LDCs ........................................................................ 209.0 230.1 190.4 236.2 Developed countries .............................................. 2.418.4 2,482.7 2,140.3 2,491.1 Belgium .............................................................. 214.1 187.8 187.9 302.21 Japan .................................................................... 314.0 230.2 168.0 200.5 United Kingdom ................................................ 399.2 380.9 369.4 367.9 United States ...................................................... 181.4 275.7 132.4 346.1 West Germany .................................................... 414.4 449.8 404.9 409.7 Other .................................................................... 895.3 958.3 877.7 864.7 ' Because of fuel shortages in 1976. Zaire exported most of its blister copper to Belgium for refining. ' Japan's large exports in 1974-were made to reduce heavy inventories. tons. Output from this mine added an estimated $175 million to foreign exchange earnings in 1977. The Ilo refinery came onstream in mid-1976 with a capacity of 150,000 tons. Ilo's capacity will be doubled by early 1979. Approximately 16,000 tons will be added to the capacity of the La Oroya refinery in 1978, raising Peru's refinery capacity to 366,000 tons. When a new 170,000-ton-smelter now under construction at Cuajone is completed, Peru will smelt and refine practically all its mine output. Chile, possessor of the world's largest copper resources, can produce at the present annual rate of 1 million tons for 150 years. At the present, Chile smelts about 85 percent of mine output and refines about 65 percent. A small expansion of existing mines is planned, and a new 100,000-ton refinery is under consideration. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Zaire mines about 500,000 tons of copper annually, smelts 450,000 tons, and refines 250,000 tons. Most of its smelted copper and leach cathodes are exported to Belgium for further refining. Zaire plans to construct a 100,000-ton refinery in Maluku at a cost of $460 million and a smelter of equal size. The refinery could be completed by 1980 and the smelter several years later. Eventually the size of the refinery is to be doubled. Even so, Zaire will refine only 70 percent of the present level of mine output and considerably less if plans to expand mine output to 800,000 tons are carried out. Zambia refines its entire mine output of 700,000 tons per year. Plans to expand are limited to a small electrowinning refinery of about 20,000 tons, which could be onstream by mid-1980. The plant will cost $134 million. The Philippines mine 230,000 tons of copper annually, exporting ores and concentrates. Vertical integration plans have been cut back to one 84,000-ton smelter, scheduled for completion in 1980 at an estimated cost of $220 million. This smelter will be able to process only about 40 percent of concentrate output. Construction of a refinery is still under consideration. Papua New Guinea mines 180,000 tons of copper annually which it processes through the concentrate stage. Concentrates are exported to Japan and West Germany for smelting and refining. No smelters or refineries are planned at the present time. Competitive Advantage Pollution abatement requirements and rising operating costs in the major industrial countries have widened the LDC edge in the smelting and refining stages. Pollution control programs have raised the costs of smelting and refining by as much as 16 cents a pound-about 30 percent of the present LME price of refined copper. The LDCs are exploiting their cost advantage by maintaining output at capacity levels and underpricing old-line producers in certain markets. US producers have been especially hard hit; US imports rose to record levels in 1976 and rose again in 1977, keeping capacity utilization below 70 percent. LDC copper producers will maintain their competitive edge into the 1980s, However, their profits will be checked by continued low prices and slow growth in product demand. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 During 1978-80, completion of refineries now under construction will raise world capacity by more than half a million tons, or by about 10 percent. Most of the new capacity will be in the LDCs, with Peru adding 200,000 tons and Mexico and Iran each adding 150,000 tons. By 1980, Mexico and Iran will join the ranks of copper exporting nations. Free World Copper Production Capacity Thousand Tons (Contained Metal) 1980 1970 1975 (Projected) United States Mine ............................................................................................ 2.000 2.000 2,100 Smelter ......................................................................................... 1,950 2.065 2,065 Refinery ...................................................................................... 2.425 2.640 2,640 Developed countries exporters' Mine ............................................................................................ 1,170 1,640 1,760 Smelter ........................................................................................ 945 1,170 1,170 Refinery ...................................................................................... 785 920 1,080 LDCs exporters' Mine ............................................................................................ 2,720 3,565 4,075 Smelter ........................................................................................ 2.370 2,775 3,035 Refinery ......... .............................................................................. 1,630 1.860 2,645 Developed countries producers' Mine ............................................................................................ 130 85 85 Smelter ........................................................................................ 1,000 1,650 1,660 Refinery ...................................................................................... 1,850 2,340 2,435 Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Chile, Peru, Zambia. Zaire, Philippines, and Papua New Guinea. In 1980 the six major LDC exporters will be joined by Mexico and Iran with a total refinery capacity of 390,000 tons. ' Japan, Belgium, West Germany and the United Kingdom. As for 1981-85, announced plans call for about 650,000 tons of additional refining capacity, all to be added to LDCs. Although these plans are tentative and may be raised or lowered as market trends become clearer, they suggest that no sudden tightening in the copper market is likely. We expect exports of refined copper to the industrial countries to increase as vertical integration continues. The developed countries thus face some hard choices: ? To allow market forces to phase out a substantial portion of the domestic copper industry. ? To establish protectionist measures. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 ? To improve the competitive position of the domestic industry by relaxing environmental constraints. (Unclassified) The USSR, while on the threshold of a major new advance in computer technology, will find it extremely difficult to reap short-term economic gains from the breakthrough. The RYAD-II, a new family of data processing computer systems patterned after the IBM 370, is now going into production. RYAD-II computers will be faster and much more versatile than the models being replaced and will be able to use IBM 370 software. The USSR, however, cannot achieve the full capabilities of the RYAD-II without advanced integrated circuits from the West. These could become available. later this year if current proposals for the relaxation of embargo restrictions are adopted. The need for high-grade associated software and technical manpower, as well as the ineffective employment of advanced computers at the enterprise level, will limit the usefulness of the RYAD-II for a long time. The Setting The CEMA-wide program to build the RYAD series computers-the first modern Soviet computers designed specifically for data processing-was beset throughout the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (1971-75) with design and production difficulties. Production grew from a few prototypes in 1971 to an estimated X00 units in 1975; total output was only 10. to 15, percent of what had been anticipated, however, and included only the smaller, less powerful ES-1020 and ES-1030 models-both markedly inferior to their Western counterparts in reliability and performance. By 1976, mainly-because of increased domestic production of improved semicon- ductor components, these basic RYAD models had been modified, upgraded, and redesignated as the ES-1022 and ES-1033. The new RYAD-Is are nonetheless still limited in their performance characteristics and are soon to be superseded by RYAD- IIs. Technology Gap 25X1A The RYAD-II program has moved along rapidly since it was first announced in late 1974. Development cycle time-measured from the first announcement of 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 planned development to the date of the first production prototype-took about three years for Lite RYAD-II, compared with about five years for the RYAD-I. Nevertheless, the technological gap with the United States, as represented by IBM, has stayed at about seven years. In fact, the gap is much greater when Lite full range of equipment being produced by both sides is considered. IBM in its 360- and 370-series machines offers a complete line of computer sizes, including some very large, fast models. RYAD-I production, in contrast, consisted of only the smaller sizes, with the larger models only now entering series production. The Soviets claim that two RYAD-II models are now going into production, the small ES-1035 and the much more powerful ES-1060. The latter computer, however, was under development for the original RYAD-I program and is not a complete new design. The only other RYAD-II model that is likely to go into production during the current Plan period (1976-80) is the ES-1055, being developed by East Germany. The ES-1035 is in the very early stages of production in the USSR. A few prototype machines have been made, tested, and accepted by the CEMA evaluation committee. The Minsk Computer Plant, the largest producer of computers in the USSR, is now making preparations for series production. During the transition phase at Minsk, which could last until 1979, RYAD-Is (ES-1022s) will continue to be produced along with the RYAD-Ils (ES-1035), thereby avoiding a sharp drop off in total Soviet and East European production of RYADs. By 1980, RYAD-IIs should constitute about one-half of total RYAD production. RYAD-II production is going ahead even though the critical semiconductor memory components are not yet available from the domestic electronics industry. Semiconductor memory-a memory built out of high-density integrated circuits (IC) with an information storage capacity of about one thousand bits of information on each IC-is a key feature that distinguishes the technology of RYAD-1I from RYAD-I. Although by current Western standards this level of density is low (off-the-shelf memory components in the West have 16 times as much capacity), it nonetheless represents a giant advance for the RYAD program. Semiconductor memory will permit the USSR to double the memory size of the RYAD-I in one-fourth of the space, while substantially increasing the speed of memory operations. Greatly increased memory size makes it possible to (a) handle much larger programs and more than one program at a time and (b) attach remote terminals for time sharing. These characteristics would provide the USSR with its first true capability for computer-to- computer communications. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Neither the USSR nor any of the other East European participants in the RYAD program has yet demonstrated a_ capability to produce ICs of the required density. The highest density IC in production in the USSR is a 64-bit device; even these- are_._ scarce and-shortages have caused delays in.the production of RYAD-Is. To compress development time, the Soviets are attempting to copy several high-density devices manufactured by US firms. _ Soviet designers, apparently uncertain about when the new component technol- ogy will become available, have designed RYAD-II memories to employ the traditional magnetic core technology. Use of this technology, however, will curtail the number of new features of the RYAD-II and greatly reduce overall system perfor- mance. In particular, it would be difficult to use the RYAD-IIs to establish large computer networks. ... But Questionable Impact RYAD-IIs will have little short-run economic impact. First, the increased speed and capacity of RYAD-IIs raises the performance requirements of associated hard- ware to levels that, in some cases, are beyond the reach of current Soviet technology. a The smaller RYAD-IIs will require disc drives with a capacity (30 megabytes) four '; times greater than those now being produced in the USSR. It is not clear if Bulgaria,,,-' which has mastered production of such drives, will be able to supply large-scale Soviet ?, needs. The larger RYAD-II models will require disc drives of a capacity (100 megabytes) far beyond the current manufacturing capability of any Communist producer. Second, RYAD-IIs will require higher professional skills from systems analysts, programers, and service personnel. Programs to meet these manpower needs are proceeding with far lesser priority than production. Third, RYAD-IIs are likely to encounter the same problems in allocation and use that have curtailed the effectiveness of RYAD-Is. Many enterprises have overordered RYADs, failed to train personnel in their use, and have shown monumental indifference to their care and maintenance. M. Ya. Rakovskiy, Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, recently complained of "frequent cases where the machines are kept in a storehouse, and sometimes under the open sky, still in a crate, for 4 to 6 months and even longer." Finally, RYAD-IIs offer the typical industrial facility few advantages over RYAD-I and seem better suited for data processing at higher levels-the production association, the Ministry, and regional and national planning bodies. Even in the latter 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 uses, potential effectiveness awaits the development of appropriate software and complex data transmission systems. Policy Implications To realize the full capabilities of RYAD-II computers, especially the time-sharing feature, the Communist countries will have to turn to the West for_ the required integrated circuits. As precedent, the East Germans used Western ICs entirely in the first few units of their RYAD-I model and continue to use some Western ICs. The ICs-needed for the semiconductor memory in RYAD-IIs are controlled by COMM. Even so, substantial quantities of these components have been acquired by the USSR and East European countries. These acquisitions have allowed RYAD producers to design exact physical and performance copies of the Western parts and, probably, to use them in prototype RYAD-11s. The supply of Western memory ICs through illegal channels is_neither adequate nor sufficiently dependable for use in series-produced RYAD-11s. Later this year, however, COCOM will consider relaxing controls on ICs to a level that would permit free export of the needed Western memory components to Cornrnunist countries. The USSR and East European countries would become large purchasers until high-volume domestic production is achieved. Soviet military authorities have been directly involved in the RYAD production program and are important users. RYAD-Is are employed in military-space research institutes and in plants producing military hardware. The more versatile and larger- capacity RYAD-Ils would strengthen these military applications. Also, the networking and time-sharing features of RYAD-II will permit more sophisticated military command and control, automated air traffic control, and strategic planning and targeting. (Confidential Noforn) China: The Nonferrous Metals Industry in the 1970s (ER 78-10104, March 1978, Secret Noforn-Nocontract) This research paper analyzes China's nonferrous metals industry in terms of production trends, technological development, and international trade. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 roy Apr Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Assessment Center Economic Indicators Weekly Review ER EI 78-012 23 March 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S. Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to: Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project Exchange and Gift Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540 Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific publications on an individual basis from: Photoduplication Service Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 1. The Economic Indicators Weekly Review provides up-to-date information on changes in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non- Communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic Indicators Weekly Review is updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that the results are made available to the reader weeks-or sometimes months-before receipt of official statistical publications. US data are provided by US government agencies. 2. Source notes for the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are revised every few months. The most recent date of publication of source notes is 16 February 1978. Comments and queries regarding the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are welcomed. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 ? db&&bt 3f A JkS BIG SIX F0R6 i ' 96bM 'f ' 17 Industrial Production 140 130 INDEX: 1970=100, seasonally adjusted Semllogarithmic Scale Unemployment Rate Percent JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1973 J1 p o , w e d For Rel s 52002/01/30 :1q,,JZDP79T013j01 000040012VJ78 tlncluding Japan, West Germany. France. the United Kingdom. Italy, and Canada. A-2 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Consumer Price Inflation Note: Three-month average compared with previous three months. 4.0 Percent, seasonally adjusted, annual rate Percent Change LATEST from Previous MONTH Month Industrial Production Big Six DEC 77 0.3 United States DEC 77 0.2 Consumer Prices Big Six DEC 77 0.5 United States DEC 77 0.5 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE SINCE 1 Year 1970 Earlier 9.4 7.8 6.5 6.8 Billion US $, f.o.b., seasonally adjusted 3 Months LATEST MONTH 1 Year Earlier Earlier 3 Months Earlier2 Unemployment Rate Big Five United States DEC 77 nEC 77 4.3 6.4 3.9 7.8 4.4 6.8 LATEST MILLION CUMULATIVE (MILLION US $) MONTH US S 1977 1976 Change 5 5 Trade Balance . Big Six DEC 77 4,824 37,242 16,562 20,680 4.4 United States DEC 77 -2,116 -26,490 -5,635 -20,855 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 2Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months, seasonally adjusted at annual rate. A-3 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX: 1970=100, seasonally adjusted United States West Germany 130 120 -120' JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APAp VQ F%ML RgFeagb 2M2/01/3t1 CIA-Rl9P79'f0t 16A0010000400h'0-5mm OCT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 United Kingdom 100 Italy Canada 20- JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL Change GROWTH RATE SINCE Change GROWTH RATE SINCE from from LATEST Previous 1 Year 3 Months LATEST Previous 1 Year 3 Months MONTH Month 1970 Earlier Earlieri MONTH Month 1970 Earlier Earlieri United States FEB 78 0.4 3.4 4.5 0.7 United Kingdom DEC 77 1.4 0.4 -1.2 -4.3 Japan JAN 78 1.0 4.2 5.5 15.7 Italy AN 78 4.5 3.3 -3.5 25.5 West Germany DEC 77 1.7 2.4 2.6 4.7 Canada DEC 77 0.2 3.9 3.6 2.9 France DEC 77 -3.1 2.8 -1.6 -1.1 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 TAverage for latest 3 men his compared with average for previous 3 months. UNEMPLOYMEp~++1TeRATElease 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010- PERCENT ~ 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Approved For Release 2002,0 /30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 United Kingdom A labor force survey based on now definitions of economic activity sharply raised the official estimate of Italian unemployment In first quarter 1977. Data for earlier periods thus are not comparable. Italian data are not seasonally adjusted. Italy (quarterly) 3 Canada JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 LATEST MONTH 1 Year Earlier 3 Months Earlier 1 Year Earlier 3 Months Earlier United States 1-FR 78 6,090 7,183 6,818 United Kingdom i EB 78 1,409 1,331 1,433 Japan DEC 77 1,180 980 1,130 Italy 77 IV 1,598 777 1,692 West Germany FEB 78 1,022 1,007 1,031 Canada IAN 78 891 780 886 France JAN 78 991 945 1,100 NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted. Unemployment rates for France are estimated. The rates shown for Japan and Canada are roughly comparable to US rates. For 1975-78, the rates for France and the United Kingdom should be Increased by 5 percent and 15 percent respectively, and those for West Germany decreased by 20 percent to be roughly comparable with US rates. Beginning in 1977, Italian rates should be decreased by 50 percent to be roughly comparable to US rates. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : Clfk. DP79T01316A001000040010-5 A roved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION Percent, seasonally adjusted, Japan 45 40 35 30 West Germany 4.3 JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 'Three-month average compared with prey Aopproved E For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 /~ A-8 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 United Kingdom 4.7 Italy 35 30 25 4.2 Canada JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL Change GROWTH RATE SINCE Change GROWTH RATE SINCE LATEST from Previous 1970 1 Year 3 Months LATEST from Previous 1970 1 Year 3 Months MONTH Month Earlier Earlier2 MONTH Month Earlier Earlier2 United States JAN 78 1.0 6.6 7.0 6.1 United Kingdom JAN 78 0.2 13.5 9.9 6.5 Japan DEC 77 0 10.1 4.8 2.1 `Italy JAN 78 1.0 13.2 14.5 12.3 West Germany JAN 78 0.1 5.4 3.2 1.9 Canada JAN 78 0.5 7.5 9.0 9.8 France JAN 78 0.3 8.9 9.2 6.7 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 A-9 Approved For Release 2002/0 /30 CIA-RDP ` 01 - RETAIL SALES I Commercial paper Call money Interbank loans (3 months) Call money Sterling interbank loans (3 months) Finance paper Three-month deposits Pwceof Avwop. Ara o Growth Rat. Smc. Choree Average Annnd Grawth R.I. Si.. Latasl Irom Pr Qortw Qoor ., en t Year P,.riaw tr 1970 Eafw Qsarlw La M the onth Pwc fro .nt Change m Pr.riow Month 1970 1 Year Earlier 3 Months Earner' United States 77 IV 1 .0 3.3 5.7 4.2 United States Jo n 78 Japan 77 111 0 .5 5.4 5.2 1.8 Japan Se p 77 West Germany 77 IV 1 .3 2.5 1.9 5.3 West Germany Jo n 78 F 77 111 0 2 7 3 2 3 9 0 France N ov 77 -12.0 rance . . . . United Kingdom 77 III -0 .4 1.6 -0.6 -1.4 United Kingdom Fe b 78 9.7 Italy 77 III -2 .7 2.3 -1.2 -10.3 Italy O ct 77 - 11.1 Canada 77 III 1 .3 4.6 2.5 5.3 Canada N ov 77 ' Seosonoty od"rynted. United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada ' ScosonoCy odi ated. A-9. Anyd Growth R.I. Sne. P.rmet Chong. Latest from Pr.vioas 1 Year P`.ntoos Quortx Quarles 1970 Errfwr Qaw1. 77 IV 77 111 77 IV 77 III 77 III 77 III 77 111 -0.7 2.8 -10.2 3.2 S.asondty adust.d. ' Avwage for Iol.sl 3 months carttpo.d with anwape lot previous 3 months. United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada Average Anmal Growth R.I. Sim. Pectin Change Latest from P,.wiavs 1 Y.v 3 Months Pried Period 1970 Earlier Earle,' Jan 78 Oct 77 77 IV 77 IV Nov 77 Nay 77 Mourly .rhinos (NOfancly adpeted) far the IJr I.d States, Jaan, and Canada. hourly wage rotas lox otI,n, Wal German and French data r.lw I. the beginning of the quortw. 'Average for latest 3 montfu comparesd with that for pr.vian 3 months. United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Canada Eurodollars mar 15 Mar 17 Mar 15 Mar 17 Mar 15 Mar 15 Mar 15 e2002/01/3 : CFA pproved For Release A-l0 EXPORT PRfC?froved For Release 2002/01/30 : C A-I?ToofgA001000040010-5 US $ National Currency Average Average Annual Growth Rate Since Annual Growth Rate Since Percent Change Percent Change Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months Latest fr om Previous 1 Year 3 Months Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier United States Dec 77 1.1 9.3 3.0 6.2 United States Dec 77 1.1 9.3 3.0 6.2 Japan Jan 78 -0.7 11.0 11.9 20.0 Japan Jan 78 - 0.8 5.3 -7.3 -4.2 West Germany Dec 77 6.3 12.1 11.9 49.6 West Germany Dec 77 2.1 4.4 1.0 10.2 France Nov 77 -0.5 11.0 9.0 -3.8 France Nov 77 -0.7 9.0 6.1 -7.0 United Kingdom Feb 78 -0.2 12.1 22.7 33.8 United Kingdom Feb 78 -0.4 15.3 8.2 3.6 Italy Oct 77 -0.6 10.9 12.7 0.2 Italy Oct 77 -0.9 16.3 16.0 -0.7 Canada Nov 77 -0.5 8.4 -3.5 -23.0 Canada Nov 77 0.5 9.3 8.6 -12.7 IMPORT PRICE S OFFICIAL RESERVES National Currency Average Billion US $ Annual Growth Ra te Since Latest Month Per cent Change 1 Year 3 Months Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months End of Billion US $ Jun 1970 Earlier Earlier Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier United States Jan 78 19.5 14.5 18.7 19.0 United States Dec 77 -1.6 12.6 6.1 -3.3 Japan Jan 78 23.4 4.1 16.5 19.6 Japan Jan 78 -3.0 7.6 -18.2 -33.4 West Germany Jan 78 40.7 8.8 34.4 35.7 West Germany Dec 77 -1.2 3.8 -1.8 -4.1 France Oct 77 10.1 4.4 9.6 9.9 France Nov 77 -0.3 9.8 4.7 -5.3 United Kingdom Nov 77 20.7 2.8 5.2 15.0 United Kingdom Feb 78 0.3 17.7 1.6 -5.4 Italy Jan 78 11.4 4.7 6.7 11.1 Italy Oct 77 -4.3 19.8 10.9 -3.0 Canada Feb 78 3.7 4.3 5.3 4.2 Canada Nov 77 0.6 8.7 15.2 -7.3 BASIC BALANCE ' CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE ' Current and Long-Term-Capital Transactions Cumulat ive (Million US $) Cumulative (Million US $) Latest Latest Period Mi llion US $ 1977 1976 Change Period Million US $ 1977 1976 Change United States 2 77 III -4,302 - 13,064 -48 -13,016 United States No longer published' Japan Jan 78 -223 1 1,112 3,680 7,432 Japan Jan 78 -272 7,876 2,696 5,180 West Germany Jan 78 -105 3,584 2,659 926 West Germany Jan 78 1,106 -1,648 2,472 -4,120 France 77 IV 136 - 3,179 -5,721 2,541 France 77 IV 149 -3,218 -6,842 3,624 United Kingdom 77 III 916 -691 - 1,539 848 United Kingdom 77 III 2,238 3,995 -1,585 5,581 Italy 77 III 2,390 1,629 -2,028 3,657 Italy 77 III 2,520 2,128 -2,083 4,211 Canada 77 III -1,150 - 4,106 - 3,215 -890 Canada 77 III 346 -446 3,239 - 3,684 'Converted to US dollars at the current market rates of exchange. 'Converted to US do llars at the current market rates of exc hange. 2 As recommended by the Advisory Committee on the Presentation of Balance of Payments ' Seasonally adjusted. Statistics, the Deportment of Commerce no longer publishes a basic balance . TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES' EXCHANGE RATES Spot Rate As of 10 Mar 78 Percent Change from Percent Change from As of 17 Mar 78 US $ 1 Year 3 Months 1 Year 3 Months Per Unit 19 Mar 73 Earlier Earlier 10 Mar 78 19 Mar 73 Earlier Earlier 3 Mar 78 Japan (yen) 0.0043 14.33 22.69 4.77 2.07 United States 1.07 -5.33 -1.53 - 0.74 West Germany 0.4909 38.64 17.55 5.06 0.39 Japan 18.61 19.95 4.03 1.82 (Deutsche mark) West Germany 32.84 7.98 1.09 - 1.06 France (franc) 0.2144 -2.74 7.04 2.85 4.61 France -11.64 -3.81 -1.40 3.90 United Kingdom 1.9070 -22.51 11.00 2.86 0.50 United Kingdom -27.50 4.12 -0.18 - 0.57 (pound sterling) Italy -41.85 -6.45 -1.37 - 0.86 Italy (lira) 0.0012 -33.95 3.45 2.36 0.60 Canada -10.90 -8.96 -3.42 - 0.54 Canada (dollar) 0.8384 - 10.96 - 6.59 -2.64 -0.27 ' Weighting is based on each listed coun try's trade with 16 other industrialize d countries to Ap proved For Rel ease 2002/01/30: CI -Frtbv`'GTuli31adb fth ofPIoblly ?"g the major currencies. Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Work! Big Seven Other OECD OPEC Com- munist other World Big Seven Other OECD OPEC Com- munist Other UNITED STATES 1975 ............. 107.65 46.94 16.25 10.77 3.37 29.82 103.42 49.81 8.83 18.70 0.98 25.08 1976 ........ . .... 115.01 51.30 17.68 12.57 3.64 29.44 129.57 60.39 9.75 27.17 1.16 31.09 1st Qtr ........ 27.37 12-18 4.11 2.75 1.08 7.24 29.34 13.72 2.40 6.07 0.27 6.88 2d Qtr ..... . .. 29.69 13.38 4.51 3.11 1.01 7.51 31.65 15.36 2.41 6.07 0.28 7.54 3d Qtr .. , .... 27.43 11.94 4.09 3.11 0.78 7.42 3174 15.24 2.40 7.55 0.31 8.24 4th Qtr . . ...... 30.52 13.79 4.97 3.60 0.76 7.26 34,84 16.07 2.55 7.48 0-30 8.44 1977 ............. 120.17 53.92 18.53 14.03 2.72 30.97 156.70 70.48 11.08 35.44 1.22 38.48 1st Qtr ........ 29.46 13.75 4.73 3-14 0.86 6.98 37,37 16.07 2.76 8.97 0.30 9.27 2d Qtr .. , ..... 31.67 14.39 4.81 3.69 0.71 8.07 40.45 18.14 2.77 9.31 0.35 9.88 3d Qtr ........ 28.75 12.23 4.39 3.58 0.47 8.08 39.50 17.73 2.78 8.92 0.32 9.75 4th Ott JAPAN ........ 30.29 13.55 4.60 3.62 0.68 7.84 39.38 18.54 2.77 8.24 0.25 9.58 1975 ............. 5533 16.56 6.07 8.42 5.16 15.87 57.85 16.93 6.08 19.40 3.36 12.05 1976 ............. 67.32 22.61 8.59 9.27 4.93 17.84 64.89 17.58 7.78 21.88 2.91 14.72 l st Qtr ........ 14.44 4.89 1.83 1.87 1.28 3.76 14-84 4.09 1.70 5.22 0.67 3.16 2d Qtr ....... 16.42 5.46 2.09 2.27 1.32 4.39 15.89 4.35 1.95 5.40 0.66 3.54 3d Qtr ........ 17.54 5.95 2.27 2.47 1.09 4,52 16.81 4.51 2.14 5.41 0.74 4.01 4th Qtr ........ 18.92 6.30 2.40 2.66 1.24 5.17 17.34 4.62 2.00 5.86 0.84 4.01 1977 1st off ........ 17.89 5.89 2.45 2.46 1.36 5.73 17.44 4.72 1.84 6.24 0.79 3.85 2d Qtr ........ 19.73 6-73 2.41 2.91 1,19 6.49 17.88 4.88 2.10 5.74 0.86 4.30 3d Qtr ........ 20.63 7.40 2.47 3.05 1.33 6.38 17.63 4.68 1.84 5.88 0.84 4.39 Oct & Nov .... 14.26 4.93 1.56 2.21 0.94 4.62 11.98 3.00 1.36 4.17 0.59 2.86 WEST GERMANY 1975 ............. 91.70 28.33 36.44 6.78 8.81 11.05 76.28 27.09 27.78 8.24 4.87 8.21 1976 ............. 103.63 3144 41.86 8.25 8.72 11.04 89.68 31.28 32.64 9.73 5.93 10.01 1st Qtr ...... . . 23.79 7.92 9.54 1.71 2.09 2.47 20.49 7.13 7.59 2.19 1.33 2.23 2d Ott ........ 24.96 8.21 10.12 1.84 2.08 2.64 21.94 7.70 8.13 2.22 1.43 2.42 3d Qtr ........ 25.53 8.00 10.28 2.24 2.13 2.78 22.14 7.56 7.89 2.57 1.49 2.58 4th Qtr ........ 29.35 9.31 11,92 2.46 2.42 3.15 25.12 8.88 9.03 2.73 1.67 2.78 1977 1st Ott ...... . . 28.19 9.28 11.62 2.31 2.11 2.87 24.45 8.46 8.85 2.58 1.42 3.14 2d Qtr ........ 29.20 9.59 11.79 2.69 2.07 3.06 25.21 9.09 9.04 2.43 1.54 3.11 3d Qtr ....... 28.75 9.20 11.45 2.71 2.26 3.13 25.27 8.99 8-97 2.54 1.65 3.12 Oct FRANCE & Nov .... 21.32 7.13 8.65 1.90 1.24 2.40 17.85 6.35 6.79 1.65 0.96 2.10 1975 ............. 52.87 20.00 15.50 4.90 3.13 8.61 53.99 23.04 14.33 9.43 1.94 5.21 1976 ............. 57.05 22.49 16.15 5.08 3.23 8.75 64.38 27.81 16.93 11.36 2.24 6.01 1st Qtr , .. , ... , 13.97 5.52 3.93 1.24 0.84 2.08 15.52 6.57 4.16 2.82 0.56 1.42 2d Ott . , ..... 15.02 5.91 4.41 1.22 0.98 2.23 16.19 7.15 4.33 2.61 0.55 1.53 3d Qtr ........ 12.81 4.97 3.49 1,29 0.67 2.09 14.97 6.49 3.77 2.75 0.55 1.41 4th Ott ........ 15.26 6.08 4.33 1.33 0.75 2.35 17.70 7.60 4.68 3.19 0.58 1.65 1977 1st Qtr ....... 15.68 6.25 4.55 1.39 0.75 2.74 17.89 7.50 4,84 3.06 0.52 1.97 2d Ott .... , . , . 16.69 6.60 4.79 1.57 0.83 2.90 17.96 7.84 4.71 2.65 0.61 2.15 3d Qtr ....... 14.75 6.02 4.08 1.32 0.67 2.66 16.14 6.99 3.85 2.87 0.62 1.81 Oct & Nov .... 11.45 4.60 3.13 0.99 0.41 2.32 12.11 5.25 3.12 2.10 0.46 1.18 UNITED KINGDOM 1975 ............. 44.03 12.55 16.59 4.55 1.56 8.64 53.35 18.47 18.52 6.91 1.68 7.67 1976 ............. 46.12 14.03 17.53 5.13 1.39 7.92 55.56 19.66 18.81 7.29 208 7.65 1st Ott ........ 11.60 3.41 4.37 1.24 0.38 2.17 13.50 4.69 4.64 1.82 0.49 1.83 2d Qtr ........ 11.46 3.53 4.32 1.26 0.37 1.95 13.96 5.04 4.57 1.74 0.56 2.03 3d Qtr ........ 11.03 3.43 4.11 1.26 0.32 1.87 13.69 4.75 4.54 1.89 0.51 1.98 4th Ott .. , , .. , . 12.03 3.64 4.74 1.38 0.31 1.93 14.41 5.17 5.06 1.84 0.51 1.81 Approved For Release 2002/014 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Developed Countries: Direction of Trade (Continued) Big Other Com- Big Other Com- World Seven OECD OPEC munist Other World Seven OECD OPEC munist Other UNITED KINGDOM (Continued) 1977 ............. 57.44 16.99 22.56 6.79 1.63 9.47 63.29 24.02 21.34 6.31 2.40 9.22 1st Qtr ........ 13.14 4.02 5.16 1.52 0.35 2.09 15.45 5.80 5.12 1.78 0.49 2.26 2d Qtr ........ 14.35 4.20 5.72 1.69 0.44 2.30 16.52 6.02 5.73 1.70 0.58 2.49 3d Qtr ........ 14.59 4.47 5.55 1.75 0.46 2.36 15.20 6,05 4.74 1.44 0.66 2.31 4th Qtr ........ 15.36 4.30 6.13 1.83 0.38 2.72 16.12 6.15 5.75 1.39 0.67 2.16 ITALY 1975 ............. 34.82 15.61 7.86 3.72 2.46 4.67 38.36 17.32 6.75 7.85 2.09 4.34 1976 ............. 36.96 17.41 8.69 4.23 2.18 3.96 43.42 19.35 8.04 8.12 2.65 5.24 1st Qtr ........ 8.01 3.80 1.86 0.83 0.53 0.87 9.77 4.37 1.83 1.82 0.54 1.21 2d Qtr ........ 8.85 4.22 2.09 0.97 0.52 0.95 10.83 4.85 1.94 2.10 0.63 1.31 3d Qtr ........ 9.45 4.51 2.22 1.07 0.53 0.99 10.33 4.51 1.85 2.03 0.67 1.26 4th Qtr ........ 10.65 4.88 2.53 1.36 0.59 1.14 12.49 5.62 2.42 2.17 0.81 1.46 1977 1st Qtr ........ 9.80 4.56 2.30 1.26 0.53 1.15 11.37 5.00 2.14 2.18 0.60 1.45 2d Qtr ........ 11.47 5.33 2.61 1.51 0.60 1.42 12.49 5.51 2.24 2.50 0.64 1.60 3d Qtr ........ 10.93 5.01 2.51 1.41 0.63 1.37 10.55 4.39 1.80 2.10 0.73 1.53 Oct ........... 3.72 1.76 0.81 0.48 0.20 0.47 4.25 1.92 0.78 0.66 0.28 0.61 CANADA 1975 ........ . .... 33.84 26.30 1.73 0.71 1.20 2.00 38.59 29.78 1.70 3.43 0.32 2.02 1976 ............. 40.18 32.01 2.03 0.81 1.25 2.09 43.05 33.55 1.82 3.48 0.38 2.56 1st Qtr ........ 9.18 7.39 0.43 0.47 0.33 0.42 10.40 8.05 0.42 0.95 0.09 0.59 2d Qtr ........ 10.75 8.61 0.50 0.18 0.34 0.56 11.61 9.02 0.45 1.02 0.10 0.70 3d Qtr ........ 9.94 7.74 0.56 0.20 0.35 0.53 10.12 7.75 0.47 0.80 0.10 0.69 4th Qtr ........ 10.31 8.27 0.55 0.26 0.23 0.58 10.91 8.73 0.48 0.71 0.09 0.58 1977 1st Qtr ........ 10.35 8.37 0.53 0.23 0.22 1.00 10.92 8.64 0.43 0.82 0.09 0.94 2d Qtr ........ 11.34 9.23 0.54 0.24 0.29 1.04 12.28 9.92 0.47 0.74 0.10 1.05 3d Qtr ........ 10.25 8.12 0.54 0.23 0.29 1.07 10.38 8.17 0.43 0.82 0.07 0.89 Oct ........... 3.80 3.10 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.36 3.82 3.11 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.34 A-13 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 FOREIGN TRADE BILLION US $, f.o.b., seasonally adjusted United States 14.0 12.0 10.0 2.0 JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 A-14 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 1.5 JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 CUMULATIVE (MILLION US $) CUMULATIVE (MILLION US $) LATEST MONTH MILLION US $ 1977 1976 CHANGE LATEST MONTH MILLION US $ 1977 1976 CHANGE United States JAN 78 10,014 121,206 114,860 5.5% United Kingdom FEB 78 5,819 56,132 44,643 25.7% 12,393 147,696 120,495 22.6% 5,656 59,024 51,108 15.5% Balance -2,379 -26,490 -5,635 -20,855 Balance 163 -2,892 -6,465 3,573 7 697 79 212 65 751 20 5% 4 555 45 007 37 957 18 6% Japan JAN 78 , 55.809 , 61,752 , 56,004 . 10.3% Italy DEC 77 , 4,173 , 44,132 , 40,025 . 10.3% Balance 1,887 17,460 9,747 7,713 Balance 382 876 -2,068 2,944 West Germany JAN 78 11,133 117,787 101,923 15.6% Canada JAN 78 3,202 42,035 38,355 9.6% 91818 96.533 83,574 15.5% 2,932 39,189 37,255 5.2% Balance 1,315 21,254 18,349 2,905 Balance 271 2,846 1,100 1,746 France JAN 78 5,690 65,087 56,967 14.3% 6.083 67,389 61,068 10.4% Balance -393 -2,302 -4,101 1,799 Approved For Release'2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 A-15 A proved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T01316A001000040010-5 FOREIGN TRADE PRICES IN US $1 1974Approved FI&Tglease 20021 /73 : CIA-RDP bf316A00100 bti0-5 1Export and import plots are based on true-monltr weighted moving averages A-16 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79TO1316AO01000040010-5 France United Kingdom 1 34 APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT 1J p4ioved For R IRA9 2002/01/3(. 1J4-RDP79T01-~ A-6010000400+&-9$ 575484 3-78 A-17 ApgElVdf 2~Q~ Q t lA ~TQ. '1~6Q001000040010-5 MONEY SUPPLY' INDUSTRIAL PRODUC TION Arrag. Annod Growth R.I. Since Awrape Percent Chongs Anonol Growth R ate Since LOPnl hen Prevous I Year 3 Months Percent Chaps Month Month 1970 Earlier E