THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE A STUDY OF ITS FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00317A000100030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 158
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: BOOK

Or Release 2002/1?W U4
SCHOOL OF INTELLIGENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS
TRAINING MANUAL NUMBER 5
THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
A STUDY OF ITS FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
By
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OFFICE OF TRAINING
MAY 1970.
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This document must not be given further
dissemination without permission
of CIA/OTR
NOTE: This document cjntains information affecting the national
defense of the US within the meaning of the espion-age laws, Title
18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is p-oh i bi ted by law.
a
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CONCEPT, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION ........................... 1
Authorization and Concept .............................. 1
History ................................................ 3
Organization ........................................... 7
Professionalism in OCI .................................. 8
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE ......................... 10
The Process of Production .............................. 10
National Intelligence .................................. 11
Departmental Intelligence .............................. 18
PRODUCTION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES ............................... 22
Support for the National Security Council .............. 22
Operation of Task Forces ............................... 22
The Watch and Alerting Function ........................ 24
Briefing and Liaison Activities ........................ 26
Participation in Interdepartmental Committees .......... 27
PROSPECTS ................................................... 28
SELECTED READINGS ........................................... 30
25X1 A I I "Intelligence for the Policy
Chiefs ......................................... 31
25X1A I "On Warning ................................ 42
"Policy Bias" ....................... 49
25X1A I I., "Style and Stereotypes in
Intelligence Studies".... .......................... 54
25X1A P I "The Monitoring of War Indicators"... 59
25X1A "A Watchman for All Seasons"............ 72
25X1A "Policy and Intelligence: The
Arab-Israeli War" ........... 78
25X1 A I I "View
from the Hot Shop......... ............................ 86
25X1A I "The Analyst in a War Theater Role"... 93
25X1A I "Cloud 9: A Problem in
Intelligence Production .............................. 101
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Ccntinued)
LIST OF CHARTS
1. The Office of Current Intelligence
(Organization Chart) .................... Follows Page 7
2. The CIA Operations Center
(Organization and Functions Chart) ...... Follows Page 24
APPENDIXES
A. Sample Articles from Central Intelligence Bulletin
1. Brief: "Communist China"
2. Notes: "UN-Middle East," "Nigeria," "East Germany-
Guinea"
B. Sample Item from National Intelligence Survey
Introduction, (General Survey): "INDIA"
C. Sample Items from Weekly Summary
1. Table of Contents
2. Preface: "Far East"
3. Article: "Communist Guerrillas Active in Thailand"
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D. Sample of a Weekly Summary Special Re rt
E. Sample OCI Intelligence Memorandum
"Czechoslovakia Faces the First Anniversary of the
Invasion"
F. Sample OCI Situation Report
1. "El Salvador - Honduras"
2. "Countries to be Visited by the President, No. 8"
G. Sample OCI Briefing Notes
"CUBA"
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This manual describes the activities of the Office of Current
Intelligence. Five types of publication most likely to be of
interest to the reader--the Central Intelligence Bulletin, the
National Intelligence Survey, the President's Daily Brief, the
Weekly Summary, and the Intelligence Memorandum--are described
in some detail. The remainder of the text deals with the concepts
and history of OCI, its organization and personnel, some of its
special functions (including the watch, indications, and alert
functions), and its outlook. In addition, the manual includes
reprints of articles from the Studies in Intelligence as well as
examples of various OCI publications.
The text is designed primarily for students in the CIA Career
Training Program, for new employees, and for those undertaking new
duties within the Office of Current Intelligence. The manual may
also be useful to other CIA employees involved in collecting intel-
ligence information or reviewing Agency production and to members
of the broader Intelligence Community interested in a better under-
standing of some of CIA's production activities.
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GLOSSARY
STATSPE
All-Source Information Intelligence information from all sources
regardless of classification.
CIB
COMINT
CRITIC
Central Intelligence Bulletin
The communications system for handling
intelligence information indicating a
situation or pertaining to a situation
which affects the security or interests
Of the U.S. to such an extent that it
may require the immediate attention of
the President. It is given adequate
communications precedence and rapid
;analytic handling to permit it to reach
responsible action officials in Washington
within ten minutes of the identification
of the intelligence information.
CRS Central Reference Service
CS Clandestine Service
DD/I Deputy Director for Intelligence
DD/P Deputy Director for Plans
DDS&T Directorate for Science and Technology
Departmental Intelligence Finished intelligence which a department
Dr agency requires to execute its own
mission.
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
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IG Interdepartmental Group
IM Intelligence Memorandum
INDICO Indications Officer
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(State)
JANIS Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
LDX Long Distance Xerography
National Intelligence Finished intelligence required for
formulating national security policy
which is contributed to, and coordi-
nated by, several intelligence
organizations.
NIC National Indications Center
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NIS National Intelligence Survey
NMCC National Military Command Center
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSSM National Security Study Memorandum
OBGI Office of Basic and Geographic
Intelligence
OCI Office of Current Intelligence
OER Office of Economic Research
ONE Office of National Estimates
ORE Office of Reports and Estimates
ORR Office of Research and Reports
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Office of Strategic Research
Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs
Senior Duty Officer
Special Intelligence (COMINT)
Special National Intelligence Estimate
United States Intelligence Board
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CONCEPT, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION
A. AUTHORIZATION AND CONCEPT
The Office of Current Intelligence is responsible for providing
quick evaluation of world-wide all-source intelligence information
twenty-four hours a day to support the Director's role as the Govern-
ment's principal foreign intelligence officer. This role was spelled
out in a letter from President Kennedy to John McCone in 1962*, and
again in a memorandum from President Johnson to McCone on 24 September
1964.
It was the Director's need for a close support office that led
to OCI's formation in 1951, but the authorization for the functions
of the Office of Current Intelligence is found in National Security
Council Intelligence Directive #3, of which the current version is
dated 18 January 1961. This directive defines current intelligence
and assigns to CIA a major responsibility for its production. In
section 2 the Directive states:
"Current intelligence is that intelligence of all
types and forms of immediate interest which is usually
disseminated without the delays incident to complete
evaluation or interpretation."
"The Central Intelligence Agency and the several
departments and agencies shall produce and disseminate
such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet
their own internal requirements. Normally, the current
intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency
is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President
and National Security Council; in addition it serves the
*
President Kennedy, after appointing John McCone as Director of
Central Intelligence on 16 January 1962 wrote, "In carrying out
your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence it
is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign
intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an inte-
gral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective
guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort.
"As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will
assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of
intelligence for all sources and its prompt dissemination to me
and to other recipients."
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common needs of the interested departments and agencies
of the Government for current intelligence which they
themselves do not produce. The departments and agencies
will contribute to the Central Intelligence Agency cur-
rent intelligence publications as practicable."
Current intelligence requires that all incoming information that
might indicate a threat or potential threat to U.S. security--whether
political, economic, or military--be recognized immediately and with-
out fail, and that it be processed immediately without waiting on the
regular production schedule. The process of evaluating critical in-
telligence information must take place without the quantity of data
and the leisurely analysis available later.
Since the founding of OCI, the all-source principle has been a
fundamental consideration in the office's operations. All informa-
tion, regardless of security classification, is distributed to the
analytic desk of primary :oncern. OCI was the first element of CIA
and of the Intelligence Community to adopt this procedure in regard
to all-source material.
OCI's current intelligence function may be divided into three
main phases. The first is to alert the White House, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community; it is fulfilled
largely by the CIA Operations Center--supported by the substantive
analyses and judgments of the OCI analysts--and by OCI's regular
publications. The second is preparing a draft briefing paper for
the Director when he appears before the National Security Council,
congressional committees;, and other official gatherings. Perhaps
best known is the third, as a producer of current intelligence pub-
lications--both national and departmental.*
The volume of OCI reporting has increased greatly in the last
decade. Since 1958 the office has produced daily national intel-
ligence in the form of the Central Intelligence Bulletin, which
presents the consensus of Intelligence Community evaluation of
significant world developments. In addition, OCI produces several
important publications that are not coordinated within the Intel-
ligence Community. Chief among these are the President's Daily
National Intelligence is finished intelligence required for
formulating national security policy which is contributed to, and
coordinated by, several intelligence organizations.
Departmental Intelligence is finished intelligence which a depart-
ment or agency requires to execute its own mission.
S E C R E T
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Brief, with a very restricted readership; the Weekly Sunmary, with
a fairly wide circulation; and specialized memoranda and reports
written for the White House Staff and other top government officials.
Along with its function of supplying current intelligence, OCI
is increasingly involved in basic research. Since 1962, OCI has been
charged with preparing the political, sociological, and subversion
sections of the General Survey of the National Intelligence Survey
(NIS) for each of the hundred-odd countries covered by this program.
More recently, OCI has enlarged its research effort to include in-
depth studies of long-range problems, mainly political and socio-
logical, that are likely to have a significant effect on the stability,
development, and ideological orientation of important nations. Most
of these projects have been self-initiated.
B. HISTORY
The Office of Current Intelligence developed out of two
organizations in CIA: The COMINT division of the Office of Reports
and Estimates (ORE) and the Advisory Council, which served as the
Director's staff for COMINT matters. In December 1950, William
Jackson, Deputy Director of CIA, approved the creation of an office
to handle all-source current intelligence and to be named the Office
of Special Services; in January 1951 it was renamed the Office of
Current Intelligence. Production of the CIA daily report previously
assigned to the newly formed Office of National Estimates was trans-
ferred to OCI, together with responsibility for furnishing current
intelligence support to ONE and the Director in making their estimates
of the situation. To staff the office, Q former ORE employees were
25XlAadded to the people assigned to the transitional Office of Special
Services. Because special security clearances were mandatory for all,
25X9 and few of the had such clearances, it was February 1951 before
OCI could function as a unit.
OCI's original organization included a Policy and Planning
Staff; an Administrative Staff; a Special Information Center (with a
Reading Panel); a Watch Office; and a Current Intelligence Division.
This last division included an Indications Branch, a Support Branch
(divided into geographic areas with emphasis on the Communist world),
and a Situation Room Branch to handle graphics and briefings. The
25X9 ceiling for personnel was set at
By 1970 OCI has changed considerably and has become recognized
both as the alerting office of the Agency and as a quick source of
substantive judgments on a wide range of international problems.
The Watch Office has become a greatly expanded CIA Operations Center.
The Indications Branch has been superseded by an OCI Indications
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Officer (INDIGO) who is the contact point with the National Indications
Center (NIC) run by the Watch Committee of the United States Intel-
ligence Board (USIB). Intelligence coverage of non-Communist regions
nas burgeoned, and the simple briefing function of the former Situation
Room Branch has been taken over by a specialized staff which adapts
the written intelligence contributions of several offices of the
Directorate of Intelligence to the style required for oral presenta-
tion by top Agency officials.
Publications
Since the days of its formation, OCI has produced a daily current
intelligence report. On 28 February 1951 an all-source Current Intel-
ligence Bulletin made its first official appearance. Each item carried
a paraphrase of a field ir..telligence information report and an analyst's
comment on its significance. Originally, dissemination was limited
to the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three service chiefs, but within
a few years the list expanded to 13 copies outside CIA. During this
period the publication was strictly a departmental product, reflecting
only the views of OCI.
In 1958 OCI began thE' production of a national intelligence
publication, the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), after the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
advised the Director of Central Intelligence that the Board was not
satisfied that CIA's statutory responsibilities for correlating and
evaluating national current intelligence were being met. The author-
ization for a national coordinated publication was contained in a
revision of NSCID #3 on 13 January 1958.
"Normally, the current intelligence produced by
the CIA is produced primarily to meet the needs of the
President and the NSC; in addition it serves the common
needs of the interested Departments and Agencies of the
government for current intelligence which they themselves
do not produce. The Departments and Agencies will con-
tribute to the CIA current intelligence publications as
practicable."
The change to a coordinated publication required the institution
of a panel system where representatives of the Departments of State
and Defense take an active part in reviewing the Bulletin items.
Initial meetings were often stormy, but gradually an atmosphere of
trust and cooperation was achieved. Until the formation of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, each of the three military
services was represented.
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S E C R E T
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In December 1964 there was a major change in the CIB format.
The briefs were lengthened to some 250 words and introduced by a one
sentence lead paragraph that carried the central theme. Another
major change occurred in April 1968 when, to remedy the deficiency
of inadequate coverage of sensitive materials, OCI began to publish
the Bulletin at three different classifications to meet the special-
ized needs of different consumers.
Similarly, the present weekly publications grew out of the
weeklies written by the Office of Reports and Estimates before the
establishment of OCI. Until the late 1950's the weekly was a thick
publication printed on legal-size pages, almost too heavy for con-
venient handling. It was divided into three parts; the first dealt
with the world hot spots and was recommended reading for the busy
official who could spend only a few minutes on the publication.
Part II dealt with subjects of repeated interest to the intelligence
specialist; Part III considered items in perspective with considerable
background treatment.
By 1966 the weekly assumed its present format. The trend or
background articles (former Part III) are published separately as
Special Reports, and the regular articles of the four major regional
subdivisions are preceded by a one-page "perspective" section which
permits the busy reader to see at a glance the significant weekly
developments in each area.
Several of OCI's publications and activities date from the early
1960's. Among the most important of OCI's finished intelligence pub-
lications are the Intelligence Memoranda (IMs). They were conceived
during the administration of President Kennedy to aid White House
Staff officials and have been used extensively by those officials and
their successors in subsequent administrations. Staff officials are
interested in knowing quickly OCI's viewpoint on international devel-
opments and, therefore, frequently assign short deadlines--on many
occasions a matter of hours. They are also interested in getting
background judgments on problems requiring policy decisions and those
related to implementation of policy. The IM is particularly chal-
lenging to the analyst because he has a highly-placed consumer, and
he has relative freedom in style and length to "speak his piece."
National Intelligence Survey Program
During this period OCI became increasingly involved in research
as the Office's participation in the National Intelligence Survey
(NIS) grew larger. The NIS Program was an outgrowth of the Joint
Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) of World War II days, and it
was established to preclude the possibility that the U.S. would ever
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again be confronted with ~e. lack of basic intelligence on foreign areas,
as had occurred during most of World War II. The JANIS was heavily
military in coverage, featuring maps with minimum text, and was de-
signed primarily for military commanders and planners. The peacetime
basic intelligence prograrl was to be wider in scope, with greater
attention devoted to poli=ical, sociological, and economic matters.
In the late 1940's the Central Intelligence Agency had been given
responsibility for coordinating the NIS research program, and other
departments of the U.S. GDvernment produced most of the sections.
The CIA funded these activities and acted as coordinator for the pro-
ject. However, a major change occurred in 1961 when Secretary of
State Rusk decided that the Department of State--which had produced
the political and sociological sections--would discontinue basic
research except for that connected with policy decisions. As a result,
writing of these sections for the single-volume General Survey for each
country became the respor..sibility of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Other offices of the Directorate of Intelligence have responsibilities
for other subjects; all the sections of the General Survey prepared in
CIA are under the contro:_ of the Office of Basic and Geographic
Intelligence.
Task Force Concept
Also during the 1961J's and particularly as a result of the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962 and its lengthy aftermath which made excep-
tionally heavy demands on the personnel resources of the Cuban desk,
OCI gradually developed a concept of operating an area task force to
meet the greatly expanded demands for intelligence analysis and pro-
duction during a crisis. In this responsibility it has the active
support of all offices cf the Directorate of Intelligence, the Office
of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Service. During the
Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 the Director of Central Intelligence
became involved in devising task force techniques and facilities. The
Kashmir Task Force of the autumn of 1965 was the first to occupy quar-
ters in the Operations Center where it had the advantage of seclusion,
superior communications facilities, easy contact with the Center's
Watch Officers, and quick access to a representative of the Clandestine
Service. From 1964 to L967, OCI improved the system of task force
management. The concept was notably successful with the Arab-Israeli
Task Force of June-July 1967, when the daily handling of the situation
brought general praise. OCI has also adopted special procedures for
functioning during a Presidential trip abroad. Here the security of
the President is the primary concern, but there is also special han-
dling of intelligence reporting to the Presidential party.
S E C R E T
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M 1. I I I I a I I I t l
ORC4tiTIZATION OF TFF O, ICE OF C=NT INTELLIGE ;CE
Office of the Director
DD/ I
Management
LStaff
Operations
Center
Special Projects
Staff
The Director (D/OCI)
The Deputy Director (DD/OCI) j--
Research
tal f
nrper
Cw_ Plans and Adair.
Develop en Technology Off
Ocer Officer
Far East
Division
Historical! ? NIS
Officer 10ff.
U.S.I.B.
National ^ dications
Center
Production
Staff
Presen- Reis try ' INDICC
Cations Sppt. Branch
Branch Branch I I f
Euopean
vidaleFast- ; western
Division Africa Herisp^ere
Division 1 Division
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C. ORGANIZATION
OCI has four geographic divisions for substantive intelligence
production and four supporting functional staffs, and manages the CIA
Operations Center. The branches within each of the geographic divi-
sions are small, and an analyst usually handles one or more countries
and is looked to as the authority on his areas. In the case of the
Soviet Union and Communist China, which are handled by one or more
branches, an analyst has responsibility for one or more aspects of
the country's political and sociological life or international posture.
1. The Four Geographic Divisions:
The European Division handles Western and Eastern Europe,
the USSR, and European and Communist international organizations. The
Far East Division covers China, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia,
and Australia and New Zealand. The Middle East-Africa Division covers
Greece, the Middle East and South Asia, and Africa. The Western Hemi-
sphere Division handles all countries south of the United States,
and dependent possessions of the European countries in the Western
Hemisphere.
The Four Staffs:
a. The Production Staff (see chart) is responsible for
reviewing, editing, publishing, and disseminating the regular publi-
cations and special current intelligence production of OCI. In addi-
tion, it prepares all-source current intelligence briefings, provides
current intelligence support to overseas stations by cable or
and monitors the contacts
Through the
e s a is responsible for alerting the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence and his principal assistants to important
news from the wire service tickers--AP, UPI, Reuters, FBIS--located in
the CIA Operations Center and for supplementing this information with
relevant data from classified sources. The Indications Officer (INDICO)
coordinates Agency support of the strategic warning responsibility of
the National Indications Center.
The Staff is responsible in OCI for central document control, for
the reproduction of the publications, and for operating a special courier
system needed for the sensitive materials.
b. The Research Staff is charged with stimulating research
throughout OCI. It has encouraged office studies, as well as joint
research projects with other components of the Agency, with other Govern-
ment departments, and with academic centers and research institutes. The
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Research Staff plans and cDordinates OCI's responsibilities under the
National Intelligence Survay program. In addition, the Staff monitors
the research and writing of OCI's history.
c. The Special Projects Staff provides substantive intelli-
gence support and planning that cut across the responsibilities of the
geographic divisions, including preparation and delivery of the Presi-
dent's Daily Brief and any required oral supplement to the written
analysis.
d. The Management Staff administers OCI's personnel, budget,
travel, training, logistics, and records. The Staff includes the Career
Development Officer and the Plans and Technology officer, who is con-
cerned with OCI's projected needs and role in the next decade.
3. The CIA Operations Center:
The Center, administered by the Director of Current Intelli-
gence as the agent of the DD/I, is charged with providing a 24-hour
intelligence alert facility. The Center is responsible for alerting
the White House, the Director of Central Intelligence, DD/I, DD/P, and
other senior Agency offic-_als to situations and developments requiring
their immediate attention, It also watches developments requiring
priority intelligence information collection, and it operates a Situa-
tion Room for the display of U.S. and friendly military operations and
critical intelligence situations. In addition, the Center is geared
to ensure the rapid movement of all incoming intelligence information
and its prompt evaluation, and to maintain close liaison with corres-
ponding watch centers in other parts of CIA and in other agencies.
Other duties include prod icing finished intelligence during off-duty
hours, with the assistance of appropriate OCI substantive elements;
facilitating the work of ad hoc intelligence task forces; operating
and controlling the CIA terminal of the Washington area high-speed
facsimile Long Distance Xerography (LDX) network; providing facili-
ties for the Clandestine Service Duty officer; and providing daily
support to the Directorate of Intelligence representatives abroad.
D. PROFESSIONALISM IN OCI
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As of may 1970, OCI had an authorized strength of persons,
of whom = were professionals and were secretarial an clerical.
The vast majority serve at Headquarters, although sixteen were on
PCS duty at several overseas posts and lesser numbers were in rota-
tional assignments with the Clandestine Service and other Agency
components or were attending institutions of higher learning.
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Many OCI employees have been hired directly from the academic,
professional, and business communities. OCI has also relied heavily
on the Career Training Program, and in May 1970 some 30 percent of
the professionals on duty were products of that program. The Office
has also drawn on the Agency's Skills Bank and utilized veterans of
OSS days. Some 32 percent of its professionals have been with the
Office for ten years or more.
Among the professionals there is a high level of academic achieve-
ment; only a small percentage does not have at least one college degree.
Some 45 percent have Master's Degrees, and 9 percent are Doctors of
Philosophy--many of these have MA's as well. The majority of all de-
grees are in the social sciences, particularly political science and
history. In addition, many analysts have personal backgrounds of value
to the Office as a result of residence abroad and a knowledge of foreign
languages.
The professional in OCI can increase his knowledge and expertise
both through a daily exposure to varied. sources of information and
through programs of travel and academic training. Since early in the
1950's, OCI has carried out an Area Familiarization Trip Program in
which the analyst can visit his area of interest, if it is not a denied
area, on a government-sponsored trip. OCI also sponsors employees for
university courses related to the employees work, and a number of em-
ployees have been able to use credits so obtained to satisfy the require-
ments for advanced degrees. Some professionals are sent to special study
programs, such as the China Area Studies now being featured at both
Harvard and California; others attend the senior service schools, such
as the Naval War College.
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PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
A. THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION
OCI strives for clear, non-emotional, easy-to-understand writing
which the busy Government official can quickly grasp. There is no
mystique to this writing Frocess, and any OCI analyst who thinks clearly
usually has a minimum of c.ifficulties with editors. Basic to the pro-
duction process, of course., is the analysis of the situation by the
trained observer and his writing of his interpretation in the format of
the proper publication.
1. Coordination:
One of the most vital steps in the production of an intelli-
gence report by OCI is coordination with other offices in CIA, and, if
the report is national intelligence, with other departments of the U.S.
Government. However, coordination is attained in a number of ways. It
may involve simple analys-:-to-analyst contact or it may require an
elaborate panel system or official review and sign-off by another depart-
ment of government.
The panel system of substantive and editorial review by representa-
tives of the intelligence agencies (CIA, INR, DIA) to achieve coordinated
national current intelligence began when the Central Intelligence Bulletin
replaced the Current Intelligence Bulletin in 1958. The system permits
an exchange of views at he production level and also provides for an
examination of each article by persons of divergent backgrounds and in-
terests. If a disagreement cannot be resolved at the panel meeting or
later between analysts, tie other agency can take a dissenting footnote
in which the disagreement is clearly spelled out, thereby permitting the
consumer to evaluate the two positions and draw his own conclusions.
The coordinating process is even more involves in the case of the
National Intelligence Surv. Upon receiving a manuscript of a section
of the General Survey of the NIS from one of the production offices in
CIA, the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence transmits the sub-
mission for coordination to INR and DIA. It is also sent to the appro-
priate American Embassy for comment if considered necessary by INR. This
coordination frequently Means extensive and detailed communication between
analysts; the Embassy, too, often sends useful and detailed data or evalu-
ations back to the producing analyst. Finally, after achieving coordi-
nation within the Intelligence Community, OBGI combines the various units
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received from all CIA components and other agencies into the General
Survey, edits the entire package, and publishes the complete product as
a coordinated document of the Intelligence Community.
In the case of departmental finished intelligence reports such as
the Weekly Summary and Intelligence Memorandum, the coordinating pro-
cess is far simpler and generally involves checking with other Agency
offices which have interest and competence in the subject matter. Par-
ticularly, in the Intelligence Memorandum the analyst must indicate the
extent of his coordination.
Editing and Review:
Generally, the editorial process in OCI occurs in two stages.
The regional supervisors review the analysts' work looking particularly
at the substantive treatment of the subject. They bring to the review
a wider scope than the country-oriented outlook of the average analyst
as well as a stronger feeling for the desires of top officials. There-
after, a Production Officer (PO), who is both experienced as an editor
and substantively informed about an area, checks the item for format
and grammatical presentation.
In the specific case of the National Intelligence Survey, which
has a rigid format and lengthy text, the editorial review is handled
by specialists in each of the geographic divisions.
Deadlines:
Deadlines play a significant role for many publications and
activities in OCI. Articles for the Central Intelligence Bulletin
should be ready for panel consideration in mid-afternoon, although
late arriving information or a fast moving crisis situation is gener-
ally sufficient excuse to forego the panel review. Articles for the
Weekly Summary should be to the editor by Wednesday afternoon to enable
the editor to plan the space allocations of the publication that evening.
Intelligence Memoranda often have short deadlines--12 to 24 hours--and
the analyst is further challenged because of the importance of the White
House Staff consumer. Deadlines for the National Intelligence Survey
are long--usually three to four months--but in view of the magnitude of
the writing task and the required research, the analyst is pressed to
turn out copy at a good rate.
B. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
1. Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The purpose of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), from
its inception in 1951, has been each day to inform the President and
high-level U.S. Government policy makers of the most noteworthy for-
eign developments and to provide an evaluation of them. The process
of "informing the President" does not necessarily mean that he person-
ally reads each edition of the publication; chief policy advisers on
the White House Staff have often briefed presidents on selections from
it. The CIB is the only national-level daily publication to be co-
ordinated and approved by the three major members of the Intelligence
Community: the Departments of State and Defense, and CIA.
The CIB is now published in three versions of different classifi-
cation, each designed for a specific readership. The most sensitive
goes only to some forty individuals who are senior advisers on foreign
policy. The regular codeword version goes to about forty offices; the
secret-level version is sent out in some 1,000 copies to analysts at
home and abroad. The classification and sensitivity of the source
material largely determine in which version an article will appear.
Although the same item may appear unchanged in all three versions,
the most highly classified version is usually abbreviated. In this
version only the most critical areas and the most critical situations
are covered. Its content averages five briefs and two notes, about
half the number in the morE! widely disseminated secret book.
The Bulletin is the national daily current intelligence output
of the Intelligence Community and can be regarded as a classified
daily paper for a highly sophisticated clientele. It is assumed that
the readers are interested in and knowledgeable about foreign affairs,
that they will achieve continuity by reading the publication daily,
that they are busy people who should not be burdened by unimportant
items, and that they turn to the CIB for informed interpretation of
both classified material ar.d subjects covered by the press.
The present format of the Bulletin represents more than a decade
of experience and adaptation, always with the goal of improving the
presentation of current intelligence for busy top-level officials of
the U.S. Government.
A brief contains about: 250 words. The first sentence, which
stands alone as a paragraph., contains the topical theme of the item.
The succeeding paragraphs usually describe the new development, add
pertinent background material, and, finally make an "outlook" assess-
ment. A note--some 11 to 1.4 lines in length--is a one-paragraph
comment on a situation without the introductory theme! sentence.
Notes are usually factual reporting where analysis is not needed,
follow-ups to a previous CIB item in which there has not been a
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major development since the last brief, or resumes of a developing
situation that is not yet of sufficient importance to present more
extensively.
Among OCI divisions there is considerable variation in the
production of a Bulletin item because neither the situation that
gives rise to an item, the way in which it is initiated, nor the
manner of its control in the branch and division can be standardized
into a strict procedure. One factor, however, is constant: the
situation must be significant for U.S. security interests and worthy
of bringing to the attention of top U.S. policy makers, particularly
those in the White House.
Let us assume that an item on Japan is written during normal
working hours and thus is given the normal editing and coordination.
In the morning's take of intelligence information, an analyst in the
Japanese branch of OCI reads a cable from the American ambassador in
Tokyo which analyzes student riots of the previous day and forecasts
that imminent disturbances will provoke police retaliation that could
bring down the government of Premier Sato. There is also a Clandes-
tine Service report of Communist leadership in one faction of the
student group. The morning's press carries an account of the rioting,
but does not make the dismal forecasts outlined in the State cable
from Tokyo.
The analyst confers with the branch chief about the situation
and the thrust of a CIB item. They decide to feature the threat to
Sato's government, and then, in the supporting paragraph of the item,
to discuss the previous day's rioting and Commu lvement. The
OCI analyst may call his colleague who handles I affairs in
the Clandestine Service for further details and tor his personal
evaluation of the CS source. He may may continue his coordinating activ-
Intelligence and Research for a quick reading of the situation. vy
Armed with this collective insight, the analyst then writes the 250-
300 word item based largely on the two relevant cables and the news-
paper report, but relying also on his accumulated knowledge.
When the item is completed, the analyst passes it to his
supervisor for review and then to the division's Production Officer
(PO) for editing. The PO has known since midmorning that the item
was being prepared and has informed the Panel Chairman and Panel
Secretary about its probable submission at a late morning planning
session. This session is- attended by each of the division POs, the
Panel Chairman and Secretary, and by representatives of the Office of
Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Carto-
graphy Division of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence.
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When he is satisfied with the item, the PO sends it to the Panel
Secretary who has it "put :)n the wire" (LDX) to contact points in INR
and in DIA for the Japan analysts there to examine. Before the 1530
panel meeting, the Panel Secretary and Panel Chairman review the item,
and may request changes in wording or content. These persons are also
concerned with the size of the CIB as well as the coverage of signifi-
cant world developments.
At the afternoon panel meeting, which is under the chairmanship
of a senior OCI official, are the Panel Secretary and POs from each
of the four geographic divisions of OCI, and representatives from the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the
Clandestine Service as well as from the Departments of State (INR) and
Defense (DIA).
The Panel Chairman tc.kes up each CIB article in turn, trying to
identify any differences of opinion. The articles are then referred
as necessary to the OCI geographic branches for the analysts or super-
visors to negotiate with their opposite numbers in State and/or DIA.
If there is an unresolvab:_e substantive disagreement, the chairman may
request the dissenting department to take a footnote explaining why
they do not concur. The CIB is considered to be the publication of
the Director of Central Intelligence and, therefore, CIA does not take
a footnote. Items based on intelligence information that comes in after
the panel meeting, or is based on sources not available to State or DIA
and therefore cannot be coordinated in a reasonable time, are bracketed;
asterisks are used to indicate that either State or DIA has not yet had
the opportunity to see the source.
After the panel meeting and after the final agreement between the
analysts, the Panel Secretary makes the final check and sees that the
Senior Duty Officer in the Operations Center and the Night Editor, who
will follow through on the item during the night, have been properly
briefed. The Senior Duty Officer watches the incoming intelligence
information until each version of the CIB is "put to bed" starting
about midnight for the secret version and ending with the highest
classified at 0500, so they can be reproduced and distributed to top
level consumers by 0800.
2. National Intelligence Survey
The finished irtelligence presented in the National Intelli-
gence Survey (NIS) is generally concerned with the description of
relatively unchanging natural features, fundamental. characteristics,
and basic resources of a foreign country or area, and covers its geo-
graphic, oceanographic, transportation, sociological, political, eco-
nomic, scientific, and military aspects. The NIS is a digest of basic
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intelligence, comprehensive in scope but selective in detail, designed
to provide the foundation for high-level operational and policy planners
in the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
military services and major military commands, and other government
agencies. The military are among its greatest users particularly for
briefing purposes--both formal and individual--as well as for opera-
tional planning dealing with specific objectives and situations. The
civilian officials, particularly those operating abroad, generally find
the NIS most useful for briefing and background information on countries
adjacent to the state in which they are located.
The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) provides direction to
the Program. It establishes broad policies, allocates responsibility
for production and maintenance of the NIS, sets priorities on indi-
vidual countries or NIS sections, and determines dissemination. The
NIS Committee, one of fourteen USIB committees, consists of represent-
atives from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of Army, Navy, and
Air Force. The CIA representative is the Director of Basic and Geo-
graphic Intelligence (OBGI), and he is chairman of the Committee. His
staff is responsible for general administration of the NIS Program. It
also provides the final editorial review of the NIS contributions to
ensure consistency and compliance with procedures and guidance promul-
gated by the NIS Committee, accomplishes the final processing and repro-
duction, disseminates the NIS in accordance with USIB policy, and
provides administrative services.
Some 120-150 geographic areas need to be covered and the program
has been set up to handle 30 General Surveys per year--usually each one
covering a single country. The decision as to which 30 will be produced--
either by initial coverage or by periodic maintenance--is decided by the
NIS Committee, which is guided by the requirements as well as by the
personnel resources of the participating agencies. Particular attention,
is given to the needs of the military services, which are among the
principal users of the product. Schedules are normally set up at least
one fiscal year in advance and usually about three to four months are
allocated for the writing of an NIS section of the General Survey.
The production offices of the Directorate of Intelligence and the
Clandestine Service, as well as offices in other U.S. Government depart-
ments, make contributions to the General Survey in their subject speci-
alities. OCI is responsible for the introduction, political and
sociological sections of the General Survey, plus a section on subversion.
The Introduction, or Significance of the Area, is a short exposition
of fewer than 1,000 words that succinctly examines the important character-
istics of the country, emphasizing those which determine its regional or
international significance.
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Subdivision 4, Sociological, of the General Survey covers the social
stability, characteristics of the society, population makeup and problems,
manpower and labor condi::ions, health and welfare, education, cultural
expression, and media of public information.
Subdivision 5, Political, of the General Survey describes govern-
mental stability; struct-.ire and functioning of the government; political
dynamics and the party system; key domestic, foreign and defense policies;
propaganda programs; vulnerability to subversion; and the police and
intelligence organizations.
The Section on Subversion assesses the general threat to the
country, factors bearing on insurgency and subversion, activity of the
local Communist Party and Communist fronts, non-Communist subversive
groups, and the government's countersubversive policies and activities.
The analyst, in undertaking an NIS section, consults with his
division's NIS coordinator to establish a deadline schedule and with
the current intelligence specialists to get the feel for the country.
He will ask the Central Reference Service for a machine-run on relevant
topics and then begin an extensive reading of classified materials as
well as unclassified books and periodicals to get the necessary back-
ground of factual knowledge.
Vital to a,good NI3 report is the preparation of a well-organized
outline of the proposed unit. Here the analyst uses his ingenuity to
adapt the general format to his individual country. Upon completion
the analyst looks to the branch chief for a substantive review. There-
after, the submission passes through a series of editorial steps which
ensure compliance with the proper format until the NIS section goes
from OCI to the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence for final
review and editing. In OBGI the manuscript is given to recognized
specialists in a certain type of subsection (e.g. education); then to
an overall editor who checks to see that the format has been followed
and that all required appendices and illustrative. material are in good
form. OBGI has in the meantime sent the submission for coordination
to the Departments of State and Defense as mentioned previously.
3. Support Furnished to the Office of National Estimates
OCI participates in ONE's production o national estimates
in several ways. The ONE Staff analyst responsible for writing the
initial draft frequently "picks the brain" of the OCI specialist on a
specific issue or a general problem. The ONE staffers also keep abreast
of OCI publications as part of their reading to maintain knowledge on
their areas of concern.
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For about ten percent of the estimates--especially those on a
specialized subject--ONE will request a written contribution from OCI.
The OCI contribution is usually factual and is sometimes used as an
annex to the basic estimate. Later on, OCI will usually be asked by
the ONE Staff to make comments on the draft estimate, and the appropriate
specialist from OCI will sit in on the first discussion of the draft by
the Board of National Estimates. Sometimes he or she takes part in
subsequent stages of redrafting and coordinating the estimate.
4. Support for the Watch Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board
The National Indications Center, manned by CIA, NSA, and
the Armed Services, is the joint operational and administrative staff
of the USIB Watch Committee. The Center collates, analyzes, and eval-
uates intelligence materials received from the Intelligence Community
to support the Watch Committee's mission of providing the earliest
possible intelligence warning of, and continuing judgment on, any
threat from Communist states.
Indications intelligence deals with a military threat to the
United States, its forces, or its allies. It is generally strategic
intelligence even though the Watch Committee gets into the most min-
ute tactical details, like identification of specific small military
units. Indications intelligence is a form of current intelligence
although it is focused on the specific problem of possible attack.
The Center is also charged with updating the Indications List
and making indications assessments. The Indications List applies to
the USSR particularly and is a compendium of concrete actions which
the USSR would be expected to take in preparation for war.
The Center, under the direction of a senior OCI official, has a
complement of some thirty people drawn from CIA, NSA, and the three
Service intelligence organizations. Of these, eleven compose a sub-
stantive staff and another eleven a watch component. The rest are
supervisory or clerical. The Department of State is represented in
the Center only during a crisis. The Air Force provides the Center's
facilities, as well as its deputy director.
Within OCI, the Indications Officer (INDICO) has the responsi-
bility for scanning incoming intelligence information for data
pertaining to strategic warning of enemy attack and for ensuring
that proper coordination and cooperation is maintained with the NIC
in the Pentagon. He also serves as a relay point for reports, infor-
mation, and requests from the Center to the offices of CIA. An
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important segment of INDICO's activity and responsibility is to
assist in the preparation of the Watch Committee's weekly report.
Early in the week the staff of the NIC drafts a Preliminary
Watch Report from the responses of the participating agencies to an
agenda previously circulated. INDICO receives copies of this report
and distributes it to OER., OSR, OSI, the Chief of OCI's Production
Staff, the Far Eastern Division and the European Division of OCI,
and to any other components that may have an interest. At a subse-
quent meeting of interested specialists, a CIA position is reached
and the NIC quickly advised.
On Wednesday morning the USIB Watch Committee, attended by
INDICO and other CIA representatives, meets at the NIC and goes
over the new draft, which reflects changes suggested by the par-
ticipating agencies. After accord is reached, the final report is
prepared by NIC and sent to the agencies for their formal approval.
On Thursday the Watch Committee report becomes the first order of
business at the USIB meeting, and upon approval is then transmitted
to top level interested U.S. Government officials. In addition, it
is cabled to intelligence officials in the
C. DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE
Some of OCI's most significant intelligence production is not
coordinated with other agencies of the U.S. Government. Although
such publications do not carry the blessing of the Intelligence
Community, they nevertheless may exert a great influence on the
specialized consumer. One of these, the President's Daily Brief,
is a personal intelligence report from the Director of Central
Intelligence to the Presicent. OCI's Intelligence Memoranda are
designed for highly-placec consumers in the White House Staff and
elsewhere and are responsive to their particular needs in support
of policy formulation and of planning the implementation of policy.
OCI's Weekly Summate is valuable to the foreign affairs specialist,
and is particularly useful for personnel stationed abroad--civilian
and military--who need to be continuously informed of world-wide
developments.
1. President's Daily Brief
The Brief, begun for President Kennedy in 1961, is a
personal report for the President. Its format, style of presenta-
tion, and time of delivery at the White House are adapted to the
tastes and desires of each President. The Brief tries to anticipate
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policy questions and such special requirements as those which arise
from the forthcoming visit of a foreign dignitary or from Presiden-
tial visits abroad. The publication is not coordinated with other
intelligence agencies, but within CIA the items for the Brief are
coordinated by the writers with analysts in OCI, OER, OSI, OSR, and
FMSAC when relevant. The PDB is reviewed by the Director of Current
Intelligence, and advanced drafts are sent to the Director of Central
Intelligence and the DD/I.
The President's Daily Brief is all-source and makes heavy use
of CS cabled intelligence information reports. The articles offer
a comprehensive survey of the day's receipt of intelligence informa-
tion compressed into from two to five legal-size pages. The style
of writing is informal and succinct. The items combine facts and
intelligence judgments and are based on the assumption that the
President is generally acquainted with each subject. It is pub-
lished every day except Sunday and is now delivered to the White
House at 0630.
Weekly Summary
The Secret level Weekly Summary--and its more highly
classified version--reports current intelligence in more perspective
than is possible with the close deadlines and space limitations of
the daily Bulletin. It is able to provide the continuity that the
daily lacks, and to present more speculative judgments than is pos-
sible in the coordinated CIB. Because of its wide geographical and
topical coverage, the Weekly is an excellent global wrap-up for over-
seas posts that need information on world situations apart from those
of their own immediate concern. Usually accompanying the Weekly
Summary are from one to three separately published Special Reports
that in some six or eight pages examine a country situation in more
detail than is possible in the Weekly itself. In July 1969 the ap-
proximate weekly dissemination outside CIA was: Weekly Summary,
1,000 copies; and Special Reports, 630 copies. Highlights of the
Weekly Summary are also sent out by cable to CIA stations and some
military commands.
There is considerable variation in the length and manner of
presentation of articles in the Weekly Summary, but articles in this
28 to 32 page publication generally are about 450 words long and di-
vided into recognized parts. The title is itself a summary--"Middle
East Situation Remains Critical"--rather than only a label. The first
paragraph, of one or more sentences, contains the conclusion devel-
oped later in the article. The follow-up paragraphs, unlike those in
a newspaper where the important news comes first, are arranged to
support the discussion. Ideally, each begins with a topic sentence.
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The last paragraph is often an outlook on how the situation may
develop and its implications for U.S. security interests (usually
stated in terms of its implications for the country involved rather
than for the U.S.). A summary of the salient points of the article
is placed in the table of contents and generally forms the highlights
sent by cable to overseas posts.
The Special Report starts with an introduction that contains
information not repeated in the body of the article and that leads
naturally into the first background or detailed sections of the
article. The main section begins with a historical or other logical
opening and proceeds into a discussion of the problem at hand. It
ends with a section that speculates on the outcome.
Preparation of the Weekly Summary begins on Monday morning when
analysts in OCI, OER and OSR consult with their supervisors about
possible topics. In mid-morning there is a Planning Meeting of Pro-
duction Officers from OCI and representatives from OER and OSR with
the Weekly Chairman and the Weekly Secretary at which the publication
is planned. Articles on non-crisis situations are due the following
day; those on crisis areas, at midweek. By Thursday noon the space
allocations are rigid and there can be no significant change in length
or content of an article. The Weekly Summary is printed Thursday
evening and distributed to the Intelligence Community on Friday morning.
There is extensive coordination among the components of the
Agency in the production of an article for the Week. Analysts
consult widely within the Office of Current Intelligence, and with
colleagues in OER and OSF--occasionally with ONE and the Clandestine
Service--when necessary. Both OER and OSR contribute a significant
number of articles to the. Weekly dealing with economic and military
developments.
Intelligence Memorandum (IM)
The IM style is more flexible than that of many other OCI
publications. There is usually an introduction or summary of several
paragraphs that outlines the problem. This is followed by the main
text, numbered by paragraph, which is a logical development of the
subject. Frequently, the text begins with a brief history of the
situation, is followed by a discussion of the various salient fea-
tures, and ends with an cutlook section. The approach may vary
considerably from one memorandum to another, however. The length is
also flexible--three to ten pages are usual, but 25 to 50 are not
uncommon. Like other intelligence publications, the Memorandum
strives for clarity and unbiased presentation. It is designed for
readers who are interested in the subject at hand and willing to
give some time to reading; about the problem.
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The IM may provide an unusual challenge to the analyst from
three viewpoints; it is a response to a specific request--often from
a high level official, it frequently poses difficult deadline require-
ments, and it permits the analyst to combine background and relevant
facts of a situation in one article. An IM requested by the White
House Staff or high CIA officials receives priority treatment and
generally comes with a tight deadline and little advanced warning.
The deadlines are often one working day or less, though in the case
of generalized background articles the deadline may be several weeks.
The IM often receives top level scrutiny in OCI and CIA because of
the importance of its requesters, and after passing through the usual
editorial process the Memorandum is reviewed by the Chief of the
Production Staff before being submitted to the D/OCI, DD/I and the
Director of Central Intelligence for approval to disseminate. Each
Memorandum states clearly which office prepared it and the extent of
coordination within CIA.
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A. SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OCI has three si-gni::icant roles in supporting the National
Security Council and its subordinate bodies. (The OCI briefing
function is discussed lai_er.) Most of this support is directed
toward the policy recommendation function of the Council, which
is conducted by the NSC Review Group.
The National Securij:y Council, before making a policy decision,
often has a response to a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)
prepared on the problem at hand. The NSSM is frequently sent to the
appropriate offices in C::A for preparation of the response. In the
period from January to July 1969, OCI prepared or coordinated the
response to fifty of these Study Memoranda.
A second type of support is given to the NSC Review Group,
which is charged with preparation of the agenda items for policy
recommendations by the NSC. The CIA representative on the Review
Group is the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and he may ask the
OCI desk analyst to prepare a paper or to comment on a memorandum
initiated by some other office. Such contributions stress the
intelligence information pertinent to the situation.
Another form of NSC support involves OCI's relationship to the
Interdepartmental Groups (IGs). Five of the six IGs are responsi-
ble for geographic areas, and the CIA representative (the appro-
priate area chief in the Clandestine Service) looks to the OCI area
specialists for substant:ve support. This support ranges from
informal oral comments to formal papers presenting the CIA position.
B. OPERATION OF TASK FORCES
1. Area Crisis
An area task fo.-ce is activated when the DD/I or D/OCI
decides that a situation has become critical from an intelligence
standpoint, that special production procedures are necessary, and
that a 24-hour watch by area experts is required. The branch
personnel, augmented by analysts from other components who may be
able to make contributions, are located in the Operations Center,
where they have special cable facilities, graphics displays, and
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administrative support. All offices in the Directorate of Intel-
ligence are instructed to establish named contact points for easy
communication with the task force. Close communication is main-
tained with the Clandestine Service to facilitate the quick exchange
of information and the levying of collection requirements.
Personnel are organized into shifts for round-the-clock
operation, and the task force leader--usually the regional super-
visor--assigns responsibilities for reading incoming intelligence
information, writing situation reports, and preparing the regular
publications. Most task forces produce three or four situation
reports a day. Each maintains a log so that each shift knows what
the previous shifts produced and what production requirements were
levied on them. In Complicated situations, such as the Arab-Israeli
crisis of 1967, a liaison officer is appointed to handle contacts
between an interagency working group for the entire Intelligence
Community and the DD/I's task force. This man assigns requested
memoranda, or other production requirements, to the task force or
appropriate agency component and monitors their production and
eventual dissemination.
During the administration of President Johnson, OCI partici-
pated in 18 area task forces. A few task forces, such as those
dealing with Greece and Cyprus, lasted for only a few days; the
task force handling the first Dominican Republic crisis in 1965
lasted for several months. The lives of several task forces
dealing with specific major developments in Vietnam were of inter-
mediate length.
2. Trips of the President and Vice President
A trip abroad by the President or Vice President is
generally known several weeks in advance, and support procedures
can be instituted well before the actual journey. The Office of
National Estimates, in consultation with OCI, prepares a Special
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on security conditions in
the country or countries to be visited. After publication of the
SJ\IE, OCI has the responsibility for its daily update in the form
of a memorandum. In some cases, memorandum production may commence
a month before the trip and continue for its duration; however, a
shorter time span is more usual. During the trip, the task force
functioning in the Operations Center will maintain an elaborate
graphics display. The task force prepares daily cables on events
of interest both in the countries to be visited and in surrounding
areas, as well as significant items not covered in the regular
publications. OCI's regular publications are transmitted to the
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Presidential party--usually in special cable versions at times
convenient for the party.
On two occasions, such as President Johnson's trip to the Far
East in October 1966 and the summit meeting at Punta del Este in
1967, OCI personnel have acted as briefing officers for the Presi-
dential party. In perform' _n this service they have helped to
Lessen the demands on who could then devote
more attention to security problems. During the Johnson adminis-
tration, there were seven ?residential trips. President Nixon was
Similarly served during his trip to Western Europe and his round-
the-world journey in 1969.
4~. THE WATCH AND ALERTING FUNCTION
The CIA Operations Center, (see following chart) which is
Located in the OCI area and is managed by the Director of Current
Lntelligence for the DD/I, provides a number of special facilities
and services 24 hours a day. A Senior Duty Officer (SDO), who is
supported by three Watch Officers, is the single point of contact
with the other Operation G.nters in CIA and in the Intelligence
Community. He is responsi:)le for alerting the Director of Central
Intelligence, the DD/I, and all other senior Agency officials.
The Watch Officers receive and screen all incoming intelligence in-
formation on an all-source basis, including press teletype. Internal
and external alerts are issued and selected intelligence information
Ls rapidly disseminated within the Agency.
The responsibilities of the Operations Center are particularly
heavy during the hours from 1700 to 0800 weekdays and throughout the
weekend, when only a few of the regular OCI staff are on duty to
support the SDO. The SDO must keep the Central Intelligence Bulletin
current by checking both classified traffic and press ticker to change
articles already prepared, and add new items.
The personnel of the Operations Center also furnish close support
for each task force. An all-source working area is set aside for the
exclusive use of a task force where telephone services for all four
systems (black, red, green, and grey) are available. Facilities are
available to permit the rapid establishment of field teletype tele-
conferences. A second task force can be handled by converting the
Situation Room into a task force space.
The Operations Center is well equipped with communications
facilities. There is twenty-four-hour service on the four telephone
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1 1 l l I [ L k l 1 1 1 1. (
SECRET
THE CIA OPERATIONS CENTER
WHITE
HOUSE
? Int. Sit Room (manned
by 7 duty officers from
OPS Center)
PENTAGON
? National Indications Center (N I C)
? National Military Command Cenfpr
(NMGC} by4btrtyof.fronOPS Ceti.
?DIA?Intlliq i Support~Snd.Cai.(L6IC)
STATE
?Op Center
?RCI Watch
PRODUCES or SUPPORTS
Presidents Brief
CIB
Nigh+ Journal
Infelligeoce. Memoranda
"selects',
AM Br of ng of DCL
Indications Control Officer
ATSPEC
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NSA
RECEIVES
CIA Reports
State Cables
Milifory Cables
FBI Reports
Preis 4Radio
Lin AP, UP1,Reuhcra hokere)
Comi
Tripartite link mwssages
Other
U n9enc4 p annmg a
miIitar~ optrations
ALERTS ~ CONSULTS
Senior CIA officials CIAanalys+s
USIB officials Gable seoretaria+
Senior US govt. I W
officials WWhitt No ~ . m.
u 1~TSPEC
N I C
State operations Center ~ RCI
DIA (151C)
JCS (NMCC)
Army,Navy,Air
NSA (Command Center)
AEC
FBI
OSA
? Office of Special Activities
CABLE SECRETARIAT
HOUSE KEEPING
? Functions in Off Duty Hours
ADMINISTERS or CONTROLS
(espOutside rwrmal duty hoarse
On call" lists
Motor Pool arrangements
Printing graphic requirements
Courier service
Security problems
Intelligence Support of DC I
#24 HRS.-A- DAY COMMUNICATION ~ EXCHANGES
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In addition to the communications facilities, the Operations
Center can provide typing, reproduction, and clerical support around
the clock. The Center also provides space for the President's Daily
Brief group, and the News Analysis Officer who disseminates press
ticker during normal working hours. An overnight editor, with pro-
duction support, operates in the Center from 2230 to 0700 each day.
The Clandestine Service Duty Officer, who is assigned space in the
Center, receives all operational traffic and acts as the non-working
hours alerting officer for the Clandestine Service. In the Situation
Room, the Center prepares and maintains graphic displays and textual
data on U.S. and friendly military plans and operations. The room
is available for briefings, for conferences, and for use as a second
Task Force Area if required.
The night SDO is responsible for preparing the Operations Center
Night Journal seven days a week. This is a two- or three-page publi-
cation that gists important cables or press items received during the
night that the SDO believes top Agency officials and area analysts
should be aware of at the opening of b.isiness. The SDO also briefs
the Director of Current Intelligence or his deputy on world-wide
developments at the opening of business each morning.
The Operations Center has a special relationship with both the
White House Situation Room and the National Military Command Center
(NMCC). The CIA Center supplies duty officers--who serve under
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White House direction--to ensure that material received in CIA is
transmitted expeditiously to those on the White House Staff who need
to have the latest intelligence information. The Operations Center
also mans a 24-hour liaison desk in the NMCC as CIA's link with this
organization in the Pentagon.
D. BRIEFING AND LIAISON ACTIVITIES
1. Briefings
The Production Staff of OCI is the focal point for CIA in
the preparation of briefings to be delivered by the Director of
Central Intelligence and other top Agency officials to a wide variety
of audiences. The Staff accommodates its style of preparation to the
Director's manner of speaking--informal and conversational, using
colorful words and colloquialisms when appropriate--that enables him
to read the notes without appearing stilted. By reading prepared
notes, the Director is ab:_e to discuss highly technical and contro-
versial subjects without danger of misstatement. Ii addition to the
formal briefing, the Director is provided with backaip material, pro-
viding either further details on the major subject or short resumes
of other topics on which he might be questioned.
In addition to standardizing the submissions of the various
contributing geographic and functional offices of CIA, the Production
Staff provides a substantive review of the draft notes, ensuring that
all facets of a problem are accurately discussed, that no information
is taken for granted by area specialists, and that statements that
might be inappropriate for political or other reasons are deleted.
It also arranges for graphics and follows through to see that they
are accurate. The briefings are organized in outline form: by one-
sentence principal thoughts (I, II, III, etc.), supported by e::plan-
atory statements (A, B, C...), each in turn buttressed by relevant
supporting discussion (1, 2, 3, etc.).
The National Security Council and congressional committees are
among the most significar.t regular audiences for t1te Director. During
L969, the Director gave twenty-five briefings to the NSC and fourteen
briefings to congressional groups. In addition, he occasionally
briefed the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs.
In most cases, the notes were specially prepared fcr the event, with
little hold-over from previous briefing.
In addition to preparing briefing notes for the Director, the
Production Staff gives weekly current intelligence briefings to the
staff of CIA's Office of Personnel and of the CIA Library. In addi-
tion, a large number of briefings are given by sup_,_rvisors and
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specialists in OCI's geographic divisions to a wide variety of CIA
and other government officials.
E. PARTICIPATION IN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES
Throughout the period of OCI's existence, its analysts have
frequently been called upon to serve as the Agency or Office repre-
sentatives on committees of the Intelligence Community and of policy-
making agencies in the government. In his capacity as an Agency
representative, the OCI specialist has a primary responsibility for
furnishing intelligence pertinent to the needs of the committee.
These committees vary widely in their formality of organization
and membership, their functions, and their duration. The committee
dealing with the Rhodesian question was active for only about two
years: that concerned with the Berlin problem has continued for a
decade. Frequently, an interagency crisis committee is allowed to
recess when the crisis cools down and then is reactivated if the
situation again becomes critical.
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S E C R E T
The finished intelligence required for U.S. National Security
policy making and implementation during the next five years will be
increasingly national, as opposed to departmental. This will be
true both in localized political turbulence in the underdeveloped
world and in troubles between the great powers. Research.and analy-
sis regarding Communist China must be greatly increased during this
period, without relaxing any of the effort devoted to the USSR.
Vietnam is likely to demand attention, even after a cease-fire, for
a number of years.
The volume and detail of intelligence information will increase
appreciably. It is anticipated that clashes of interest among nations
may well continue to occur at least as frequently as in the past few
years, and new armed conflicts are likely. New technical intelligence
collection systems likely to be operative in the 1970's will have a
sharp impact on the current intelligence program. To handle the
greatly increased volume of information and to exploit the material
properly, OCI probably will have to make very rapid analyses of data,
expand after-hours shift operations, require analysts to develop new
skills in the rapid interpretation of information, and purchase new
processing equipment.
Many OCI analysts i:a the 1970's will be assisted in their work
by computers. The recently installed IBM 360 Model 67 is intended
primarily for use by analysts at Headquarters. Analysts will operate
this time-sharing computer through typewriter keyboards (called remote
terminals) which are tied in to the computer. The analyst will be
able to put into the computer memory any information he wants stored;
he can develop programs for manipulating the information; and he can
get the computer to print out on his terminal some of the stored in-
formation, or the results of manipulation of the data. In the future,
it will also be possible. for the analyst to call on data and programs
which other analysts have put into the computer's memory. The com-
puter output may either be printed out by the typewriter, or may be
shown on a cathode ray tube.
In the future, computers may disseminate inte=lligence information
to analysts, thus making possible a reduction in the number of docu-
ments which the analyst receives in his inbox. The texts of documents
would be placed in the :omputer, together with the identification of
analysts who should see them. At the analyst's command, the computer
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would show documents on the cathode ray tube until the analyst stops
the display, or until the documents keyed for him have been exhausted.
When he sees part or all of a document which ha would like to have in
his own computer file, he could have the text transferred from the
disseminating computer to the time-sharing computer.
For several reasons, the computer is not as useful to the
current intelligence analyst as it is to the researcher. Because
most current intelligence information, by its nature, is of value
for only a relatively short time, the OCI analyst is less likely to
build the large background files required by analysts doing long
term economic and military research. Furthermore, relatively little
current intelligence information is received in quantitative terms
and seldom lends itself to arranging in tabular form. Moreover, in
view of the amount of time and work involved in converting present
document files into computer files, when computer dissemination
becomes available the current intelligence analyst will begin putting
his current document flow into the time-sharing computer while con-
tinuing to draw as well on his manual files until they are sufficiently
outdated to be discarded.
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The following readings are either illustrative of the philosophy
and concepts pertinent tc current intelligence or are descriptive of
various components or related activities of the Office of Current
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Intelligence. Exce t for I I of the Board of National Esti-
25X1A mates, and I of the Office of Economic Research, all
authors are or were members of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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INTELLIGENCE FOB THE POLICY CHIEFS*
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In this discussion of intelligence needs at the top national level
and some specific ways in which they are filled, I shall be speaking
from the perspective of CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence. I
will not attempt to speak for the other organizations of the Wash-
ington intelligence community or pretend to be presenting the whole
picture.
First it will be useful to say who the people are that are served by
what we call national, as opposed to departmental, intelligence. We
start with the President, of course. But we must take into account
certain members of his personal staff and in particular his special
assistant handling national security affairs and his staff. Next
come the heads of departments, in particular State and Defense, the
military chiefs, and the heads of independent agencies dealing with
foreign affairs. Then there are numerous interagency bodies estab-
lished for the purpose of recommending policy; the Committee of
Principals on disarmament is an example. And at the senior level
are also the regional proconsuls, such as Ambassador Lodge in Vietnam
and Ambas;uador Bunker in Santo Domingo, who have been delegated
extraordinary authority.
But in the end the buck stops at the President's dese, and the advent
of the nuclear age has greatly multiplied the number of things he
must decide personally. He has almost become, in Richard Neustadt's
words, "a decision machine." His decisions in international affairs
are influenced by many people and institutions, but in particular by
those just mentioned.
The requirements for intelligence at this national level are particu-
larly fascinating because they are so kaleidoscopic. They change
with the men, they change with the times, they change with the bureau-
cratic structure, they change with each policy decision. As a result,
it is possible to generalize only most broadly on the needs of the
Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1967), pp. 1-12.
**I I is a senior CIA current intelligence officer.
The article is adapted from a paper he prepared for presentation at
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senior policy maker. He certainly must be provides, if possible, with
what he thinks he needs to know. He sometimes shorfld be provided with
things the intelligence Ieople think he should know. Often he must
be given material which in the beginning neither he nor the intelli-
gence officer realized wculd be needed--material generated by the
interaction between the two as they work together.
Lines of Contact
The most direct way of finding out what the senior policy maker needs
is to ask him. Fortunately, all DCI's have had regular direct access
to the President and have not been reluctant to ask. what he wants.
Meetings in person or talks between the two by phone are more frequent
than most people, including Washington political insiders, realize.
Mr. McCone, for example, met every morning with President Johnson
throughout the first weeks of his administration to deliver an early
morning intelligence brief.
There is of course a limit on access to the President and the time he
has available. But we are in frequent touch with the other senior
policy makers, who not only know their own needs but have a pretty
good idea of the President's. Then communication and rapport with
the President's immediate staff are of great importance. These men
close to him are in the best position to make his reeds known. At
present they usually do this by telephoning the Director or his
Deputy for Intelligence.
We are constantly receiving requests for information and analysis
from the White House staffers who handle national security affairs,
and it is an advantage that some of our former officers have served
or are serving on this staff. For example, when Q received
his special assignment to concentrate on South Vietnamese problems
we asked him how, as a former member of the Office of National Es-
timates, he felt we could best meet his needs. He asked for a
periodic summary of econonic and pacification developments in South
Vietnam, information that tends to get buried in the welter of
military reporting, and we now have such a weekly publication tail-
ored especially for him.
Moving from the White House to the Pentagon, the Agency has an in-
telligence officer serving, in the office of Secretary McNamara.
He is attuned to the Secretary's needs and levies many requirements
on us for him. These supplement those that come directly from M--.
McNamara through his frequent meetings with the Director.
Over at State we have a new mechanism called the Senior Interdepart-
mental Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of State and compri-
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sing top representation from agencies concerned with foreign
affairs, including the DCI. The SIG is responsible for insuring
that foreign policy problems requiring interdepartmental attention
receive systematic consideration. It stands at the apex of a
series of Interdepartmental Regional Groups chaired by the Assis-
tant Secretary of State for each region. Intelligence is repre-
sented on each of these groups, too. They thrash out new regional
policy recommendations which then move on through the Senior
Group to the Secretary. In essence, the new system attempts to
apply in Washington the country-team approach of a large American
embassy abroad. We expect these groups to become particularly
important in the slower-moving policy problems; the big, Class-A
flaps tend to bypass any set institutional framework, generating
their on high-level task forces responsive directly to the
President.
Outside the departments there are the several statutory or ad hoc
committees with special tasks in the field of foreign affairs.
Intelligence is represented on many of these bodies, for example
on the Economic Defense Advisory Committee concerned with Western
multilateral trade to Communist countries and on the Advisory
Committee on Export Policy handling U.S. unilateral controls.*
Last but by no means least, to discover the needs of the policy
maker there is always the "old boy" net: people we have known,
gone to school with, worked with, played with, fought with, and
whom we are now in contact with either on the policy level or in
intelligence components. To take one good example, one of our
representatives eight years ago at the first Intelligence Methods
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us and we know them, we get a constant stream of suggestions as
to the needs of the men above them, and we usually hear quickly
when what we produce fails to meet those needs--so that we can
try again.
Tailoring
How do the needs of the senior policy maker, these "national" re-
quirements, differ from departmental requirements? To my mind
they can be distinguished in two ways: first, if they involve more
than one department's interests and it is either difficult or
plain impossible to separate out each department's responsibility;
* See "Intelligence for Economic Defense"
in Studies VIII 2, p. . .
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second, if they are so critical that the judgment c.' -more than one
department is desired. More simply, you might say that when any
of the people or groups we have been taking about asks you some-
thing, you know it is a national requirement because they are all
involved in the making of national policy. It is a-most impossible
today to identify a national policy matter that lies wholly within
the sphere of one department.
What level of detail does the policy maker require? No clear-cut
answer can be given. In the Cuban missile crisis one did not have
to be clairvoyant to know the President was himself handling all
the details of the naval quarantine and that he personally wanted
to know the exact location of every Soviet merchant ship that might
be bound for Cuba. We dii not wait to be asked, we simply sent
the information on as fast as we obtained it. At certain points in
the Laotian crisis in the spring of 1961 also, it became obvious
that, as Ambassador Winthrop Brown put it, the President was the
"Laotian desk officer." And everyone knows how gre-dy for infor-
mation an area desk can be.
There are some other maxims. Anytime the lives o1 a country's
nationals, civilian or military, are endangered in foreign countries,
the highest level wants to know about it quickly and in as much
detail as possible. Communist kidnapings in Latin America, heli-
copter shootdowns in the Berlin area, or for that matter shootdowns
anywhere--in all these cases the President wants to get the com-
plete word. These days when ne must spend a great deal of time
with the Vietnamese war, we have found it wise to e_2r on the side
of giving too much in this field rather than too li-.tle.
Beyond these cases where it is obvious -that you shoot the works,
there are only rules of thumb. We have come, :fbrturately or no,
a long way since the good old days of the one-page precis so fav-
ored by General Marshall. If we are specifically a.-:ked for some-
thing by a senior policy maker and no length is mentioned, we write
as much as we think required to do the job, no more. Then we ask
someone to review it and c:ut it in half for us. If this cannot
be done--or even if it car:--we put a summary up front.
If we have not been asked specifically but feel it desperately
important to get something; across to the senior policy maker,
brevity is the overriding virtue. Conclusinns and hudgments are
the nub; argumentation car cone later. If his appetite is whetted,
if lie wants to know more, or if he violently disagrees, we expect
to pick up some feedback somewhere along the line sc that we can
follow through with more detail as necessary.
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It is here that the regularly scheduled publication, the daily or
the weekly, comes into play. By and large we find that such pub-
lications prepared for senior policy makers should hit the high
spots. It is not necessary for them to carry all the classified
news that's fit to print. They should serve rather as an alert to
any developments which might directly or indirectly affect the
nation's security. In the course of preparing them every bit of
information the intelligence officer can get his hands on is re-
viewed, but it is then put through a very fine screening. If the
policy maker wants more on a given subject or if the intelligence
officer thinks the policy maker needs more, a separate memorandum
or paper is written.
Communication Hazards
There are always difficulties in maintaining contact with the policy
maker. One difficult situation is when he is on the road--how to
get to him in an emergency, how to keep up his continuity of infor-
mation. We have partly solved this one through a system of briefing
cables tailored specifically for the high-level traveler. They
consist in the main of a synopsis from our daily publication sup-
plemented by material in which the traveler may have a special
interest because of the area he is visiting or the people he is
meeting.
Sooner or later, a period seems to come when the demands on the time
of the senior policy maker are so enormous as to preclude our get-
ting through to him in any way at all. In these circumstances we
can only wait for an opening and hope he may be able to take a
quick look at our regularly scheduled intelligence publications.
In these we note the things that he really should not miss even
if he is spending 100% of his time on Vietnam or the Dominican
Republic.
When Mr. Kennedy became President, he brought with him a deep in-
terest in foreign affairs, a voracious appetite for reading, a
retentive memory, and above all a different style of doing things.
Our publications in January 1961 simply did not fit his needs.
Our primary daily publication was the Central Intelligence Bulletin.
It had been expressly asked for by President Truman. Then it was
specially adapted to meet President Eisenhower's needs, and al-
though we had tried to alter it further it did not suit President
Kennedy's style and he did not read it.
We were thus without a daily link or any periodic link with which
to carry out our critical alerting function. We bent every effort
to restore contact. Finally we succeeded, adopting a new publi-
cation different in style, classification, format, and length but
not different in fundamental concept--a medium whereby we present
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I? I
to the President in the tersest possible form what he should know
about the play of the world for that day, particularly as it im-
pinges on U.S. national security interests. This publication be-
came the President's alone, leaving the Bulletin to serve readers
at the next level down.
There remains one other basic problem of communicat_.on with the
policy maker. That is that the desk-level intelligence analyst,
the fellow at the heart of the process, is never going to have
all the clues to what is making the high-level world go 'round.
He does not sit in on the National Security Council sessions. The
Director, who does, cannot; for various reasons--the need-to-know
principle, the sheer physical impossibility of spreading the correct
word and feel down far enough.--fully communicate it to the analyst.
I submit, however, that the analyst is not thereby relieved of his
responsibility to keep track of developments in national policy.
The daily press and the favored columnists are excellent sources.
If the President or the Secretary of State delivers a speech on
foreign policy, it will be revealing and should. be read. I sus-
pect that the percentage of intelligence analysts who read such
speeches is still far from 100%. You hear the argument that the
less one knows about policy the more objective one's analysis is.
But the counterargument that you cannot produce intelligence in
a vacuum, cannot recognize threats to U.S. policy interests unless
you know what those interests are, seems to me overriding.
From Need to Deed
So on the question of requirements for intelligence at the national
Level, we might summarize as follows: In large and complex gov-
ernments, there are no siriple ways to determine the full range of
the policy maker's needs. They change as situations emerge, devel-
op, and subside. Comnunication--free and easy contact in an
atmosphere of confidence-??is essential to the smooth working of
the intelligence-policy relationship. Mechanisms can be estab-
lished to speed the flow of intelligence up and requirements
down, and these mechanisms are essential. But nothing is so
valuable as an effective person-to-person relationship. In our
country all policy author__ty and decision rest ultimately in one
man. It is he that intelligence must serve.
Now we turn to how we go about filling the policy maker's needs,
however expressed or divined. This is a discussion of technique,
and form, and formula. Again let me stress that I am not saying,
"This is the way to do it," but "This is the way we in CIA are
doing it." We do it both by working in concert with other members
of the intelligence community and by preparing unilateral reports.
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The scope of the information we process is determined by the
nature of the information that comes in and by the range of national
security interests it impinges ono The form in which it is pro-
cessed is determined by the requirements of the consumers, in
particular the quite personal requirements and preferences of the
President. From the beginning almost twenty years ago, the DCI
has considered his role to be that of the President's number-one
intelligence officer, responsible for seeing to it that the Presi-
dent is kept unexceptionably informed and directing the work of
the entire intelligence community to that end.
In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the White House has
generally preferred to deal with big problems by calling together
the top policy makers, putting all the available information on
the table, and then discussing possible courses of U.S. policy
and action. This method of operating places a premium on rapid
intelligence support. "Rapid" does not necessarily imply crash
assessments, thoughts formulated on the run. It is more often a
matter of reshaping or resynthesizing for the occasion the assess-
ments we have already published in our regular production routine.
I want to underscore the importance of a deep and stable base of
day-to-day intelligence production. This is what enables us to
respond quickly to -big and little flaps, whatever the subject or
area.
Re oilar Production
The routine production base includes three national intelligence
publications representing the coordinated views of the intelli-
gence community and dealing respectively with past, present, and
future. The past, so to speak, is represented by the National
Intelligence Survey, an agreed-upon basic compendium of factual
detail and historical development. The future is represented by
the National Intelligence Estimate, containing the best thinking
the community can put forward on a given problem for future U.S.
policy. The present is represented by the Central Intelligence
Bulletin, the daily which brings current developments to the atten-
tion of high-level readers in brief form.
The procedure for coordinating the evaluations made in the Bulletin
among the agencies of the intelligence community may be of interest.
Each day the items are drafted in the CIA Office of Current Intel-
ligence, often with help from analysts in CIA's economic, scien-
tific, and technical research components, and circulated to the
community by secure communications channels. They are reviewed
by the competent desks and branches within CIA, in the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
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at the State Department, whose representatives then meet in the
afternoon, bringing such changes, additions, or deletions as the
desks may have suggested. An agreed version is hammered out, foot-
notes being used, as in national estimates, to register any sharp
dissent. By six o'clock in the evening the draft Bulletin consti-
tutes agreed national current intelligence. Before the publication
reaches its readers at the opening of business the next morning,
however, it has to be updated. We in CIA make the changes uni-
laterally, so marking them. The Bulletin's reporting on Vietnam,
for example, will incorlorate information receivee'_ up to 4:30 in
the morning: this is not an hour conductive to formal coordination.
Besides coordinating these community publications we produce others
under the CIA imprint, some of which may also be coordinated with
other agencies. A weekly world roundup reviews current reporting
in a little deeper perspective, and one or two special annexes
accompanying it usually treat some current problem in a fairly
comprehensive way. Then there are regular publications for particu-
lar purposes such as a daily Vietnam situation report, the weekly
Vietnam report I mention=d, a weekly tailored to the needs and
agenda of the new Senior Interdepartmental Group, and monthly
compilations on shipping to North Vietnam and Cuba.
Special Publications
A problem common to these regular issuances is created by the con-
flicting demands of classification and dissemination. We want to
serve as broadly as poss_ble everyone in the government requiring
intelligence information for the performance of his duties. On
the other hand, we want to be able to publish information of the
most restrictive classifications. We tightly limited the dissemi-
nation of the Central Intelligence Bulletin from its inception
in order to make its content as comprehensible as possible. But
new collection mechanism, with highly compartmentalized reporting
systems now supply information which cannot go ever, to all recip-
ients of the Bulletin. 'There are valid reasons for the restrictions,
but they make it impossitle to serve the Director and the Presi-
dent adequately with normal publications.
We are therefore forced to create new and ever more tightly con-
trolled special publications for these readers. They are pre-
pared by a very small number of senior officers and go outside
the Agency in only a very few copies. Their content is governed
by the concept that there can be no piece of information so highly
classified or so sensitiv-6 that it cannot be passed to the Presi-
dent. The main one is th? President's Daily Brief. It generally
follows the lines of the :Bulletin, but it contains added material
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too sensitive for the wider audience and is written in a more
sprightly style, with less concern for citing the evidence under-
lying the judgments expressed.
Inevitably, some such publications become more widely known and
get into such demand that their dissemination creeps up, no matter
how hard we fight it. At this point, lest the added circulation
destroy their purpose, we put sensitive information on a separate
page included only in the copies of the prime recipients.
The trouble with regular publications, in addition to the classi-
fication problem, is that they tend to have fixed deadlines, for-
mat, and dissemination schedules and hence suffer in flexibility
and timeliness. As a result, we have been turning increasingly
to individual intelligence memoranda to meet many of our respon-
sibilities. Then we can let the requirements of the particular
case dictate the deadline, the format, and the distribution, as
well as the classification.
For the CIA research components one of the most important devel-
opments in recent years has been a sharp increase in the servicing
of policy makers with memoranda and longer reports devoted to par-
ticular policy issues. This reflects both a more sensitive appre-
ciation on our part of precisely what kinds of intelligence are
required and a growing awareness among policy officials that in-
telligence can be responsive and helpful on some of the more
troublesome questions underlying their decisions. A few of the
economic studies done recently in support of policy decisions
have been on the effects of economic sanctions against South
Africa, the logistic situation of the Communist forces in Vietnam,
the effectiveness of U.S. bombing there, the consequences of cer-
tain proposed actions in the Zambia-Rhodesia crisis, and the impli-
cations of change in U.S. economic policy toward the Communist
world.
From scientific and technical research come, for example, special
memoranda concerning foreign military research and development,
especially in the USSR and Communist China, for consumers such as
the President's Scientific Advisor and Advisory Board, the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Director for
Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense.
These officials have an important role in determining the direction
U.S. military research and development must take to counter the
Soviet and Chinese threat. They often require more detail than is
presented in the standard National Intelligence Estimate, or they
require very specific answers to equally specific technical ques-
tions. Such memoranda are often accompanied by a briefing.
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The intelligence memorandum originally prepared in answer to a
specific request from a senior policy maker also tends to generate
additional, self-initiated memoranda either to update the first
response or to insure that the recipient, in concentrating on a
narrow aspect of a problem, doesn't overlook something else that
is germane. Finally, in servicing such requests from the policy
maker you build up over a period of time an intuitive sense of
what he is going to ask, and you anticipate it.
The Operations Center
Another way we endeavor to insure that we are providing timely and
useful intelligence support is to know what is going on with U.S.
operational forces. We have found that our top customer regularly
expects a full picture of any crisis situation, particularly where
U.S. forces are involved or may become involved. To be able to
marry the kinds of data wanted on U.S. operations with the customary
intelligence on foreign activities and developments, the intelli-
gence producers need regular inputs not only from the intelligence
collectors but from the operators. We need immediate access to
the operational people in National Military Coamand Center in the
Pentagon. We need to know the directives State is about to send
to embassies in crisis situations.
To deal with this problem, we have recently expanded our former
Watch Office into an Operations Center. The Center continues to
have the watch office function of filtering incoming; information
and alerting the proper people as necessary. Outsice of normal
office hours it is directed by an experienced generalist of or
rank. It has teleprinter service from the
STATSPE and from the National Secure y Agency. It has
u7cure teleprinter and voice communications with the White House,
Pentagon, and State Department, and through these switchboards
'.with American military and governmental outposts all over the
~,Jorfd. The amount of information received and screened in the
"enter in now running in excess of a million items a year.
'!'he Operations Center main-;ains up-to-date briefing information
on critical situations and areas in a special situation room. When
!;here is a major flap, a task force with representat-.ves from all
of the components involved can be pulled into the Center to op-
E?rate there on a 24-hour basis if necessary. (At one period we
Lad four task forces going--on Vietnam, the Dominican Republic,
Indonesia, and Kashmir. I muse say it got a little crowded in
there.) During the Dominican crisis, the Director called for
situation reports every hour on the hour, around the clock. To
a certain degree Vietnam reporting now remains in the same category.
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The point is, of course, that the policy makers have gone tactical
in their concerns, and apparently this is the way it will be when-
ever the United States is engaged in a fast-moving potentially
dangerous situation. At such times the President and his top cabi-
net officers become involved in day-by-day and hour-by-hour opera-
tional planning, down to the selection of targets and the deployment
and commitment of troops. This is because of the world-wide poli-
tical implications of tactical decisions today, and it is made posi-
ble by the capabilities of modern communications systems. The
situation room in the White House is manned by seven of our exper-
ienced watch officers borrowed from the Operations Center, who
are no longer completely unnerved to find the President peering
over their shoulder at almost any hour.
In summary, we might say that in a system to support the senior
policy maker two ingredients are essential--a good production base
and a readiness to adapt it as necessary. One must be alert to
the changing needs of the policy maker, and be ready to meet them.
Above all, there must be a pool of experienced intelligence officers,
both generalists and specialists, with continuity in their jobs
and objectivity in their outlook. Ted Sorenson wrote in Decision-
Making in the White House:
No President, of course, pays attention to all the infor-
mation he receives, nor can he possible remember it all.
What he actually considers and retains may well be the
key to what he decides, and these in turn may depend on
his confidence in the source and on the manner in which
the facts are presented. He is certain to regard some
officials and periodicals with more respect than others.
He is certain to find himself able to communicate more
easily with some staff members than others. He is cer-
tain to find that some reports or briefing books have a
'igher reliability than others.
We want the policy maker to be confident that in asking us for in-
telligence, he is getting as knowledgeable, pertinent, unbiased,
and up-to-date a presentation as it is possible to provide.
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The capabilities of U.S. intelligence have improved markedly in
the course of the last fifteen years or so, but in the same period
expectations about what it ought to be able to accomplish have
probably grown even faster. This is natural enough, and probably
professionally salutory for those who ply the trade, since most
people need demanding requirements to keep them up to the mark.
In any case, the government spends a great deal of money to equip
itself with good intelligence and is rightly impatient with any-
thing less than the best. But the situation does carry irritations
and hazards for the professional. It is comparable to that in
modern medicine, wherein improvement in techniques and medications,
by giving rise to anticipation of consistent success, makes occas-
ional failure a doubly grievous matter.
And by some standards intelligence fails more than occasionally,
since it is considered in many quarters to have fallen down on
the job if there takes place anywhere in the world an important,
or sometimes even mildly interesting, political event which it
had not heralded in advance in a way to make the warning stick
in the minds of its consumers. We are all familiar with the quer-
ies and the resulting search of the record to find cut whether
top officials had been warned of such and such a development prior
to its occurrence, and if not why. The short answer is often that
these officials had indeed been warned, sometimes repeatedly, but
won't admit it. This is the one likely to jump to the tongue of
the participant \in the post mortem, whether intelligence collector,
analyst, or estimator: he had reported a week or month ago that
coup plotting was afoot in Ruritania and the government's position
was shaky, so nobody should have been surprised when it was thrown
out last night.
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* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 1965), pp. 15-21.
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Whether or not anyone should have been surprised, however, the
fact is that they often enough were surprised, and so inclined to
ask why. Except in a narrow and not very profitable way, the anal-
yst or estimator cannot meet the question by pointing out that an
estimate or a current intelligence daily "covered" yesterday's big
event when it noted weeks or months ago the possibility of a coup
in Ruritania. Too often that report has been forgotten in the in-
tervening stream of intelligence issuances and other papers or their
equivalent in briefing sessions. Unless the consumer has been in-
formed recently, and with sufficient emphasis and impact to make
it stick., he has not in an effective sense been warned.
The following observations on this subject are intended neither as
a defense of the intelligence community's record nor as definitive
analysis and solution of the difficulty. The problem of crisis
anticipation and early warning will continue with us, I suspect,
despite the recurrent efforts of this computer age to gear machines
for effective and reliable prophecy in these soft areas of intel-
ligence; here art, old-fashioned expertise, and a judicious amount
of imagination still count for more than science. But while these
reflections can offer no new secret insights or intellectual break-
through, it may nonetheless be useful in a professional journal to
record some guidelines and techniques derived from experience in
asking the questions, if not always giving the right answers.
Varium et Mutabile
The obvious first consideration is that the world itself is a
chancey and uncertain place, in which change, sudden or gradual,
is more the rule than the exception. One need only compare the
world today, or any area of it, with what prevailed 10 years ago
to get a measure of the flux we live in. Technology, altering
the lives and the thinking of men everywhere, has been accelerating
the pace of even the most massive historical trends, the kind that
used to take decades to work themselves out. To take one conspicu-
ous example: with some stretching of the historical imagination
one can imagine a colonial revolt against imperialism getting
under way a century ago and gaining wide support in various parts
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but one can scarcely picture
such a movement winning'hands down, but for a few isolated spots,
in little more than a decade. Yet this is what happened in the
last 15 years, and the accompanying turbulence has generated some
of the principal problems for U.S. foreign policy and intelligence
during most of our official careers.
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In this world and this period of history, the intelligence analyst
and his customers are going to be nearer the mark if they think of
change as more or less constant, and the main quest__on as being
not whether but when and how it will manifest itself. Unless proven
otherwise, it should be assumed that a given society is changing
daily. We face a semantic: pitfall in the possibilic.y of inferring
from the overworked term "stable" or "stability" that things are
remaining static; this attribute is often ascribed to a kind of
mere surface calm below which change and flux are going on all the
time.
If accepting the fact that change is normal and widespread predis-
poses us favorably, it st::ll does not begin to solve the problems
arising from what we have to work with in forecasting a particular
change. In most cases the raw material of the evidence is neces-
sarily fragmentary and inconclusive, and as it is rounded out it
normally becomes not the stuff of early warning but news of current
events. A number of things contribute to the poor quality of evi-
dence on future developments.
One is the sheer impossibility of keeping track of the moves of
every individual, organization, or government that cay be in a
position to change things in some part of the world. This dif-
ficulty is compounded when the success of the move for change
depends on the ability of the promoters to keep it secret. If the
coup plan that gets leakei is the one most likely to be frustrated
by its enemies, it follows that a lot of such impending moves that
have been reported either do not come off or go quite differently
than anticipated. No one in the early-warning business can afford
to overlook such reports in his own calculations, but some of them
are going to prove ill founded by reason of the same lack of secrecy
that led to our getting them.
There is also the intrinsic element of caprice in the affairs of
men and nations. Some events cannot be predicted because the
principals seize sudden opportunities to act or are reacting to
sudden stimuli, unforseen and quite unforeseeable by those on the
spot. If the participants themselves could not have predicted
the turn of events, the most sensitive and pervasive intelligence
systems would not be likely to do better. It is probably a salu-
tary sign of awareness of such limitations that the unanticipated
fall of Khrushchev was nct followed, at least to my knowledge, by
stern admonitions to the intelligence community to reform its pro-
cedures and sharpen its sense of urgency.
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S E C R E T
Shotgun and Pinpoint
For those charged with intelligence warning there is of course a
simple and appealing solution to these dilemmas--to point the gun
in all possible directions. Warning always of everything gives
you a technical defense against the charge that you failed to pro-
vide warning; it is also likely to lose you most of your readers or
listeners and beat the remainder into a state of permanent hysteria
or hopeless apathy. It is doubtful that anyone could be got to
read an estimate or current intelligence paper big and fat enough
to cover all the dire possibilities, and it is certain that the
inflationary effect of this course on the value of intelligence
warning would be ruinous.
A cardinal principle of effective warning intelligence, then, has
to be selectivity. Selectivity involves rejection, and rejection
involves risk. If intelligence is to eschew the shotgun approach
in the interests of being read and respected, it will have to pick
from the voluminous mass of often fragmentary and sometimes contra-
dictory data a limited number of items to pass along, and sometimes
what it rejects will later prove to be important. The hope is that
the error will be corrected in time by the receipt of information
supplementing or shedding new light on the rejected item and so
promoting it out of the rejection category. Or perhaps another,
better or luckier human mind will encounter the same fragment of
information and respond more sensitively and perceptively--hopefully
well in advance of the event it foreshadows. In the best of cir-
cumstances, however, selection will occasionally eliminate something
that subsequently proves to have been important stuff. It is the
argument of this essay that an occasional miss of this type is
preferable to the overprudent shotgun alternative.
Criteria: Likelihood
Now even a highly selective warning system will have to deal in
possibilities more often than in probabilities or near-certainties.
Reasonable prudence requires that a government be prepared, at any
given moment, to cope or at least live with a number of contingent
possibilities only some of which will in fact materialize. If
something could happen, it had better be borne in mind, whether it
will "probably" happen or not. This being the case, some fairly
substantial proportion of the warnings delivered will in the event
prove exaggerated or will otherwise not be borne out by subsequent
developments. (Sometimes the fact that a warned-of development
fails to come off may be due to U.S. action triggered by the warn-
ing; here intelligence has done its job to perfection even if its
prophesies fail to come true.)
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S E C R E T
Errors on the side of caution are less harmful than neglect of
warning, but they are not harmless. A false alarm will normally
be overlooked or forgiven much more easily than a failure to call
the shot on something that does happen; but both are errors and
both ought to be on the consciences of those in the warning busi-
ness. Most of us recall with acute pain instances in which in-
telligence failed to forecast something that did occur. A re-
view of the dangers and opportunities warned of that did not mater-
ialize may give less pain but is still sobering.
Importance
The area between these two kinds of error thus represent one of
the criteria in the process of selection--degree of likelihood.
The standard is admittedly a fuzzy one. A second criterion offers
somewhat solider ground, na4iiely the importance of the matter being
warned of. It is often, though not always, easier to judge how
significantly some contingency would affect our interests than how
likely it is to occur. Common sense and a reasonable familiarity
with the scope of our go-Ternment's interests and activities usually
enables us to tell whether some forseeable event would be of cri-
tical, great, moderate, little, or no importance to national or
departmental interests. In any case the policy makers' judgment
on this score can supplement our own.
The complexity and many responsibilities of a government like ours
suggest that very few foreign developments would fail to be of
concern to some department or program. As a criterion for warning
selection, then, the question of importance probably refers less
to whether than to whom to warn and how. Some predictions should
have top billing in national intelligence publications or briefings,
others more subdued treatment in departmental or specialized is-
suances. The criterion is thus most usefully relevent to selection
for briefings and publication at the highest levels.:
It is this writer's subjective and purely personal opinion that
the application of more vigorous standards in this respect would
have a salutory effect on the bulk and readability, and hence on
the impact, of most intelligence publications, not excluding the
national estimates. An urge for completeness and detailed per-
fection is a good thing, but sometimes an inordinate amount of time
and energy is spent in perfecting presentations of detail which can
make no earthly difference to policy decisions but confront already
overburdened readers with more information than they want or need
to know. This is not an argument for either carelessnes or super-
finality but a plea for the classic virtues of brevity and concen-
tration on the essential as still useful in our line of work.
S E C R E T
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Imminence
The criteria of likelihood and importance for determining whether,
how, and to whom to give early warning are supplemented by a third,
that of imminence, which is most relevent to the choice of when to
warn. This timing is often of critical importance, for policy
makers are as human as the rest of us and busier than most. On
the higher levels they are subjected to a mentally exhausting
barrage of publications and briefings on a host of subjects, and
in the daily round of attending to inescapably urgent things,
some of the rest are going to be remembered and some are not.
Selection in the light of imminence is a matter of avoiding un-
acceptable extremes, warning too early or too late. Logically
it might seem the earlier the better, giving as much time as
possible to do something about it, but this logic leads to pre-
senting a catalog of all kinds of important things that may or
are likely to happen eventually. Though it is unquestionably
desirable to look ahead, in appropriate context, with a general
prediction of developments that seem ultimately probable, our
problem here is a pointed particular warning at a time when some-
thing can and should be done about it.
Even the most prudent and forward-looking administration cannot
give as serious attention to a problem forseen five years ahead
as to one shaping up next week. It is not just that something
postponable is crowded off the stage by real and present dangers;
there is often little that can or should be done about some foreseen
events until they are closer at hand. There is always the chance
that the contingency will not arise when expected or not at all.
It is true that in addition to delivering specific warning at the
right time, intelligence has a responsibility to keep its consu-
mers sufficiently aware of the remoter contingencies, of what
Walt W. Rostow recently described as "the relevence of the less
obvious."* It has to do this without dulling their senses or
straining their patience with frequent laundry lists of all imagin-
able horrors. I confess it is much easier to state this problem
than to offer any but the most banal answers. One line of pro-
cedure, however, while more the result of evolution in the art of
* In a lecture on "The Planning of Foreign Policy," given at the
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins
University and published in The Dimensions of Diplomacy (E.A. Johnson,
ed., Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 19
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policy making than of intelligence innovation, does offer the in-
telligence officer some help. I refer to the increased emphasis
in recent years on isolating and studying very long-range policy
problems--issues of a sort which may not require U.S. counter
action for several years to come. It may be debated whether the
policy lines worked out in these exercises will in most cases be
followed when the moment for action comes--certainly it will not
be just a matter of lifting a ready-made "courses of action" for-
mula out of the files--but the long lead-time concept is salutory
for policy planning, and its acceptance makes the job of intelli-
gence warning a few degrees easier and conceivably a bit more
fruitful. In an uncertain world perhaps we can't ask for much
more.
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The question of the extent to which the U.S. intelligence assess-
ment of foreign situations is biased by already established govern-
ment policy toward them is a delicate one and in all its ramifi-
cations too complex to be broached by a junior trainee like the
present writer. But any student with access to the materials can
sample one aspect of it by separating off a particular fairly
clear situation and examining the community's finished reports
on it for signs that their objectivity has been impaired by the
policy makers' views. This is what I have done, taking as sample
the National Estimates, articles in CIA's Current Intelligence
Weekly, and State's INR publications concerned with the situation
in Portuguese Angola over a period of about two years.
Here the established U.S. policy, first publicly declared by
Ambassador Stevenson in the United Nations in March 1961, is one
of support for Angolan self-determination and of opposition to
Portugal's resolve to keep the colony, which was legally declared
a "province" in 1951. Evidence that the finished intelligence
reports had been affected by this policy was found in their phrasing
and emphasis, in their omission of facts reported from the field
(by tie U.S. I attaches, the American consul in Luanda,
and the clandestine services) which could be cited in favor of the
opposing Portuguese policy, and in their measurement of Portuguese
performance against standards set up by t1hP U.S. policy. In these
respects the National Estimates showed the least anti-Portuguese
bias, the INR publications the most.
* Studiee in Intelligence, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1963), pp? 55-59.
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National Estimates
Although the four estimates between 1959 and 1962 which treated
the subject of Portugal's overseas territories seem to be for the
most part objective, they do contain a few manifestations of bias.
In an NIE of 21 July 19,19, it is said that
Portuguese policy is a curious mixture of indifference
to the lot of the native, half-hearted efforts to elevate
him from savagery, repression of all dissident voices,
and cheerful assertion that in fact no problems exist.
Hyperbole and ridicule cf this kind are clearly inconsistent with
objectivity. It is possible, however, since the estimate antedates
the public declaration cf U.S. policy, that this is an instance of
personal rather than policy bias.
An NIE of 11 April 1961 estimates that Salazar
may take some measures designed to give the impression
of liberalizing the colonial regime.
This statement implies, first, that no measures of reform had
theretofore been taken, and second, that any reforms in the future
would be made only in order to influence world opinion. But re-
ports from the field shcw that some reform measures had already
been taken and that currently schools for African- are being built
rapidly and public health facilities greatly expanded and improved.
It seems clear that the Portuguese have concluded, whether reluc-
tantly or not, that reforms must be made if t:iey are to stay in
Angola; and they are determined to stay. Given their lack of re-
sources and the conservatism of the government at home and in
Angola, it is not surprising, that the reforms are neither sweeping
nor rapid. But it is unrealistic to assume that what measures are
being taken are designed only to impress international opinion.
The Portuguese have never been terribly concerned by adverse public
opinion before, and it is unlikely that they would_ now base their
policy on it.
Several passages in the estimates also leave an exaggerated impres-
sion of the "rigid, harsh, and penurious" conditicns under which
the average Angolan lives. Conditions in Angola are far from
utopian for the African, but the field reports supply evidence that
they are not so bad as generally believed. This evidence is not
presented in the NIE's. On the other hand, it was only in an NIE,
of all the finished reports, that a reference was found to the "un-
usual cruelty on both sides" in the rebellion.
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Many of the estimates' conclusions were the same as those which
have been reached by U.S. policy makers--that the Portuguese are
likely to have continuing troubles in Angola, for example, and
that reform will have to be considerable if the situation is not
to become explosive. One cannot say whether this is because policy
influenced intelligence, because intelligence influenced policy,
as it should, or because the evidence led both independently to
the same conclusions.
Current Intelligence Weeklies
Examining seventeen articles in the Weekly from May 1960 to April
1962 covering the Angolan situation, I found no evidence of a lack
of objectivity prior to the U.S. declaration of policy, but begin-
ning in April 1961 there was a prejudicial omission of mitigating
material contained in the field reports. In these articles there
are several references to "brutal repression" on the part of the
Portuguese armed services and civilians. According to reports
from State and Army personnel on the scene, the attacks of the
African terrorists have been equally brutal. For example, one
State despatch said that Africans were "killing white families,
mulatto families and native Africans who had not joined their
movement with equal and impartial brutality." Reports of African
brutality have also appeared in the New York Times. This the
Weeklies do not mention anywhere, leaving the impression that there
was no provocation whatever for the Portuguese reprisals.
There is also considerable discrepancy between the articles and
field reports with regard to the extent of Portuguese brutality.
In the panicky month following the uprising, according to the latter,
there were indeed indiscriminate acts of cruelty and reprisal on
the part of the Portuguese authorities and civilians in Angola,
and some groups of innocent Africans were killed or driven from
their homes in both official and vigilante-type actions. The re-
ports go on to say, however, that since the Portuguese army moved
into Angola in force there have been only isolated instances of
such reprisals. The army officers in the north, feeling that the
natives in that area had some reason for revolt, have instituted
a policy of j'sychological rehabilitation." They are laying out
new villages where they can protect the natives, assisting in the
construction of homes and schools, and encouraging rebels and ref-
ugees to return to their homes with no punishment. The civilian
Portuguese often regard all Africans as rebels or potential rebels,
but the army discourages this view and is trying to avoid indis-
criminate acts of violence. The Weekly articles do not mention
this effort of the Portuguese army to deal with the situation;
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they make no distinction between military and civilian actions.
They also do not mention the statements in field reports that
Portuguese retaliation and cruelty have been greatly exaggerated.
INR Publications
Although the INR publications carry a caveat that they do not
necessarily reflect Department of State policy, the two Research
Memoranda and the one longer Intelligence Report covering the re-
bellion in Angola do seen. to have been written in support of policy.
One of the Research Memoranda begins by setting up the standard,
The U.S. had hoped these reforms wuuld set the stage for
(1) a marked improvement in the status o'' Africans, and
(2) eventual self-determination in the provinces.
and then proceeds to measure Portuguese performance against this
U.S. "hope," reporting for example that
...the Portuguese seem to have little unc_erstanding
of, or inclination toward, the positive programs
needed to prepare either the African for full parti-
cipation in modern political or economic life or the
overseas provinces for ultimate self-determination.
and concluding that
The rigid atti-;ude of the present government offers
no hope that the principle of self-determination
will be accepted in the near future.
Thus Portuguese policy is judged in the light of what the U.S.
policy maker thinks should be done in Angola. Moreover, the pub-
lications openly show their anti-Portuguese bias throughout. They
refer continually to "brutal repression" without mentioning the
provocation of African terrorism and cite alleged traits of Portu-
guese national character:
The recently reinforced police, in conjunction with
the large military garrisons, can and have suppressed
nascent subversive movements with characteristic Portu-
guese thoroughness and ruthlessness..
They speak of Portuguese reforms with tongue in cheek and point
again and again to the disparity between principle and fact in the
Angolan society. Disparities are evident, but inless the field
reports are all wrong reforms are really being undertaken.
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It is interesting to see the great discrepancy between the reports
of the consul in Luanda and the INR publications. The consul is
not all-out Portuguese; he is quite critical of many aspects of the
policy in Angola. But he also brings out things that show the Por-
tuguese in a favorable light, for example the steps toward economic
and educational reform, the good race relations which obtained in
Angola until 1961. He stresses his conviction that statements about
Portuguese brutality and the extent of rebellion have been greatly
exaggerated, a conviction substantiated by reports from the British
and American attaches. But these points do not appear in the De-
partment's intelligence publications. They are not explicitly
discounted or denied; they are simply ignored.
Conclusions
As a trainee, I have been led to believe that intelligence should
present and analyze the facts in any situation in as completely
objective a way as possible, and further that it should present
all of the relevent facts regardless of whether or not they sup-
port a given government policy. In varying degrees the publi-
cations on the Angolan situation I examined did not live up to this
ideal but manifested an anti-Portuguese bias and disregarded infor-
mation favorable to the Portuguese viewpoint reported from the field.
On the basis of the material that was available to me I would there-
fore conclude that the intelligence community's coverage of the An-
golan situation has not been completely objective and has not pre-
sented all the relevent facts. If this is true, it raises a seri-
ous question in my mind: If policy makers do not receive complete
reports and objective estimates from the intelligence community,
to whom do they turn for them?
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STYLE AND 'STEREOTYPES IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES*
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Droning monotony, fancy jargon, and Victorian stuffiness in govern-
ment prose, long the butt of an excessive amount of satire, have
again become a favorite target of journalists. A top official of
the Department of State acknowledged the vulnerability in a recent
speech before a group of career officers in his agency. Pointing
out; his concern over the abstruce style used in the reports which
he received, he made a plea for the revival of the straightforward
"declarative sentence" and for direct expression of ideas.
In this wave of public baiting intelligence writing has not been
singled out for special attention, for the obvious reason that it
Is classified, has limited distribution, and does meet a high stan-
dard. On the other hand, it has certainly not escaped periodic
,jibes, often justified, from intelligence writers and editors and
from the recipients of their products.
A truism about any form of communication is that effectiveness de-
pends on not only what :_s said but how it is said. Format and
style are perhaps even more important in intelligence than in most
forms of writing. A keen analysis of any given event or develop-
ment can be mangled in the process of presentation, for example
by burying the critical portions in superfluous detail. The em-
phasis on brevity and charity in intelligence reports implicitly
recognizes that the key officials who are of influence in the for-
mation of our foreign and defense policies are under a variety of
pressures and demands, that they can devote only a limited part of
their time to the great volume of intelligence materials which flow
across their desks. Aware of this competition for time and attention,
all intelligence producers would like to feel. that their efforts are
presented as sharply, clearly, and effectively as possible.
* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring L964), pp. Al-5.
is a current intelligence analyst.
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Mass Perfection
A uniform style adopted by all producing agencies and for almost
all types of intelligence production has been perfected to a degree
which may have reached the point of being self-defeating. Extreme
uniformity, even in perfection, risks having a deadening effect.
Regardless of originator, subject matter, area, or type of study--
from reports of coup attempts and general political estimates to
specialized economic surveys--finished intelligence is beginning
to have a remarkably familiar ring. How necessary is this uni-
formity?
Intelligence style has had to develop within the strict framework
of acceptable official prose and of course is limited by these for-
mal confines. However, since the product is classified and not
subject to general scrutiny, it would appear that intelligence com-
ponents should have at least a little more flexibility of expression
than other government bureaus. In addition, it would have been
reasonable to assume that the different intelligence agencies and
the several staffs for different types of intelligence production--
basic, current, estimative, etc.--would have attempted to achieve
some degree of individuality, each developing its own style and
format. But quite the opposite has happened.
One of the causes of uniformity is the widespread and recurring
use of a high percentage of :fashionable words and phrases derived
from an invisible elite phrase book. Thus intelligence studies
are generally chock-full of such words as image, posture, mystique,
offload, dialogue, presence--terms currently considered choice in
government, journalistic, and academic circles. To borrow a phrase
from the sociologists, "cross-fertilization" explains the wide pro-
pagation of these terms. All producers are perusing the output of
the others and consciously or unconsciously borrowing or plagiari-
zing from it. This literary osmosis soon becomes a kind of disease
which adversely affects good writing.
The Editorial Compulsion
Not content with the osmotic leveling, editors have exercised their
authority to impose an extreme rigidity of style on intelligence
publications. Their usual explanation to the writer is that the
next echelon of editors will perform even more drastic surgery on
a manuscript if it is not carried out at the initial stage. Other
rationalizations for manuscript changes go something like this:
"We just don't use this word (or phrase)." "This is inappropriate
to our style."' Or "the chief simply writhes in anger whenever he
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sees this word." Most frequently, however, editors make changes
in the interest of "the reader" (aka "consumer"). The editor
smooths the ruffled feelings of the analyst in the following terms:
"The reader will see a double meaning in this idea." "The reader
won't understand the terminology in this context." "The reader
will infer such-and-such from this paragraph." The clairvoyance
of editors with respect to the thoughts and reactions of this lone
reader is nothing less than preternatural. Embarrassingly, however,
their psychic or telepathic finds are occasionally reversed by the
higher editorial echelon, which not infrequently restores the anal-
yst's original phrasing or something like it.
No one would deny that intelligence production of all types re-
quires a closely controlled style and format in order to fulfill
its purposes. Considerable uniformity is inevitable, in part
because of the pressures of deadlines and the variance in writing
skills among analysts. If the latter were unleashed to give ex-
pression to their personalities in their reports, ,haos would soon
reign and the reputation of the producing component be ruined.
Some stereotyping, moreover, is necessarily introduced by the pri-
mary additive of finished intelligence--interpretation, estimates,
analysis, meaning. These cannot be couched in absolutes, and the
English language has jus so many synonyms to qualify unknowns and
signal the difference beu;ween fact, reported fact, and significance.
The words possibly, probably, likely, unlikely, may be, seem, almost
certainly, according to, presumably, allegedly, ostensibly, belie-
ved to be, and a few others are bound to recur in intelligence
writing. They are accepooed as indispensable guide7_ and warnings.
But there still remains a small degree of undeterma_nism in the re-
latively rigid framework of both style and format. And this small
bit of leeway could prov:de a refreshing breath of variety in in-
telligence presentation, sharpening the interest and receptivity
of the reader. For example, editors might lower the bars slightly
to permit the occasional passage of sentences beginning with "But"
or "And," a form of sentence structure widely approved in the best
grammatical circles and highly effective when used sparingly. Or
a single striking phrase without a predicate. The granting of such
small liberties might encourage initiative and ori;;inality among
analysts who otherwise tend to feel too hopelessly tethered by edi-
torial regulations. Too often an analyst will. excuse a perfunctory
job of writing and organ=_zation on the ground that "the editors
will rewrite the piece anyway, so why waste my time on anything but
the content?" A greater flexibility in presentation than may be
possible for periodic reporting under short deadlines would be
feasible for special studies and memoranda which develop a subject
in depth and detail and at greater leisure. An occasional sampling
of consumer opinion could serve as a guide.
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The Elegant Cliche
It is always easier to take negative action, and one eminently
practicable means of improving intelligence presentation and at
the same time eliminating some of its sameness requires only a
negative action on the part of editors and analysts--the elimi-
nation of as many as possible of the popular cliches that saturate
the content of most government and journalistic reporting. Clar-
ity, accuracy, brevity, and directness are among the cardinal qual-
ities of intelligence writing and indeed of any good non-fiction.
These characteristics should not be confused with the excessive
and often contrived introduction of terms once pungent and effec-
tive which through overuse has become a mere jargon, perpetuated
to give the sophisticated a feeling of "belonging's and "together-
ness." Shopworn pretentious phraseology can be distracting if
not actually repelling to a reader.
For example, ima e, posture, presence, and confrontation. The
flexible word 'situatio n should not be made a cover for all sins;
it is often superfluous embroidery. A recent government publi-
cation mentioned 'sthe fat cow surplus situation's in a particular
foreign area; did the surplus of fat cows have to be a situation?
And are we really being more sophisticated in saying that a cargo
is "onloaded" or "offloaded?" The English-speaking peoples sur-
vived for many centuries with plain-vanilla load and unload, and
I have yet to get through my obtuse skull the advantage in the
new coinage.
The following is a small sampling of currently fashionable cliches,
listed for handy reference of analysts and editors. All of them
are recommended for the most "Limited Official Use" to which it is
possible to limit them.
NOUNS AND PHRASES VERB FORMS
image
posture
presence
mystique
confrontation
situation
structure
infrastructure
dialogue
on balance
political infighting
dichotomy
thrust (of an argument)
take-off stage (a program
or economy)
to play in low key
to stem from
to structure
to restructure
to onload
to offload
to move forward
to kick off (a political
campaign, program)
to trigger
to step up
to add a new dimension
to back-stop
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Finally, the editors might to advantage dispense with the term
"the reader" when deferding their changes during confrontations
with analysts. The imrlication of this word in the singular--
an audience of only one--is wilting of the analyst's posture and
has an adverse impact cn the projection of his image. Besides,
analysts always speak of editors in the plural, because there
always seem to be several echelons. Since the analyst is guaran-
teed at least so many readers, the plural form--on balance--
would appear to be good usage in the editorial dialogue.
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r
To provide warning of any surprise attack against the United
States and its allies is our first national intelligence objective,
but one, it has been our experience, that cannot be adequately ser-
ved by the normal processes of estimative or current intelligence.
We have therefore found it necessary to develop a somewhat special-
ized intelligence effort for advanced strategic early warning. This
effort, which we have termed "indications intelligence," seeks to
discern in advance any Soviet or other Communist intent to initiate
hostilities, whether against the United States or its forces, its
allies or their forces, or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.
It also seeks to detect and warn of other developments directly
susceptible of enemy exploiting action which would jeopardize the
security of the United States; and this effort has been extended
in practice to any critical situation which might give rise to
hostilities, whether or not there is an immediate threat of direct
US or Soviet involvement.
We maintain a sharp distinction between this intelligence early
warning--a strategic warning in advance of military operations,
based on deductive conclusions about Soviet preparations--and
operational early warning, tactical conclusions from information
on Soviet operations now obtained largely by mechanical means. I
like to think of the indications activity as having four aspects:
First, it is the cultivation of a mental attitude which leads to
first assessment of all Soviet or Communist action in terms of pre-
paration for early hostilities.
Second, it is the development of a body of doctrine which can serve
as guidance for the collection of warning information, for its phy-
sical handling, and for its evaluation. Basically this is the iso-
* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1959), ppa 55-68.
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lation of those actions which would be most likely to constitute
preparations for hostilities, whether deliberate or in response
to the immediate international situation. It is the creation,
through experience, of a body of "common law" applicable to the
selection, evaluation and analysis of information pertinent to
warning.
Third, it is the development of new techniques and. methods for
the collection, processing, evaluation, and analysis of information
significant principally or solely for purposes of strategic early
warning. These techniques and methods range from finding new sour-
ces to analysis by electronic devices. With the development of
missiles and the consequent sharp reduction in the time lag between
an enemy decision to attack and the attack, we must give this as-
pect of the activity increased attention. The alternative would
be a degree of abdication by intelligence to "operations," with a
consequent loss to national flexibility.
Fourth, it is the organ:Lzation of the intelligence community at
all levels so that it can process most rapidly and effectively in-
formation from every source which could provide insight into Soviet
preparation for hostilities. This processing involves every step
from initial screening, or even collection, to the reporting of
conclusions to responsible officials of the executive arm of the
government. This continuous process is an integral part of, and
yet different from, the current intelligence and estimative pro-
cesses. When a threat appears great, as in moments of considerable
crisis, the indications process tends to coalesce with both the
current intelligence process and the estimative process, at least
at the national level.
Before treating these a3pects in detail I shall outline the organ-
ization and procedures for advanced strategic warning which have
evolved in the United States. Fax from perfected and still evol-
ving as they are, they will at least illustrate one national effort
to provide intelligence indications of threatening war.
The Watchers and Their Work-Week
The Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board,
who have the ultimate national responsibility for this warning,
have in effect delegatei the function to the USIB Watch Committee.
The Watch Committee is composed of senior intelligence officers
at the general officer or senior colonel level representing the
major intelligence agencies, and is chaired by the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence. Although it meets only weekly during
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normal times, or perhaps daily during crises, its function is con-
tinuous, exercised through frequent liaison and contact and through
a constant routine exchange of information and evaluations, formal
or informal.
Serving the Committee is a permanent staff in the National Indi-
cations Center, the physical locus of Committee functions. The
NIC staff of 25 is composed of intelligence officers at the col-
onel or naval captain level representing each of the major intel-
ligence agencies, assisted by administrative, communications, and
graphics personnel. The Center itself is linked by electrical
communications to the major agencies. It receives from the USIB
agencies a flow of possible indications information, both on a
routine across-the-board basis and as evaluated and selected for
possible pertinence. It has a 24-hour intelligence duty officer
who is in frequent contact with duty officers in other agencies
and with members of the staff. Through these contacts and communi-
cation links there is a constant interchange of information and
views, but formally the Watch Committee functions on a weekly cycle
which can be telescoped during crises to a matter of minutes. The
cycle is rather elaborate, and while imperfect it at least aims at
thoroughness. It runs roughly as follows:
Friday to Monday noon: Screening and processing information, in
the NIC and in each member agency.
Monday afternoon: The NIC staff reviews available information,
compiles a preliminary agenda for the Wednesday Watch Committee
meeting, and teletypes it to member agencies.
Tuesday: "Pre-watch" meetings in each member agency, attended also
by NIC staff members, at which available information is reviewed
and selected for the Watch Committee meeting. Final agenda and
graphics are prepared in the NIC.
Wednesday morning: Watch Committee meeting. All intelligence
and operational information considered pertinent and its interpre-
tation is reviewed, orally and graphically, in a two-to-three-hour
session. The Committee drafts its conclusions at the table.
Afternoon: Watch Committee members check its conclusions individually
with USIB members. The conclusions, when coordinated through the
medium of the NIC, are then published as USIB views and transmitted
to responsible government officials and other recipients around the
world. NIC prepares the draft body of the Watch Report, a summari-
zation of the evidence considered by the Committee, and sends it
by courier or teletype to USIB member agencies.
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Thursday morning: The draft Watch Report is reviewed, updated, and
commented on by USIB.memnbers and by responsible analysts at the
desk level in all major agencies.
Afternoon: The NIC staff, on the basis of agency comments, pre-
pares a final draft report and submits it to USIB members for appro -
Val.
Friday morning: The printed report is disseminatei to all recipients;
all concerned breathe deeply and plunge into the :ycle again.
This fairly exhaustive procedure is complex, sometimes ponderous
and time-consuming. Bu-; in addition to the production of the formal
Committee reports, it has served another very important purpose:
it has accustomed all those involved to the joint hammering-out of
all the issues, including minor or particular ones. This means
that when time is press`ng and the issues really urgent we can
arrive at joint evaluat=_ons and conclusions very quickly. Upon
occasion a Committee conclusion has been passed to the White House
less than an hour after the Committee was summoned to meet.
Within most of our agencies, the normal internal -ntelligence pro-
cesses and organizations are relied on to flush out and evaluate
the information which is passed to the NIC or utilized by Watch
Committee members at their meetings. Several agencies, however,
maintain small internal groups whose sole function. is to screen
out warning information and seek or stimulate evaluations of it.
They are parallel pieces, by way of insurance, to the normal in-
ternal intelligence organization and process. In Air Force, for
example, a 24-hour indications center is maintained to serve USAF
Headquarters and to act as central for a net of small indications
centers in the major geographical air commands.
Each of our major joint military commands outside the continental
United States has a replica of the national Watch Committee. These
are responsible to the theater joint commander, but forward their
reports to Washington, where they are regularly considered by the
Watch Committee. Thus in our national intelligence warning pro-
cess the Watch Committee cycle has its concurrent parallels abroad
dealing similarly with local warning problems. In some instances
the timing of the process abroad has been adjusted to that of the
Watch Committee.
With these mechanics as ;3. background, I return to the four aspects
of indications intelligence which I mentioned earlier: mental atti-
tude, doctrine, the development of techniques, and organization.
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My remarks constitute an amalgam of the experience and ideas of a
small number of us who have worked in indications intelligence for
some years. Some of these ideas have yet to be adopted throughout
our community, but our experience leads us to believe that in time
they may be more widely accepted.
Attitude of the Watcher
Ideally, for the purposes of indications intelligence, some or all
of the following assumptions must be made as basic working hypothe-
ses, though each can be legitimately challenged in any given situ-
ation:
The Soviets, together with the other Communist states, are seeking
an opportune time to initiate hostilities to achieve their ends.
The attack will attempt maximum surprise, possibly during periods
of international calm.
The decision to initiate hostilities may be made without the mili-
tary capability which we would consider requisite.
Any estimates which argue from other assumptions may be quite wrong.
If intelligence officers dealing at any stage with potential warn-
ing information can be conditioned to these assumptions, we feel
that we have a greater chance of detecting that pattern of develop-
ments which may attend preparations for an attack. Intelligence
officers need not be ruled by these assumptions, but they should
be conscious of them when any possibly relevent information is con-
sidered: for instance, military exercises should always be consid-
ered as deployments and as changes in degree of military readiness
or as rehearsals for an impending attack.
We must instill and maintain this attitude in all personnel deal-
ing with potential warning information, particularly during non-
critical periods or during the fading days of a crisis. This is
a difficult task, especially in a large intelligence organization
with a high degree of specialization and compartmentalization.
There are two obvious alternative ways of going about it. One is
to wage a relentless educational campaign among the body of our
intelligence personnel. This method faces some of the obstacles
of a highway safety campaign or a campaign against sin; and it is
possible that in laying extensive general stress on the warning
problem we might overdo it and give rise to unbalanced or unduly
alarmist intelligence reporting and estimates.
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The other approach, which I favor, is to develop small group of
-indications intelligence; officers, either working together as a
body or spread among various organizations but ma:Lntaning close
contact. Such officers would consider information from the warn-
ing point of view only, would provide continuity in the development
of doctrine, would serve as missionaries among both collectors and
axnalysts, and would keep pressing for adequate attention to frag-
mentary information of potential but not necessarily apparent sig-
nificance to warning. Such officers need not achLeve great depth
in any regional or func-,ional intelligence field, since they could
rely on experts for the necessary support. It has been our ex-
perience that intelligence officers given this responsibility be-
come enthusiasts, if no-, zealots, of the indications hunt, and
extremely sensitive to ,hose visceral signals which in the last
analysis may well be the vital factor in our judgment as to the
imminence of a 'Soviet a--,tack.
In the United States several intelligence agencies have made use
of this approach to a g:'eater or less degree. Otters depend largely
upon having their representatives in our National Indications Cen-
Lor and upon the fact that our major joint current intelligence
committee, the Watch Committee, focuses on indications of hostil-
Ities and does not spread its consideration to alL matters of gen-
eral intelligence significance. Although it might, appear that
this specialization could develop a predisposition to a too-fre-
quent crying of "wolf," we feel that the joint nature of the con-
siderations which precede the forwarding of our warnings tends to
preclude the danger. In practice, we have found that the nature
of our system has served to reduce the number of alarmist "flaps"
which arise, particularly outside intelligence circles, from un-
deliberated interpretation of developments.
Doctrine of the Watch
In the development of a doctrine to guide and assist us to provide
warning of an attack, we have sought first to identify in advance
those actions which would constitute preparations for hostilities.
Such pre-identifications, useful to both analysts and collectors,
we have compiled into Indicator Lists. An indicator we define as
a major action which the Soviets must take before they are ready
for hostilities, wheras an indication is evidence that such an
action is being or has been taken. The distinction is an essential
one which all of us tend to lose sight of in common usage.
In isolating those actions which we designate as indicators or
potential indicators, we are seeking answers to several key ques-
Lions:
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What are the essential steps the Soviets and their allies must
take in their preparation for early major hostilities?
Which of these steps represent a degree of national commitment
which would only, or most likely, follow their decision to initiate
hostilities?
In the light of the nature of information currently available to
us, or which can be expected, what sort of information will we
accept as evidence that these preparatory or implementing steps
are being taken?
How do we distinguish, during periods of crisis, between those
actions which are precautionary and those which are preparations
for deliberate hostilities?
What actions constitute evidence that the Soviet decision-making
process is in action, possibly considering the question of hos-
tilities?
We have attempted to distinguish a series of preparation phrases
representing progressive steps toward a decision to attack or pro-
gressive commitment of the enemy state to war. We group the in-
dicators in four such stages as follows:
Long range: Actions involved in the intensified achievement of
specific military capabilities, offensive or defensive, essential
to the prosecution of general hostilities which are either gen-
erally anticipated or deliberately planned.
Medium Range: Actions or developments which might accompany or
follow a decision to ready the nation or the military forces
generally for any eventuality, or which might follow a deliberate
decision for war but precede formulation, issuance or implemen-
tation of specific operational plans and orders.
Short Range: Actions which might follow or accompany the alerting
and/or positioning of forces for specific attack operations or to
meet an estimated possible US attack.
Immediate or Very Short Range: Actions which might accompany or
immediately precede a Soviet attack (frequently combined in prac-
tice with the preceding stage).
These stages can, and have been, defined at greater length or
quite differently, but the purpose is the same--to arrive at a
listing which groups at one end those actions which may represent
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long-range preparations for hostilities, but not necessarily a
commitment to them, and at the other end those actions which, by
their urgency and costliness, appear to connote a, commitment of
the enemy state to war. It also gives us a sensing of the immi-
nence associated with such indications as we may detect, and of
the phasing in time among them.
In our listings we attempt to give not only -the major actions which
constitute indicators, but also some of the contributory indicators
which, if noted in concert, would comprise evidence of a major in-
dication otherwise undetected. Our phased approach also serves to
isolate actions by whic:a we hope to gauge the extent and danger of
Communist reaction to a particular, perhaps seemingly localized,
crisis.
Our proposed schedule of lists will include:
First, a general indicator list stating in broad terms the major
actions we would expect.
Second, a series of functional lists in much greater detail.
There will be separate lists for Long Range Air Force preparations,
ground force preparations, political and diplomatic activities,
clandestine activities, civil defense, military medicine, weather
service, etc.
Third, a series of lists which address themselves to specialized
sources, including technical sources. These lists, in effect, are
an application of the p:eceding lists to information provided by
individual sources, par-;icularly to changes in a routine take whose
warning significance might not be immediately apparent. One such
list addresses itself to monitored changes in the conduct of Soviet
broadcasting. Another night concern radar monitoring. Another
would cover observations our embassy personnel in Moscow might
make in the normal course of their daily routine: closure of some
subway stations, for example, and an absence of fire engines from
normal stations might provide confirmation for suspicions that
late-stage civil defense preparations were under way. A similar
list for legal rail travelers would include actions observable
from a train window which might fit into indicator:, patterns.
Fourth, a series of target lists naming those installations or
outfits by whom or at which certain activity would be of major
significance, and those by whom or at which ann activity would
have major significance. Examples of the latter might be an elite
Long Range Air Force unit or an air transport unit suspected of a
role limited to the ferrying of nuclear "pills" to operational
commands.
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This is an ambitious program, reflecting primarily the paucity of
available information, particularly information on the major instru-
ments of Soviet attack. When completed, it will be a massive doc-
ument. We also plan, however, a highly condensed one-sheet ver-
sion of each list, perhaps in tabular form.
Such lists must be looked on only as guides, and quite often they
rapidly become obsolete. In some instances we have failed to come
up with anything really satisfactory--most notably in the missile
field. But when we have had sufficient experience with our own
missiles and with information on Soviet missile operations, we ex-
pect to be able to list actions which would serve to indicate the
operational readying of the Soviet missile system.
Another aspect of doctrine is formulation of the answers to these
questions:
How early, or at what stage, and how often in a given situation
do we inform officials of the executive arm of the government?
What general criteria do we use to determine that a warning situ-
ation exists?
Our first premise is that we should provide executive officials
with the earliest warning possible. This means, in effect, a
progressive series of warnings--from a generalized one, perhaps
conveying only our sense of uneasiness, through a contingent one
pointing out that if certain further actions take place it may be
that hostilities are imminent, to an unconditional one conveying
our conviction that an attack is forthcoming.
The criteria of a warning situation lie in patterns, in configur-
ations of Soviet or Communist activity which might be consistent
with some stage in preparations for early war. Once an apparent
pattern is detected, giving an indications situation although not
necessarily an alert situation, the hypothetical patterns we have
constructed in the preparation of our indicator lists suggest
further developments to look for. If information on such develop-
ments is subsequently received, we have then progressed toward an
alert situation.
When we note apparent patterns of preparation we alert our field
collection, particularly to our need for information on major in-
dicators. When we receive information on the accomplishments of
one or more isolated major indicators, we also alert the field,
this time to our need for information on those other indicators
we might expect to see patterned with them. In both instances we
feel that we have the basis for some form of warning to the govern-
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ment, even though we may have no conviction that a pre-war situation
exists.
The pattern approach is particularly applicable to the surprise
attack; it has limitaticns in situations of localized tension,
where the buildup for a limited attack may be as complete as it
will ever be, but where there may have been no political decision
to make the attack. The indications effort may suggest refine-
ments in our collection, and it may assist in narrowing the field
we must search in order to detect evidence of the decision; but
it cannot go a great deal further. Subsequent developments are
sometimes almost exclusively matter for tactical or operational
intelligence. Indications intelligence is looked to, however,
for warning of preparations to broaden a localized situation or
to cope with an expected broadening.
Techniques and New Techniques
Our attempt to develop techniques has thus far been aimed at facil-
itating the processing and analysis of information and the detec-
tion of patterns, and at exposing areas requiring further analytical
investigation or more extensive collection efforts. We have used
extensively the more orthodox methods, although despite their use-
fulness we have had to abandon some because of their expense in
time and personnel. To describe a few:
Card files of information extracted only for apparent or potential
indications significance--one item to a card in three separate
files, according to functional fields, date, and the apparent axis
or targets of Soviet/Convnunist attack.
Running lists constituti:.g highly condensed summaries of apparently
significant developments arranged according to the apparent axis of
attack.
"Shelf-paper" rolls of charts with summarized information of appar-
ent indications significance entered according to late of activity,
area and functional field, or in other arrangements.
Highly condensed summaries of apparent current ind cations, nega-
tive and positive, bearing on particular situations.
Quarterly summaries of indications, including only selected develop-
merits of apparent medium or long-range significance.
There have also been efforts, some only experimental, at posting..
developments on display charts or boards categorized variously
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according to area, functional field, date of activity, and degree
of imminence or hypothetical length of pre-attack time remaining.
Through the use of colors and other devices, such displays serve
to call attention to possibilities which need further investiga-
tion. The Air Force, which has been the most active among our
departments in the development of indicator techniques, devised
such an indicator display board for use in all Air Force indica-
tion centers and is now experimenting with other graphic means of
calling attention to trends and potential warning situations.
There have been a number of suggestions for the use of electronic
devices which could store information so coded and weighted that
when queried they would respond with a "temperature" reading and
a predicted area and time of danger. We have been hesitant to
plunge into this sort of thing, because the information fed in
would in many cases be so uncertain, and its weighting--which
would reflect immediate judgment as to its significance--even more
uncertain. I do not believe, however, that we should rule out
this approach forever. In many respects, our most important warning
information is becoming more and more of a technical nature. It is
hard information, such as detection of radar emanations, but diffi-
cult to evaluate, analyze and record by our conventional methods.
It may be that an imaginative and judicious use of machines will
enable us to put information quickly into meaningful patterns which
can contribute to our warning.
In developing these techniques we are merely seeking aids to analy-
sis and to presenting the situation. In no sense do we believe
that intelligence warning can be performed mechanically, although
there are a surprising number of people who believe that this is
possible or that it is what we are trying to do.
There is also a need for development of new collection techniques
for warning purposes. One thing that can be done is to formulate
a coordinated series of collection requirements and reporting direc-
tives which would be put into effect only during periods of alert
or international crises, when certain types of information would
assume new significance. Another is to direct a series of routine
monitoring-type missions aganist selected targets for indications
purposes only, with a view to detecting any changes from normal
activity. The targets themselves might be of minor importance,
but changes in their activities might reflect far more important
activities elsewhere. A series of somewhat riskier pre-planned
monitoring-type missions could be reserved for periods of alert,
when the risks could be justified by the depth of our suspicions.
It may be possible to devise new technical collection systems or
adapt some now in use to the purposes of warning intelligence.
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Electronic intelligence, for example, I understanc_ now produces
chiefly information on capabilities, new technical. developments
and order of battle. We must rethink it to see if it can pro-
duce unique information on changes in day-to-day activities which
would be meaningful to indications intelligence. Early in the
development of any new collection device its possibilities for
indications intelligence should be examined. This, is frequently
done far too late.
There is also a need, presumably through communications techniques,
for reducing the time lags between collection of -._nformation and
Its effective presentation for evaluation. Our a-r defense has
found it necessary to develop methods for automat=c or semi-auto-
matic presentation, and even analysis, of tactica=... air warning
information. But intelligence warning information, although we
have been able to cut down actual transmission times for a few
highly select messages from field collection points, is too often
subject to completely unacceptable, even though understandable,
delays.
Organizational Devices
.I have touched in the foregoing sections on some of the organiza-
tional devices introduced in the National Indications Center and
member agencies in support of the Watch Committee's function, de-
vices which range from -:,he establishment of the NIC itself and the
IJSIB coordination mechanism to the creation of small parallel in-
dications staffs in individual agencies. I believe that certain
other organizational measures might in some form or combination
further facilitate our warning efforts. One would be a sort of
national directory of intelligence assignments which would locate
and fix responsibility for analysis and reporting of potential
warning information for every segment of our inteligence coverage,
no matter how minor.
Then there might be created a body of collection experts, perhaps
even supported by a collection coordination center, which would work
in harness with the Watch Committee and the National Indications
Center. This might assist, particularly during moments of crisis
when time is short, in the coordinated search for missing elements
of information or in the rapid clarification of uncertain infor-
mation.
Finally, we could organize against emergencies a thorough-going
phased national intelligence alert, making provision for availability
of intelligence personnel, extent of 24-hour staffing, availability
of administrative support (including communications), comprehensive
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situation reporting by field collection and by intelligence agen-
cies, and the initiation of pre-planned collection measures such
as the assignment of new priorities and targets and the activation
of reserve or one-shot sources. Such a total alert would be very
difficult to arrange and to keep current, but it could save pre-
cious hours.
There is such great change either present or impending in methods
of warfare and the balance of power between East and West that the
task of providing warning is increasingly difficult. The two major
factors in this increasing. difficulty are a) the accelerating com-
pression in time between the enemy decision to launch an attack
and its launching and between its launching and its delivery, and
b) the concurrent reduction in the amount and variety of discer-
nible pre-attack activity. It seems to me that now, as never be-
fore, we must subject our intelligence organization and processes
for collection and evaluation to continuing scrutiny, and must
improve or adapt them to cope with the changing conditions. We
must ensure that we are collecting and considering the proper in-
formation and that we eliminate every possible delay in the pro-
cessing of the potentially vital information. Furthermore, in
order to provide warning, no matter how contingent, at the earliest
possible stage, we must improve our understanding of Soviet Bloc
decision-making and strategic doctrine.
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Allen W. Dulles in "The Craft of Intelligence" comments: "The
cloud in the sky may be no bigger than a man's hand, but it may
portend the storm; and it is the duty of intelligence to sound an
alarm before a situation reaches crisis proportions."
No intelligence officer is apt to dispute Mr. Dulles' nutshell
presentation of problem number one. There are, however, differen-
ces in the kinds of interest individual analysts may take in the
cloud, depending on their fields of specialization--tactics analy-
sis, current intelligence, strategic warning, and so on through a
long list.
There is a degree of overlap among the three fields named both
because boundaries are nebulous and because the individual analyst
is often expected to don more than one hat. Tactical warning might
be described as that which can be obtained by such sensors as the
DEW line radars indicating that an attack had actually been initi-
ated. The best-publicized tactical warning in US history occurred
in April 1775 when the intelligence apparatus of the patriots sent
Paul Revere galloping ac:-oss the Middlesex countryside.
Strategic warning has been defined to be that which the intelli-
gence community might provide prior to an actual attack, and hope-
fully while preparations for the attack are still in process. This
is the uneasy realm of the warning, or indications analyst. In the
nature of the case, therefore, the warning analyst deals in extreme
situations. The hypotheses he tests against the evidence tend to
stress the outside possi:)ilities. He is interested in what might
be. The problem of warning essentially involves the steady contem-
plation, and sometimes t.ae courageous advocacy of ominous cases.
In the trade, these are mown as "worst case"y situations.
* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 37-43?
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current intelligence organization.
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Some other distinctions can be made. Current intelligence seeks to
discern the enemy's actual intentions in the short run. The inter-
ests of current intelligence are world-wide while those of warning
intelligence--as defined in the intelligence community--are rather
limited geographically. The latter is engrossed in "indications
of preparations for offensive military action in the immediate fu-
ture against the United States, its overseas forces or its allies."
This is the primary mission of the Watch Committee, the Washington
focal point under USIB of strategic intelligence. It has historically
been largely limited to the USSR, Communist China, and their allies.
In the last decade the Watch Committee has followed developments
from time to time in a number of diverse areas peripheral to the
Communist blocs such as Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Sino-
Indian border, Korea, Cuba and the Middle East. The rationale for
following these developments has been that a potential for Commun-
ist exploitation existed in the situation which might develop into
a threat to the US or its allies.
Indications, or warning intelligence thus may be said to be dis-
tinguished from other forms of current intelligence in that its
primary interest in enemy behavior is in terms of its threat poten-
tial. While indications intelligence is usually co-located with
current intelligence, is always dependent on the same information,
and is frequently dependent on the current intelligence analyst
himself, it does nevertheless view matters from a different per-
spective. The warning analyst takes incoming scraps, matches them
in his mind against an indicator list, and frequently refers back
to small nuggets that have long since lost their current intelli-
gence value. The warning analyst may find threat overtones in a
pattern of events which might otherwise be considered innocuous if
viewed piecemeal.
This is not to suggest that there is some peculiar mystique about
the indications process. The indications analyst is, in the writer's
view, a current intelligence analyst under instruction to review
the same intelligence as others, but, as we have said, from a dif-
ferent perspective. The indications analyst looks at the infor-
mation for any strategic threat, perhaps only potential, to the
US, its forces abroad, or its allies. Other current intelligence
analysts are also expected, as one of their duties, to think in
terms of indications, but it is the warning analyst's sole obli-
gation to do so.
A hypothetical situation might--in oversimplified terms--illustrate
the differing viewpoints. Let us assume that in the 1970's the
leadership of Great Frusina (GF)--a mythical nation invented by
Sherman Kent--chooses to levy demands in most threatening form on
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the neighboring small country of Outer Riding (OR) to stop the
alleged gross discrimination against OR's Frusinian minority. OR
has a defense pact with the US.
Current intelligence evaluation of the situation w:1l proceed along
several lines. Thus, thE! political analyst sees the threat as part
of the Frusinian leadership's effort to distract and obtain support
from dissatisfied groups. The political analyst will question the
degrees of support to be expected from allies of the two countries.
The economic analyst calculates the length of time it will take
for GF to gird its logis-,ic Loins for intervention. The military
analyst follows closely -the number of GF units involved in exercises
near OR's border.
The indications analyst, however, might ask himself whether GF was
just possibly using the threat of intervention to disguise efforts
at a surprise attack on the US. How many of its submarines are op-
erating out of their nornal area? What is the state of GF's heavy
bombers? Are there any unusual steps being taken in the civil de-
fense field, such as art treasures being crated and moved out of
town in case of a retaliatory attack, keeping in mind that OR has
no heavy bombers or missiles that could reach the Great Frusinian
capital city?
Hypothetically and ideally the warning analyst should be able to
rack up all his indicatcrs, both positive and negative, and pro-
duce a rough assessment as to how ready GF may be to launch an
attack.
In reality, reading the warning tea leaves is not all that clear
or easy. Except in the unlikely event of our having direct access
to policy-making circle; in Moscow or Peking, and guaranteed chan-
nels of prompt communications, the available intelligence may pro-
vide no signals, some signals, or ambiguous signals. Should the
Kremlin decide on a pre-emptive attack on the US limited to missiles,
the preparations would be minimal and indicators might be virtually
non-existent. The othe extreme would be a full-Scale mobilization
of the enemy's conventional forces to be utilized in conjunction
with his missiles. In the latter case there may very well be suf-
ficient indicators available to give warning that the enemy had
developed his capabilities to the point where he could launch an
attack at almost any time should he elect to do so.
In developing the tools of his trade, the warning analyst has sought
to create yardsticks for measuring norms of behavior. Thus, when
only a single gauge begins to register abnormally, there may be no
particularly serious threat developing. As an increasing number of
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abnormalities begin to show up simultaneously, however, the warning
analyst inches closer to the edge of his chair and seeks to determine
the intent behind the enemy action.
The total picture presented by developing enemy action is rarely
defined in sharp colors. It tends to be less than clear-cut, in
part because of the constantly changing base lines which make last
year's abnormalities this year's norms. By way of example, the
Soviets' surface Mediterranean Squadron is now always present in
the backyard of the 6th Fleet, and the Squadron's size has gradually
expanded. There was no surface Mediterranean Squadron consistently
on station the year-round prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.
Soviet heavy bombers get "out-of-area" and touch off radar reactions
in Iceland and the North American east coast periodically, both in
numbers and at distances that would tend to be considered more or
less normal, if not completely friendly at present.
There is a strong tendency in the ranks of professional bureaucrats
to safeguard one's nether parts. For the warning analyst, however,
continually to utter only shrill cries of "Wolf;" would obviously
be no service to the policy-maker. For this reason the warning
analyst, keeping in mind the possibility of the worst possible sit-
uation, must make a strenuous effort to give a realistic judgment
on the significance of any collection of abnormalities. And since
the enemy's activity may have been initiated for any one of a variety
of reasons, he obviously must try to come up with the best possible
assessment of enemy motivation. The enemy may be creating abnor-
malities as he prepares for a pre-emptive attack on the US or one
of its allies; or he may be staging a magnificent bluff in support
of a major political move; or as in the recent past he may be plan-
ning--right next door to NATO--to force one of his satellites back
on to the straight and narrow path that leads to Socialist perfec-
tion, Moscow style.
It can be hazardous to measure present and future situations against
past lessons. Nevertheless, past experience does suggest a number
of observations that should help shape the warning analyst's gen-
eral background and judgment.
Two Major Don'ts
Don't expect the enemy to apply the same logic to his estimates of
the situation in question as the US analyst would. To wit, in the
summer of 1968, there was a strongly-argued line current around the
intelligence community that the Soviets probably would not invade
Czechoslovakia since they would surely be deterred by the oppro-
brium with which the world would judge such an action.
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Don't be a victim of the Easy or Logical Explanation Syndrome. It
is frequently tempting to accept such an explanation even if it may
not be the correct one. Thus, during the Korean War there was con-
siderable warning that the Chinese might intervene in the conflict,
but there was also a tendency to downgrade the seriousness of the
Chinese threat. Instead it was interpreted as a diplomatic ploy
designed to restrain the US and its allies by means short of direct
military involvement.
Three Great "Remembers"
Remember that US intelligence has been trapped before by misjudging
the intended target(s) which an enemy is preparing to attack. Before
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the warning signals received
by US intelligence were analyzed, in part at least, as pointing to
a Japanese campaign against Southeast Asia, which turned out to be
only a part of the whole truth.
Remember that repeated warnings can dull the reactions and wariness
of both the policy-maker and the intelligence analyst. Warnings on
North Korean intentions and capabilities were given repeatedly during
the year prior to June 1950. How was one to distinguish the North
Korean Army activities north of the DMZ in June 1950 as preparation
for a jump-off when similar past activities prior to that time had
proven invariably to be preparations for maneuvers?
Remember that history does not necessarily repeat itself. An ex-
cellent example of this was the Dutch hope prior to World War II
that they would again be allowed to remain neutral as they were in
World War I. The hope apparently grew into expectation. Thus, re-
peated warnings from a German military source located in the horse's
mouth, including notices of postponements and changes in schedule,
served largely as an irritant and caused disbelief in The Hague.
Following receipt of the final warning, the deputy chief of Dutch
intelligence is reported. to have sought reassurance about German
intentions by phoning the German military attache. In the latter's
absence, his "charming wife" is reported to have given the Dutch
bureaucrat the assurance he craved. The Dutch official thereupon
went home, only a few hours before German ground forces rumbled
over the Dutch frontier.
The Two Important Questions
Do the enemy's actions signify an effort at deception and is he de-
liberately, or perhaps unintentionally, creating a mix of signals
that point in virtually opposite directions? The missile crisis
in Cuba is a well-remembered example of deception. Another possible
example is the Hungarian revolution in 1956 when, in the face of
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Hungary appear to have carried out a charade by fulfilling an agree-
ment to withdraw Soviet forces from Budapest and apparently indi-
cating agreement to discuss withdrawal from Hungary.
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Does everyone have the warning? History records that some nine
hours after the opening of the attack on Pearl Harbor, US planes
were caught wing-tip to wing-tip at Clark Field in the Philippines.
The points cited are not an all-inclusive presentation of essential
background for a warning analyst, but they are typical of points
he might ideally check off in reaching a judgment. The points-ad-
mittedly also overlap to a degree and have been placed under arbi-
trary designators.
In conclusion, the warning analyst's analysis should tend to sound
more ominous than that of the current intelligence analyst. By defi-
nition, as the advocate of the worst possible situation, the indica-
tions analyst is expected to espouse that attitude in considering
each new set of circumstances.
Given the state of modern Soviet weaponry, it is theoretically
possible for the USSR to launch a bolt-from-the-blue without a sin-
gle indication warning that the appropriate Kremlin finger is poised
over the ICBM button. If the Soviet preparation, however, called
for considerably more activity and of longer duration involving
such diverse fields as political warnings, extraordinary civil de-
fense measures, unusual Long Range Air Force deployments and/or
an unusually large number of submarines out-of-area, the chances
of sounding a tocsin would be considerably improved.
Several weeks prior to the 20 August 1968 Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia, the warning machinery expressed the belief that the
Soviets were militarily prepared to intervene if the Kremlin con-
sidered it necessary. If the reader will accept this warning as a
satisfactory example of what might be expected from strategic in-
telligence, then the number of hours devoted to the indications
type of sentry duty represent a reasonably inexpensive US insurance
policy--possibly straight life.
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Among the developments leading up to the outbreak of war between
Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967, there were some in
Washington that provide one of those relatively rare instances in
which the visible impact of intelligence on national policy is spe-
cific and clear cut.
A number of circumstances came together to make thLs possible.
First, the basic question which the policy makers asked--who will
win if the US stays out?---was sharply defined. Se-ond, the dur-
ation of the "crisis," as far as the production of premonitory in-
telligence and short-tern judgments were concerned, was only some
three weeks, from mid-May to dawn of 5 June. The basic issues thus
had no time to become fogged over. Third, the impact of the in-
telligence judgment was -,he more explosive in that this judgment
ran nearly head-on into -;he initial impressions of some, at least,
of the administration's -,op advisers.
This last point, which lends drama to the role of Intelligence in
this episode, is not easy to document. At the time, however, it
was nonetheless reasonabb_y clear that in fairly high quarters in
Washington the first reaction to Nasir's opening moves in mid-May--
the mobilization of Egyptian forces and their deployment into Sinai,
followed by the withdrawal of the UN screening forces there--was to
assume that we were witnessing the unfolding of a calculated Soviet-
Arab plan to eliminate Israel (and ultimately the US) from the area.
Given this assumption, and the strength--at least on paper--of the
Soviet-backed Arab forces, it seemed likely that "Little Israel"
would lose the war being prepared against it. Fur`;hermore, given
the extent of the emotional attachment to Israel ir. this country
developed over twenty years in the form of moral i not political
Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 969), pp. 1-8.
is an officer in CIA's current intelligence
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commitments, it appeared to follow that the US ought to move tan-
gibly and quickly to Israel's support. Indeed, a number of US
actions early in the crisis appear to have sprung from these as-
sumptions and this logic. Thus, the way was cleared for an emer-
gency airlift to Israel of spare parts, ammunition, and, because
of the Egyptians' known use of chemical agents in Yemen, chemical
defense equipment.
The Intelligence View
The US intelligence community was virtually unanimous in rejecting
these assumptions and judgments. Soviet and Arab-Israeli experts
were agreed that Nasir's initial moves must have been conceived
out of misinformation about immediate Israeli intentions, and that
this misinformation had reached Nasir because of miscalculation
somewhere in the Soviet apparatus. On the most critical point,
it was nearly unanimously agreed that if the war came the Israelis
would be able to defeat Nasir and the other Arabs combined, and
that the Soviet military would not physically intervene. In short,
the intelligence community saw no carefully calculated Arab-Soviet
plan. It saw instead a Soviet blunder being compounded, to Moscow's
embarrassment, by the responses of Arab leaders ridden with the
compulsion to react against what they read as Israeli threats.
These contrasting views of the origin of the crisis and of the
likely outcome of hostilities first collided at the top policy
level on Tuesday, 23 May, the day after the Egyptians announced
that the Gulf of Aqaba was henceforth closed to Israeli shipping.
On the morning of that date, the President called the Director of
Central Intelligence out of a briefing session with the House
Armed Services Subcommittee to tell him that Ambassador Goldberg
had telephoned from New York, complaining that there had been no
warning of a Middle East crisis, and worrying over the possibility
of a war which Israel, in Goldberg's opinion, could not win. The
President asked the Director for papers on these subjects.
The Director in turn levied these requirements on his deputy for
intelligence, asking that the responses be delivered to him before
the White House regular Tuesday lunch.* The papers--"US Knowledge
of Egyptian Alert," and "Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capa-
* There were at the moment less than four hours remaining in which
these papers had to be finished, prayed over, and delivered.
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bilities"--were drafted. by a task force* which had been brought
into being earlier the same morning. (The Egyptian announcement
had also triggered the Watch Committee of the United States Intel-
ligence Board, which had been called into special. session at 0300.)
The two memoranda, plus a general situation briefing for the Dir-
ector's own use, were delivered to him in the ground floor lobby
outside Walt Rostow's White House office. At the lunch, in addi-
tion to the President and the DCI, were Secretaries Rusk and Mc
Namara, General Wheeler (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff),
George Christian (the White House press officer), and Walt Rostow.
The "who will win" memorandum was clearly crucial. It delivered
"the judgment of the intelligence community" that, on the ground,
Israel could "hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully
a major offensive on the fourth."** In the air, the Israelis
"probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air fa-
cilities were not damaged beyond repair." This memorandum concluded
that, although the Egyptian forces had "improved substantially"
since 1956, nevertheless "we consider that the Israeli forces have
retained an over-all superiority." On the spot, the President
asked Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler whether they concurred
in this judgment. After they did so, he ordered both papers deli-
vered to Ambassador Goldberg in New York.
Second Round
Wednesday, 24 May, was devoted by the intelligence community and
the policy people to digesting developments and refining their
appreciations. A regularly scheduled National Security Council
meeting took up problems of South Arabia, while on the intelligence
Level the USIB Watch Committee met once again to sift the evidence
bearing on possible Soviet intervention in the crisis. The Watch
Committee concluded that "direct Soviet military involvement" was
highly unlikely."
Next day (25 May), however, activity stepped up. The
weighed in
with a written estimate of the situation which described Arab
* A task force in current intelligence parlance is a peculiar inven-
tion, not entirely dissimilar in conception from the Manhattan Pro-
ject, the object of which is to bring into organized relations all
who can help the intelligence effort during a crisis.
** The fronts envisioned were the Sinai, Syrian, Jordanian, and
Lebanese.
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gency's paper judged that the Egyptian positions in Sinai were
essentially defensive, that the other Arabs' troop movements were
gestures for political effect, and that the possibility of the
Egyptians using chemical warfare could be discounted since the local
conditions were most unfavorable. The paper took the position that
"the Soviet aim is still to avoid military involvement and to give
the US a black eye among the Arabs by identifying it with Israel."
The paper concluded that the Soviets "probably could not openly
help the Arabs because of lack of capability, and probably would
not for fear of confrontation with the US."
Early on the evening of the 25th, a high-level group* assembled
in Walt Rostow's office at the White House. Secretary Rusk, having
seen Eban, asked if the Director agreed with ONE's comments
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re ary commented: "Dick, there is only one thing I want to say--as
am LaGuardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut." The
group then moved to the President's office.
The President had read the two papers, and again quizzed the Direc-
tor and General Wheeler--was the US assessment solid? The President
evidently had in mind both the question of Egyptian and Soviet in-
tentions and the "who will win" issue, which Goldberg was still
* Rusk, Cyrus Vance (vice McNamara who was out of town), General
Wheeler, Eugene Rostow, and the Director.
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picking at. The Director replied, "we'll scrub it down again,"
and following the meeting threw the CIA machinery once again into
gear, to produce the next day what has a good claim to have been
the classic paper of the crisis, "Military Capabilities of Israel
and the Arab States."
Reassessment and Reassertion
This paper, product of a. coordinated effort by ONE, elements of
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Defense intelligence
Agency, considerably sharpened but did not in essence alter the
assessment given the President by the Director two days earlier.
-r estimated that the I6raelis could attain air superiority over
Sinai in 24 hours after taking the initiative or :_n two or three
days if the the Egyptians struck first, and that sraeli armed
:'orces could breach Egypt's forward lines in Sina:.. within "several"
days, although the paper foresaw a need for the I.$rae-_i ground
orces to regroup and resupply before they could move to the Suez
Canal.
As for Syria and Jordan, this paper was even more prescient. it
,judged that the Syrians had no capability for a successful attack
and said the Israelis could break the Syrian line, though with
relatively heavy casual'.ies because of the terrain and the Syrians'
aortifications. Regarding Jordan, the paper estimated that if Jor-
dan undertook more than very limited operations, Israel could occupy
most of the West Bank in a few days once major fi Ming with Egypt
had subsided.
This paper was disseminated about mid-afternoon on. 26 May. Policy
makers therefore had not yet read it when they again convened in
the White House Cabinet room that day. They did -ave, however, an
ONE memorandum, "The Middle Eastern Crisis," whic'n spelled out at
come length the view of the intelligence community in general and
-)i CIA in particular on how the crisis had come about and how it
might develop. The President asked the group, which on this occasion
included advisers Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas as well as the of-
!?icials responsible for national security affairs, to read the paper.
Its theses also contradicted the "little Israel under Red attack" view.
* Original drafts had said "two to three" days wculd be needed by
the Israelis to break the Sinai defenses, and "seven to nine" days
to reach the Canal, but this precision was sacrificed in the debate
of coordination.
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While ONE conceded that Moscow might have encouraged Nasir to be-
lieve that his forces could stand off an Israeli offensive once
they were deployed in Sinai, the estimators did not believe that
"the whole operation is a Soviet plan, or that the Soviets urged
him to his present course of action." Indeed, ONE said it be-
lieved that the Soviets would almost certainly advise Nasir against
a military show-down with Israel. Noting that Nasir had won the
"first round" and appeared to be standing pat, this paper clearly
implied that Israel, facing "dismaying choices," might well react
dangerously. The Israelis had the choice of risking a military
strike, or of acquiescing in the "permanent closing" of the Strait
of Tiran. Specifying Israel's dilemma, ONE was "inclined to be-
lieve that unless the US and other major powers take whatever steps
are necessary to reopen the Strait, the Israelis will feel compelled
to go to war." In discussing the Soviet role and probable actions,
ONE repeated its earlier judgment that the Soviets would not inter-
vene with their own combat forces, even though Nasir's defeat by
Israel would, by extension, be a "grave setback" for the USSR it-
self.
Although it is nowhere spelled out in the intelligence record, the
cumulative impact of these judgments over three successive days
evidently led to policy decisions limiting the US material commit-
ment in support of Israel to a fairly narrow range of "defensive"
military items. Perhaps more important, it was made clear to the
Israelis that, if they chose to take the military initiative, they
would have to go it alone. Rarely has the intelligence community
spoken so clearly, as rapidly, and with such unanimity. The re-
sult was early adoption of a policy posture in consonance with the
intelligence judgment.
story of the intelligence contribution to policy planning up to the
This was of course not the end, nor by any means the whole, of the
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Directorate of Intelliger.ce elements at CIA, configured in the so-
called Arab-Israel task force, had meanwhile come essentially to
the same conclusion. On 3 June the task force issued to the com-
munity a self-initiated memorandum entitled "The Current Focus of
the Near East Crisis," which warned that "all reporting from Israel
shows mounting pressure for a 'decision'," while the Arabs, on
their side were "sniffing blood." In this situation, the task
force emphasized the dangers, physical as well as psychological,
to US material and strategic interests in the area, and observed
that "the damage to the US position in the area al,-ready appears
serious." With these documents in hand, the whist-'le of Israeli
jets--and the crash of breaking embassy windows--surely came as
no surprise to those who were awakened early on 5 June.
As indicated earlier, however, the story would. be incomplete with-
out some reference to the flood of requests for memoranda which,
in addition to the requirements of the regular intelligence and
estimative media, inunda-,ed intelligence components during this
period. The records of -,he Arab-Israel task force give some of
the flavor of those days--and nights:
The story told here is obviously one of a "success." The intelli-
gence community was "rig-it," and the "right" answers reached the
very top quickly and in immediately usable form. Were we lucky?
Did we merely have on tap, for this occasion, a group of unusually
perceptive analysts and capable drafters? In part, the answers
are perhaps yes. The present writer, having been one of them, is
not inclined to dismiss the idea that talented people were in fact
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involved. But he is inclined to point out that the judgments were
not concocted for the occasion. On the contrary, the community
had repeatedly addressed itself to most of these very questions for
a dozen years, through formal estimates and--at least as, if not
more important in bringing a body of experts to rub minds together--
through the Arab-Israeli Ad Hoc Working Group.
This group, which produced--and still produces--the "Arab-Israeli
Handbook," had been meeting periodically under the aegis of CIA's
Office of Current Intelligence since before the 1956 Suez war.
Originally focusing on deliveries of Soviet equipment to the Arab
states, the handbook had gradually expanded into a compendium of
political and military facts and current military judgments. More-
over, over the years, experts from CIA, State, DIA, and NSA had
learned to know each other, to work together, and to debate on the
basis of a commonly-shared corpus of information. Thus, when Nasir
made his move and the Israelis reacted, the spadework on the cen-
tral problems had long since been done, and the policy makers
could be presented with informed judgments confidently arrived at.
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Bhnrtly after 0600 on the morning of 12 December 1)67, a high-
Its subject was an impeniinb. attempt a, a uuii ~e l.a
Greek Junta by King Constantine and several army o'L'ficers. Here
;; what ensued during the next hour and forty-eight minutes:
060'T--Senior Duty Officer briefs the CIA current intelligence chief
and the DCI's Deputy or Intelligence by telephone. They
order that appropriate intelligence analysts be called in at
once and that the DCI be alerted.
0612--Watch officers phcne analysts as ordered.
)61.5--SDO canvasses intelligence community seeking additional
information. State has received a high-precedence cable
from the Athens embassy and is phoning Assistant Secretary
Battle.
0620--SDO briefs DCI. DCI instructs SDO to brief Walt Rostow by
telephone at his home.
o625--SDO briefs Rostow, Rostow instructs SLb to inform White
House situation room*** that he will be com:_ng .,o his office
immediately, but that the President should not be awakened.
u630--Rostow's instructions passed to White House situation room.
x- Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1)68), pp. 39-45.
** I Iare officers of the
CIA current intelligence organization.
*** Staffed by officers seconded from the CIA Operations Center,
the Situation Room perfDrms a parallel function for the President
and his national security assistants.
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0636--Rostow phones to make sure that Secretary of State Rusk (in
Brussels) is being informed. SDO confirms that State's Greek
desk is sending a cable to Rusk.
0637--DCI phones and is brought up to date.
06+2--State sends copy of the cable from Athens embassy by LDX.*
Reuters is now reporting that tanks have surrounded Prime
Minister's residence in Athens.
0650-
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been unable to obtain.
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0723--SDO proceeds to Signal Center to arrange the direct tele-.
printer connection.
0755--SDO briefs Rostow to the effect that Constantine had left
Athens, arrived safely in Larissa in northern Greece, and
broadcast a message to the nation. State operations center
and NMCC also briefed.
The record of this activity in the Operations Center at the dawn
of 12 December, when a potentially serious crisis appeared about
to engulf an ally of the United States, is significant because it
shows that the standard intelligence processes, from collection
and communication to evaluation and dissemination, were successfully
accomplished--out of normal business hours--despite the speed with
which the crisis developed. Senior policy officials of the govern-
ment were thus placed in possession not merely of information but
of finished intelligence in which they could repose confidence.
* Long-distance xerography. This is a system for secure and vir-
tually instantaneous facsimile transmission. Terminals are at the
White House, the Department of State, the Pentagon, NSA, and the
CIA Operations Center. A manuscript the size of the Encyclopedia
Britannica could be transmitted in two and a half days by this
process.
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The Operations Center is an instrument by which the DCl can provide
intelligence to the right quarters at the propitious time, i.e.,
when decisions about action have to be made. The Greek example is
but one of many that might be cited to illustrate the manner in
which the Center, in business around the clock, performs an alerting
function and facilitates rapid transmission of intelligence through-
out the intelligence co=.unity and to the White House. This in-
stance illustrates also the vital relation between the Operations
Center and the substantive resources of the Agency, whose analytic
and current intelligence reporting responsibilities it supports.
Finally, the Greek episoc.e exemplifies the extreme pressure for
detailed and timely intelligence support that builds up at the nexus
of the policy-making and intelligence communities in periods of cri-
sis. The growth of this avidity for the product of intelligence is
surely one of the significant developments in the American govern-
mental system during the past decade or so. The Operations Center
is a systematic attempt to help satisfy this appetite, which almost
certainly will not diminish.
The Mechanics
Regardless of the method chosen, an attempt to provide round-the-
clock continuity in current intelligence support is bound to be
an intricate undertaking. The general problem is the troublesome
one common to all intelligence, that of converting an input cate-
gorized by source into an output separated out by subject and sig-
nificance. During the normal working day, princip=_es of division
of labor and quite detailed specialization can be applied in organ-
izing the institutional solution. As for the rest of the time, it
was long debated whether it would in peacetime be possible to fund
and staff a reduced but similar operation for around-the-clock
alerting. The alternative approach, that of the Operations Center,
is to concentrate attention on the inputs most likely to be pro-
ductive in a still more skeletonized and specialized operation,
mechanically equipped to the fullest degree feasible. From the
substantive point of view, this kind of operation will be success-
ful to the extent that it can call upon the effect:'ve backing of
major research and analytical resources.
Very roughly speaking, the inputs to the Operations Center are
selected according to the way in which they have been communicated.
The general category with which the Center mainly deals is infor-
mation electrically communicated through official channels. As
will be seen, however, there are many exceptions e-ien to this.
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The channels into the Center are complex. An adjacent signal
facility receives special intelligence from NSA and advance cable
traffic from the State Department. The Cable Secretariat, which
disseminates within CIA most message traffic, provides State and
Defense Department cables and intelligence information reports
cabled from CIA field stations. The clandestine services duty
officer makes available intelligence from operational cable traf-
fic which otherwise might not be disseminated for some hours.
The Operations Center also maintains constant contact by secure
means with other intelligence centers in the Washington area.
The NSA Command Center answers questions concerning special intel-
ligence. The State Department Operation Center makes immediately
available via LDX any particularly sensitive traffic. The National
Military Command Center of the JCS puts on the.LDX military opera-
tions cables which might otherwise be delayed for several hours or
not be sent to CIA at all. The DIA Intelligence Support and Indi-
cations Center, the National Indications Center, and other duty
offices throughout the government also provide the Operations
Center with information or evaluations in areas in which they
possess special competence.
In addition, the Center subscribes to the full wire services of
the Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters
and receives the teletyped output of the Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service.
From the stream of information flowing it through these channels--
and it averages 135 separate reports every hour around the clock--
the Center seeks to filter out first that which is of critical
significance, and secondly that which may be less critical but is
nevertheless of capital importance. The second of these cate-
gories is in practice considerably larger than the first.
Some Critical Cases
In the category of critical intelligence, a degree of automatic
selection has been built into the process in the form of the
Criti(cal)-com(munications) System, under which messages designated
CRITIC by the field in accordance with a criterion that they "may
require the immediate attention of the President,"* are expedited
by NSA to the intelligence community and the White House. The first
report on 22 January 1968 of what quickly developed into the "Pueblo"
* Seel .n Studies IV 2,
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incident was an example of a CRITIC. So was the CIA cable of 30
January reporting the Viet Cong attack on the U.S. Embassy compound
in Saigon.
Critical intelligence, however, does not invariably get put into
the Criticom System. On 20 April 1967 at 2058 hours the U.S.
Embassy in Athens reported by a merely FLASH cable that the Prime
Minister of Greece had been seized in a military coup. On 15
November 1967 at 0950 they U.S. Embassy in Nicosia reported under
FLASH precedence that fighting had broken out between the Greeks
and Turks at Kophinori, beginning the Cyprus crisis. On 5 June
1967 at 0300 the U.S. Embassy at Tel Aviv confirmed by FLASH pre-
cedence that fighting between the Arabs and the Israelis had begun.
In all these cases it was up to the Operations Center to recognize
that the reports fell well within the definition of critical intel-
ligence and take action accordingly.
To complicate matters further, critical intelligence may come from
many sources other than high-precedence cables. For instance, the
earliest intimation of the freshened tension that led to the Six
Day War was supplied by Reuters on 17 May 1967 when Egyptian forces
replaced those of the U.N. on the Israeli border. FBIS was the
first to report the outbreak of fighting between the antagonists
at 02+0 on 5 June. UPI was the first press agency to report that
the Egyptians had broken the cease fire on 9 June.
On 24 June 1967, the CIA
provided the first information that Premier Kosygin was leaving
New York to go to Cuba; it was the sole source of this information
for the Washington intelligence community. The CIA action officer
at the NMCC relayed word from Eglin Air Force Base on !I- January
1967 that a Mace missile had escaped control and was on its way
over Cuba despite attempts at automatic self-destruction and an un-
successful pursuit by F-1-04s. On 27 July 1967, the D.C. Civil De-
fense Emergency Operations Center at Lorton, Virginia, reported
disturbances close to CIF facilities in Alexandria, Virginia, as
the result of the arrest of H. Rap Brown. In all these instances,
the role of the Operations Center was to recognize the potentially
critical significance of the information and to initiate the appro-
priate alert and action procedures.
The Less Than Critical
In a sense, coping with the second category of information, that
which is less than critical but nevertheless important, presents
the more difficulties. This is only partly because there is sub-
stantially more of it. Lacking the formal or mechanical aids which
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often identify critical traffic and its almost invariably self-
evident importance, the lower category requires resort to judgment,
general knowledge, imagination, and all-around lore in the tech-
niques of intelligence. Here it is not enough to be knowledgeable
about the principal situations and intelligence questions of pri-
mary. current interest. The ideal is to be able not only to detect
evidence of significant mbvement in matters known to be of concern
but also to recognize the advent of new problems that may well be-
come of concern. Successful anticipation is of course one of the
objects of intelligence. The analytical attack upon the evidence
of such emergent problems begins in the Operations Center and the
headquarters components with which it is so closely linked.
Both the Cable Secretariat and the Operations Center are involved
in the mechanical process. The Secretariat, as the primary recep-
tion and dissemination point within CIA for State, Defense, and
CIA information cables, selects the most significant and perishable
traffic for rapid distribution to Agency officials and, in the case
of CIA cables, to the White House. It sends material selected for
current intelligence components in the CIA Directorate of Intelli-
gence directly to the Operations Center in enough copies for fast
distribution. There the SDO reviews it substantively and may alert
senior officials in the Directorate immediately if he thinks this
warranted.
As a precaution, the Cable Secretariat also sends to the Operations
Center copies of the remaining traffic received but not selected
for rapid distribution. All this material is reviewed in the Cen-
ter, which may then request the distribution of any items that have
eluded the Secretariat and at the same time alert or consult with
the appropriate area specialists about them. The Operations Cen-
ter thus is in'a position to insure that all available significant
intelligence information, regardless of source, is quickly reviewed,
checked with other operation centers, evaluated by specialists, ans
distributed to senior officials.
Trends and Principles
It is perhaps obvious from the foregoing that considerable technical
and bureaucratic ingenuity--not to speak of money--has been lavished
on the effort to buy time for the making of informed judgments. This
effort has so far evidently been on the whole successful. There is,
moreover, reason to believe that communications and other technical
improvements now in the development stage will in time both enlarge
the volume of information available to the Center and facilitate
its handling. Some categories of potentially valuable reporting
which for a variety of reasons are not now readily accessible to
the Center may in time become so. Other improvements in the system
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that cannot presently be foreseen may be forthcom-ng in due corse
to increase efficiency and perhaps the quality of the product.
Certainly, in the era of the computer it would be rash to predict
that the task of the Operations Center will remain unchanged.
Other trends that are also now visible, however, raise some serious
questions, not only for the Operations Center but for the business
of current intelligence in general. We have seen how there is in-
creasing demand for greater volumes of detailed intelligence at
times of crisis. At such times the classic responsibility of intel-
l.igence for evaluation of raw information tends to become absorbed
in policy-making. The cLuestion being put to intelligence more and
more often nowadays--anc. not necessarily only at times of crisis--
is, "What is happening in country X at this moment?" This bespeaks
the impulse of the policy-maker, himself subject to relentless pres-
sures, to get at his problem as directly as possible, the better to
grapple with it. His real desire, in a word, is to experience per-
sonally the events that concern him as they are occurring. One effect
of this tendency, as we have seen, is greatly to constrict the time
available to intelligence to practice its arcane arts. But the
effect is compounded because the demand is not only for speed but
for the greatest possible precision, which necessarily implies
detail.
It is indeed up to intelligence to answer speedily the question,
"What is happening in ccuntry X at this moment?" tut this is not
the most important question it is responsible for answering, and
the intelligence community ought not to encourage the assumption
that it is. Rather, intelligence renders its highest service in
answering the question, "What do you make of what is happening in
country X?" Answering this requires the application of analytical
judgment.
A kind of Gresham's law that operates in the market place for in-
telligence could favor a trend to the first question: mistaken
intelligence tends to erode confidence in the commodity in general
and in the institution that produces it. The existence of a cer-
tain field of confidence is thus essential if intelligence is to
perform its useful service. It is therefore to be hoped that
future technical innovations to speed the acquisition of informa-
tion in intelligence work in general, as well as in the Operations
Center, will have as their ultimate purpose the improvement of in-
telligence judgments. It should not be a system for rapid commun-
ication of raw material that rouses mighty chiefs from their couches
in the murk of early daw:a, but confidence in our selection and eval-
uation and in the finish=_d intelligence we produce.
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On the 24th of January this year there descended upon the Directorate
for Intelligence a document that for a brief but frantic period was
to try the resources of the Directorate in some ways more severely
than they had ever before been tested. This document was a National
Security Council directive, later dubbed by those who became involved
in it, with appropriate irony, "Cloud Nine." This directive called
for an inventory of the international situation as of January 20,
1969, in the form of a "current assessment of the political, economic,
and security situation and of the major problems relevant to US se-
curity interests and US bilateral and multilateral relations" world-
wide. It demanded, in addition, "a discussion, where appropriate,
of the data upon which judgments are based, uncertainties regarding
the data, and alternative possible interpretations of the data." To
make certain that the response was properly pointed, the directive posed,
in 52 pages, a total of 893 probing questions touching almost every coun-
try on the globe. The answers were to be in the President's hands by
the 20th of February, a matter of 26 days, including weekends.
Obviously this was a task of formidable magnitude, one that at first
glance appeared almost impossible of fulfilment in the time span al-
lotted. Of course, certain short cuts could be taken. It is always
tempting, for example, when confronted with a requirement of these
dimensions, to look on the shelf for already canned material that
could be dusted off, updated if necessary, and ladled out lukewarm
to the consumer. Another time saving device is to by-pass the usual
processes of editing and review, sending forward immediately from the type-
writer the analyst's sweaty draft. Unfortunately, although in many
instances, at least, the analyst views the draft as perfect, the editor
thinks it is merely perfectible, and his ministrations toward that
laudable end take time.
In this case, it was decided that there would be no short cuts. A
really fresh look at the situation would be taken, candid judgments
would be rendered, and the answers would be made as incisive and un-
equivocal as it lay in our power to make them. Each answer would be
*Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 1969).
25X1A is a senior CIA current intelligence officer.
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responsibly edited, and the entire lot would be reviewed by two senior
officers -- one of them the chairman of the task force established to
complete the project -- who would ensure that, stylistically and sub-
stantively, the whole massive response met the hig?o standards set by
the DDI. In appearance the response was to be neat and attractive, if
not as psychedelically colorful as a Madison Avenue product, and it
was to be carefully packaged. And finally, in the words of the Di-
rector, as far as CIA was concerned, at least, the deadline would be
met. His determination in this respect may have been influenced some-
what by knowledge that the directive had been levied also on the De-
partments of State, Defense, and Treasury, putting the Agency, in a
sense, in competition with them for timely production of a quality prod-
uct.
The manner in which inter-Office and inter-Directorate teams were manned
and organized to prepare the answers and get them edited and coordinated
is a complex story in itself'. Here, however, we propose to deal with a
different aspect of the Cloud 9 problem, one with which we are well ac-
quainted, especially in current intelligence production, but which is
not generally thought of until it becomes potentially a major obstacle,
as it did in the case of Cloud 9. This aspect embraces the mechanics
of reproduction, the process of getting a clean draft typed, a final
draft printed, and a finished product ready for distribution to meet a
deadline.
Anyone with any experience _n the management of current intelligence is
likely to be more familiar than he likes with the sentence, "It's in the
typewriter." This sentence, usually uttered in a tone of bored in-
difference by a writer who has been asked what has happened to an item
that has a rapidly approaching deadline, typifies an all too common
feeling among professionals that once the draft is written, the work
is done and the project completed. Would that it were so; our task
would be much easier. Few, of course, would buy the proposition that
the clerical process is as difficult or complex or even as valuable as
the analytical/writing process. But the fact remains that in many in-
stances, unless the analyst's work is typed and reproduced and dis-
tributed at the right time, the analyst might just, as well not have
done it at all, for all the effect it will have. So from this point
of view, the clerical process, whatever else its level in the scale of
values in the professior of intelligence, is just as essential as the
analytical one. And it is played down or disregarded only at the peril
of derailing the entire train of intelligence production.
In the case of Cloud 9, it was clear from the outset that the production
process, unless carefully managed, would unquestionably defeat us. This
was partly the result of the sheer bulk of the project. It stemmed also
from the decision to start from scratch and to apply the full editorial
review machinery to the final product. It was closely related, obviously,
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to the shortness of the deadline: there were less than three weeks left
after the writing teams had been organized in which to finish and deliver
the product. And, of course, the fact that all of the production personnel
involved in Cloud 9 had other duties that normally occupied them full time,
duties that still had to be carried on simultaneously, compounded an al-
ready difficult situation. Given all of these factors, it was legitimate
to question whether the deadline would, in fact, be met as we plunged
into work.
It was estimated originally that CIA's response to the NSC directive
would require about 1000 pages, and in actuality this was only slightly
below the mark. Each original contribution would be subjected to at
least two levels of editing. No one, least of all the analyst, was hope-
ful that minimum alterations in the first or any subsequent draft would
suffice. The average editor is-said to live by the principle that the
pen is mightier than the sword, and it is commonly held that he forgets
that both can be equally lethal against their natural targets. So it
was conceivable that every contribution to the aggregate response would
have to be typed a minimum of three times and quite possibly, when
finally reviewed, for a fourth. The massive size of this typing load
made potentially a serious obstacle to our meeting the deadline, a
built-in impediment at every stage of production between the writer,
the reviewer, and finally the print shop. A back log of any consequence
at any stage of the process could cause us to miss the target date by
a wide margin.
In fact, the key to the success of any large, operation of this sort is to
establish and adhere to a realistically shared writing - typing - cor-
rection schedule that will ensure a smooth, steady, and controlled flow
of material from the writers through the editors to the printers. This
began, in the case of Cloud 9, with scheduling the actual writing so
that the answers to the easier questions would be prepared and edited
first and the more difficult ones deferred until close to the deadline.
It was hoped, and indeed it turned out to be the case, that the senior
reviewers would be confronted on any given day with no less and if
possible very little more than they could plow through in around ten hours.
Since these two gentlemen constituted a marked constriction in the pipe-
line, having to read everything, it was mandatory that their part of
the operation proceed smoothly.
To ensure the essential control of the flow of material, a control cen-
ter was established in OCI's Publications Support group. Here a number
was assigned to each question in the NSC directive (they were unnumbered
in the document itself) and notation made of the team and office respon-
sible for producing the answer and of the scheduled date of delivery to
the senior reviewers. As the various answers were written, edited, and
typed in second draft, they were sent to the control center. The center,
in turn, passed them to the senior reviewers. When the latter had finished
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massaging them, they were returned to the control center, which then had
them put on mats in final. form and sent them to the print shop for repro-
duction. The control cer.ter could tell at any time, and kept the Task
Force Chief informed, whether the production schedule was being main-
tained, where any particL.lar answer was at any time, etc. The system
made it possible also to have the individual answers printed as they
were completed, regardless of sequence, and to ensure that assembly and
pagination of the entire response could be done in orderly fashion at
the very end of the process. Obviously it would have been fatal to hold
the drafts until all parts of the response were in and had been put in
the sequence required by the NSC directive before beginning to print
them.
The production schedule was extremely tight, and there was little latitude
for slippage. We were fighting the clock to such an extent that rather
than hand carry, we used the pneumatic tube system to get papers from
one part of the building to another without delay, and to keep everyone
busy. At one point, the tube system broke down, causing a certain amount
of panic until the missing papers were located and extracted, and business
could go ahead again.
Despite this and a few other lapses, our attack on the Cloud 9 problem
was well organized, and it proved to be effective. The flow of manu-
scripts actually began earlier than expected, and no large backlog de-
veloped at any time. But even with the best organized and most rational
schedule, we would still have failed to deliver on time if we had not
had the MTST -- Magnetic Tape Selectric Typewriter. We had eleven, and
sometimes twelve, of these machines at our disposal, five of them in OCI's
Publication Support group and the remainder elsewhere in the Intelligence
Directorate. We could have used more, since not all of the substantive
teams had one available to them. The answers to the vast majority of
the questions, however, were put on magnetic tape after initial editing
and review had been completed by the substantive teams. The tapes and
the corresponding typed crafts were then delivered to the Control Center
in OCI, where the tapes were retained while the senior reviewers were
working independently on their copies of the drafts. The revisions made
at this level were then, with the aid of the MIST, incorporated in a fin-
ished, corrected tape and a final draft typed simultaneously.
The advantage that the M'I'ST has over the ordinary manual or electric type-
writer, and its unique ccntribution to Cloud 9, may not, be apparent from
this generalized description of procedures. So to be a little more speci-
ic: At a reasonable estimate, probably less then five percent of all the
pages in the analysts' original typescripts were completely untouched in
both levels of review. Fetyping all of these pages by hand would have
been enormously time-consuming, not to mention the strain it would have
imposed on the typists themselves. But when a draft on tape is run
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through the machine, the MTST retypes automatically at a very high rate
of speed. The trained operator stops the machine wherever a correction
is necessary, enters the change on the corrected tape, simultaneously,
and directs the machine to proceed until the next change is encountered.
By this means a clean, corrected draft, together with a new tape, is
rapidly produced with a minimum of effort compared with what would be re-
quired without the MTST. Depending upon which stage of production we
are talking about, this new draft is either a typescript designed for
further review or a mat for printing, if final review has been completed.
We believe that without the MTST, it would have taken about twice the
number of typists twice the time to do the same job.
A final factor bearing on our success with Cloud 9 -- intangible but
nonetheless critical -- was the morale of the machine operators. Theirs
was an exacting task, and, despite the magic of the MTST, a nerve-
racking one because of the constant pressure on them to get the thing
done, and done accurately. Their performance was splendid, their pride
in their work obvious and justified. At one point when the Task Force
Chief inadvertently referred to them as typists, he was politely but firmly
told that they were machine operators. The distinction is a valid one.
The girls do have to be trained to operate the MTST, and certain stages
of their work are somewhat akin to computer programming.
Between February 3, when Cloud 9 drafts began to pile into Publication
Support's office, and February 16, when the mats were finished, the
machine operators worked every day. The five in the Publication Sup-
port group, alone, together with three proofreaders, racked up a total
of 378 hours of overtime. Their supervisor had to watch them closely --
a pleasurable occupation in any event -- for signs of exhaustion and
falling efficiency. Occasionally he had to tell one to pack up and go
home. But he was most impressed by their energy and drive and their
devotion to duty, which clearly went beyond any desire for overtime
compensation.
Once the mats were done, the only remaining hurdles to be surmounted
were printing and assembling the answers. These tasks were performed
in Printing and Services Division's plant on the seventh floor of Head-
quarters Building, operating around the clock. Considering that the
various parts of the project were delivered to the plant piece-meal
and were printed on arrival, without regard for the final order of the
answers, the job of collation alone was staggering. Small. changes in
the texts, moreover, were being introduced up to the very last moment.
Printing and Services Division designated a Control Officer for Cloud 9
who, in close coordination with the Control Center in OCI, maintained
the flow of mats into the seventh floor plant and ensured that the
printing schedule was maintained. High standards of appearance were
demanded and met. And, of course, in this as in other Agency compo-
nents engaged in Cloud 9, regular routine work requirements had to be
carried on at the same time.
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When Cloud 9 was finished and put together, it filled 7 volumes and
1030 pages, counting inserts. The product wa= the result of a team
effort probably unparalleled in the Agency's Listory, involving co-
operation - smooth at all times - between elements of the DDP, ONE,
DDI, DDS & T, and DDS.
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APPENDIX A
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Communist China: The appointment of a new
provincial revolutionary committee chairman in
Kwangtung may attest to the growing influence in
Peking of chief of -the general staff Huang Yung-
sheng.
The important post was previously held by
Huang, the longtime Canton Military Region commander,
but had been vacant since March 1968 when Huang be-
came chief of staff. The long delay in replacing
Huang suggests that the choice of a successor may
have generated considerable debate among competing
interest groups in Peking.
The new chairman, Liu Hsing-yuan, has served as
a political commissar in the Canton Military Region
since at least 1955 and is among Huang's close as-
sociates in Kwangtung. Liu was promoted over the
head of K'ung Shih-ch'uan, who has been "first vice
chairman" of the revolutionary committee since it
was established in February 1968 and had been acting
chairman since Huang's departure the following month.
K'ung was sent to Kwangtung from Peking during a
period of radical resurgence in May 1967 to serve
as a high-ranking political officer in the Canton
Military Region.
Huang is clearly on the rise. His counsel and
approval no doubt were instrumental in confirming
the Kwangtung appointment. Moreover, the recent
upgrading of the office of the chief of general
staff reflects his enhanced personal stature.
Huang's ascent is further evidence that some regional
military leaders have been acquiring a significant
share of political influence in Peking.
I
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NOTES
25X1 C
UN - Middle East: reports
that General Odd Bu , chief of staff of the UN
Truce Supervision Organization, has decided to close
temporarily two observer posts, one on each side of
the Suez Canal. If conditions do not improve, Bull
plans to close four more of the 18 posts shortly.
The UN political adviser on the scene reportedly is
urging that all observers be withdrawn on humanitar-
ian grounds. According to press reports, UN officials
met yesterday in New York with representatives of the
seven nations contributing observers to consider the
situation. F__ I
Nigeria: Pope Paul's efforts to bring about
peace negotiations between the Nigerians and Biafrans
during his visit to Uganda on 31 July - 2 August are
not likely to be productive. The federal government
and the Biafrans, however, are sending delegations
to meet with the Pope. Nigerian and Biafran delega-
tions are now in Geneva to discuss relief operations,
but this also seems unlikely to lead to s peace
negotiations.
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East Germany - Guinea: A high-level East German
delegation which arrived in Conakry on 26 July pre-
sumably is attempting to persuade the Guineans to
establish diplomatic relations with Pankow. The
delegation, led by politburo member Albert Norden,
probably will attempt to convince the Guineans that
now is the time to recognize Pankow, and that such a
move would not offend Bonn. As in the case of the
six other countries which previously extended recog-
nition, the East Germans may also offer to grant
further economic assistance to Guinea.
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F I
S E C R E T
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1. Introduction
India,* the most populous country of the free world,
is rich in natural resources, militarily the strongest
non-Communist nation in Asia, and geographically
situated to command the Indian Ocean and the stra-
tegic Suez-Singapore sea lanes. It is a culturally com-
plex country whose leaders are striving to maintain
national political unity and to keep population growth
from outstripping food production and economic
growth. Though increasing in both economic strength
and military power, India faces internal problems that
could lead to prolonged economic stagnation, do-
mestic political instability, and further deterioration
of international influence.
The leading political force is the Congress Party,
spearhead in the fight for independence from the
United Kingdom that culminated successfully in 1947.
The party achieved major successes in unifying the
country and providing some degree of stability to the
national, economy. It made the general principles of
state socialism, secularism, and nonalignment in inter-
national affairs Indian national policy. However, its
control of the national government was seriously weak-
ened in the 1987 elections. Its majority in the national
Parliament was substantially reduced and it has lost
control of 9 of the 17 states.
The death in 1964 of Jawaharlal . Nehru, India's
charismatic Prime Minister, posed the Congress Party
with a leadership crisis. Neither the brief incumbency
of Lal Behadur Shastri, who died in January 1966,
nor that of Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter who
succeeded Shastri, has filled the leadership void left
by Nehru. Disunity within the ranks continues to
weaken the Congress Party organization. .
The Indian Communist movement, around which
opposition to the Congress Party at one time seemed
to be polarizing, has attracted little further support
since the mid-1950's, although the Communists man-
aged to capture control of one state government-that
of Kerala-in the elections of 1957 and again in 1967.
Factionalism within the movement has intensified as
a result of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and
other contentious issues. In 1964 the party split, with
one of the successor parties remaining loyal to Mos-
cow and the other espousing many of the Chinese
? Included with India in this NIS Area are the Indian
union territories of the Andaman, Nicobar, and Laccadive
Islands, the State of Jammu and Kashmir (whose status
is in dispute with Pakistan), the protectorate of Sikkim,
and the kingdom of Bhutan. Nepal is covered by NIS
Area 35A.
party's militant tactics but stopping considerably short
of alignment with Peking. Several non-Communist
parties have been growing steadily, but none is large
enough to provide a stable alternative to Congress
Party rule at the national level.
Even with political stability under Nehru, the gov-
ernment had difficulty in keeping economic develop-
ment abreast of population growth and in satisfying
the demands of a politically awakening population.
Indian economic growth is impressive in absolute
terms; in relative (or per capita) terms it is low.
This contrast is largely due to the country's late start
toward industrialization, the rapid growth of the popu-
lation (which increases by more than. 12 million an-
nually), the high rate of illiteracy, the religious, lin-
guistic, and social complexity of the country, and
the scarcity of equipment and of experienced ad-
ministrative and technical personnel, all of which
hamper the development of India's potentially large
resources. Nevertheless, India is an important world
source of minerals and 1 of the top 10 industrial
nations of the world as well as 1 of the top 15
trading nations, though it is far behind the leaders in
both categories.
The government has found it necessary to key its
5-year plan economic development targets to the grow-
ing needs of the Indian people rather than to the
country's own capabilities, with the result that outside
assistance is necessary to compensate for shortfalls.
As each 5-year plan period passes, the increased size
of India's industrial plant requires more foreign ex-
change, while its ability to produce exchange-earning
export has risen very slowly. India, therefore, is de-
pendent on increasing increments of foreign financial
and technical aid in making net forward progress.
After achieving independence in 1947, India at-
tempted to play a leading role among emerging
nations by sponsoring a series of international con-
ferences, establishing itself as a champion of anti-
colonialist forces, and advocating a doctrine of non-
alignment for Asian nations. Thus, during the mid-
1950's, India was a leading participant in a loose and
short-lived Afro-Asian bloc whose members worked
together on a limited number of world issues.
Since then, and particularly since the death of
Nehru, most Indian political leaders have become less
interested in international matters not directly affecting
India's welfare. They welcome close relations with
both the West and the Soviet Union, which they view
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as vital participants in Indian economic development
and as potential guarantors against Chinese Commu-
nist aggression. Nevertheless, Indian diplomacy con-
tinues to attach some importance to Afro-Asian non-
aligned causes, although at times Indian nonalignment
appears to be little more than a lingering vestige of the
Nehru era. Some government policies-such as the
unwavering backing of the Arab countries-are de-
signed in part to gain international support for India's
position in its dispute with Pakistan.
India's relations with Pakistan, whose eastern and
western provinces are separated by 1,000 miles of In-
dian territory, have been strained since partition in
1947. Though both countries are members of the
Commonwealth, they have been unable to reach agree-
ment on a number of important poinis of difference,
including conflicting claims in Jammu and Kashmir.
In 1960, however, they managed to reach a satisfac-
tory compromise on dividing the waters of the Indus
River basin; however, a number of ether issues re-
mained unsettled. In early 1965 there were armed
clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces in a dis-
puted portion of the Rann of Kutch, and in August
and September of that year open warfare broke out
between the two countries over the Kashmir problem.
Between 1947 and 1956 India held its military
expenditures at a fairly constant level. After the
delivery of substantial U.S. arms aid to Pakistan in
1956, however, India commenced a slow military
buildup which was sharply increased following Chi-
nese Communist attacks on Indian-claimed territory
in the Himalayas in 1962. India, despite the govern-
ment's political heritage of "nonviolence" and its con-
viction that world peace is necessary for India's eco-
nomic development, maintains the largest military
force in the free world after the United States, with
approximately 1,144,500 men under arms in 1967.
Indian military power strengthens the non-Commu-
nist world in a vital area close to Communist China,
but it also contributes to Pakistani wariness of Indian
intentions and thus heightens tensions between the
two antagonistic subcontinental neighbors.
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1. Table of Contents
2. Preface "Far East"
3. "Communist Guerrillas Active in Thailand"
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(Information as of noon EDT, 26 June 1969)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The Communists' summer campaign remains confined to
sporadic surges of offensive military activity. The
Vietnamese Communists are taking a tougher line on
the negotiations, especially regarding a role for
the Saigon government.
COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS
Communist forces have launched a series of ground
attacks against government positions near the Plaine
des Jarres in north Laos.
COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND
Communist insurgents continue to make headway in the
north while they try to improve their assets in the
northeast.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
FRANCE TO MODERNIZE ITS AIR FORCE FOR THE 1970s
The French Air Force is moving ahead with a moderni-
zation program to replace a major part of the force's
equipment by the mid-1970s.
SECRET
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NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN FRANCE
President Pompidou has put together a carefully
balanced government that reflects both the continuity
and the change he stressed during his electoral cam-
paign.
POLES INTERESTED IN WEST GERMAN TRADE
During the recent visits to Poland of West Berlin
Mayor Schuetz and West German economic officials,
the Poles exhibited a more relaxed political attitude
toward Bonn, and demonstrated their interest in a
significant expansion of commercial relations with
West Germany, West Berlin, and the West in general.
CZECHOSLOVAKS DRAFT NEW DOMESTIC POLICIES
Husak and his colleagues are drafting new measures
that they hope will minimize the country's political
and social ills.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE BAATHISTS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA
Although the USSR has made a heavy investment in Syria
and Iraq, both in terms of military equipment and eco-
nomic aid, Moscow has not acquired much leverage over
the policies of the two countries. (Published sepa-
rately as Special Report No. 0376/69B)
Middle East - Africa
SOVIET ARMS RESUPPLY CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST
The USSR is maintaining the rate of military deliver-
ies to its arms clients in the Middle East at close
to last year's levels.
BRITAIN SEVERS FINAL TIES WITH RHODESIA
As a result of the decisive mandate that the Smith
government won in referenda held on 20 June, Britain
this week announced the severance of all remaining
formal ties with Rhodesia.
MIDDLE EAST INCIDENTS INCREASE
The tempo of terrorist incidents and Israeli reprisals
has risen over the past few weeks.
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POWER STRUGGLE ERUPTS IN SOUTHERN YEMEN
President al-Shaabi's ouster on 22 June appears to
represent a further shift to the left in Southern
Yemen, but the position of the new government may
not yet be secure.
INDIA AND THE HIMALAYAN KINGDOMS
India considers the preservation of its predominant
influence in the three Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal,
Bhutan, and Sikkim vital to the security of the,
Indian'subcontinent. Its treaty relationships with
each state provide for varying degrees of Indian in-
volvement and each is heavily dependent on India for
economic assistance, trade, and security. (Published
separately as Special Report No. 0376/69A)
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
SWEEPING LAND REFORMS ANNOUNCED IN PERU
President Velasco has announced the promulgation of
an agrarian reform law that provides for the expro-
priation and redistribution of all major land hold-
ings in the country, including those owned by US
companies.
COLOMBIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETTING UNDER WAY
The reunification of the Conservative Party will
strongly influence the choice of the National Front
Coalition's presidential candidate for next year's
election and reduces the chance of a split in the
coalition that might enable ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla
to win the presidency.
TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MEXICAN STATE OF YUCATAN
Political conflict in the state of Yucatan is inten-
sifying with the approach of the gubernatorial elec-
tion in November.
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Hanoi, by rejecting any compromise arrangements short of of a provi-
sional coalition government, is trying to intensify pressures on the Thieu
government. Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's top man in Paris publicly dismissed a
suggestion that the Communists might join South Vietnamese Government
representatives on an electoral commission. He also flatly ruled out interna-
tional supervision of elections.
On the military side, the major Communist thrust during their sporadic
summer campaign has been aimed at western Kontum Province, where South
Vietnamese troops have recently assumed the major ground combat role. In
particular, the Communists apparently are trying to impose a local defeat on
South Vietnamese irregular forces at the isolated outpost of Ben Het in
hopes of demoralizing the Saigon government and the armed forces. The
enemy, despite substantial losses, has been repeatedly attacking the camp
since early May.
Communist forces in Laos have launched a series of ground attacks
against government positions near the Plaine des Jarres. The ability of North
Vietnamese troops to move rapidly into position around Muong Soui demon-
strates the vulnerability of the neutralist headquarters there to enemy forces
situated directly east on the Plaine. It is also fresh evidence that the North
Vietnamese can deploy troops into Xieng Khouang Province with little or no
warning. The attack may have been intended as a response commensurate
with the government's occupation for six weeks this spring of the once
inviolate Communist base at Xieng Khouangville.
Communist insurgents are consolidating their control over tribal ele-
ments in north and north-central Thailand, while in the northeast they are
trying to improve their assets. The guerrillas have continued to avoid armed
encounters with superior government security forces, although periodic T
operations have resulted in some small-unit clashesi
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VIETNAM
The Communist summer campaign
remains confined to sporadic
surges of offensive military ac-
tivity. The second June "high-
point materialized, for the most
part, only to the northwest of
Saigon. The enemy's two--day of-
fensive thrust in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince, which included a penetra-
tion into the provincial capital,
cost the Communists more than 320
killed late last week.
At least one source has re-
ported that slippage in the en-
emy's timetable was caused by al-
lied pre-emptive operations.
Nevertheless, current enemy ac-
tivities strongly suggest that
preparations for future offen-
sives are under way. There have
been reports that new attacks will
come in July; some hint that a
new surge of shellings and lim-
ited ground attacks is set for
2 July.
Meanwhile, Communist forces
are maintaining pressure against
the Ben Het Civilian Irregular
Defense Group Camp in western
Kontum Province. Elements Of
tree North Vietnamese regiments
pose a substantial threat to the
-3en Het - Dak To area. These
units have been active throughout
western Kontum Province for nearly
two months. The camp arid sur-
rounding defensive positions have
been the target of almost daily
-artillery and mortar bombardments--
totaling some 5,000 rounds--since
early May. South Vietnamese pa-
trols and reconnaissance forces
have fought numerous engagements
against enemy troops in the vi-
cinity of the remote allied out-
post.
Despite more than 300 B-52
sorties against enemy troop con-
centrations and bunker complexes
since 1 May, testimony from pris-
oners captured near Ben Het points
to further enemy action in the
area. The Communists may believe
a decisive victory over South
Vietnamese troops who recently
assumed the major ground combat
role in Kontum Province would have
considerable impact on the South
Vietnamese Government and its army.
Furthermore, if Ben Het should
fall, it could be a major stepping
stone for an enemy thrust against
the South Vietnamese strongpoint
at Dak To.
Despite the heavy losses suf-
fered by the Communist 9th Divi-
Ision in its attacks on Tay Ninh
ion 18-19 June, defectors reveal
that elements of the division con-
tinue to plan for coordinated at-
tacks against allied targets in
the province.
The extent of the continuing
Communist effort in Tay Minh sug-
Igests that this province plays an
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COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND
Communist insurgents continue
to make headway in the north while
they try to improve their assets
in the northeast.
In the north and north-cen-
tral provinces, the Communists
are consolidating their control
over tribal areas. Village prop-
aganda meetings and sightings of
larger insurgent bands attest to
the insurgents' growing strength
in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces.
Village reports also indicate the
guerrillas are strengthening
their organization in Tak.
in Udon Thani and Kalasin prov-
inces indicate the guerrillas
may be establishing footholds in
neighboring areas that are rel-
atively free of government se-
curity forces. They are reported
to have established new political
and military training facilities
in Kalasin. Bangkok has been
particularly concerned over the
spread of insurgent activity in
southern Ubon Province, an area
that is especially vulnerable be-
cause of the proximity of Laos-
based Communist forces.
The guerrillas continue to
harass government security forces,
but incidents have become less
frequent because several army
units have been pulled out of the
area for security duty in adja-
cent lowlands. Bangkok has as-
signed a new military commander
to the north who has a reputation
for being aggressive. Neverthe-
less, the leadership still ap-
pears to be divided on the best
course to follow in combatting
the tribal insurgency.
In the northeast, the guer-
rillas are apparently carrying
out plans drawn up last December
to pare down and improve their
organization. An increased num-
ber of sightings of insurgents
The guerrillas also continue
to avoid armed encounters with
superior security forces, al-
though periodic Thai Army opera-
tions have resulted in some small
unit clashes.
There are some indications
that the Communists intend to in-
crease their military assets in
the northeast. A senior Com-
munist defector has stated that
several hundred insurgents were
scheduled to return earlier this
year from extended training in
North Vietnam and Laos. There
have also been reports that the
insurgents have acquired a few 25X1
mortars and rocket launchers,
but there has been no indication
of their use. r
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Thailand: Insurgents Improve Positions in Widely Separated Areas
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COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS
Communist forces have launched
a series of ground attacks against
government positions near the
Plaine des Jarres in north Laos.
The action was highlighted
by a sharp attack on 24 June
against the neutralist headquar-
ters at Muong Soui. At least two
battalions of North Vietnamese
troops supported by tanks overran
a. number of the base's outlying
defense positions and inflicted
light casualties on government
defenders. The airstrip, however,
remained in government hands.
One North Vietnamese prisoner
claims that his unit moved into
Laos from North Vietnam in early
June with the specific purpose of
attacking Muong Soui. The abil-
ity of the North Vietnamese to
move their forces rapidly into
position around Muong Soui demon-
strates the vulnerability of the
neutralist headquarters -:o enemy
forces situated directly east on
the Plaine. It also is :fresh
evidence that the North Vietnam-
ese can deploy troops in-:o Xieng
Khouang Province with li?:tle warn-
ing or chance of detection.
In apparently related moves,
the Communists drove government
troops from Phou Soung, a recently
won position north of the Plaine,
and hit government guerrilla out-
posts on the southern rim. These
actions are almost certainly in
response to General Vang Pao'
recent effort to re-establish a
government presence on the Plaine.
The attack against Muong Soui
is the first major action against
that position in five years. It
may have been intended as a com-
mensurate response to the govern-
ment's occupation for six weeks
this spring of the once inviolate
Communist base of Xieng Khouang-
ville. The attack may also have
been launched for political rea-
sons. In recent weeks the Com-
munists have made a concerted ef-
fort to portray Communist "patri-
otic neutralist" elements as the
"true representatives" of the
neutralist faction. Such preten-
sions presumably would be fur-
thered by the capture of the
neutralist headquarters at Muong
Soui.
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S E C R E T
18 April 1969
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Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Secret
Secret
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19 August 1969
S E C R E T
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
CZECHOSLOVAKIA FACES THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY
OF THE INVASION
Secret
No. 1$43/69
19 August 1969
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"ATAlr.NIt`yG
Vita document contains informnatinn affec'xng the national
+lc~fen$e of the United States, within thcy u waning of Title
16, se,:tion 93 and 79-1. of the US Coc',?, as amended.
its trsinsrrnssion or 1'4tvP1sation of 'tS cor,*~nts to or re-
4?(1ipt )y i?n unauthorized taorson is proilibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 August 1969
Czechoslovakia Faces the First Anniversary
of the Invasion
Introduction
The regime of Gustav Husak will meet its most
critical test this week when Czechoslovakia marks
the anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of 20-21
August 1968. A tense situation exists. Dissidents
appear determined to mount demonstrations, if only
scattered and peaceful ones. An equally determined
Husak has undertaken elaborate security precautions
to control the situation. The measures ordered ap-
pear to be more than adequate, but some relatively
minor incident could nevertheless spark civil unrest.
This memorandum proposes to collate available
information on the current situation and assess the
course demonstrations might take.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current InteZZi-
gence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic
Research and the Office of National Estimates.
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Security Measures
1. Authorities have ordered the regular police
reinforced with special units and have activated the
people's militia--the Communist Party's security arm
consisting largely of miners and factory workers.
Some elements of the Czechoslovak Army are on alert,
and the military probably will patrol all major ci-
ties throughout the week. Security officials are
arresting known criminals, dissidents who have pro-
duced and disseminated inflammatory "antisocialist"
leaflets, and others who are most likely to generate
trouble. Border regulations have been tightened,
primarily to restrict the flow of foreign students
and journalists into the country during the anni,wer-
sary period. The regime warned foreign newsmen in
Prague against inflammatory reporting by expelling
a Swiss correspondent on 15 August, allegedly for
slandering Czechoslovak leaders.
2. Regime spokesmen and mass organizations
are appealing daily to the people to refrain from
even quiet, nonviolent demonstrations. Husak and
President Svoboda reportedly will make additional
televised appeals on 19 August. Svoboda, probably
the most popular and respected political figure in
the country, will follow with an "eleventh hour'
plea for calm on 20 August--the eve of the anniver-
sary. Other popular officials--such as Alexander
Dubcek and Josef Smrkovsky--may be asked by Husak
to urge the people to abstain from manifesting anti-
Soviet sentiment.
The Dissidents
3. Dissidents from labor, journalist, and stu-
dent groups are active but are not calling for ex-
treme violence. Leaflets circulating clandestinely
throughout the country advocate peaceful demonstra-
tions, including a boycott of public transport, res-
taurants, and nightclubs, and call for appropriate
services to honor the victims of the "new terror."
Handbills also call for a token five-minute general
strike at noon on 21 August. The grave of student
martyr Jan Palach, who set himself afire last Jan-
uary in protest over the occupation, was covered
with flowers this past weekend. Top party leaders,
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who obviously would be thankful if nothing more than
protests of this kind developed, nevertheless have
assailed these methods of marking the anniversary.
4. Some labor groups have become increasingly
bold. On 29 July Czechoslovak workers reportedly
stoned a candidate member of the Soviet politburo
when he tried to visit their plant. At another in-
dustrial installation, the Russian was greeted by
a walkout. The rock-throwing episode was the most
serious publicized incident since the hockey riots
in late March that led to the ouster of Dubcek.
5. According to a recent poll, two thirds of
the university students who are party members have
no confidence in Husak's leadership. Student lead-
ers are presently trying to persuade dissident
youths to refrain from demonstrating, and univer-
sity and government officials have agreed to post-
pone until September the remaining student exami-
nations scheduled for the last two weeks of August
in Prague. Nevertheless, some youths reportedly
stole a few small arms recently, possibly intending
to stir up trouble.
6. A continuing purge of the armed forces
since the invasion probably has insured the relia-
bility of the high echelons in the officer corps
and the defense ministry. Most rank-and-file mil-
itary personnel, however, are youths with a liberal
political outlook who vehemently oppose the occupa-
tion. A shooting incident between Czechoslovak and
Soviet soldiers is reliably reported to have taken
place in Karlovy Vary on 11 July.
Hardliners a Source of Trouble
7. Pro-Russian officials in the regime who
stand to gain from more doctrinaire policies--e.g.,
the editor of Rude Pravo--may attempt to fan any
disturbances, hoping to bring the intervention of
Soviet forces and the downfall of Husak and his
moderate colleagues. These conservatives--probably
confident of Soviet backing--have been critical of
Husak for proceeding too slowly in re-creating a
more orthodox Communist regime. They have been
calling for arrests and trials of liberal and other
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anti-Soviet and anti-Communist dissidents, and for
official party condemnations of Dubcek, Smrkovsky
and others. This Husak has refused to do. Conse-
quently, the hardliners may judge that the anniver-
sary provides a good opportunity to weaken Husak's
position and pave the way for his subsequent polit-
ical demise.
8. Although their recent clandestine activi-
ties are unknown, the hardliners have the apparatus
for subversive activity. They have established their
own political "front" organization, organized student
and journalists' unions, and now exercise control
over some key security departments in the Interior
Ministry.
9. The Soviets have been taking an increasingly
active hand in the situation as the anniversary ap-
proaches. Russian leaders Brezhnev and Podgorny met
with Husak and President Svoboda in Warsaw on 23 July,
and again in the Crimea between 2-10 August.
10. Moscow apparently has put pressure on Husak
to whitewash the invasion by admitting publicly that
it was a necessary move to save socialism in Czecho-
slovakia. Czechoslovakia's main party daily, Rude
Pravo, published on 29 July the first forthright
dust fication for the intervention. That newspaper,
however, is completely controlled by hardliners, and
Moscow apparently is still insisting that Husak him-
self must declare that the intervention rescued the
party from disintegration. Husak still has not suc-
cumbed to this demand, and, according to one source,
he pledged last April that he would never do so.
11. The Soviets have also been in close touch
with prominent Czechoslovak conservatives. Party
secretary Indra arrived in the Soviet Union some-
time before 2 August and departed for home on 16 Aug-
ust. Indra was on hand with Soviet leaders to greet
Husak and Svoboda on their arrival in the Crimea and
presumably took part in these talks as well as meet-
ing with other Soviet officials. Another hardliner,
Vasil Bilak, returned from Moscow to Prague on 18
August after discussions with Soviet party officials.
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Both Indra and Bilak talked with Soviet party sec-
retary Katushev, a Brezhnev protege who reportedly
has been charged with monitoring the Czechoslovak
situation. Both men are likely to confirm the So-
viet inclination to demand repressive action as a
means of forestalling disturbances.
12. A Soviet military delegation headed by
General Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Di-
rectorate of the Armed Forces, has been in Czech-
oslovakia since 6 August, conferring with party and
government leaders and visiting military garrisons
throughout the country. Yepishev and his staff
probably are charged with overseeing security ar-
rangements and contingency plans involving Soviet
occupation troops and the Czechoslovak Army. The
Soviet delegation may also be involved in efforts
to strengthen the reliability of the-Czechoslovak
armed forces.
No Related Warsaw Pact Troop Activity
13. Reports that Soviet military units have re-
cently entered the country have not been confirmed by
reliable intelligence sources. Western military at-
taches in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia have conducted several field trips during
the past week, paying special attention to the major
border crossing points, but have not observed any un-
usual activity. Neither is there evidence that Pact
forces are preparing for combined maneuvers this
week, as has been rumored. Soviet troops stationed
in Czechoslovakia may show themselves near the ci-
ties in the next few days, however, to add weight
to the deterrents on popular outbursts.
Reaction in Eastern Europe
14. The reactions of the other invasion powers
to the imminence of the first anniversary. thus far
have been minimal. The Poles--who have offered an
open and direct endorsement of Husak--advertised
their obvious concern over the situation by giving
increased coverage and front-page treatment to Czech-
oslovakia on 15 August. Budapest media, however,
have devoted only scant attention to Czechoslovak
developments. The Hungarians, perhaps mindful of
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their own bloodbath in 1956, appear to be alarmed
over the prospects for another Czechoslovak "crisis."
A reliable source has indicated that Hungarian of-
ficials in Frankfurt and Cologne are not permitted
to travel this week and must remain at their posts.
Likelihood of a New Crisis
15. The precautions taken and the ready avail-
ability of military force make an outbreak of vio-
lence of crisis proportions unlikely. Any disturb-
ance that the Czechoslovak security apparatus could
not handle would bring in Soviet troops, and would
be short-lived. Moreover, the population-at-large
does not seem primed to participate in any such in-
surrection. The people are increasingly apathetic
toward politics and the Soviet occupation of their
country. In addition, many who dislike the Husak
regime nevertheless realize that open revolt would
mean a change to a more Moscow-oriented leadership
and possibly a new Stalinist age.
16. It seems likely that the security measures
introduced by Husak are more than adequate to control
the situation and to head off, if not discourage en-
tirely, any large demonstrations. Most public pro-
tests--in the Czechoslovak tradition--probably will
be confined to passive resistance such as the called-
for boycott of public transport, restaurants and
nightclubs, and a token five-minute general strike
at noon on 21 August.
17. Small to medium crowds probably will gather
at the graves of the victims of the intervention, and
some groups may attempt to form a peaceful protest
rally in Prague's Wenceclaus Square. The police
probably have been instructed to disperse such gath-
erings as peaceably as possible.
18. Some incident such as a self-immolation or
excessive police brutality might trigger isolated
acts of violence, especially in areas where tensions
are high. Disturbances could break out in such
places as the industrial city of Ostrava, where
worker unrest has been increasing. These might take
the form of defiance of police orders to disperse or
stoning the police and Soviet troop barracks and in-
stallations. Local authorities, however, probably
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can handle such outbursts without recourse to the
people's militia or the army. Overreaction of se-
curity and police officials in minor confrontations
with crowds also could precipitate a major incident,
but this could also be controlled.
Husak After the Anniversary
19. During his first four months in office,
Husak has been unable to get open and direct sup-
port from Moscow or a firm grasp on the powers he
needs to run the party. Nevertheless, he has dem-
onstrated that he is a strong leader who is both
receptive to Soviet demands and able to avoid the
"crisis politics" that gripped the Dubcek leader-
ship in the aftermath of the invasion.
20. A resolute and uncompromising stand during
the anniversary period, full and effective use of
the security apparatus when and where required, and
the passing of a relatively peaceful.week--without
major incidents--will strengthen Husak's hand vis-a-
vis the Russians and give him some leeway within his
own faction-ridden party as well. It will also en-
able him to focus on the country's myriad domestic
problems, many of which are contributing substan-
tially to the widening gulf between the party lead-
ership and the people.
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APPENDIX F
SITUATION REPORT
1. El Salvador-Honduras 17 July 1969
2. Countries to be Visited
by the President 31 July 1969
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OCI No. 0633/69
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 July 1969
El Salvador-Honduras
(Situation Report Number 6 - As of 6:30 PM EDT)
1. Salvadoran response to the OAS cease fire
proposal has not been received. The delay is be-
lieved to hinge on disagreement within the Salvadoran
Government on the timing for withdrawal of troops.
The OAS Organ of Consultation will meet again to-
night at 9:30 PM EDT to continue its efforts to
bring about a cease fire.
2. Honduran troops near El Amatillo on the
southern front have encountered heavy mortar and
artillery fire. A Honduran government official told
our charge that three corsairs had been dispatched
"to provide cover." The Embassy comments that the
Honduran Air Force, riding the crest of yesterday's
three confirmed kills on Salvadoran planes, are be-
coming "cocky" and anxious to redress recent losses
on the ground. Honduran ammunition and other materiel
is apparently still in short supply. The Honduran
government has requested from the US on an urgent
basis small arms, ammunition, and bombs through
either commercial or military sales, and/or grants.
3. The Guatemala City press reports that
Guatemalan refugees from both belligerent countries
are flowing into the Guatemalan town of Esquipulas.
The Guatemalan immigration service reports the
numbers in the "hundreds" while the Red Cross says
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that "thousands" are entering the city.. Meanwhile
the US Embassy in Guatemala City reports that there
is an increasing awareness among Guatemalan leaders
of the long range damage the conflict is causing
not only to the Central American Common Market but
also to plans for the entire Central American in-
tegration movement.
4. OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza this
morning told US Ambassador to the OAS, Jova that he
would consider a variation on the OAS formula in an
effort to gain an immediate cease fire. Galo Plaz
suggested that both Honduras and El Salvador could
tacitly agree to the principle of troop withdrawals
but no deadline be set. Instead compliance would be
within a "reasonable time." Ambassador Jova fore-
sees considerable feeling in OAS against this pro-
posal as going too far in "fuzzing" up nature of
troop withdrawal. The majority believes that Article
7 of the Charter of the OAS is basic to the inter-
American system and requires immediate cessation of
the military occupation of Honduran soil.
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OCI No. 1745/69
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1530 EDT 31 July 1969
Situation Report on Countries to be Visited by the President
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1. Rumors of a growing rift between Deputy
Martial Law Administrator Air Marshal Nur Khan and
President Yahya Khan continue to circulate.
2. Army Chief of Staff General Gul Hassan in-
formed a close friend in mid-July that he had heard
rs that- Nur Khan might lead a 25X1 C
.444
ce
noun to overthrow Yahya Khan,
president who stated that he was aware people were
talking about a possible coup.
3. Since shortly after the establishment of
the martial law administration on 25 March, there have
been occasional reports that Nur Khan was dissatisfied
with Yahya's leadership--particularly his failure to
weed out corruption in government and his moves toward
returning the government to civilian politicians.
Nur apparently opposes an early return to civilian
government. The air marshal is a dynamic officer and
is generally regarded as having political ambitions.
He has received more publicity in regard to his activ-
ities in his governmental role than either of the
other two deputy martial law administrators.
4. Yahya, meanwhile, moving to assert his leader-
ship, announced on 28 July a program leading to the
eventual return of the country to civilian government.
The plan has been welcomed by most West Pakistani
political leaders and, presumably, will mute recent
widespread demands for more action at the top. It
is not yet clear, however, whether installation of
the proposed civilian council of ministers will result
in the return of Nur and the two other deputy martial
law administrators to their respective services.
5. unconfirmed rumors that Nur Khan is plotting
a coup will probably continue and may reflect some
"contingency planning" by the air marshal. To be suc-
cessful in a coup, however, Nur would need widespread
support within the ranks of the army officer corps,
support which he probably could obtain only if Yahya,
by his actions or inaction, appears to be destroying the
public's confidence in the armed forces.
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6. President Yahya Khan reportedly plans to
visit the Soviet Union in September. Since Premier
Kosygin's visit to Pakistan late last May, Pakistan's
relations with the Soviet Union have slightly de-
teriorated. Rawalpindi has reacted cooly toward
Soviet suggestions for regional economic cooperation
and has rebuffed the Brezhnev proposal for an Asian
collective security organization. Pakistan's con-
trolled press has also been critical of the'allegedly
unhelpful Soviet position on Indo-Pakistani relations.
Yahya may try to convince the Soviets that relations
would be much better if only they would provide more
military aid.
1. The Romanian embassy in Moscow is urging
all envoys to Moscow who are also accredited to
Romania to come to Bucharest for the President's visit.
According to a 0 embassy official in Moscow,
Romanian diplomats are letting it be known that
Bucharest not only wants a "good show" for the.Presi-
dent, but also hopes to impress Moscow with a display
of international support for the visit as a further
means of emphasizing its independent course in foreign
affairs.
2. Romanian diplomats posted elsewhere in Europe
doubtlessly are making the same point. About 25 of
the approximately 100 countries with which Romania has
diplomatic ties do not have ministers or ambassadors
resident in Bucharest. Of these, 12 represent African
or Middle Eastern countries, 6 Asian, and the remainder
are from other countries.
3. A number of Soviet officials have spoken out
recently on Soviet attitudes toward Romania in the
light of President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Bucharest.
Their remarks suggest a calculated effort to register
their displeasure over the visit, but also indicate that
the present inclination to treat the visit in low-key fashion
will continue. On balance, Moscow's official silence and
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the caution of Soviet officials in private conversa-
tion over the past weeks have make it clear that
Moscow does not intend to allow the President's trip
to Romania to affect the course of US - Soviet rela-
tions.
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I. It appears worthwhile to review the situation in
Cuba, because Castro has been back in the news
recently. There are new reports of new missiles
in Cuba, new exile infiltration attempts, a new
Castro policy on exporting revolution since the
death of Che Guevara, and even new exile claims
that Cuba is ripe for revolt if they just get a
little help.
A. As a matter of fact, Fidel Castro is firmly
in control of Cuba.
B. His power position is based on the loyalty
of key officials in the military and security
forces and in the Cuban Communist Party.
1. Senior officers--most of them veterans
of Castro's 26th of July Movement--com-
prise about two-thirds of the party's
Central Committee, and dominate almost
all other public institutions.
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2. They have become the supreme institutional
force in Cuba, probably because they are
the only organized group that Castro com-
pletely trusts.
C. Despite his increased demands for harder work,
austerity, and the unpopular reforms of 1968,
Castro probably still has the support of a
majority of the population.
1.
Juvenile delinquency has become a moderate
problem for the police, but most youths
and students appear to support the regime
actively. More than half of the population
2.
is under 25 years of age.
The peasants and activist members of the
3.
mass organizations probably are also loyal
to Castro.
Most other Cubans are acquiescent. They see
no alternative to Castro, and fear the
strong and efficient security apparatus.
Many merely hope to subsist until they
can emigrate legally to the U.S.
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D. Activities by Cuban exiles pose no threat to the
stability of the Castro regime. In the past
several years, the security forces have con-
sistently proved themselves more than a match
for groups attempting infiltrations and raids
from abroad.
1. Ten members of a Miami-based exile organi-
zation landed in eastern Cuba early this
month to conduct sabotage operations. Most
were either killed or captured within hours
after the landing; in less than six days,
the entire team was wrapped up.
2. Another exile infiltration attempt last De-
cember met the same fate. All five team mem-
bers were captured in less than a week.
II. The economic situation is still Castro's biggest
headache.
A. Troubles arising from mismanagement, inefficiency,
low labor productivity, and shortages of workers
for agriculture have been aggravated by a series
of natural disasters.
B. Output has increased slightly despite shortages
of almost every kind since 1961, and considerable
fluctuations in the economy.
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1. In 1967 Cuba's GNP was about 15 percent
higher than in 1957 (the highest pre-rev-
olution year). In that ten year period,
however, there was a 20 percent increase
in the Cuban population.
C. The outlook in the crucial area of sugar pro-
duction, however, is not good.
1. This year's harvest, which was meant to be
dress rehearsal for a planned 10-million
ton crop in 1970, will not exceed last
year's output of 5.2 million tons. One
Cuban source admitted "unofficially" that
the harvest would be only about 4.2 mil-
lion tons.
2. The 1970 yield, moreover, will probably
be no greater than 7.5 to 8 million tons.
If it sinks below 7 million tons, Cas-
tro will be hard pressed to shrug off the
complete failure of a goal he has pushed
dramatically and unequivocally for the
past four years.
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III. Castro's armed forces are in good shape. The
Cuban military establishment is the most modern,
the best trained, and best equipped in Latin
America. It could successfully defend the
island for any attack short of an invasion with
U.S. support.
A. The Cubans depend primarily on Soviet-sup-
plied arms and equipment. From September
1966 to February 1968, an average of two
major military shipments per month were re-
ceived from the USSR, in a campaign to
update and resupply the military services.
There have been no major arms deliveries
in the past 15 months, but the armed forces
are at satisfactory levels of readiness
and proficiency.
B. It is unlikely that the USSR will attempt
to reintroduce strategic missiles into
Cuba.
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1. A good share of those rumors and reports
of new missiles which we are able to
check out trace back to the routine re-
placement of missiles for the SA-2 surface-
to-air missile system.
2. This missile system has been operational
in Cuba since mid-1962, and even in the
Russian climate for which it was designed,
the missile has a shelf-life of five years
or less, after which it has to be replaced
3. It is commonplace, but still surprising and
for intelligence purposes unfortunate, for
untrained observers to be unable to dis-
tinguish between a 35-foot'SA-2 missile,
and a 75-foot SS-4 MRBM.
C. We do, of course, recognize that the Soviets
have the technical capability to reintroduce
the components of a strategic weapons system
clandestinely.
1. Within the intelligence community, we have
a CIA-DIA-State Team whose main purpose
is to look into the missile problem. It
also reports on the military posture in
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Cuba, particularly as it pertains to
strategic weapons systems.
2. This team's latest report, dated 21 May
1969, states that "during the past month,
there has been no evidence from photog
raphy or from other sources that there
are any strategic missile systems or nu-
clear weapons in Cuba."
3. Intelligence analysts read and study every
scrap of information received on the possi-
bility of the presence or reintroduction
of strategic weapons. They are in almost
daily contact on this problem. Information
comes from overhead photography, refugee
interrogations, clandestine reports, and
speculation by various press writers.
After careful analysis, a coordinated re-
port is printed each month by the team.
The team is always "on-call" if any piece
of information looks unusual.
IV. During the year and a half since the death of
Che Guevara, Cuba has modified its tactics and
priorities for "exporting" the revolution in Latin
America.
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A. Castro has withdrawn from the extreme and
violent approach he pursued in 1966-67, has
toned down Cuban propaganda, and has allowed
front groups like the Latin American Solidarity
Organization to lapse into dormancy. He has
almost completely ignored themes of revolu-
tion during this period.
Be Castro is more cautious because of the repeated
failures of guerrilla groups he has supported,
and because he may realize that Cuban interfer-
ence and bullying have contributed to their fac-
tionalism and impotence.
1. He was stunned by the failure of Che Guevara
in Bolivia, and in retrospect probably
recognized the hopelessness of the campaign
as it was revealed in Guevara's diary.
C. The Cuban intelligence service continues to
train Latin Americans in guerrilla techniques,
but more selectively than in the past.
la A few Cuban advisers are probably with in-
surgents in Guatemala and Venezuela, and
Castro continues to support the principle
of armed revolution as an instrument of
his foreign policy.
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2. During the next year or so, however, he
is likely to adhere to the more cautious
approach he has followed since Guevara's
death, unless he believes that some guer-
rilla group is making definite headway.
V. Cuban relations with the USSR have improved con-
siderably since last August, when Castro endorsed
the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
A. In January 1969, Castro had warm and unequivocal
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B.
has reported that Castro
has agreed to cease all public attacks on the
Soviet-supported Communist parties in Latin
America, and that the Cuban foreign intelligence
service is working closely with the Soviet KGB.
C. Castro probably hopes that if he appears more
compliant, Moscow will increase its aid to
Cuba signiticantly. Larger numbers of Soviet
praise for the first time in three years, even
though massive Soviet economic support had
continued without interruption in the interim.
Relations between the two countries may now be
better than at any time since Brezhnev and
Kosygin came to power in Moscow.
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technicians and advisers may be sent to Cuba,
but rumors of increases in Soviet military
personnel cannot be substantiated.
D. Cuba's relations with Peking have been extremely
cool since early 1966. They are not likely to
improve appreciably in the near future, espe-
cially if Cuba attends the June meeting in
Moscow of world Communist parties.
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