INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000400020011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS
SEP 1977
;;rte,- ...., ~.~-
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
,OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS
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Preface
This report; presents the Inspector General's findings from an
inspection of the Office of Communications. Four inspectors devoted
March through June 1977 to ii L.
installations, area headquarters, and bases of the
Office of Communications were inspected, as were a sample of
Fl
of
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its fie'ad stations. The inspectors surveyed facilities, examined
files, and by visiting homes and talking to spouses gained all appre-
ciation of housing and living conditions. Some
employees of
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the Office of Communications were -interviewed.
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additional interviews were with chiefs of station or base
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CONTENTS
Page
I .
II.
III.
Preface
Contents
Summary
Introduction
Personnel-Dominated Issues
1
A. Promotion and Assignment for Communicators
10
B. Cable Secretariat
19
C. Other Personnel Issues
22
2. Per Diem I
I
24
3. Voluntary/Involuntary Retirement
4. Career Counseling
IV. Operational Effectiveness
A. Staff Communications
B. Covert Communications
C. Support
D. Recommendations
V. Compliance and Privacy
A. U.S. Law and Propriety
B. Privacy
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VI. Communications Security
A. The Threat
B.
C. Regal ittiions
D. Recommendations
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VIII. Management Philosophy
Page
38
40
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I. Summary
If there is one subject on which all those in the mainstream of
the Office of Communications (OC) are in full accord, it is that they
are members of the world's best communications organization. They
are proud and we believe rightly so.
Yet there are issues that are troublesome now and bid to be more
troublesome in the future. Personnel-dominated issues (Section III)
are primary among them. For almost all groups in OC the specific
issues tend to be symptomatic of a widespread need for recognition.
Despite some efforts to meet this need, management generally has been
unsuccessful in dealing with it. The first five of our ten recom-
mendations, all of which follow at the end of this Summary, deal with
this need. Recommendation 6 addresses Cable Secretariat's need for
increased staffing.
OC's effectiveness today is at a very high level, but future per-
formance will depend on wheat is done to resolve the personnel-related
problems and on the decisions made with regard to: (1) whether or
not a high -frequency (HF) backup system should be retained as satellite
systems improve; (2) whether or not the present
continues to be accepted as the
principal solution for for the
rest of this century; and (3) whether or not the ever-increasing
voluiie of traffic is justified (Section IV), In our discussion, we
note the importance of an HF backup system and the problems that
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would confront the Agency if it no longer provided the communi-
cations services; we express our doubt about the ever-increasing
volume of traffic. Recommendation 7 calls for comprehensive long-
range planning to prepare for the uncertainty of the -Future, while
Recommendation 8 calls for the Director of Communications (DC)
and the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) to encourage elimi-
nation of unnecessary and wasteful use of the communications system.
We found no problems with regard to compliance with U.S. law and
standards of propriety. We also found that there is no violation
of the privacy of the communications of any person or governmental
organization in the Agency's handling of their communications
(Section V).
The examination of communications security (COMSEC) led to the
last two recommendations-..,.-9 and 10 (Section VI). We believe that
the adequacy of the Agency's COMSEC program cannot be determined with
certainty until the significance of the COMSEC threat is known.
We recommend accordingly: first that there be an effort to define
the COMSEC threat and thin that steps be taken to ensure a program
Consistent with it. As an adjunct of security, we note the inade-
qua(.Jes of cover arrangemi=mnts (Section VII). We can only suggest
with Comments on OC's maru.qiement philosophy and the possible benefits
that might come with more decentralization (Sect-ion VIII).
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Our specific recommendations are:
Recommendation 1: that the Director of Communications
provide more opportunity and equity by (a) promoting those who
perform well in positions of higher grade and (b) by creating,
in concert with the Director of Personnel, the positions of master
journeyman (GS--10) he requested of the Office of Personnel in
January 1977.
Recommendation 2: that the Director of Communications, con-
sistent with the recent growth in his use of Quality Step Increases,
(ai seek comparable use of achievement awards to reward those who
may not be eligible for promotion but are otherwise deserving
because of sustained high-level performance or unusual deed, and
(b) that he do so with the ceremony and publicity (within the
Agency) to make Quality Step Increases and achievement awards
meaningful forms of recognition.
Recommendation 3: that the Director of Communications ensure
that the secret ballot is used at all stages of the competitive
evaluation process. I
Recommendation 4: that the Director of Communications create
an effective method for providing employees with timely information
on available or forthcoming vacancies so that employees can express
meaningful preferences, either through the quarterly Expected Per-
sornel Vacancy List introduced in December 1976, or through other
means.
Recommendation 5: that the Director of Communications
(a) make his recently reintroduced newsletter a publication about
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people as well as technology and production and that, among other
things, it be used to announce promotions, Quality Step Increases,
awards, commendations, and other actions that recognize individual
performance; and (b) that he publish it every two months.
Recommendation 6: that the Director of Communications
undertake with the Office of Personnel's assistance a staffing
study of Cable Secretariat.
Recommendation 7: that the Director of Communications ensure
that the planning nucleus he established in January 1977 (a) brings
together the disparate, and now largely technical, planning elements
of OC and (b) performs long-range planning that; will be compre-
hensive, and will look ahead to the kind of organization the Office
should have in the future and to the steps necessary to achieve
that organization.
Recommendation 8: that the Director of Communications and
the Deputy Director for Operations jointly remind users that
communications are not free and, therefore, are to be used (a)- only
when necessary and in as brief a form as possible; (b) with appro-
priate, not overstated, precedence; and (c) during normal working
hours, except for good cause.
Recommendation 9: that the Director of Commun-ications, in
consultation with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy
Director for Operations, and the Deputy Director .for Science &
Technology (a) define the communications security (COMSEC) threat
and establish its significance to the intelligence effort; and
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(b) then develop procedures to take COMSEC considerations into
early account in the planning, development, and procurement of
Agency equipment and, as necessary to ensure that this is done,
propose modifications in regulations.
Recommendation 10: that the Director of Communications
develop a plan and program of communications security education
to reach the general population of the Agency, both those entering
on duty and those on board, and that. this program be implemented
through the Director of Training.
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II. Introduction
The Office of Communications (OC)
components of the Agency.
different from other
Its job is more easily defined and understood, and perhaps for this
reason it is easier to measure performance--traffic either is or is
not getting to its destination in the allotted time and is being
transmitted either with or without errors.
OC is different, too, because so many of its people serve over-
seas a the GS--08 and 09 'levels. Its average grade is 09.9, below
the average for the rest of the Agency--even though, again unlike
other components, -t:here are few clerical positions to keep t e average
down.
Moreover, we know of no other component that routinely expects
its GS-09's, lO's, and 11's to accept so much responsibility, or any
in which it is so routinely accepted. A GS-09 and a GS-10 or 11 in a
typical two-man station may be responsible for the operation and
maintenance,! of one-half iii l l i on dollars worth of equipment; responsible
for being on-call 24 hour's tai day; responsible for getting the traffic
to its destination regard I c s;s; of the volume or the time it might take;
responsible for the security of the facility, of transmissions, and
of cryptographic materials; and responsible for good relationships
chiefs of station (COS), whom they serve
and from whom they receive administrative support.
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We found them to be an impressive group of people. They take
pride in their work and typically rise to the occasion. There is no
doubt among them as to their superiority as professional communi-
cators. They know they can do whatever is required more quickly and
more reliably than others. It is hard to question their confidence
when it is c1c-ar? that other U.S. governmental organizations look to
them when the chips are down.
The Office's management is entitled to take a bow for its part
in these accornplishrnents? It has run a taut ship that does its job
and above all does it well. Good equipment, good training, and good
personnel have been blended into a highly efficient organization.
Nevertheless there are prohl erns that have plagued OC for some
years. Although the problems are old, they have become more trouble-
some because of the malaise affecting the Agency and because of changes
in the, environment. Now,_adays, "new hires" have more schooling than
was once the case and have. correspondingly higher expectations (the
military servi c(:'s, now made up entirely of volunteers, are no longer
a dependable source of new hires); perquisites are fewer; life abroad
is less pleasant because of increased hostility toward Americans;
and, because an American liffe-style has become more costly overseas,
there has been erosion of financial advantages. At the same time,
some of the older employees, who have served abroad without a home
tour" for 10, 15, and more years, are anxious to return home--usually
because their children are reaching high school and college age.
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The relatively small number of
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for communicators, makes it difficult for management to accommodate
these desires. When accommodated the employee faces the financial
burden of life in the Washington, D.C. area without the free housing
and allowances he has become used to overseas. For all of these
reasons the employees, new and not new, have become less accepting
of their lot.
Although less accepting than they once were, many of them. are
reluctant to ask management questions about their careers and well
being. We found this behavior somewhat surprising because in their
work they are confident. and self--reliant. Such behavior may be
explained by the military backgrounds of so many of the employees
and by the military traditions of OC, which for so long (1951-1965)
was run by its creator,
But we believe it is 25X1A
also attributable to uncertainty and even fear about how management
will react to being questioned. For probably the same reasons, some
employees sf,:err~c:d hesitant to speak with us. Others, however, were
enthusiastic about the opportunity this inspection gave them to voice
their opinions.
Our inspection of OC at the outset promised to be easier than most.
Its task was easily defined, its reputation good, and its people proud.
Little of consequence c:oiild be wrong. The few persistent problems
were accepted as -i nsol ub l e and reflected on no one.
Now we have completed the inspection and have another view. The
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promised simplicity never materialized. Instead, in true-to-life
fashion the attributes had blemishes and the faults their reasons.
The Office is a complex organization and not easily described.
We find ourselves likening it to a fine old tapestry: from a distance
its superb qualities dominate, but as one draws near a number of
snags and tears in the fabric begin to be visible. None of these
is foreboding in its own right, but taken together they make one
wonder if that fine old tapestry is up to the wear and tear of the
future.
We have confidence that it is, but that some repair and preventive
maintenance are necessary. To these ends we address the comments and
recommendations of this report.
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III. Personnel-Dominated Issues
We believe that personnel-dominated issues tend to permeate OC
and are the most pressing that its management faces. In what
follows in this section certain recurrent themes will be noted--
whether we are discussing the problems of the communicator/crypto-
grapher, of the Cable Secretariat, or of others. Briefly, these
people feel too much ignored, overlooked, unappreciated--unrecognized.
Although we focus our attention on these feelings and attitudes and
the possible consequences of them, we wish to note that it would help
if the small and common courtesies were practiced more consistently--
particularly with regard to responding to employee's concerns and
keeping them informed.
A. Promotion and Assignment for Communicators
The communicators, and their supporters in and out of OC,
wonder what has to be donee to earn promotion, for themselves or for
colleagues they consider superior. They accept that headroom is
a problem, but wonder why early retirement is not used to create some;
they also wonder why Quality Step Increases (QSI's) are so rarely
used, given the lack of heee(-idroom. They accept OC's system of competi-
tive evaluation, if only l)ecause they cannot think of a better method,
but wonder why promotion does not come even to those who have been,
presumably on a competitf;ive basis, assigned to higher-graded positions
and have pert ormed well iii them. They accept that their journeyman
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wonder why the communicator who can maintain his equipment without
the help of technicians is not paid their wages and when he advances
cannot similarly "skip" grade 10.** They accept the need to be assign-
able, but wonder why assignments are arbitrary (to them) and not made
in time to provide overlap with those whom they replace and in time to
facilitate housing arrangements. And they accept the notion that their
wages are reasonable in terms of the market place, but wonder why
there is no recognition of the versatility they must display and of
the conditions under which they must perform, i.e., so much more is
expected of them that the norms of the market place are not valid for
comparison.
These, one way or another, are the personnel issues that command
everyone's attention. And they should; something needs to be done
about them. But important as these issues are, we believe they are
only symptomatic of a widely felt and often expressed need for recog-
nit;ion. A large number of OC's journeymen employees are chafing at
never having received any sign that someone appreciates their pro-
fessional competence and their contribution to the overall Agency
effort. Perhaps they should know without being told, but for most
there is limited opportunity for competitive promotion--the traditional
sign. Also, because of the work, and therefore the work force, there
is more of a gulf between manager and employee, more of a labor versus
management attitude than nios t elements of the Agency. The
*A technician iri OC is one who maintains, repairs, and installs
equipment; it is also a specific job category.
**Technicians literally are promoted from GS-09 to GS-10, but typically
remain at the GS-10 level for only six months.
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people feel taken for granted and in many cases are certain that
management treats them as interchangeable parts that will function,
like any other good piece of equipment, wherever placed.
In seeking solutions to these and other personnel-related
problems, OC's senior management has been trying to change to a
managerient style that is more responsive to people and their needs.
By and large we do not believe it has succeeded. Most of the senior
managers seem to be dedicated to such change, but it has not
permeated to enough middle- and lower-level managers. No doubt
this situation was exacerbated when, unexpectedly, senior management's
ranks were decimated by early retirements in 1975. In filling these
vacancies the more experienced middle-level managers were drawn upon,
thereby passing the impact on to the middle and lower levels of manage-
ment. 'rhe situation was not helped when so many of the vacant posi-
tions were filled by engineers who were of the appropriate'grade, but
lacked adequate field and managerial experience.*
1. Promotion
Surprisingly, a significant number of complaints
about the lack of opportunity for telecommunicators (and cryp-
tographers) to be promoted do not blame OC's present management
for the situation. Many of them, particularly the :GS-09's, are
unhappy and believe they were misled when new employees. ? Even
so, they complain less about money or about the journeyman-level
being GS--09 than about never receiving any recognition or reward
* A number of engineers in management positions testified to these
shortcomings.
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for good, sustained performance. More than anything else,
recognition is competitive promotion--ergo, they would like
to see more GS-10 positions.
Some of the older hands have become cynical, expressing
the view that management knows they are "locked in" and will
stay whether or riot promoted. Younger employees, aware of
the situation and less accepting of it, are more inclined to
seek other opportunities if advancement is not forthcoming
within two or three tours. And to the extent that management
promotes the young, for whatever reasons, it provides nourish-
ment for the cynics.
a. Grade Struc:: Lure
Promotion and grade structure are inextricably
tied together: management must have slots to which it can
promote, if it is to promote. OC's management has sought
and continues to seek upgrading of some positions.
Currently it expnc is that automated field equipment, which
is about.: to be introduced, will provide convincing justi-
fication because of its technical requirements. OC,
however,, cannot rn ko such changes unilaterally; agreement
must be sought from the Position Management and Compen-
sation Division (f'MCD) of the Office of Personnel (which
has criteria that: must be met) and must fit within the
average grade imposed upon the Agency by the Office of
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Management and Budget.
The problem with OC's grade structure for communi-
cators is that there are
0
GS-09, or journeyman,
positions and only OGS-l0 positions. There are
actually more GS-11 positions, some
Consequently,
there is a narrow and unusual waist to the grade pyramid.
With L_jpositions at the GS-l0 and CS-11 levels, it is
clear that through the years a large number of GS-09's
have been promoted. But in more recent years, as the
organization has stabilized and attrition rates have been
low, there have been few vacancies and equally few pro-
motions.
We have also observed a different kind of promotion
problem: OC's senior managers are frequently one grade
below their slots. Enough of them noted or complained
of the situation, and we cannot help but wonder about
it:----.in part becau=se the practice is widespread and in
par~t because the practice parallels what often happens
to communicators. Although many of these managers are
in their current positions because of the large number
of r'?ei.i i.,+. meut:s in 1971, hence have not been in them for
uncommonly long, we believe it only fair that those who
serve successfully be promoted to the grades of their
positions.
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b. Competitive Evaluation
OC's competitive evaluation system is used for
promotions and assignments, particularly the former.
There are complaints about it, but overall a perhaps
grudr
)'i'n) acceptance because people cannot suggest a
better method. We did note, not surprisingly, that
enthusiasm for the system correlates with one's success
under the system. Several complaints surfaced with
frequency: first, that the system is no better than
the people who participate--individuals, particularly
senior ones, can dominate panels, "buddies" are still
favored, old deeds or misdeeds cannot be outlived, and
the like; second, that assignment to a new geographical
area invariably means, as the "new boy," being relegated
to the lower reaches of the competitive lists; third,
that information not in their personnel files is used in
the process; and last, that information on training and
assignments that should be in their files often is not,
particularly in the field. In recognition of the validity
of the complaint ,hr)ut the effect of assignment to a
new area, marragr,,inii:nt has begun to send the most recent
one or two fitness reports and the standings from the
most recent compet,i give evaluation to area headquarters
to provide history on individuals and to foster more
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uniform and consistent evaluations.
We consider this step desirable, but not enough. We
believe that the secret ballot should be used for the
preliminary and consolidated evaluation lists, a prac-
tice not now universally followed. Also, we question the
use of material that is not part of some record or subject
to verification. We view it as a matter of fairness to
the empl oyee.
2. Assignments
The more or less biennial assignments become a sore point
more because of shortcomings in the way they are administered
than beUAU!see o f fai l ur e to receive desired assignments. Complaints
focus on assignments being late and changed without explanation.
late assignments frequently mean no overlap with predecessors
(which is bothersome to field managers), unnecessarily long waits
for housing, and sometimes long-time separation from household
effects. Late assignments are also just one more way in which
our people are distinguished
is some feeling, too, that there should be an opportunity to
volunteer for positions. The employees accept that the "green
sheet" gives them the opportunity to express preferences, but
believe it, is done in a vacuum because they have no knowledge
of the jobs to be filled.
Although there is recognition of the limitations placed on
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management--all employees are not suitable for all locations and
jobs and vice versa---there is still concern and question about
how the assignment process really works. To many it is hit or
miss, and there is little appreciation of how many assignments can
be affected when just one falls through. And as is usually the
case, management's recognition of personal circumstances always
seems to get less publicity than its real or fancied failure to
do so.
3. Recommendations
Before making our recommendation on these issues, we wish
to note that OC's management has not been unaware of or indifferent
to these matters. It has decided or made efforts, for example:
to try to the extent practicable to fill positions with volunteers;
to try to obtain more GS-10 positions; to increase its use of the
QS:[; to study the implications of creating the position of master
journeyman; to authorize language training for employees and their
spouses; and to consider a promotion list of some minimum number,
al[l of whom would be promoted as vacancies occur and before anyone
else became eligible.
But our concern is not with management's recognition of`
the problems, it is with the need to solve-them. OC's management
says many of the right things and undertakes to do many of the
right things, but does not seem to put them together in a.
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way that is adequate for the need. The requirements of modern
personnel management are more complex than they used to be, and for
an organization such as OC the actual implementation of solutions
is even more demanding.
Here we make five recommendations that deal with the
personnel-related problems of the communicator (and cryptographer).
They are presented as an integrated set whose primary focus is on
increased recognition for the employee.
Recommendation 1: that the Director of Communications provide
more opportunity and equity by (a) promoting those who perform well
in positions of higher grade and (h) creating,-,in concert with the
Director of Personnel, the positions of master journeyman (GS-10)
he requested of the Office of Personnel in January 1977.
Recommendation 2: that the Director of Communications, con-
sistent with the recent growth in his use of Quality Step Increases,
(a) seek comparable use of achievement awards to reward those who
may not be eligible for promotion but are otherwise deserving'
because of sustained high-level performance or unusual deed, and
(b) that he do so with the ceremony and publicity (within the
Agency) to make Quality Step Increases and achievement awards
meaningful forms of recognition.
Recommendation 3: that the Director of Communications ensure
that the secret ballot is used at all stages of the competitive
evaluation process.
Recommendation 4: that the Director of Communications create
an effective method for providing employees with timely information
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on available or forthcoming vacancies so that employees can express
meaningful preferences, either through the quarterly Expected Per-
sonnel Vacancy List introduced in December 1976, or through other
means.
Recommendation 5: that the Director of Communications (a) make
his recently reintroduced newsletter a publication about people
as well as technology and production and that, among other things,
it be used to announce promotions, Quality Step Increases, awards,
commnendations, and other actions that recognize individual per-
fornance; and (b) that he publish it every two months.
B. Cable Secretariat
The preceding discussion focused on the promotion and assign-
ment problems of communicators/cryptographers. It was not possible
in that context to do justice to the situation in the Cable Secretariat,
even though there are some ostensible similarities--the most obvious
of which are relatively large numbers of people in low grades who have
limited opportunities for promotion.
In Cable Secretariat the problem is worse because the wages are
significantly lower and the work repetitious and monotonous. In
January 1977 one-third of the work force was below the GS-06 level
and more than one-half was below GS-08. Low pay; pressure to increase
productivity and to reduce the error rate, and tedium have created
a morale problem. Matters have not been helped by the EEO issues with
which the Cable Secretariat has been beset, issues ranging from per-
ceptions by minorities of job and promotion discrimination to alleged
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sex and age discrimination.
Nor have matters been helped by absorption into OC. There seem
to be fond memories of former days as an independent office in the
DCI area. They give three reasons. (1) Their role, which they
believe is held in generally low esteem throughout the Agency, is
ignored or held in even lower esteem by OC. (2) Opportunities for
promotion beyond GS-12 have disappeared for them. Without a GS-13
slot in Cable Secretariat, the chief's and deputy chief's jobs, GS-15
and 14 respectively, will henceforth be filled by other OC'ers.
(3) The two senior jobs may provide opportunity for others in OC, but
Cable Secretariat employees have no opportunities to transfer or to
qualify for transfer to other jobs in OC.
Some employees have labeled Cable Secretariat's management as
"insensitive," "partial to chosen employees," "lacking candor and
honesty in dealing with employees," and "not caring about the employees."
But other employees label that same management as "attentive,"
"bending over backwards to help.personnel," and "producing a close-
knit and good team effort." These conflicting statements do not pro-
vide a basis for general conclusions reflecting, as they do, different
perceptions and reactions to different supervisors. In typical
fashion supervisors are chosen because of their ability to process
the largest number of cables and not on their ability to manage people.
Cable Secretariat's manning table indicates that it may have too many
supervisory levels and, in general, too many employees of different
grades doing the same work.
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Recognition, in the form of QSI's'or other awards, is rare.
Employees have little opportunity for internal or external training,
and many stated that OC's management has left them with the impression
that attempts from below to suggest better methods of processing the
tremendous volume of cables would be unwelcome.
We believe management can take steps to overcome the complexes
that its employees have developed from believing that "nobody gives
a damn" for too many years. These steps, by Cable Secretariat's own
management, would include the investment of time in staff meetings,
in serious solicitation of employees' ideas for improvement, in
counseling, and in training opportunities. At the same time, OC's
senior management should start treating Cable Secretariat as an
integral part of OC. We urge both these levels of management to be
alert for opportunities to provide employees with recognition, from
"'pats or the back" to QSI's and achievement awards.
But more than anything else, we believe the major problem con-
fronting Cable Secretariat is that it is understaffed; its people
are always under pressure and always fighting backlogs. The automated
Cable Dissemination System now being tested may in time relieve this
problem but it will be a limited form of relief that may do no more
than offset the great increase in volume. With more appropriate
staffing some of the other problems would lessen and even tend to
disappear.
Accordingly, we reiterate the applicability of Recommendation 2
to Cable Secretariat and make the following additional recommendation:
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Recommendation 6: that the Director of Communications under-
take with the Office of Personnel's,assistance a staffing study of
Cable Secretariat.
C. Other Personnel Issues
A potpourri of other personnel issues was raised. Many of
these were the concerns of individuals and not shared by others or
many others. Several, however, recurred with frequency and were to
be heard in all four corners:
(2) per diem
(3) ability to retire under the voluntary/involuntary
systerm; and
(4) career counseling.
Items (1) through (3) are invariably put forth as examples of OC'ers
receiving different, and inferior, treatment from other Agency
employees.
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2. Per Diem
OC personnel, when brought back
tours for training
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receive per diem of $12. Many
complain that the amount is inadequate, that it effectively
precludes having their families with them for the duration of
their training and until they are reassigned, perhaps several months.
We believe that this is a classic case of misunderstanding
compounded by inflation. OC could bring these people back for
training PCS, in which case they would have to bear all their costs
of 'living. Instead OC is bringing them back TDY and providing what
it believes is adequate per diem for housing. Thus management
believes it has been generous, while the recipients of the gener-
osity feel cheated. It is possible that the $12 is no longer
adequate to provide family housing in the perhaps 25X1 A
particularly so for those with large families. We suggest that its
adequacy be reexamined. (OC, on its own authority, could pay up
to $35.)
3. Voluntary/Invo'luntary Retirement
Objections to OC'ers not being allowed to retire under
the voluntary/involuntary retirement plan were frequent. Some of
the objectors clearly want to retire now for personal reasons,
but others are concerned about not having a privilege that is
available to most Agency employees. We do not know how many
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of OC's people would take advantage of retirement under a
voluntary/involuntary plan if it were offered to them but, from
age and grade distributions by years of service, we do not believe
that any serious manning problems would result.
Recently it was deliberate practice, but not Office policy,
to be understrength in communicators. This practice lasted for
only several months. Nevertheless, it may have contributed to
denying employees an option available to most others, and the
responsible management may have been denying itself an oppor-
tunity to obtain headroom. OC now believes that it might be in
surplus by the Spring of 1979, which will make this issue disappear.
4. Career Counseling
The comment heard most often from those with whom we
talked about OC's Career Management Division was that it did not
have professional counselors. Although those on the staff are
considered to be well-intentioned, the absence of professionalism
is an irritant to all grade levels and in all panels. "He's just
a tech like me and besides we might serve together on the next
tour."
But the comments were not, by any means, all negative. Many
appreciated at 'least aspects of the counseling effort, particularly
being told in detail about their competitive standings. They made
sharp distinction between the officer from area headquarters who
bothers to learn something about those he will be counseling and
the one who does not.
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Overall, we believe OC needs-to make sure that all who are
engaged in counseling have the same understanding of its purpose
and of how it is to be practiced.
In fact, career counseling and even career management are
misleading terms, raising expectations in some that will not and
cannot be i'ulfilled. An unambiguous statement of what the
empl,ayee can expect and can contribute to the process should help.
If our experience on this inspection is any indication, more
sitting and listening, and knowledge of the communicator being
counseled, would enhance the effort. Doing so could surface
incipient problems and would do much to overcome the widespread
belief that nobody cares.
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IV. Operational Effectiveness
To most of us in the Agency OC is staff communications. We have
come to take for granted that all--source messages can be reliably
transmitted to or received from virtually any part of the world as
promptly as the indicated precedence calls for. To a much smaller,
but still substantial, body of OC employees and users it also has
represented covert communications.
A. Staff Communications
The Agency's entry into communications in its early days was
to provide a:x capability for covert communications. It was not until
the early 1960's, when OMB decided that for reasons of economy there
should be a world-wide governmental communications system and that
CIA should run it, that. the current staff communications system began
to develop in size and sophistication. Although CIA's role is subject
be efficiency and economy, no
if the criteria continue to
change is likely in the near term.
To the point that it i s marked and obvious, OC uses significantly
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Doinij more not only entails handling more traffic,
but being more versatile -being able to operate a greater variety of
equipment, including emxrgency equipment, and being able to maintain it.
These capabilities are topped off with a dedication that often is
lacking elsewhere, certainly if one can judge by willingness to put in
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extra time, to respond to call-ins during nights and weekends, and
to ensure that incoming traffic is on customers' desks by the opening
of the work clay.
As we proceeded with this inspection, it struck us that there
were three basic questions that were ever present in any consideration
of staff communications. The first of these questions is an Agency
or OC matter: whether or not, as satellite systems improve in relia-
bility, we should maintain a world-wide HF backup system, particularly
i n 1 i ght of i is requirements for manpower. The second question is
government-wide in scope: whether or not, as more elements of the
government have more involvement in foreign areas and an increased need
for secure communications with Washington, the present
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the solution for the last 10 years of this century. The third
question also is government-wide and has implications for the whole
system: whether or not the ever increasing volume of traffic is
Justified.
The answer to the fir>t: question is a matter of policy with regard
to the needs of this Agency and the rest of the government for
communications services. Unless one is willing to sacrifice reliable
and timely communications, Lhere is no alternative to maintaining an
HF capability. In some parts of the world, because of local law or
policy, we cannot and are not likely to be able to use satellite
communications. More basic:, though, is that today's satellites are
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not completely reliable and even with substantial backup in orbit
(which does not exist now) they will still be vulnerable to enemy
interference. HF equipment has had to be used often enough--where
satellite i`acilities are available--to make clear that it will be
necessary for some time to come if our standards remain the same.
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We note that a significant number of the communicators accept
the idea of'a federal communications agency, with the proviso that it
be run by professionals--that is, themselves. The idea of the function
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The third question clearly has implications for the size and cost
of the communications effort. We raise this question because we do not
understand why traffic must ever increase in volume--particularly in
the current period of sharpened priorities and fewer resources. OC
understandably takes pride in keeping up with the volume, but because
of it probably will not achieve all of the reductions in personnel
that have been forecast with the -introduction of automated field
terminals.
As an adjunct to this question of volume, we note the reported
abuse of precedence and of after-hours use of the facilities. The
reports involve both Agency and non-Agency users. There are enough
legitimate demands on OC without unnecessarily making work and
increasing costs. Certainly the abuse by Agency personnel can be
sharply reduced and effort should be made with regard to others.
A joint effort by the DO and DC will be necessary.
B. Covert- Cornmuni cations
The recent decision by the EAG to give DS&T/OTS responsibility
for support of covert communications indicates dissatisfaction
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with OC's handling of it. This decision will not affect OC's doing
the actual transmitting and receiving to and from agents, but
ultimately will mean no longer providing these people with their
communications equipment, training them in its use, and maintaining
it. The transfer of what were OC's facilities and staff for appli-
cations engineering and production has already occurred. In a sense
this transfer completes the change begun in 1973 when all R&D for
covert communications was given to DS&T.
We found no dissatisfaction with the way OC does the transmitting
and receiving of covert communications. Generally, it is graded as
well in this area as it is for staff communications. With regard to
support of covert communications, there are still some who sing OC's
praises. Others, as already noted, obviously think otherwise. We
note in passing that the loss of these functions has had an adverse
effect on morale: employees are concerned that it is a forerunner
of additional dissolution; are disappointed that an interesting aspect
of their work has been taken from them (leaving them with the
"Western Union" work); and believe that with the transfer of a signi-
ficant percentage of their GS-11, 12 and 13 slots to OTS there will
be even fewer opportunities for advancement and for home assignments.
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C. Support
The transmission and receipt of-staff and covert traffic
are the reasons for OC. To produce these services OC engages in
numerous other activities--the technical activities of engineering
and maintenance, communications security, processing and dissemination,
and training. Communications security is a subject in its own right
and is -created in Section VI. Processing and dissemination are the
responsibility of the Cable Secretariat, which we discussed in
Section III. Here we briefly examine engineering, maintenance, and
training.
1. En
c3i n e e r i nq_
OC's engineers are tasked with the design, accquisition,
and maintenance of a modern, world-wide communications system--
one that is expected to stay abreast. of the state-of-the-art.
If the current staff system, and the way it compares favorably
with others, is any indication, they have been and are continuing
to do their job well. Any criticisms that may have reflected
on the engineering effort have focused on covert communications.
With the transfer of R&D for covert communications in 1973 and
the recent deci si on by the EAG, performance in this role has
become accademi c.
2 M,-,int{ginance
Maintenance is supervised by the engineers, performed
by the technicians and communicators, and supported by logistics.
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The engineers and technicians work primarily out of the
area headquarters and base stations'and out of the
Washington, D.C. area. They are responsible for new instal-
lations, major overhauls and modifications, and any main-
tenance beyond the routine. Routine maintenance is per-
formed by the communicators (but not by cryptographers).
It might be noted that routine maintenance, because of
restricted access to the communications facilities, also
includeshousekeeping, carpentry, and just about anything
that needs doing--not just upkeep of communications equip-
ment.
Although there are occasional complaints of slow response
in sending assistance or parts, we found no instance of
communications ever being down for such reasons. By and large
the logistics system, particularly with regard to communications
equipment, works. well. Several times we were told that support
is slow unless a cable is sent and a date, by
which the parts or supplies are needed, is specified. There
seemed to be reluctance to send cables for routine resupply.
A few, to overcome this problem, over-ordered in anticipation
of future needs. By and large, though, these problems--where
they exist--are rnihor? and their solutions would seem to require
only some better coordination.
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3. Training
The heart of OC's training effort is
Without having any professional
D
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educators on the staff, 0 has achieved and maintains a high
level-of professionalism. It is unique in the comprehensiveness
of the skills taught. Courses are carefully planned and tested
before inclusion in the curriculum. When offered they are
critiqued by the students and evaluated by the staff. There
seems to be little doubt that
0
'turns out the best communicators, 25X1A
bar none. So much so, we are told, that they are attractive
to other employers, which drives up the attrition rate. Thus,
it behooves management, even more, to resolve the personnel
and personnel--related problems.
D. Recommendations
OC's task with regard to effectiveness is to continue to do as
well as it has been doing. In this section, but more so in the pre-
ceding sections, we have noted problems that we believe will have an
impact on future performance --?- unless offsetting actions are taken.
To deal with this situation, and with what we suspect is sometimes
'less than desired decisiveness, we believe that OC must look to the
future in an organized and disciplined way (and thereby show the
way to the rest of the Agency). The small long-range planning element
created in January of this year is meant to be the vehicle for doing
so. Nevertheless, the task still lies in front of OC; therefore, we
recommend:
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Recommendation.7: that the Director of Communications ensure
that the planning nucleus he established in January 1977 (a) brings
together the disparate, and now largely technical, planning elements
of OC and (b) performs long-range planning that will be comprehensive,
and will look ahead to the kind of organization the Office should
have in the future and to the steps necessary to achieve that
organization.
Recommendation 8: that the Director of Communications and
the! Deputy Director for Operations jointly remind users that
communications are not free and, therefore, are to be used (a) only
when necessary and in as brief a form as possible; (b) with appro-
priate, not overstated, precedence; and (c) during normal working
hours, except for good cause.
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V. Compliance and Private
A. U.S. Law and Propriety
We neither identified, nor were advised of, violations of U.S.
laws, regulations, executive orders, or standards of propriety.
B. Privacy
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VI. Comriunications Security
OC, not the Office of Security, is responsible for communications
security (COMSEC). It has Agency-wide responsibilities but, as some-
times happens, without corresponding authority. In an earlier time,
before the widespread use of electronic equipment, responsibilities
were focused on communications equipment as traditionally and narrowly
def-ined?--hence were largely intra-OC. Today there is hardly a component
that does not use equipment that could or should be of concern.
The COMSEC staff procures, distributes, and accounts for the
Agency's cryptographic keying material
it, often finds itself handling physical and personal
security matters as well and, for these same reasons, it has been made
responsible for ensuring its own compliance with the Agency's safety
program. Naturally enough, it also represents the Agency on government
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inspections are done by personnel from headquarters.
With the limited staffing available for this work (about 15) and with
the large number of industrial facilities that also need to be
inspected, their schedule permits an inspection about once in
All told the COMSEC _; I:aff has about I
pf whom are in
the headquarters area, and has an FY 1977 budget of some
exclusive of personnel costs.
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A. The Threat
The world of the COMSEC officer holds many threats. Technical
penetration of machines is only the first. Anything that processes
classified material--typewriters, dictaphones, duplicators, computer
terminals, privacy radio devices, and the like--may radiate emanations
that can be -intercepted. One model of a typewriter may be found clean;
later models may include slight engineering modifications that render
it vulnerable. A piece of equil)rnent, secure in itself, may amplify
its signal significantly when someone puts his hand on it. Even
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Improvements in technology may themselves produce threats--as in
the case of miniaturization that puts all of the cryptology on a
single chip, thereby i ncreas-i nq concern for contractor security
and raising questions, for example, about what is done with the
rejects?
If an agent's radio transmission interferes with his neighbor's
TV reception, the ensuing investigation may terminate his usefulness.
This has happened in
underscoring a different threat--that of
el ec troriragne t i C i nt:E:erference (EMI).
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C. Reaul~ations
The mission of the Director of Communications includes "advising
on all communications security (COMSEC), technical, and operational
matters pertaining to electronic communications that have a bearing
on those aspects of the security of the United States for which the
Agency is responsible."
The DC's functions include "establish and implement the Agency's
Emanations Security Program for telecommunications equipment and all
other electronic and electromechanical equipment which is used to
process classified inform.tion. This program will include coordi-
nating policy, establishing standards, testing, designing counter-
rneasuress, iriakiinq technic;.0 inspections of Agency installations, and
recommending for approval the procurement or lease of all such
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processing equipment."
OC probably is best able to carry out these functions within the
Directorate of Administration; there, for example, the procurement of
commercially available word-processing equipment and computers
requires: COMSE_C approval. However, in the case of items not com-
mercially avaailable--where research, development, and new systems are
involved--there is less certainty of COMSEC involvement and some pro-
curement does proceed without'any COMSEC consultation. Assignment
of COMSEC officers to some DS&T offices mitigates the problem in
that Directorate, but does not guarantee that requests for proposals
(RFPs) or unsolicited proposals will be acted on with COMSEC considera-
tion.
We believe the regulations, and the procedures developed pursuant
to regulation;, may not adequately set formal responsibility and
accountability in the COMSEC area. Lack of provision for the EMI
threat is one example. Another is lack of provision for COMSEC
involvement at.. an early enough stage in programming, planning, and
budgeting to ensure proper consideration of it. A complicating factor,
in view of the COMSEC Staff, is the irresolution of the regulations
quoted above. "I,E]stahl ish and implement the Agency's Emanations
Security Program" appears a straightforward charge to the DC, but it
occurs under the umbrella of a mission statement that limits his
COMSEC role to "advising." The result, particularly in COMSEC
approaches to Directorates outside the Directorate of Administration,
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is diffidence and reliance upon personal negotiation and accommodation.
D. 'Recommendations
We are not advocating control through detailed regulation,
but conscious decision as to policy and procedure. The transfer of
Covert Engineering Divison from OC and of rom DO to
D/S&T, both 1977 actions, makes it an appropriate time to underscore
the responsibilities of the COMSEC Staff. As a general principle,
we endorse its involvement not only in procurement, but also at an
early stage in the development of electronic equipment that processes
classified information. We understand that OC has considered pro-
posing regulations along some of these lines. It is.-also our view
that such measures should be amplified by a program of headquarters
and field education to ensure full awareness within the Agency of
COMSEC responsibility and of the threats to communications security.
Although such awareness seems widespread within OC and_theDO, as a
result of specific training programs, we judge the Agency as a whole
to be relatively uneducated. The generally recognized cavalier use of
black telephone lines, and the use of red lines as if they were.
cryptographically secure, need only be cited in evidence.
We recognize that the present COMSEC Staff might have to be
considerably larger if it were to take on such added responsibilities.
Thus, the importance attached to the threat is of primary consideration
and must be determined.* Accordingly, we recommend:
* An internal decision in July 1977 to make the DDI the focal point
for threat information could. provide the data base necessary to deter-
mine the significance of the threat.
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Recommendation 9: that the Director of Communications, in
consultation with the Deputy Directdr for Intelligence, the
Deputy Director for Operations, and the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology (a) define the communications security
(COMSEC) -threat and establish its significance to the intel-
ligence effort; and (b) then develop procedures to take COMSEC
considerations into early account in the planning, development,
and procurement of Agency equipment and, as necessary to ensure
that this is done, propose modifications in regulations.
Recommendation 10.: that the Director of Communications
develop a plan and program of communications security education
to reach the general population of the Agency, both those
entering on duty and those on board, and that this program be
impl'ement:ed through the Director of Training.
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VIII. Management Philosophy
OC's management is centralized. The Oheadquarters do not
represent the decentralization their existence might suggest. They
are too closely tied to Headquarters by good, rapid, and essentially
free communications.
We have no quarrel?with the degree of centralization; centralized
and decentralized structures can and do work. But given the dupli-
cation of facilities and capabilities between Headquarters and the
area headquarters, we question whether both need to be as large as
they are. One or the other would seem to lend itself to some reduc-
tion.
OC's top management states that it is decentralized. We believe
that it wants the advantages of decentralization, but has a strong
reflex of managerial control that holds the reins on area headquarters.
Duplication of activities by Headquarters and area headquarters rein-
forces this disposition because the senior partner tends to be looked
to for the decisions.
As we have already noted, many employees consider OC's management
to be impersonal and disinterested. Although management style and
personality are factors, the size and far-flung nature of the organi-
zation contribute significantly. Large organizations invariably find
it more difficult to be responsive to employees than do smaller ones.
We emphasize, whether management is centralized: or decentralized,
that we believe area headquarters have their place--they serve as a
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training ground for managers, provide backup and resources in times
of crisis, and are regional centers for logistics, repair, security,
and other matters. Nevertheless, there is that redundancy with
Headquarters. We are inclined to suggest that Headquarters play the
role of a corporate headquarters, making policy and establishing
guidelines, and that area headquarters have more opportunity to act
as semi?-autonomous corporate divisions.
Accordingly, we urge OC to examine its management philosophy
(and possibly its structure). We have in mind that with more auto-
nomy area chiefs -night have the authority to promote (which would
elevate the PCEL and eliminate the CCEL),* would be able to resolve
more problems in the field, would be able to meet periodically among
themselves, and would be consulted by Headquarters about significant
decisions.
*'The PCEL, or preliminary competitive evaluation list, is prepared
by the areas, among others, and is an input to the CCEL or con-
solidated (worldwide) competitive evaluation list.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP80-00473A000400020011-8
 -:UNCLASSI FI INTERNAL a~ SECRET
proved I McM1110005/11/29: CIA-RDPU00~? WA9V1~A0~'0011-8
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Inspection Report on the Office of Communications
I EXTENSION _T__NO. _
Inspector General
2E24 HQS
2711 SEP V7,
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
.Michael.J. Malanick
Acting Deputy Director
for Administration
2`f SEP 1977
DDA/MJMalanick:lm (27 Sept 1977)
Distribution:
Orig RS - D/OC w/cy DDA 77-5300
w/o IG Report
S - DDA Subject w/cy
DDA 77-5300 & IG Report
1 RS - DDA Chrono
1 RS - MJM Chrono
DDA 77-5300, Memo for DCI from IG,
--dated 23 Sept 1977, Subject:
Inspection Report on the Office of
Communications.
Approved For Rel ase 2000/11/29: CIA-RDP
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0-00473A000400020011-8
3-62 EDITIONS INTERNAL
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