Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 9, 1977
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3.pdf1.08 MB
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RQP80-00473A000300 9 March 1977 014-x_'1-3 MEMORANDUM FOR: Morning Meeting Participants SUBJECT : Supplemental Questions on Admiral Turner's Confirmation REFERENCE : Memo from George Cary, Legislative Counsel, to Morning Meeting Participants, dtd 2 March 1977, same subject 1. In follow-on to referent memorandum, it is requested that you designate a representative to attend a meeting in the DDA Conference Room, room 7D-32, at 10:30 a. m. , Thursday, 10 March. 2. The purpose will be to determine the status of office responses to the supplementary questions and to reconcile and coordinate where more than one office is involved. 3. Another object of the meeting will be to identify those questions which can be satisfactorily answered by 16 March and those which should be deferred for further consideration. On this latter category we must, of course, be prepared to explain to Admiral Turner why we 'recommend deferral and obtain his approval. STATINTL Legislative Counsel Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Morning Meeting Participants 1- 1 1 - Mr. Evans. 1 1 -- Dr. Stevens 1 -- Mr. Wells 1 - Mr. Dirks 1 - Mr. Blake I - Mr. Tony Lapham 1 -- Mr. Waller 1 - Mr. Taylor I - Mr. Falkiewicz 1- 1 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIADP80-00473A000300050014-3 LC (George Cary has called a meeting " . ow, 10 March of Morning Meeting ants (090 group) in our conference 0:30 t,/discuss "Questions on s Karen a Security and'' had comments Neither di 14. rner' Confirmation". Mr. Malanick queried as to whether they at 10:0 tomorrow morning, would you i Mr. Malanick or someone else to represe t you at th meeting? Del/9 March Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 P Rm4gm s qP Mli 6 : CIA-RDP8rr-'U647 TO: Mr. Blake ROOM NO. I BUILDING REMARKS: FROM: ROOM NO. BUILDING proved For elease 2005/05/16 : CI -I9bb-004 A A r~ q I FORM O 24 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8 FEB WHICH MAY BE USED. ,-....owe mm vv'" G S 4 - 1 ENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 3 3 2 4 5 vi 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks: STATINTL Ake L,e ti-16t) MAR }97'7 FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. ,zUSGPO: 1976 - 242-953 1-7 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIATRDP80-00473A00030005 4- Dn;` ,0istry File MEMORANDUM FOR: Morning Meeting Participants SUBJECT : Supplemental Questions on Admiral Turner's Confirmation 1. Attached is a copy of a 28 February 1977 letter from Chairman Daniel Inouye, of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to Admiral Turner forwarding questions supplementary to the Admiral's confirmation hearing. The letter pointed out that the Admiral's answers,will be published by the Committee as part of the record of the Admiral's confirmation hearing. 2. Please give your immediate attention to those questions and answers which properly impinge on your component's interests. Admiral Turner is sending an interim letter to Senator Inouye stating that he hopes to have his reply ready by 16 March. We ask that your responses reach OLC by 9 March to permit appropriate reconciliation and coordination and approval by the Admiral. 3. Please note that the Senator's letter asks for unclassified answers to all the questions, but adds that any answers requiring the use of classified information be forwarded in a supplementary classified letter. Ge ge L. Gary Legislative Counsel Attachment STATINTL Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 ? D/DCI/IC DDO Compt D/S DTR AO/ DCI C/IPS SUSPENSE- Turne? Remarks- ...,-'Please develop response for review with Admiral Turner. 1 March 1977 Date 3637 (7-76) STATINTL EXECUTIVE SECRETARUT Routing Slip TO: ACTION INFO ...DATE -INITIAL 1 /C1-- ..3 4 -7 8 -9 1 12 13 20 21 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 DANIEL K. INOUYE. HAWAII. CHAIRMAN JAKE GARN. UTAH, VICE CHAIRMAN ' UIRCH RAYH. IND: A rovedOFo1CsRelease 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014 ~. DLALH. STEVENSON, ILL. pp STROM THUR.ONO, S.C. WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY. MAINE MARK O. HATFfSLO, OHEG. JOSEPH R. (HIDER, JR;, DEL. ROBERT T. STAFFORD, ,r. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR.. MD. GARY HART. COLO. ' J ~'fT 2 s ez e s s~z OzC i 1 C ~/ SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE PURSUANT TO 9, RES. 408. /" C0NGH859) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 February 28, 1977 Admiral Stansfield Turner Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Admiral Turner: IN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO R6616 As I indicated to you at your nomination hear- ing, the Members of the Committee would like you to answer some additional questions which I am enclosing. .We plan to publish the questions and your answers as part of the hearing record. The Committee would like unclassified answers to all the questions. However, if full and complete an- swers to any questions require the provision of clas- sified information, please identify the questions and answer them in a supplementary classified letter. The Committee appreciated your forthright testimony. I congratulate you once again on your appointment and confirmation, and we look forward to working with you. Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Admiral Turner February 28, 1977 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 A. CIVIL LIBERTIES Currently, one of the important controversies in con- stitutional law is the question of hoer the Presi- dent's authority to conduct foreign intelligence ac- tivities meshes with the provisions of the first and fourth amendments. The question has most frequently arisen in terms of wiretaps and foreign intelligence cases. Could you explain your views of the nature and extent of Presidential authority and how it is limited by the first and fourth amend- ments? Do you believe the President has the power to conduct warrantless electronic surveil- lance of Americans at home or abroad for foreign intelligence purposes? C. Is it your understanding of the law that if Congress enacts legislation setting stand- ards and conditions for the use of electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence cases, the executive branch, including the Presi- dent, is bound by those standards and con- ditions? 2. Last summer, this Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 3197, a. bill to require war- rants for electronic surveillance conducted in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. /a. Do you favor such legislation? Would you favor expanding such legislation to require warrants for electronic surveil- lance of Americans abroad, as well as in the United States? Would you favor expanding the proposed elec- tronic surveillance legislation to require warrants in foreign intelligence cases for other intrusive investigative techniques such as mail opening and surreptitious en- tries when directed against Americans, ei- ther at home or abroad? Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CLA-I2 DP80-00473A000300050014-3 Do you think that electronic surveillance of Americans for foreign intelligence pur- poses at home or abroad should be limited. to those instances where there is substan- tial evidence that the American has engaged in criminal activities? For the purpose of obtaining a warrant, would, you be willing to report to a Federal judge the facts determining. the Agency's belief that electronic surveillance should be conducted against an American living abroad? B. LEGAL AUTHORITY tive Order, particularly as it relates to the follow- ing issues: Gould you tell the Committee your views of the Execu- In February of 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 on United States foreign intelligence ac- tivities. The Executive Order was issued in order to "clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies." at the will of the President, and which pro- vides no penalties for its violation, suffi- cient to define the varying missions of the intelligence agencies and to fix firm limits on their activities? a. Is an Executive order which can be changed b. While the DCI is to provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence, under the Executive Order the DCI does not have any responsibility for tactical intelligence. Previous DCIs have had the right to review the allocation of all intelligence resources, including tacti- cal intelligence. Do you believe that the Executive Order has an undesirable effect of weakening the DCI's authority in this area? Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CtA l2DP80-00473A000300050014-3 c. Under the Executive Order, the DCI is to "ensure the development and the submission of a national intelligence budget." At the same time, the Committee on Foreign Intel- ligence, now the Policy Review Committee (PRC), is to "control budget preparation of the national intelligence program," and the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to "direct, fund, and operate" the NSA. How can these potentially contradicting charges be resolved? /d. What changes would you recommend in the present Executive Order? 2. The authority of the CIA to engage in certain activi- ties rests on directives issued by the National Se- curity Council, called National Security Council Di- rectives or NSCIDs. These NSCIDs have in the past been referred to as the CIA's secret charter and were withheld not only from the public but also,. until recently, from Congress.. a. If these NSCIDs are revised or new NSCIDs ,/ are issued, will you provide these to the Committee as your predecessor has done? Do you believe that the oversight commit- tees of Congress should be consulted dur- ing the preparation or revision of these NSCIDs? 3. /CIA practices are also affected by directives issued by other persons, such as the DCI and the Policy Re-'. view Committee (PRC). Will you provide to the Committee all such directives and modifications of directives, including DCIDs and directives from the PRC? 4. As Director of Central Intelligence, your advice may- be sought on the question of charters for the intel- ligence agencies. The 1947 National Security Act, the CIA's statutory charter, has been termed inadequate in / a number of areas. At the present time, the National S e 't A 1 h D f I 1' t l %_L y gency anc e e en se nte igence Agency have no statutory charters. The FBI's authority to engage in domestic intelligence activities has been questioned. Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-FDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Should a new CIA charter explicitly authorize covert action? Should there be specific statutory authority, for the CIA to collect intelligence? c What-activities should the CIA be allowed to undertake in the United States? Should a new charter precisely define those activi- ties? Do you favor statutory charters for the Na- tional Security Agency and the Defense In-V telligence Agency? Do you agree with Attorney General Bell that 1 the FBI needs a clear charter? Should there be statutory limitations on the permissible activities of all of the intelli- gence.agencies? Should violations carry criminal sanctions? C. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES When you take over as Director of Central Intelligence, you will inherit the present apparatus of ongoing cov- ert action and clandestine collection operations. ,Will you pledge to consult with this Commit- tee on the feasibility and wisdom of the various ongoing programs before making any final determination as to their continuation or termination? CIA clandestine operations, both covert action and clandestine collection, comprise a wide variety of activities. In this connection,*the Committee would like to explore your attitude towards two specific kinds of operations, a. What are your views with respect to the cov- ert involvement of the United States, in any manner, in the elections of a foreign coun- try? Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA_OQP80-00473A000300050014-3 t b. Under what circumstances would you approve covert payments to foreign leaders? What are the factors that would most influ- ence your judgment on the advisability of various types of clandestine operations, such as the two mentioned above? 3. T,is Committee is reluctant to request the identity f covert agents because we recognize the extreme sensitivity of such information and because the need for such information rarely exists. If, in the view of the Committee., the con- duct of its oversight role were to require such information, would you provide it? For example, if the Committee were to in- vestigate an abuse involving a covert agent whom it would wish to interrogate, would the agent be made available to us? D. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY 1. You served as NATO's Commander of Allied Forces for Southern Europe, and previously served as commander of the U.S. Second Fleet in the Atlantic. In both positions, you were exposed to a great deal of in- telligence, provided not only through service intel- ligence agencies and national intelligence agencies but also through NATO itself. a. What was the value of the intelligence you received to long-range military planning and NATO operations? b. What was the value of this intelligence to your more day-to-day operational needs and to your requirements for indications and warning? c. Did you perceive any significant gaps in U.S. intelligence reporting? Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA=RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 6 - d. What ideas for improving the U.S. intelli- gence effort have you. gained from your ex- perience as a commander of U.S. Navy and NATO forces? 2. Between 1,971 and 1972, you served as chief of the Systems-Analysis Division of the Office of Naval Operations. In that capacity you were involved in the Navy's efforts in "net assessments." a. In light of your experience, how much empha- sis do you think the intelligence community, should put upon net assessments as opposed to more traditional estimates? b. What should be the role of the intelligence agencies in net assessment? c. Would you as DCI. be averse to conducting net assessments in which analysis of U.S. capa- bilities and intentions would be explicit or implicit? d. How would you evaluate the net assessments efforts of the Defense Department and the executive branch? 3. As Director of Central Intelligence, you will have primary control over the collection and production activities of the CIA. As part of its general ef- fort in military intelligence areas to support the President, the CIA produces intelligence on naval forces. a. What is your opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA's analyses of naval, forces? b. How do their analytical efforts compare with those of the Navy? c. How do they compare with the work of DIA? In the area of intelligence support to policymaking, one of the Committee's the degree to which Congress has not been a recipient of intelli- gence analysis that could assist the Members in mak- ing important national decisions. Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Are you prepared to provide the Congress with intelligence, even when it may not sup- port the policies of the President, or when it may embarrass the President? 5. Former DCI William Colby has recently argued that more of the intelligence community's analysis should be made available to the public. a. Do you share this view? b. What advantages do you see in this more open procedure? What dangers? E. THE ROLE OF THE DCI AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT 1. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence en compasses three somewhat conflicting responsibilities: intelligence advisor to the President, Director of the CIA, and manager of the intelligence community. a. you define the Director's role? Which of these responsibilities will be most cen- tral to you? b. Do you believe that there is a potential con- flict between the need to provide the Presi- dent with objective intelligence and a natural tendency to place your trust in the intelli- gence generated by the Agency which you head? 2. One aspect of the personal relationship between the DCI and the President involves the DCI's ability to maintain the delicate balance between having the ab- solute trust of, while still being independent of, the President. What steps will you take to ensure that agen- cies in the intelligence community will not overstep the bounds of legality or propriety because of requests from the White House? 3. The DCI's Presidential advisory role overlaps in par- ticular with those of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State. Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 g -. a. Have you discussed this issue with. Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Vance? How do you view your respective roles? b. Do you think that your ability to bring in- telliience to bear on policy would be en- hanced by making the DCI a statutory member of the National Security Council? F. SELECTION OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR. Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, a DCI who is an active duty military officer must have a civilian Deputy Director for the CIA. A second deputy directorship with responsibilities for the intelligence community was created by Executive Order 11905. No restriction exists regarding that Deputy's military or civilian status. Will you choose or request an active duty military officer for the position of Deputy Director for the intelligence community? G. SECRECY: SOURCES AND METHODS, ESPIONAGE LAW, LEAKS 1. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that the Director of Central Intelligence "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and..rmlethods- from unauthorized disclosure." This language has been un- derstood to authorize, if not require,.the Director of Central Intelligence to take action for protection of such information in agencies other than the CIA. a. How would you define "sources and methods.?" b. Does the term include information not pres- ently prohibited from disclosure by the Fed- eral espionage statute or the Executive Order on classification(E.O. 11652)? c. Does it include information pertaining to illegal acts by intelligence agencies? For example, could the DCI withhold from the Attorney General, the Congress or the press Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/167-CAA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 information pertaining to violations of the CIA's "internal security" restrictions? Could the DCI withhold a violation of the Hughes-Ryan amendment requiring Congres- sional notification of covert action? d. How w6iild you define the scope of authority relating to sources and methods in the lan- guage of the 1947 Act? e. Does this language only provide the authority to coordinate the development of uniform community-wide standards on protecting vital secrets, the position taken by former DCI Colby and the Church Committee?'- Or does it provide an operational responsibility, e.g. the authority to investigate "leaks," in- eluding the authority to conduct surrepti- tious entries and electronic surveillance in the U.S. to determine the source of leaks, an authority claimed by some former DCIs? 2. The Ford administration requested the Congress to en- act amendments to the Federal espionage statute on behalf of the intelligence community. Some aspects of, that legislation are noncontroversial. Other pro- visions may prompt some concern, especially those at- taching criminal sanctions to the press for printing classified information. a. Do'you think it is appropriate to focus the sanction upon the press as well as the govern- ment employee who leaked the information? b. Should such a statute authorize Federal in- ?vestigations of newspaper reporters who:re- port classified information in their articles? c. Do you believe that the Espionage Statute, of 1917 and the accompanying Presidential execu- tive orders on classification permit too much secrecy? d. In addition to seeking amendments to Federal law which provide sanctions against legitimate secrets, will you seek amendments in both the statute and the orders which will decrease un- necessary secrecy? Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 _Cl ftj DP80-00473A000300050014-3 3. There has been a great deal of criticism in recent years, some of it from the executive branch, sug- gesting that Congress has been irresponsible with state secrets. However, two of the most serious breaches of security to occur during this period pertain to secrets in the exclusive domain of the executive branch. Section 3(d) of Executive Order 11905 provides that the DCI, among other responsi- bilities, develop programs to protect intelligence sources and methods and ensure common security stand- ards for the community. Will you, pursuant to Section 3 of the Ex- ecutive Order, reexamine these various se-. curity procedures? Will you be proposing changes in the procedures to combat such leaks? 4. Vital secrets are leaked in the newspapers. In some such cases, information has been leaked which may be vital to the national security, e.g. a critical clan- destine collection program or information which ap- pears to compromise a particular source. These leaks threaten intelligence operations because they put the target of the operation in a position to take effec- tive defensive measures. It would seem logical for the CIA to attempt to confuse a hostile government about what we had gained from that operation. In other words, the Agency could actually engage in "disinformation" by leaking confusing information to the press, a. Do you think it is appropriate for the Agency to respond to such a leak by en- gaging in such disinformation programs? b. If so, should such disinformation or misin- formation programs only be initiated after there has been a damaging leak, or do you believe that it is appropriate to conduct such a program to confuse hostile govern- ments in the absence of such a leak? c. Do journalists knowingly participate in such disinformation programs? d. What checks or controls does the Agency have upon such programs in order to avoid misin- formation or disinformation from being used Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : cjA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 by the Agency to confuse the media or the Congress about illegitimate activity of the CIA?. e. Will you provide the Committee with any CIA assessment of the damage caused. by these breaches of security? 5. At the time that Attorney General Levi and President Ford were pursuing their wiretap proposal last year, Attorney General Levi took the position that it was .necessary to authorize electronic surveillance of .corporations which export technology to foreign coun- tries. In essence, he was arguing that our govern- ment should monitor the export of technological pro- cesses, even though such processes are not classified or even classifiable, indeed, even though the export of-that technology does not violate any law. a. Do you agree with that position? Is there information in the hands of private compa- nies which is not directly relevant to-the national defense but which we-should pro- hibit from export or disclosure to a foreign power, e.g. computer technology? b.' Do you believe that such information should be subject to control through amendments to the Executive Order, the espionage statute or perhaps some other Federal statute, such as the Export Administration Act? c. Is the real issue with such information that it is vital to the national defense? Or is the real issue that since American "know how" may be an important "bargaining chip" in negotiations with foreign govern- ments such information must be controlled for foreign policy reasons? . H. BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 1. This Committee has responsibility for exercising over- sight over national intelligence, not only in the con- stitutional sense but also in the broader context of Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 CIA7RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 - 1.2 - ensuring that the long-range development of collec- tion and production supports the needs of the na- tional policy. Thus, it is important that the Com- mittee understand your objectives and goals for na- tional intelligence. a. Given your unique perspective as a consumer of intelligence in the senior ranks of the Defense Department, what do you think are the most pressing challenges facing national intelligence in the coming decade? b. In your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses in the way national intelligence is now dealing with those challenges? c. Given the vast complexity of intelligence, what type of management approach will you take in monitoring and directing the focus .of the national intelligence community in the coming decade? d. Has the President, or any senior-ranking of- ficial provided you with guidance on what they expect the national. intelligence com- munity to achieve in the coming years? [If so] What were the principal themes in that guidance? [If not] What do you believe are the major management and policy objectives which should guide your actions during your tenure as DCI? One-of the major arguments against disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget figure is that publica- tion will. result in demands for more detailed infor- mation. What is your response to that argument? 3. An argument against annual disclosure of the aggregate budget figure or any element of the intelligence budget is that publication will allow our adversaries to de- termine the program changes in specific U.S. intelligence Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : bt4-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 capabilities, such as 'a major allocation for the development of a new technical collection system. What is your response to that argument? I. CIA INTERNAL INSPECTION AND REGULATIONS 1. Existing procedures require that the CIA's General Counsel review activities which raise questions of legality. Some potentially sensitive clandestine activities are reviewed by the CIA's General Counsel who is placed in a somewhat contradictory position of both reviewing the particular activity and facili- tating CIA's overall mission. a. Would you support a requirement that poten- tially sensitive clandestine activities such as those alleged to have taken place in Mi- cronesia be reviewed for legality by the, At-. torney General of the United States? b. What threshhold would you establish to 'trig- ger such a review? 2. At present the General Counsel is required to refer to the Department of Justice allegations regarding activities by CI.A employees that violate Federal law. In order to assist the Committee in its oversight role, will you instruct the General Counsel to notify the Committee when and if such referral takes place? 3. Executive Order 11905 directs heads of intelligence agencies or departments to "ensure that Inspectors General and General Counsels of their agencies have access to any information necessary to perform their duties..." At present, CIA regulations require that the Inspectors General and General Counsels have ac- cess to all information necessary for the performance of their respective duties, but these regulations can be withdratm or modified at any time by the Director. a, Should the General Counsel and Inspector Gen- eral be assured, by statute, of access to all Agency information necessary for their work? Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 - 14.- Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3 b. Will you. notify this Committee if either of these officers is denied, on your authority, access to CIA information? One of the most effective tools of the Inspector Gen- eral is the component survey--an in-depth study of a particular segment of the CIA, such as the Office of Current Iitelligence. Will you instruct the Inspector General to notify this Committee of the schedule, of component surveys and to brief the Commit- tee as to the general findings of each? Since 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence has regularly issued a call to CIA employees to report to him any activities which raise questions of legality and propriety. Do you think that this call is sufficient to create an incentive structure that will in practice bring forth reports of questionable activities? If not, what measures are you considering to ensure your ability to be ap- pri6ed of questionable activities? 6.- It has been suggested that CIA employees having ac- cess to secret intelligence might misuse that infor- mation for personal profit. At present managerial- level employees must: disclose their financial hold- ings so that a determination can be made as to whether or not there is any conflict of interest. In addition, Section 203 of Executive Order 11222 provides that employees may not "engage in, directly or indirectly, financial transactions as a result of, or primarily relying upon, information obtained through their em-. ployment." a. Will you take steps to ensure that this pro- vision is enforced vis-a-vis CIA employees? b. Will you notify the Committee of what steps you have taken? Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000300050014-3