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December 9, 2016
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June 2, 2000
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November 19, 1974
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Approved For Releas 2000/0`/1"2 ! tiiA 13 0-00308 00100070013-7 11'1rPn:A"T1 A 19 November 1974 MEMO 1. FOR THE kPCO1D DO's Remarks t, Midcarcer Course 41a. 43, a November 1974 1. Mr. Colby not with the members of Midcareer Course No. 43 from 1430 to 1545 o Friday, 8 November. Based on my observations of Mr. Colby ' s meetings with, several other Midcareer classes in the :a.st, I feel that, although Mr. Colby has always been very generous of his time, and has been forthcoming in his responses, he was in a much more relaxed mood with this group, and there was better r ert than I have seen In the ,3.st . Reasons that this was so are difficult to say, but one favorable factor may have been one of the written questions irected to 'Jr. Colby; "What can we do as mid-career executives to make your job easier?" 2. The Director varied his -usual format in meeting with this group; usually, he has some prepared remarks that take about 15 minutes (pe-rhaps 10 minutes this time), then he customarily goes throu'x the written questions, ticking them off one by one, and. finally he invites questions from the floor. This time, hr. Colby invited the class members to ask further questions if any occurred to them while he was going through the list of written questions. led out of then sev,3ral concerns which he chose to 3 fir.. Colby opened his remarks by says; that he had over the class memberrs' questions and that he had paraphrase in several rho':orical questions that served to launch his discussion. -L o of the questions were: "Is Agency?" 4. A highly' condense--4 scary of dir. Colby's prepared a future In intell 1;ger:ee7" and "Are we going to survive remarks follows: We are adjusting to the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate. The credibility gap rust be bridged by solid information. This coincides with changes in the nature of intel,iigt9nce collection methods and analysis away from the ?4a.ta. h aria -to tochnolog1cal collection and analysis. Further, lie a.-led, the nature of the political world is changing awa fr4"n the old bipolarity of the giants to one whero tha srl.al.lor cIDuntr es are no longer attached to one big power or the Other. Among other significant changes, M. Colby snontio;iad that inflation has given As new Approved For Release 2000/09/12 w:,CIA-RDP80-00 Approved For Releases` 2000/09/2 C1-RDP80-0030D00100070013-7 ai.-+4raift nn?v4.- nroductiov, targots- it esss av~-r1 r we will retain the necessary ..,P.a4^" zn rtmtre1. r nest (stress is his) rest on eat char a is in otzr resippollsiveness to congressional W WAt WW" %94F a . 3 secrets. Mr. Colby added parenthetically that other nations' intelligence services are now beginning to feel smiler ross res, and they are brsvb to respond also. With regard to necessary secrets, Mr. Colby pointed out that one of our vast urgent-protection a~" sources-is often well, understood and appreciated by news e m because of their abdiar Positions the crets t s r then moved c,,.--. discussion of the Agency on to control leakage of those that are esseutial. ' wg,%A%o " .yw --- C hich is be1 4 ~? good ostee:). 'tr. Colby said W our contributions U? a assisted the president and in copin with the problens that no faces, and the .t our contributions are objective and free of special rr,evcy has a t tsA futu ,. such appreciate . hhar. &olb Concluded b saj xx& Proceeding from his prepared s. Mr. Colby invited the se , rith regard to their sources a protec ors In case Written _. ss_to SJsl further questions from the floor ..~~. answers raised new % estion . I po i= . the - any other quo : ,ions &ad answers that ensued. Are u sa:t ,.shed with the results of your policy of a hns.:: 7 a not so: et a reat+ atercst. think it is essential. dissatisfied, alkiag and. vas: . f interest and its effects overseas I think the directl o ch interr.al objection have you been cables with sitting in ay sear get much objection. Cl to continue stes az s he Agency doesn't Mar of the advantages Of b4tter th oi,n..t where it c hould use Li elev. project Sets to the should be transferred. - V &1 fat of this Agency in developing Approved For Release 2000109/12 :_CIA-RDP80-00308A000100070013-7 :ure for the CIA? The Agency pioneers ` C F VIN W E TIALI Approved For Rele : 2000/09/12 : Cl -RDP80-00308000100070013-7 c. Please clarity your position on Agency collection 25X1A t wedn xe i security investiaatio.s of our own prospective employee i emert ur .mss.: Mr.. Nedzi is i out to introduce a bill in the douse making it clear that our function is foreign intelligence. This bill will also make clear what i United States. , we conduct have proprietaries, and we a "" n rroc 25X1A 25X1A may get-security info ?matic n, which we will pass to the proper agency. w,4+ .,F c tc2r WsterQatee. internal security d. What are the chances that proposed legislation -ding protection. of intelligence sources and methods because it will Only apply to us, Fair , brought into the ecrets,k and not to newsn en. 25X1A Q.: What role do you see yourself playing in the drafting of official, secrets legislation? A. I have taken a high profile--I have been the only one to have recommended it. I want to hold it to intelligence sources and methods, and avoid national security, which I think would be an endless process. Approved For Release 2000/09/12 :'CIA-RD- e80-00308A000100070013-7 Approved For Release 2000/09/12 CFA-RDP80-0030&x4000100070013-7 f. Do you feel that your authority is conmen1sura7.e with your responsibility as DCI? Ans, : Yes. I do not have command authority over the other agencies. I am a staff officer to the President. As long; as people know that I can go to the President and tell him. things about them, I have all the authority I r-eed. g. CIA analysts are severely handicapped by the lack of cooperation :.=:rom - the U. S.. Navy. What do you feel you can do as fl "I to correct this situation? Ans.: The situation has just been corrected. We have a new Director ofdaval. Intelligence. The Navy has learned new ways to compartment its information; the Navy has also waked up to the fact that it can get help from the Corimunity. h. To what de .ree does our intelligence product contribute to Mr. Kissinger's foreign policy planning and formulation? Ans.: A great deal. The N 55C uses our material very heavily, indeed. The whole SALT thing depends upon i i. As Director, you have made several changes in the Agency. Are you contemplating any further changes? Ares. ; If something comes up that needs it, I will take a look. New technology may force further changes. For example, regarding economic intelligence, we may have to question ourselves as to whether we are doing it right. If such examination calls for changes--fine. If not, fine, too. J. Are you satisfied with the IC system as it is currently fincti#x ing? Ans.: Yes, I think it's been very helpful. I credit the NI0's with the spirit of collaboration we find. I don't know how anyboty did his job before them. The NIO is a vehicle for getting; across agency barriers. k. Will inflation plus stringent %1B fiscal policies require continuing personnelI and program reductions in the Agency? If se, please project the extent of reductions through 1'38O. Arts.: I do project ; further gradual personnel reduction. Partly, I do this because if I didn't, and later had to reduce, people would feed, betrayed. We will do this through normal retirements, normal departures, and from the bottom 5%. I doubt that we are going to be able to compensate for inflation in scaling down our programs--thus, we will have less real dollars, Approved For Release 2000/1?2 fi k PP80-00308A000100070013-7 Approved For Relea92000/09/12 : C A-RDP80-00308000100070013-7 ;.i.lig ace activ C n oae t *1! to" ed. AT* you aap y with the organization and ysa as of the I s ts-f'f' D** # the current mi i he taf` 41 pct t ETa ai a. Des Zara beet s terra not be r t t) pro r :? Ana.: Thera has trr ts. Ife L a ` *pt .b1 . i obl . ner will sand _ e A. tter, lbut by : a IC Ste to keep emphasis an , why ess in this Oros? Shots rig o ary -r+ r s Ia the last few pare stae of blacks upvard doing a good jobf doing a good job, 011 all of us to bring toot:, the oratiaation. u Wish you successor to is of h` a Colby directorship] r b ,Ors is likely to confront? r 1`roat the a .aaa t problem, lisp. is the co tiie e i tails, c ualizo may particular o ent . biitiou is comwunicatiori *t passing Par but real and p. Middle 1ev i 'Plan is tey- 'a. aust riot the An a tin: the upward t think t1 Agency has taken a c: how v4we hobo done by acs a.mmb .asvd civilian e IC Staff be officer Ve'Caus a i1 esr, 1$ r4 ac Approved For Release 2000/09/12 :CIA-RDP8Q_ 6308A000100070013-7 Approved For Release 2000/09/'Fv. i- ~80-0030800100070013-7 A.-. mere are a rat ::icy groups; tf reason tor re is some overlap. A long as we have ce ication we are al I as of c; r.cezte as i:.onj as we cOm Wt with *to *not . Mr. Colby than c:;1o ed the meeting by. wt class access with "the re 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/09/12 CIA-RDP40-00308A000100070013-7 Arta ?? ? d60030180000100070013-7 Approved For ReleMP6 200010912'A=Rb'$ Mr. Colby's Remarks to Mid.career Course 44 on 13 November 1974 Mr. Colby opened Midca_reer Course 44 by welcoming all members to the course. He hoped that the last half of their career would be as beneficial as was the first. Mr. Colby asked all. of the class members to look at the Agency from the outside and see how the Agency fits into the outside world while in the course. This will stimulate you as individuals and. give you a. chance to see where we should go in the Agency and how to do it. With Watergate and Chile, we have found. that we have little time to focus on the Agency itself; we need the talents of individuals like yourselves along with your experience to give the Agency a little direction. Your ideas might take awhile to be implemented but, if they are good and. sound, implementation will take place. Mr. Colby stated that knowledge of the management of the Agency was important for an understanding of the decision- making process. Management devices such as MBO, PDP, APP, all boil down to communication of what is important and provide a base for auditing results once the decisions are made. Leave the individual alone for awhile then, after a period of time ask him how he has done. Mr. Colby said that this is what he calls the post audit system of managei,.ent. The machinery runs very well by itself;, so don't muck around with it. Mr. Colby said that the main part of intelligence is the product and the substance, not the management style. This is what you as individuals should get out of this course. He also said that this was the driving force behind intelligence and our instigation. One of our main sub.; ec-ts in intelligence today is that of economics; it used to be counterinsurgency several years ago, but not now. Mr. Colby stressed. the importa-Alce of economic intelligence collection, 'both overtly and covertly. Mr. Colby asked the class members to let the substance of intelligence drive their interest during the course, so that its in the best interest of the President, Congress and most of all the country. Mr. Colby said that we have added a new image to both the Agency and intelligence, that being the engineer. The engineer has taken his place along side the spy. Sure we have spies and we will probably always have them, but its the new image that we have added that is important. The intellectual aspect of intelligence is where we are today, Approved For Release 200914911.2-:rCIA-RDP80-00308A 7fT013-7---- 1 M IRrr! I C; L y G, LIJo ..~ Approved For Releal a 2000/N 0308000100070013-7 and being able to interrelate them is what's important. Adding these new changes and images as well as new techniques into intelligence to better broaden ourselves is what is important. Mr. Colby also stated. that we were opening up our relationship with the American public so that the public may better understand us. That is one of the reasons for his being more open, "we need the public's support." Mr. Colby said. that we were also having problems keeping some of our secrets, and that he was trying to introduce new laws in the Congress to change some of this, especially the protection of sources and methods. Re said that the President backs the Agency 100 percent as -far as covert action is concerned, and Congress reaffirmed its suppo:ct for covert action in recent voting on specific pieces of legislation. Mr. Colby stated that as far as leaks were concerned, he only knew of one leak from the Hill thus far and that the real leaks were coming from the Executive Branch of the Government. The following are selected questions and responses from Mr. Colby's opening remarks: Will economic intelligence play an important part in the future? Most definitely. Look at the economic effects of petroleum and food products. If we can help solve the economic problem, we can help solve the political situation. This sort of problem-solving can avert wars. We must develop a pattern in economic intelligence on how we can better use it. There may be discreet. ways to conduct covert action to defuse potential economic disasters. By laying out the economic intelligence facts, we may be able to defuse a hostile situation between two countries. Are we d.oing anything; to improve our public image? We are not launching any full--scale promotion effort to improve our public image. However, I do a good deal. of this. For example, I am going to New York this evening to speak to the Economic Club there. General Walters does a good deal of this also, as well as some analysts in the Agency. What is the Agency's role in the SALT Negotiations? The negotiations depend on the Agency for its answers and projections. There appears to be a real effort for a SALT agreement during, 1975, prior to the election?in Approved For Release 2000(0~L12 :tc1 IRbJ 80-00308A000100070013-7 'Approved For Rele 2000/09/1 wA bP d=0030 000100070013-7 1976. The verification of an agreement will be extremely difficult as well as will be the symmetry. We have certainly raised the points about supposed violations., but you're dealing with a culture here, so its very difficult. We must convince the Soviets to be more open and less secretive. 25X1 A Midcareer. Course Co-Chairman Approved For Release 2000/09/12_ : h4 ? .. 8q-00308A000100070013-7