THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CRISIS
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01762A000800050017-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 13, 2006
Sequence Number:
17
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 8, 1964
Content Type:
MEMO
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Approved For ReleapgY ~i P79T01762A000800050017-8
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C:E NTRAL I N, T E'11 AGENCY
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CRISIS
Information as of 1300
8 AUGUST 1964
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL, SECURITY COUNJCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFO RMATION.
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT ,AUTHORIZED
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This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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SC No. 10119/64
8 August 1964
I. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. North Vietnamese Military Activity
B. Chinese Communist Military Activity
C. Soviet Military Activity
D. US Deployments
II. OTHER COMMUNIST REACTION
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SC No. 10119/64
8 August 1964
MEMORANDUM: The North Vietnamese Situation
I. CURRENT SITUATION AS OF 1300, 8 AUGUST 1964
A. North Vietnamese Military Activity
1.
I
the Vietnamese Communists remain in a
cant ous and defensive posture. Naval forces in
the north sea fleet are dispersed, and periodically
change their anchorage. Camouflage is being em-
phasized.
D. Chinese Communist Military Activity
1. No further information has been re-
ceived on the reported movement of Chinese Commu-
nist troops into North Vietnam on 6 August.
2. No major forward air deployments in
the South China area have been reported since
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indications that augmentation of air strength
on Hainan island is planned, typhoon Ida--expected
to strike the mainland north of Hainan on 9 August--
may force evacuation of the approximately eighty
aircraft now stationed there.
3. Further analysis of photography of
7 August shows that a full regiment of Chinese jet
fighters could be in place at Phuc Yen airfield
near Hanoi. Six aircraft were definitely identi-
fied as MIG-15/17s. In addition, there were 22
aircraft unidentified as to type.
While there are some
5. The Chinese navy continues to conduct
routine fleet operations, mainly coastal patrols.
There is no evidence of ships operating outside
normal areas. There is no evidence 25x1
that any Chinese submarines are planning, or
have commenced any movement southward. Chinese
patrol craft operating south of Hainan island on
8 August withdrew to within four miles of shore
when US naval units and aircraft appeared in the
area.
C. Soviet Military Activity
No significant Soviet military reaction to
the crisis has been reported during the past 24
hours.
D. US Deployments
1. The De Soto patrol in the Gulf of Ton-
kin has ended.
2. The aircraft, naval, and marine units
scheduled to be in position by 8 August have all
arrived on station. These include 38 B-57s, 30
F-100s, and 1,800 men of the 3rd Marine Division.
All other deployments are proceeding as scheduled.
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11. OTHER COMMUNI S?T REACTION
A. Peiping has underscored its reluctance
to have the UN play any part in dealing with the
Indochina crisis. A People's Daily editorial on
8 August declared tha e s not competent to
handle the question and insisted that a solution
must be sought through the machinery established
by the Geneva agreements. Chinese Communist broad-
casts report that "popular indignation" against
the US is spreading inside China. Protest meetings
have taken place in Shanghai and in the capital of
Sinkiang Province.
B. Hanoi has not yet responded to the UN in-
vitation either to send a representative to present
the DRV case or to submit its views in writing.
On 7 August Hanoi sent protest notes concerning US
air strikes to the signatories of the 1954 Geneva
accords. The Vietnamese are clearly less than sat-
isfied with the role Moscow has played in the
crisis thus far. In a review on 8 August of inter-
national support which they have received to date,
the Vietnamese failed to give the USSR credit for
any aid beyond its condemnation of the US in the
Security Council. Communist China, by contrast,
was effusively thanked for its "outstanding" help.
C. In his first comment on the crisis, Soviet
Premier Khrushchev denounced the US air strikes
against North Vietnam and, in an apparent effort
to counter Peiping's criticism of the USSR's per-
formance to date, warned that "if the imperialists
dare to unleash war upon the socialist countries,
the people of the Soviet Union will fulfill their
sacred duty and will stand up for their motherland
and for other socialist states." Khrushchev's re-
marks were made in a speech during his current farm-
belt tour of the North Caucasus and according to US
wire services, were printed in today Izvestiya.
D. Soviet propaganda continues to stress the
dangers to world peace if the conflicts in Southeast
Asia expand.
E. Soviet representatives have made some ef-
fort to probe the facts of the situation and to
determine if US policy in the area has changed. On
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6 August, Soviet `CABS correspondents in Bonn em-
phasized to several US journalists that the USSR
has no interest in getting involved. The TASS
newsmen underscored the importance of determining
the precise facts of the 2 August incident. A Soviet
Embassy official i.n East Berlin, speaking "person-
ally" with his US counterpart, took much the same
line.
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