FROM SHERMAN KENT'S STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000400020010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: MISC

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From Sherman Kent's Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy
Le{ d
Intelligence is the knowledge which oyUhigh1 placed
civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national
welfare. --p. Vii
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July 1972
Reflections on Current Intelligence
It is now 26 years since the practice of current
intelligence for top level officials began in the postwar
United States. Though there has been an evolution in the
art in this period of time, the similarities of form and
subject matter are more striking than the differences.
Throughout this quarter of a century, the aim has been to
give as straightforward an analytical account as possible
of the main foreign developments affecting the US. The
story began in January 1946, when President Truman asked
the new Central Intelligence Group, soon to be renamed
the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide him with a
daily intelligence summary. He said he had many reports
coming to him from different sources, but he needed one
compilation that would draw together and evaluate the most
important intelligence.
The CIG responded with the Daily Summary under the
25X1A editorship of The CIA daily, called the
Central Intelligence Bulletin for the past 14 years, has
continued in an unbroken line down to the present, though
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it has been a product of different offices in the Agency.
Since 1951 it has been produced by the Office of Current
Intelligence, with the regular collaboration of the Office
of Economic Research, and, in recent years, the Office of
Strategic Research. Soon after its inception, the daily
was joined by a current intelligence weekly and current
intelligence memoranda, which have remained staple products
of the profession.
A Matter of Definition
President Truman did not specify what he meant by
"important intelligence." It was left to the CIG to make
its own judgment of importance, and to decide what intelli-
gence was. CIG's course was not to adopt a definition of
intelligence and proceed in conformity with it, but to steer
largely by instinct informed by the experience its members
had gained in the intelligence field during World War II.
Later on, newcomers who had not had this experience sought a
precise definition, thereby opening up a discussion which has
been carried on sporadically, but without any great intensity,
to this day. There is plenty of room for argument and it is
not uncommon to hear someone disparage a piece of information
by saying, "That isn't intelligence!" If pressed, however,
he would prob.ably not be able to say what intelligence is.
Perhaps matters would be clearer if we recognized the
difference between raw reports and finished intelligence.
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Much raw reporting--including a large part of the latest and
most vital information to government officials--is obviously
public. The reports have been gathered and disseminated by
the press, radio, and television of various countries.
Unavoidably, most of the "big events" of the world become
known first through the public media, though some of the
events may have been foreshadowed by confidential reports. The
fact that the US government goes to some pains and expense to
scan the foreign press and monitor radio broadcasts and tele-
casts does not nullify the public character of this information.
On the other hand, representatives of the US government
investigate many situations and produce many reports for the
government's exclusive use. Because they are not to be made
public, these field reports rate as intelligence. Usually
they will be categorized as "raw intelligence," not because
they are badly constructed but because they have not been
integrated with other information in Washington. In this
group are ambassadors' analyses of foreign political situations,
attache reports of weapons and troop sightings, and observations
that travellers make confidentially to the government. Higher
on the scale of secrecy are clandestine agent reports, intercepted
communications, and overhead imagery. In sum, raw reports fall
into two classes, information and intelligence.
Of course, raw reports--notably press items--go directly
to top officials in their pristine state. It is the function
of the intelligence community, however, to clothe raw reports
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of either the public or privileged kind with other relevant
information and interpretations so that the reports will be
more meaningful to the policymakers and, particularly, will
not be misleading. This function devolves upon the analysts.
Raw intelligence and finished intelligence can deal with
political, economic, sociological or military subjects; they
can concern friend, foe, or neutral, good news or bad, danger
or opportunity. Looking at the record of what CIA has been
producing over the years, we derive an ostensive definition of
intelligence that is quite broad, and has been consistently so.
The only characteristics common to all the intelligence reports
received and published over the past quarter of a century are
that they convey foreign information--i.e., they concern
foreign countries, persons, and organizations--and they have
been written by US officials.
In other words, intelligence is official information on
foreign developments and situations. A finished report may
be factually based on material from the public media and,
even as interpreted, differ little from what is known by the
man in the street, or it may have been acquired expensively
by elaborate collection methods and constitute sensitive
information known to only a few. Whatever its subject matter,
it ought to be more reliable than non-official writing since
it can draw not only on public information but on a variety of
sources and background material exclusive to the government.
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We have been discussing intelligence in general. A word
is in order on the distinctiveness of current intelligence.
The National Security Council in NSCID No. 3 of 13 January
1948 laid down that current intelligence is "that spot
information or intelligence of all types and forms of
immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs,
which is used by them usually without the delays incident
to complete evaluation or interpretation." In simpler terms,
we could say that current intelligence deals with current
foreign events and is produced promptly. The events in
question may or may not be subjected to more thorough analysis
later on.
Analysis
And, by the way, what is analysis? It is worth being as
clear as possible on this point since anyone in the profession
frequently hears comments like "This article is deeply
analytical," "there ought to be more analysis in this pub-
lication," or "He is a first-class analyst." What is this
great thing toward which we strive?
Webster says analysis is the "separation of anything into
constituent parts or elements: also an examination of anything
to distinguish its component parts or elements, separately or
in relation:to the whole."
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If Brezhnev gives a long speech, no doubt OCI will
analyze it by distinguishing its component parts, telling
the reader how much is devoted to foreign and how much to
domestic affairs, and what topics are dealt with. But
in the connotation that "analysis" has acquired in
intelligence and the government, as well as in journalism,
the word means more than simply dissecting a subject and
laying its parts out on the table. It means something
closer to explanation or interpretation. That is, the
analyst contributes something positive to an understanding
of the development.
Here are some of the more obvious possibilities for
the analyst to make a positive contribution to the hard
news he has to report:
He can put himself in the reader's position
and try to answer the reader's natural
questions;
He can provide related facts and background
information;
He can explain the significance of the event,
clarifying why it is important;
He can illuminate the motives and objectives
of those involved;
He can explain why the development occurred,
describing the forces at work and their
interaction;
He can indicate if the development fits into a
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He can be premonitory and discuss the possible
and probable consequences of the development--
what its impact will be on the people and the
country involved, and on the US.
Crises, Threats, and Favorable Developments
From the beginning of the Daily Summary, current intelli-
gence has logically, instinctively, and unavoidably focused on
foreign developments of greatest significance to the US. Its
first concern has been with events having an immediate impact
on this country and calling for policy decisions. The hot
issues--the crises--demand treatment. Prime examples of "must"
coverage are wars. Since OCI was formed, the two wars in which
the US has been involved have regularly been given prominent
coverage in the regular daily. They have also called forth
special dailies of their own. Sometimes war reports are
eclipsed by pressure tactics by our antagonists, such as the
various Soviet squeeze plays on Berlin and the attempt to plant
missiles in Cuba. Developments regarding our antagonists'
military capabilities, and, of course, what we can divine of their
intentions, are covered conscientiously. All these are matters
directly affecting US security.
One of the main purposes of the Bulletin is to guard
official Washington against "surprises," particularly of the
unpleasant variety. When the Bulletin fails, as it has
occasionally, there is a post-mortem to determine the reasons.
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Crises do not arise solely over issues of direct
security significance; there are crises in diplomatic and
economic relations between the US and its allies, and between
other countries, with repercussions on the US. Moreover,
intelligence deals as much with non-critical situations as
with crises. It is quite possible that the most important
intelligence is non-critical in nature, even if crisis
reporting tends to hog attention. When the dam has broken,
officials tend to be caught up by events; their capability
of control is limited. On the other hand, if they can spot
trouble coming in the future, they can plan carefully to meet,
and perhaps, preclude it. It is this kind of "look ahead"
that intelligence should provide.
Officials responsible for the conduct of foreign and
defense policy cannot be adequately served only by information
of a defensive nature, whether it concerns crises or future
problems. For a full understanding of situations, they need
to be informed of developments favorable to US interests and
of opportunities for the US to promote its objectives. This
is an important side of intelligence.
The Wide US Interest
In general, intelligence reporting must cover all
countries and situations where there is a US interest.
This is not in fact a restrictive prescription. Although
it varies enormously in degree, there is a US interest in
every country in the world. This follows from our desire
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to maintain stability, to counter the extension of our
antagonists' influence, and to safeguard our economic
interests.
The developments and situations that each country
regards as most important to itself--usually its current
major issues--are likely to have at least a potential
impact on the country's political stability, economic and
social welfare, defensive capabilities, or foreign policy.
Consequently these issues must always be examined as
possibly reportable subjects. Whether in a particular case
the matter should be reported in an intelligence publication
of one level or another depends on the impact the event is
apt to have on the foreign country, and then on the US.
A change of government holds the potentiality for
effecting many changes within a country and altering its
relations with the..outside world. Consequently either
orderly or abrupt changes of government in even the smallest
countries ardormally dealt with, and analyzed, in intelli-
gence publications. Since sudden changes could have an
adverse effect on US interests, there is always an attempt
to predict coups d'etat.
The Generalist Reader and Selection for Him
Apart from memoranda directed to particular consumers,
current intelligence, following the main line set by its
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beginning as a report to the President, is by and large
written for the generalist among policymakers. The usual
Bulletin item or Weekly article does not carry factual
material that would be new to people in other agencies
working on the same countries or problems and normally
having the same raw reports, although a concise, organized
presentation and CIA's analysis may be helpful even to
the experts. The target readership is principally the top
policymakers, who have to come to grips with each major
problem as it emerges and who in any case want to keep
up with outstanding world developments.
The selection of material for publications directed to
the highest officials requires especially good judgment.
The readers should not be bothered unnecessarily, but neither
should they be cut off from intelligence that can change their
appraisals. It is axiomatic that these readers will have to
be given reports on the crises and wars of the day; not to
supply this information would be like giving them a newspaper
without the front page. However, the top officials must also
be given other "important" developments and "things they need
to know." The trick comes in identifying what is important
and necessary to know from the policymaker's point of view.
It would be a great help to the current intelligence staff
if it were aware, daily and weekly, of the immediate concerns
of its policymaking readers. It has some information of this
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kind, but obviously the closer the liaison with the consumer,
the more intelligence can be on target. However, even
without direct knowledge of the preoccupations of the top
officials, the analyst can come respectably close to the target.
For one thing, the readers should be made aware of any
development likely within a few weeks or months to demand US
policy decisions and action. Then, leaving US involvement
aside, the top officials should be informed of any development
signifying a change of considerable magnitude in the strength
or intentions of a US ally, an antagonist, or an important
neutral.
Occasionally objection is made to the proposed publication
of a report on the grounds that those officials handling the
question already have the information. This argument ignores
the fact that there are many high-level generalists who are
not working on that particular matter, who do not have the
information, but who are among OCI's principal readers. Through
ignorance of the development in question, they could affect
the situation adversely.
The Problem of the Press
One of the standard problems for current intelligence
is posed by press coverage. Where the intelligence story
is unknown to the public, there is no difficulty. Also,
if the press is telling an incomplete or inadequate story,
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it is obviously desirable for OCI to set things straight.
However, there is apt to be hesitation in those cases where
press coverage is excellent, and let us admit that it often
is. The answer usually lies in the importance of the event
involved. If the Soviet Party Politburo has met and issued
a pronouncement about US policy in the Middle East, the
fact that the press will have the full story does not
relieve OCI from writing its own piece. Probably the analyst
will have some unique interpretive contribution to make, but
even if this is not the case,the assumption should be that
officials will be looking to see whether OCI, on its all-
source basis, confirms the press, corrects it, or adds
something of significance. The touchstone is whether
officials need to be apprised of the development; if they do,
current intelligence has an obligation to guarantee, insofar
as it is able, that they will be apprised, regardless of what
the press does.
Especially in dealing with Communist countries, OCI does
not like to publish an analysis until it has received the
full text of a statement. If the statement is of great
importance, however, OCI will probably run a report based on
first impressions, so as not to remain silent when the story
is the talk of the town.
Relation to Policy
Although intelligence should not be written to defend
or criticize policy, effective intelligence reporting calls
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for a knowledge of US interests and policies. Without such
knowledge, there is a lack of criteria for the selection of
developments and their meaningful interpretation. The
producers of intelligence do not have to be in personal
agreement with current policies, or indeed have any feeling
about them at all, but their reporting needs to illuminate
foreign reaction to these policies. It is essential that
policymakers get a straight story of how things are working
out so that they can judge whether to continue on course or
take a different tack.
A Framework for Re op rting
There are probably few readers of current intelligence
who have not occasionally wondered how or why certain articles
got into the publication. And of course it is the daily chore
of the analyst, as he sifts the total inflow of traffic, to
ask himself what is reportable. To an extent, we have already
tried to describe the typical stuff of current intelligence,
but it will do no harm to put the matter another way. Because
we are providing intelligence for the use of American officials
charged with US defense and foreign relations, we can do no
better--in fact, can do little else--than look at world events
from the viewpoint of the US. Foreign developments in con-
formity with American interests and policies can be regarded
as "favorable." Developments opposed to US interests and
policies can be considered "unfavorable" or "threats."
Additionally, there are many developments that do not
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necessarily fall into either category. Some of them, however,
are of obvious importance, and hence are reportable because
they are likely to produce eventual effects that will matter,
one way or another, to this country. The Sino-Soviet border
negotiations are an example. Particular developments in these
talks may have no direct repercussion on US interests, but they
will probably affect the relationship between China and the
USSR, which has great importance for the US.
This approach to criteria of reportability results in
the following framework for all forms of current intelligence.
The examples are drawn from various years.
1.
Direct threats to the security of the US or its
personnel abroad.
Examples:
a.
North Vietnamese intensify attacks on US bases.
b.
Soviets test ABM.
c.
New terrorist actions planned vs US personnel
in Brazil.
d.
China develops thermonuclear weapons.
e.
Moscow demands Allies get out of Berlin (1958).
f.
Soviets install missiles in Cuba (1962).
II. Indirect threats to US security and threats to
other US interests and policies.
a. Japanese leftists oppose security pact with US.
b. East Germans harass Berlin traffic.
c. Malta gives Britain deadline for withdrawal.
d. Violence increased along Israeli-Lebanon border.
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e. Chile refuses compensation for takeover of US
copper companies.
f. Challengers drop out of South Vietnam election
campaign.
g. NATO faces open dispute on the Greek question.
III. Favorable developments for US security, other
interests, and policies.
a. Soviet missile program suffers setback.
b. China moderates its foreign policy positions.
c. Turkish political crisis eases.
d. Buddhists soften their attitude toward Saigon
government.
e. Left and right extremists are defeated in West
German elections.
f. New Libyan government is cool to Moscow.
IV. Other important developments.
a. Indonesia having success in controlling inflation.
b. Serious friction exists among ruling group in
Algeria.
c. Mujib faces many difficulties as he takes over
in Bangladesh.
d. Honduran president in shaky position.
e. Factional fight continues in Finnish Communist party.
f. Croat nationalism causing concern to Belgrade.
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In selecting material for reporting under category IV,
intelligence producers must guard against a natural enthusiasm
for their subjects which can lead them to write about events
having too slight a bearing on any US interest. If there is
a connection with US interests that cannot be easily per-
ceived, it should be clarified.
In this contentious world, a continued need by policy-
makers for current intelligence, as well as for other
varieties of intelligence, is assured. The current intelligence
staff will be playing its role in America's foreign relations
with distinction if it is steadily successful in identifying
important developments, in interpreting them accurately and
clearly, and in communicating its findings to the policymakers
rapidly, either by the printed page, by briefings, or by
means yet untried.
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