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December 9, 2016
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July 10, 2000
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October 8, 1970
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0 I~ ti l Dirt-556 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP80-00308AO0040001 0021-4 1,73 I appreciate seeing your draft of comments on my proposal for senior training. I'm sorry to have cause,i a pre-mature birth of your proposal but as you noted, our purposes are somewhat different. I was following a thread. which has-been winding through the Executive Director-Comptroller/Deputies meetings for over a year. Hence, my decision to address my proposal to Colonel White for consideration as an extension of the inter-Directorate exchange effort rather than as a training device per se. Hugh: MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training SUBJECT : A Senior School. for the Agency Assuming that the usual time and work pressures would. make two courses infeasible--an argument .1 don't accept necessarily--some combination of your ideas and. mine would. be desirable. What I want to accomplish could. not be done in the presence of non-Agency people. A possible solution would be a course structure which provided for a (two-week?) piece at the end solely for Agency officers. My original suggestion was four weeks but tw would. have been in large what you are proposing on the community level. I am left with one real concern. Though you are not specific, your language suggests you contemplate a course of several weeks-- perhaps months--duration. It follows that only a few from each agency would. be enrolled. (more could. not be spared.) and. presumably only one or at most two cycles a year. This would not provide for the numbers I had. in mind.. It might, though, cover as many as the Director and. his senior officers think necessary. This numbers problem is something we in OP are studying now--how many and. when for orderly succession? Let none of this suggest I don't endorse the idea of a senior seminar in intelligence. The combination of increasing demands and continuing constraints makes critical the improvement of inter-Agency understanding and, hopefully, more efficient use of community assets. 25X1A Robert S. Wattles Director of Personnel Approved For Release 2000/$/ 9, 11A-RDP8O-00308A0001 00010021- Ezc4~i:d '? proved For Release 20Q0/08/29 CIA-RDP80-00308A0d d'br0T6 ?Ar 1968) A Proposal for the Office of Training A. The need 1. For many years OTR has been a. good tradecraft college. 2. Now it is time to broaden an(,;: deepen its function: Without neglecting the how of intelligence, start concentrating on the what and the-Y; 3. Reason: American interests in the outside world are undergoing rapid and profound change. This change is likely to accelerate over the next ten years. That means that American foreign ,policy is also in for profound change. And that means that Intelligence will also change, to a greater degree than we are yet prepared to cope with. We should now add to OTR some of the functions of a graduate school - With some of the overtones of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. And some of the product of those -think-tanks like Stanford Research .Institute and the Institute fo:' Defense Analyses - though with greater relevance and vastly less expense than characterize such outside outfits. a. A place to study the functions of intelligence. 1) Especially the connections bei:ween collection and production, between human and t-echnical resources, between minimum essential requirements and the nice-to-know. 2) Methods of evaluation for accuracy, relevance to policy needs, validation of past judgments and approaches. (A serious analytical history of military estimates on the Soviet Union would be salutary. So would a validation study of the JIIRG Report, some three years after its adoption in 1966.) 3) Methods of analysis e.g., the tyranny of dubious statistics over intelligence udgments and the validity of feeding these judgments into Pentagon computers for planning purposes. (One crying need is for a hard look at the institutionalized delusions of the National Intelligence Approved, For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00308A000100010021-4 6tiS'f~r~r~- I sac..ar~~u..r ADD roved For Release 2080/08/29 1 CIA-RDP80-00308A000400010021-4 Projections for Planning. Everyone knows they are phony, but when all the ;aces have been ground into impressive tabulations they are treated like con- firmations strong as Holy Write) b. A place to assign long-range substantive problems. E.g. - 1) World-wide problems which will have important long-range effects on both US interests and the role of US Intel- ligence in helping understand those effects - especially the problems of population and food, world trade, monetary systems. 2) Some typical examples from Latin America: a) The political and social role of the military establish- ments. b) The political and social. role of the Catholic Church. c) The political and social role of the oligarchies. d) The long-range economic outlook. e) The effect of rising anti-US nationalism. 3) Similar subjects from other parts of the world, especially the backward parts. For example, why did every Indonesian expert in the US Covernment assume in September 1965 the total absence of any internal force capable of preventing a Com- munist takeover of Indonesia? c. A place to keep track of research projects of general interest, both to attract a maximum of useful contributions and to avoid duplication. Perhaps the academic custom of occasionally 25X1A issuing a list of works in progress would be useful. 25X1A d. A place to support the researches of NIPE into communit problems - e.g., the Report on the Middle East and the Report on Early 1 arn ing. e. A place to develop connections with the scholarly world, with the aim of winning eventual quasi-public awareness of the conscientiousness and accuracy of intelligence research. (And incidentally of educating the public to get over the notion that intelligence equals espionage and covert action and no more.) Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00308A000100010021-4 App ved For Release 20#0/08/29: CIA-RDP80-00308AOO 0010021-4 A B. The method 1. Upgrade OTR into an Institute of Intelligence,-on a recognizable par with the Foreign Service Tn`stitute. 2. Create a Division of Studies. a. Not permanently staffed by all the experts necessary to do the types of long-range research suggested above, but so organized as tot 1) Stimulate, facilitate, and keep track of such research as it may be carried out all over the outfit. 2) Provide a temporary haven where experienced senior officers. can profitably spend a few weeks or months (e.g. between assignments) studying some specific problem, uninterrupted by current manageri.al responsibilities, meetings, and telephones. Not a disposal device or a ti1PA leaf-raking project,,it could be useful only if it were seen as a serious opportunity by the directorates. Subjects for study might emerge from discussion of some problem at the DCI's morning meeting, or be proposed by others. For example, a senior African expert might study all our Estimates on Black Africa and contribute to answering the question-whether we' are estimating on the right subjects with the,right emphasis. 3) Bring experts on a given problem together from time to time in order a) to assure that the Agency's great assets in these fields are most usefully marshaled, and b). ta;hplp break down the lingering tribalism that still keeps the Agency's tribes unnecessarily isolated from one another. (At present the two principal devices serving this purpose are the Mid-Career Course in OTR and the rather brief in- house discussions of early drafts of Estimates. More cross- fertilization is needed.) ,Specifically, conduct "graduate seminars" of people carefully selected from all over the Agency, to meet for two or three 25X1A days at on a specific program of related topics a having to o with, say, the US interest in Cuba, or the Soviet interest in the subcontinent of Asia, or the long-range utility of Comint or computers. Set a high standard fear scholarly discipline in depth and accuracy of research, and in strength and clarity of presentation. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00308AO0.0100010021-4 A roved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00308A009400010021-4 6) Facilitate the publication of worthy products of this research. For some time to come this would mean publication within the intelligence conu:iunity, but We ought also to prepare for the day when it will be politically possible to allow 25X1A Agency scholars to publish outside the community such worthy works as recent long study of-anti-US nationalism in Latin America. Until that day comes we ought to give such studies far more accurate editing and more respectable physical production than they sometimes receive nowadays. Such publi- cation would be a reward for work well done; it could be made into an attractive incentive for doing work of real and fairly lasting value, and gradually lessen our present practice of ;publishing some ephemera for morale purposes. 7) Specifically, make better use of Studies in Intelligence for :identifying appropriate subject s an`'i?puUfis 1ng su is as far as possible. 8) Look for ways of involving some of the Career Trainees in such a program, perhaps as temporary research assistants to old hands involved in research projects. Objectives: a) A kind of on-the-job training. b) A way of interesting the Career Trainees in the long-range problems of intelligence. c) Identifying any special aptitudes they have, and giving them an earlier sense of participation in the intelligence process than they can get from classroom training alone. 3. In short, provide a vehicle to the DCI ,and the directorates for carrying out those kinds of research into the current and pros- pective problems of functi.ons,methods, and substance which they themselves identify as needing attention. Nothing proposed here would be intended to diminish either the jurisdiction or the responsibilities of management as presently constituted. The proposal looks rather toward the development of a center for scholarship which each senior manager could use as he saw fit and to the degree he was willing to support its serious objectives. Approved-For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00308A000100010021-4