FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A000800010014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 6, 1968
• Content Type: BRIEF

I
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BRIEFING PACKAGE 6 November 1968
FRANCE
De Gaulle is reappraising his foreign policies
following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia which
was a big blow to his detente efforts.
A. He probably does not fear a Russian military move
against Western Europe but is worried about the
skittishness of his neighbors.
1. De Gaulle is concerned that his fellow
Europeans will draw closer together under the
US rather than French banner.
:. Thus he is casting about for a policy initiative
to prevent this from happening.
3. He is also worried that if the Vietnamese war
is brought to an end, a Soviet-US rapproachment
will leave France out in the cold.
II . One of these casts has involved proposals for greater
US-French cooperation in nuclear matters.
A. One such proposal envisages that France would get
the same US nuclear knowledge and equipment that
the UK gets, with no quid pro quo mentioned.
A further variation on this theme is that the UK
would then be asked to join with the French to
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provide the nuclear umbrella for Europe but the
US would still underwrite it.
C. France may be using this nuclear issue to find
out whether the US is interested in expanded
bilateral time.
D. In any event, although the atmosphere in US-French
relations has improved, De Gaulle is still
opposed to what he calls American "hegemony"
and as yet has made no substantive changes in those
areas where his policies conflict with US policies.
III. De Gaulle of course remains adamantly opposed to
strengthening NATO lent this in turn strengthen US as
opposed to French interests.
A. He does not want to make NATO the focal point of
Western reaction to the Czechoslovak invasion.
B. He has made it clear that France has no intention
resuming its role in the integrated military
structure of NATO.
He is against NATO's flexible response strategy
and the build-up of conventional forces in Europe.
1. He would like to insure an automatic US
response with military weapons as the main
deterrent to the USSR.
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IV. But despite Czechoslovakia, De Gaulle has not
abandoned hope that he can work out a special
relationship with the Soviet Union which will
enhance his ability to influence world affairs.
The French President has emphasized that, in
the light of the invasion, a policy of detente
and the disappearance of the "policy of blocs"
is even more imperative.
Although sharply condoning the Soviet move, De
Gaulle has established a policy of "business
as usual" with the USSR and Eastern Europe in
cultural, scientific and economic areas.
C. There has been a curtailment of activity on the
political front, however, pending a change in
the Soviet posture.
V. In other areas of foreign policy De Gaulle will also
try to maintain French independence and gain
recognition as a factor in world affairs.
A_ He remains opposed to British entry in the European
Communities.
1. De Gaulle, with the tacit acquiescence of Bonn,
has resisted efforts by the other EC members
to foster closer political ties between
Britain and the EC.
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2. The French are promoting a program to foster
internal development of the community and
have offered to accept a new formulation for
'`commercial arrangements" with the UK and
possibily other EFTA countries - both tactics
which Paris hopes may sidestep the issue of
British entry.
3. Such commercial arrangements with no guarantee
on ultimate British entry would be inimical
to US interests and contrary to existing trade
reemen ts.
B. France will continue to refuse to sign the Non-
proliferation Treaty, decrease the amount of aid it
gives to underdeveloped countries, and promote a
French role in any Middle East settlement.
Paris has been scrupulously correct in observing
the role of neutral host to the Vietnamese
negotiations.
1. De Gaulle still believes that France is
particularly well-suited to play some role
in any settlement and is holding himself
ready for such a role.
Vi. At home the Gaullist regime is again solidly entrenched
and the outlook for stability is good.
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A. De Gaulle's own political position seems stronger
than ever and his health remains good for a man
of his age-78 in November.
B. The Gaullist party has a massive parliamentary
majority - 354 seats out of 487 - and thus can
pass reform bills to attenuate the discontent
which led to the student and labor upheaval last
spring.
1. The leftist parties are in disarray and are
unlikely to be able to challenge the Gaullists.
2. The Communist party is undergoing a severe
internal crisis, both as a result of damage
to its prestige during the May events and as
a consequence of the Czech crisis.
3. This forced the leadership to issue a categorical
condemnation of the Soviet invasion for
domestic political reasons.
C. New social disorders on the scale of last May and
June are unlikely, as the government is moving
to meet labor and student demands and the security
forces are better prepared.
D The economy is strong and should rapidly recover
its losses and continue to expand at least through
its losses and continue to expand at least through
mid-1969.
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