ADDRESS TO CIA EMPLOYEES BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000700090003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 8, 1977
• Content Type: SPEECH

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ADDRESS TO CIA EMPLOYEES
BY THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
8 August 1977
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Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Central Intelligence
Agency's supergrade promotion exercise. The Director of
Central Intelligence Admiral Turner will present the promotions,
and afterwards he will make some comments regarding the
recent reorganization of the Intelligence Community. STATINTL
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Let me start by saying to those who have just been
advanced how pleased I am for them. What an absolutely
important and sterling accomplishment it is to move into or
up within the supergrades, and it is not easy. I did some
back in my slide rule calculations, and those advanced today
are well less than two percent of those who were available
in one way or another to have shared this promotion.
One of the things that we are going to talk about today
is the future. One of the things I am most intent on in the
future is to continue to make this competitive, but to
insure that despite problems we have around here with
numbers that we are going to have a continuing flow through
of promotions. That is ahead of the story.
I would like to take a few minutes now to share with
you my thoughts. As the final verdict from Mt. Sinai has
come down, and we have, as you know from last Thursday,
some, not: some, but we have a decision by the President on
this muck-anticipated reorganization. plan for the entire
Intelligence Community. As you all know, the basic decision
was made by the President to considerably expand the authority
of the Director of Central Intelligence. Now the detailed
implementation of that is something we are all working on
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right now. We are redrafting the Executive Order 11905 and
translating the President's decision into the implementing
action. I, in the meantime, am working on the details of
how to organize within the mandate put down by this Presidential
decision. My own thinking is not entirely firm at this
point, but after all the suspense we have lived through
together for the past five or six months, I would feel
remiss if I did not share with you my thinking in the stage
that it is at at this time--so you know where I am and where
the facts are as far as they are determined by this point.
So, that is what I am going to do today. I will try to be
explicit where things are still undecided and vague, and
explicit where I think they are firm. When I am finished I
will ask for your questions and comments so that we can be
sure that I have muddied the waters adequately, the best I
can anyway.
The basic point I would like to get across is that I am
very pleased, both as the DCI and as the Director of the
CIA, with the way this has worked out. Let me start with
some of the reasons why I am pleased. First, I think there
is one we tend to overlook; that is, over the past six
months, the President of the United States, the Vice President,
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the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
National Security Council Advisor to the President, myself,
and many others, of course, have spent a great deal of time
on this-.-put a lot of effort, a lot of thought to it. In my
view, in the long run, that can only benefit you and me.
When the high-level people of the National Foreign Affairs
Community of the United States get interested in and involved
in the intelligence process, that is great for us. They
understand us better, they know what we can do for them
better, and they are going to involve us more in their
policy process, and that is what we are here for. So I
think we have benefited just by the fact that the review was
made, and it took such high level attention and interest. I
am very pleased with that.
Now, I would like to emphasize and give you what I can
of how the process works. There has been a lot of misinfor-
mation in the media, as there so frequently is. The debate
that we had was a very lively one. There were sharp differences
of opinion, but the whole thing was done with an air of
cordiality and respect. We had papers and studies and all
that kind of thing flowing, but it eventually came down to
two meetings of the PRC. After two long sessions, we just
could not come up with a unified position or recommendation
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for the :President. Not only did Secretary Brown and I have
different solutions, other people had theirs, too. Between
them all we had a potpourri that just could not be brought
into one good recipe for a pie. So, we all, and quite a few
of us as a matter of fact, not just the Defense and myself,
put in our recommended solutions to the President in writing,
along with the minutes of these PRC meetings. The President
personally reviewed them in great detail. He involved the
Vice President in considerable discussions with all of us--
sometimes as a group, sometimes individually--and I am sure
he put in his recommendations. The President met with us,
discussed the different points at hand, made sure he had all
of our views firsthand, and then he came up with his decision.
Now as all of you know, it is not my recommendation, it is
not Secretary Brown's, or Secretary Vance's, or Dr. Brezezinski's
it is a composite of them all. I am very pleased with it
because ]: think it has given the DCI a much greater opportunity
to effectively coordinate the entire intelligence activities
of the country. As I said, I recommended a different
solution. I am not sure that when I recommended it I
recommended it because I really felt it was the best. I did
not know it was practical at this time. I thought the
chances of it being inacted the way I recommended it were
very slim, but the way I operate, if I really have a conviction,
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I stand. on it. I did in this case, and I thank my instincts
it was not a practical thing to go as far as I had suggested
at this time is what in fact happened. I think what has
happened is that three new authorities given to the DCI are
going a very long way toward what I had recommended, and I
think will go far enough to give us what we need to be sure
that we are pulling together as a team.
What are those three? The first is there is now
created under the PRC a new committee of which I am the
chairman and, as a matter of fact, I did not ask to be
chairman, that was thrust on me. The Priorities Review
Committee consists of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security
Council Advisor, and myself. The objective here is for this
group to establish what the substantive requirements for
intelligence are going to be, and what sense of priority you
and I should put in our work and all the other elements of
the Community. I think this is a very good thing because
setting the priorities for what we do is not our job. We
are here to serve the policy makers, and this new organi-
zation, which has not existed before, is going to involve
the policy makers in our business, and that is all to our
benefit. So that is a good step forward.
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The second is the control, the full control of the
budget process. I need not emphasize to all of you who have
been around the govenment a good while what a useful tool
that can be, how important it is, and what a load it is
going to put on us to exercise it judicially. A great deal
will come here in terms of being able to be sure that there
is neither undue overlap nor, what often bothers me more,
underlap between our activities.
Finally, I am, as the DCI, given full tasking authority
over the entire Intelligence Community. Now this actually
came about because
my paper that went
anybody else did.
it was one of the things that I put into
into this process, and I do not think
My view
now that we need to have a
of the collecting elements
you probably know,
National Intelligence
here has been for several months
central place that will pull all
of the Community together. I have,
already created the predecessor of the
Tasking Committee in what we call the
DCI Planning Committee that has been meeting for several
months now. At that Committee we get all of the collecting
agencies and all of the production agencies represented
around the table. If I say to them, "The President wants
better intelligence on Country Y," I do not go to first to
one fellow and say what he can do and somebody else what he
can do. I point to one man who happens to be, in this case
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John McMahon because the Intelligence Community Staff is
operating as a staff for this committee and say, "Get it,
get all of these COMIREX, HUMIREX, cigarettes, oops, I got
their names wrong. Get all these committees together and
come up with a unified plan between. COMIREX, HUMINT, and
SIGINT to do the job for us." That is what the National
Intelligence Tasking Center is going to do. It is going to
(1) be a. lever of control to be sure the operations of the
entire collection elements of the Community are working
smoothly together, and (2) it is going to be a way to
emphasize the dovetailing of these collection elements so
that they properly support each other and we get the maximum
return from them. Where is it going to be located? Who is
going to be in charge of it? Where is it going to get its
staff? I can only give you one vague answer. The core of
it will come from the COMIREX, HUMIREX, and SIGINTS Committees.
Obviously, there will be more people required than that I
believe. Where it is going to be located, I can not tell at
this point. There are a number of options, we are weighing
and assessing them, and it is going to take some time to
decide. I believe that this will be what you have heard me
talk about in the past sometimes as a vice-president for
collection, but he will not have management responsibilities
over any, agencies. He will only be the coordinator of the
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tasking. He will not run the CIA, the NSA, or the NRO. NSA
will be run by the Secretary of Defense, and the NRO similarly
as far as the day-to-day management is concerned. The CIA
will be run by the Director of the CIA, but tasking for all
of them will be brought together by this vice-president of
collection, otherwise known now as the National Intelligence
Tasking Center.
Now, that brings me almost ahead of myself to how do
all things fit together, and where does this tasking center
tie in with the rest of the organization. What I am going
to describe now is my concept of how I would like to tie
these together. I want to emphasize in the strongest way
that wh'Lle most of what I am going to describe can be done
within the present authorities I possess, some of this would
tread on the fine toes of the Congress, and we will have to
get their approval for certain elements of it. So, please
respect my confidence, please recognize that there is an
element of tentativeness here in that the degree we need
Congressional support, I obviously have not had any oppor-
tunity to seek it as yet. My tentative thought is to have
four people report directly to the DCI. The first will be
the DDCI who, just as now, will be the operating element of
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the CIA; that is, I, the DCI, will still be the Director of
the CIA just as today. You all know, there was talk about
forcing a separation here; this has not come about. In
fact, the President very specifically and personally said he
did not want it to come about, and I am very pleased that
that is the way this has come out. So one of the four
people reporting to me will be the DDCI, just as today. The
CIA remains intact as an entity, with one exception with
regard to the DDI that I will get to in a moment. Basically,
there will be no substantial change that people in the CIA
will notice. The second person reporting directly to the
DCI will be this Director of the National Intelligence
Tasking Center and, again, as I said before, he will not
manage anything, he will have dotted lines on the chart to
the CIA, to the NSA, to the NRO, and to any other collecting
agencies, in some sense to the State Department collection
function. He will task all of these, including the CIA no
matter what the priorities for effort are to be. The third
person reporting directly will be Dr. Bowie who will be the
Vice President in Charge of Production. Now, the Vice
President of Production will manage directly a combined NIO--
DDI organization. They will be fused together with Dr. Stevens
as the Deputy and Dr. Bowie as the Director of that operation.
In addition to managing that operation, Dr. Bowie will be
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responsible for coordinating production with State and
Defense. So, he is different than the Tasking Center boss
who has only coordinating functions; he some linemanagement
functions, and he has some coordinating functions. Now, why
did we do this? Because the President in this decision, it
seems to me, has reaffirmed very much the DCI's role as the
President's primary advisor on intelligence and the NSC's
primary advisor on intelligence. And with that, I believe
we can produce that kind of national intelligence only by a
good meshing of the NIOs and the Directorate of Intelligence.
We have been working on this and thinking about this for a
number of months now, long before this decision was made. I
have decided to end with what I think is an artifical
division, an artificial organizational separation between
these two groups. The primary mission of the combined group
will be to produce national intelligence. We must always
remember that only here in the CIA do we have people producing
intelligence who have no relationship to policy and that is
what this combined group is really going to be, and it is a
very critical national asset to have that kind of a good
production capability that does not relate or is not any way
biased to policy considerations. The NIOs will be the
principle substantive staff officers in their respective
fields of assignment. They will be responsible
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both for coordinating all the activities of the Intelligence
Community in their areas of production and for giving
general direction and guidance to the DDI people working
with and for them. They will have to rely for the primary
part of their production support on the DDI; therefore, I
believe this change will make the DDT in effect an even more
vital and even more important element of our organization.
We do not anticipate any wild extensive organizational
changes to accomplish this. Bob and Sayer will in a few
days put their implementing instructions on this, and we are
going to go ahead with this right away. Let me say this,
nobody in DDI need worry about his job. We have got a clear
charter for more, better central intelligence of a national
nature, and there is more than enough work for all. In fact,
I have a very express plan actually to increase the size of
the staff in the DDI-NIO complex. Also, please tell all
the people in DDI that they do not have to worry that they
have lost their career status, their retirement rights,
their privileges of joining the CIA Credit Union, or what-
ever else it may be. The Directorate of Administration will
continue to serve all the people in the DDI-NIO organization
just as it does today. They are still organizationally part
of the CIA. Dr. Bowie will be their boss. The fourth
person reporting to me will be a Budget and Evaluation Vice
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President, and what this really amounts to is. the IC staff
less the Intelligence Collection Committees, COMIREX,
HUMINT, and SIGINT. Here, the IC staff in this new title
will have much increased responsibilities in the Budget
field as you, would of course, anticipate from the full
budget responsibilities that the DCI will be shouldering.
Philosophically now, let me look why we are proposing
this four-phase organization. The National Intelligence
Tasking Center is to bring together all the collectors. The
NIO-DDI, and Vice President for Production are to bring
together all the production elements. Now I am fully aware
that you have also got to bring the producers and the
collectors together. I happen to think at this time we need
particular emphasis on bringing the collectors together with
collectors and the producers together with producers. I
would also say that I would anticipate-that a combination of
the priorities board and its guidance, and the controls of
the Budget and Evaluation Section are going to force a close
coordination between the producing and the collection
elements, and we have got to have that as an essential part
of our intelligence operation. I do not want to forget the
important elements of OLC and 0GC and Public Affairs,
Comptroller, Inspector General. Basically, they will remain
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as they are today reporting to and serving the DCI. It is
possible that sometime in the future we will separate out
like functions to serve just the CIA, but that is by no
means decided at this point. Life for them will go on in
much the same style it is now. I would like to say that I
have definite plans to increase the size of and to stress
the emphasis on the importance of the Inspector General
function. We have more and more people doing oversight of
us, and I, therefore, feel that it is absolutely essential
that we stay out ahead of that by doing our own internal
oversight--is that innersight, I do not know. The Inspector
General's function is more critical than ever. Speaking of
the criticality of the primary functions here in the Agency,
let me quickly go through the other three Directorates I
have not mentioned and talk about each one of them and my
view of where they are going in the future. Let us start
with the Directorate of Science and Technology. Here, the
organizational changes I have described have a couple of
impacts. First, it makes it more critical, in my view, that
DDS&T retain a SIGINT and an imagery capability in house.
As the DCI, it is absolutely vital that I have available to
me that kind of expertise that reports to me and is loyal to
me. I also think that it is increasingly important under
this concept that we continue to have the competitiveness
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that has to come to benefit the entire Community over the
years of the ingenuity and the ability and skill of the
DDSFT's ,3IGINT and imagery operations in competition with
those of NSA and NRO. Secondly, this organizational change,
it seems to me, also reemphasizes the research and development
role of ])DSFT. Here again, in the imagery and SIGINT areas,
we are going to need somebody who is looking at the research
and development area from a national point of view, not just
a military point of view in developing the kinds of gadgets,
the kinds of techniques that are going to push SIGINT and
imagery forward into the future. In addition, of course it
is critical that DDSFT do the research and development for
the clandestine service, nobody else can or will. Beyond
that I just think the record of DDSFT in injecting new ideas
and injecting imagination into the RFD process of the entire
Intelligence Community has been superb over the years and
must be preserved. Lastly, of course, is growing
rather than shrinking in important in my view, and therefore
it remains another essential element
Moving on to DDA, there certainly will be no diminution
of the need for the support that DDA provides to all of us
and, in fact, I would anticipate a likelihood under this
organization overtime of some expansion of the common
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services that they provide--particularly, the common services
of communications. I an personally somewhat concerned at
the duplication of intelligence communication channels, and
I would like look into the DDA taking a more active role in
a Community-wide area there. I am also very, very, concerned
and interested in strengthening the security function of
DDA. It is a digression right now, but I want to say to
you, the top people here, this is one of my greatest concerns
today in the intelligence world. As a nation in handling
national intelligence when it gets to the national debating
level, we are absolutely like a sieve, and it has just got
to be stopped. Our industrial security is horrendous; it is
just terrible, from what I have seen of it. I would say in
all candor to you that right here in the CIA we have got to
tighten -up. We are very good in some areas; we are very lax
in others. The security function is just critical; there is
no point spending all this money to get secret information
and then have it published in the newspaper, as it seems to
be almost everyday around here.
Well, that moves me on to the DDO because there, too,
in the counterintelligence function that they have, that has
got to be maintained; it has probably got to be strengthened.
I have a particular concern there that we have to be, I
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believe, more alert not only to counterintelligence against
people, but counterintelligence against technology. We must
be sure that we are bringing both of those counterintelli-
gence functions together in the future so that we are making
every effort we can to deny potential adversaries information
of value common services of communications. I am personally
somewhat to them that we just give away too freely. Next,
under DDO, is covert action. The President, Dr. Brzezinski,
myself, I know, all believe with great sincerity that covert
action is a national asset that must be maintained. The day
may come when the nation wants covert action in a way that
it has not even thought of today, and you and I would be
found wanting if we had not kept that capability strong.
There is no question that there is a disinclination in the
country today to use covert action. We must maintain that
capability--paramilitary and the whole works--for the day
that it will be called upon. I am dedicated to maintaining
that capability. I believe we are all going to want more
clandestine collection, the other principle function of DDO,
in the years ahead. We are going to want to strengthen the
overseas element of the DDO. I think there is going to be
more emphasis on what we can collect clandestinely in third
countries as opposed to just the objective A and B hard-
target countries and their satellites. I think you can see
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this if you will look at President Carter's foreign policy,
Dr. Brzezinski foreign policy and philosophy, and Mr. Vance's
attitudes. I think that there is every sign that the
country is going to put more emphasis in the years ahead on
our relationships--friendly, adversarial, economic, political,
and military--with the non-hard target countries as well as,
of course, a continuing absolute demand to know what is
going on in the Soviet Union and China. I do not want
anybody here to misinterpret this; this is no instruction to
start sending signals to the Chiefs of Stations saying shift
your target area. Because I do not know whether what I am
saying means that it is going to be a totally additive
requirement that I going to give Bill Wells or whether there
is some such substitution involved here. In any event, each
country, each case will have to be weighed on its own after
detailed review. So, please do not misinterpret me and
start sending out new signals. All I am saying is that the
emphasis on clandestine collection for these reasons is in
my view bound to go up. I see it as the best source of
secret political information that we can get, I see it as of
increasing value and importance to complement other sources
in the economic area which is getting increasing stress
throughout our intelligence activities. I also see it as a
very important element in keeping our SIGINT and our imagery
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viable in the years ahead in helping us to know how and
where to target. While I am on the DDO, I know that over
the past: five months that I have been here, I have generated
concern because I conducted a major and extensive review of
the DDO operations, and I hope most of you involved in that,
particularly in the DDO, have understood that and perhaps
would not respect me if I had not. I was given a clear
mandate by the President to be sure that the way the DDO was
operating was within bounds of legality and the President's STATINTL
sense of ethics and propriety. Knowing how hard pressed I
would be in the first few months, I asked
to be my primary point man in that effort, and he has done,
in my view, a splendid job. His review of the Headquarters
side of the DDO operations is complete. It has been given
to me in 11 notebooks which I have read through. I can tell
you with great sincerity that both Rusty and I feel that not
only is all well, but all is very well in the DDO organization.
I have met with Bill Wells, and we have not finished yet
with meetings on all the 11 notebooks, but I have been
through them enough to know that the next meetings with Bill
are going to be like the last ones. I am asking for minor
adjustments here and there. These are not because there any
horrendous cases of things being run wrong or improperly or
illegally or immorally or anything 'like that. These are
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matters of tone, matters of style, matters of judgment; but
they are nothing of earthshaking significance. We are going
through them one by one, and we are getting things in line
where I feel comfortable, Bill is comfortable, and we know
just how things are operating. I found in my overview, with
Rusty's help, first of all that the take from the DDO is
very impressive. Secondly, that the coverage is very broad
and very healthy in that regard. It is not narrowly confined
to one area or another. I find that the operational perfor-
mance is admirable, very admirable, and I speak not only
with respect to the people in the field for whom I have
engendered a great respect in particular because of the
risks they take and the privations they endure, but also for
the people who are at Headquarters who administer them and
give them their guidance. My goals for the DDO in the
future are to improve their cover. We have serious problems
there, not their fault particularly, and I want to give
maximum support to improving that situation. Secondly, to
maintain the same professionalism that we have today through
good training, through good inspiration. Thirdly, to main-
tain a professional officer corps of clandestine service
people of about the same size that we have today. Fourth,
to make it a leaner, more efficient service overall. Last
summer, 1976, Bill Wells undertook a major study of the DDO
and its structure, and he came up with a three-phase program
for structuring or restructuring the DDO to be executed over
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seven or eight years until 1984. Phase one was executed
last summer; phase two was scheduled for this summer. He
gave me :phase two a few weeks ago. It called for a very
substantial reduction in the overhead of the DDO to be
carried out between now and 1984. I made two changes in his
plan--I reduced the number of people to be reduced, I made
it a smaller number, and I compressed it into two years and
a quarter rather than than seven or eight. So, based on the
DDO recommendation, thus somewhat reduced but compressed, we
are going to in the next 26 months take a reduction in the
DDO size of aboutW nd some people--positions. Now this
is a phased plan, and it comes from a conviction of the DDO
management that since the major cutback in Southeast Asia,
the Headquarters element has not reduced proportionately.
I know that even since I have been here and listening around
and talking with groups and individuals, there is a great
deal of opinion in the corridors that the DDO being overmanned
has a lot of people who are under employed. If there is one
thing I would like is to be sure that every employee in this
Agency feels a full sense of challenge, a full sense of
contribution because without that you cannot have a full
sense of reward. Let me emphasize in the strongest terms
that this ^ reduction is in no sense retributive, it is
instead an effort to be leaner and more effective. It is
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not really a reduction as much as it is an elimination of
surplus personnel. It will be carried out in as considerate
a way as we possibly can. For instance, we will take as
much by attrition that comes normally as we possibly can.
Beyond that we will try to take as much from early retire-
ment so that other people who have a few years left before
they qualify for retirement will have an opportunity to do
so. Beyond that we will reach down to those people who have
been consistently graded in the bottom of their category--
the bottom five percenters or ten percenters or whatever it
may be. About half, maybe a little more than half, of the
cut will be taken in the Fiscal Year 1978 and the other in
Fiscal Year 1979. Those to be asked to leave in Fiscal Year
1978 will be notified not later than the first of November;
no one will be required to leave before the first of March
of 1978, five months notice. For the Fiscal Year 1979 plan,
all those being asked to leave will be notified by the first
of June of 1978, but nobody will be asked to go before the
beginning of the Fiscal Year which is the first of October,
some four months later. There will be a higher proportion
of cut in the more senior grades than the junior grades.
The purpose of this being several fold. One, there is a
great tendency when you cut large organizations to end up
being top heavy and that does not do the organization any
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good. Secondly, as I mentioned in the very beginning, we
must maintain a flow through opportunity. This is a virile,
basically young organization, and our future depends on our
continuing to attract and retain the same type of high-
quality people that we have today. We have got to provide
them opportunity. Thirdly, of course, the more senior
people are more likely to have an opportunity to retire
rather than to have to abandon the equity they have in the
government. Let me reaffirm with great conviction that I
approve this elimination of these surplus people only on the
conviction that in the long run it will strengthen the DDO
organization. Let me say, without casting shivers through
the audience, that we are going to have to take the same
kind of look for surplus people in all the Directorates. I
have no thought whatsoever that there is anything like an
=man surplus anywhere else. That is a unique situation
in the DDO due to the fluctuations over Southeast Asia, but
with the intense scrutiny that we are going to have in the
years ahead from both the Congress and the OMB, we have got
to be on firm ground that we have what we need and nothing
more. I would always rather volunteer to cut than I would to
be cut if we in fact do not need it. I have not made any
judgment on any of the other Directorates at all. Let me
wind up by saying that these past five months, I spent a
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great deal of my time just getting to know you, getting to
know the Agency, getting to know the Community, getting to
know what my role is supposed to be as the principal intelli-
gence officer of the country. I have had to spend a lot of
time studying organization, purpose, and how to make the
Community more efficient and effective. I am breathing
easier now; the time has come to look ahead rather than to
look inward and backward. The President has demonstrated
particular trust and confidence in us by giving us new
emphasis, new authority, new requirements, new sense of
priorities, and in particular within my hearing and, I know,
within yours publicly also praising the confidence and the
dedication of the CIA in particular. I was told when I
first came here by each one of the former DCIs, and I spoke
with all of them, that I could find in the government of the
United States no more dedicated, loyal, or competent group
of people than those in this Agency. Although I have been
loyal to a different agency of this government for some 30
years, I have to agree with those people. This is the top
group of qualified, loyal, and dedicated people that I have
ever worked with. I believe that the qualities you have are
now going to be put to the test more than ever before
because we do have a new charter, a new responsibility under
this reorganization. Now, we have got to deliver and I know
I can count on you to do it. Thank you.
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Where'is it muddiest? Anybody like to lead off?
Q. Sir, will these four vice presidents that you spoke of,
do you visualize that they will become elements of a larger
legal erLtity organization with some kind of a name on it?
If so, what do you think that name will be?
A. The only way I think that could come about is if we
took something like DDA and had its common service element
attached to the DCI rather than the CIA. I do not know that
it would have to be named a single name like CIA. That
would just be creating the CIA all over again in terms of
its origional concept and charter way back in 1947-49. That
concept and charter really has not worked out the way the
Congress intended it, and so I think what I am trying to do
here is create that same thing over again, but not give it a
name like that. The CIA will retain its identity and it
could be--as I say, I do not have this worked out in my own
mind yet--that the common services instead of coming out of
the CIA would come out of the DCI and just be the DCI's
services, and you would have a CIA and a Vice President for
Production and, a Vice President for Tasking, and Vice
President for Budgets. Those are sort of legal, organizational
nuances, and I do not really think they will affect the
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position., the rights, the privileges, the retirement benefits,
and so on of any of the individuals in our organization. We
have got complications, and the reason I am being hesitant
here is, of course, the Congress has been driving for an IC
staff that is not under the CIA. I mean that people have a
separate entity and that is confusing life, and we are going
to have to sort that out as to which way the Congress will
let us go because this is the kind of thing that will
require definite Congressional approval if we make any
changes.
Q. I am interested in your views on the need for competing
analyses. You are going to merge the DDI with the NIO
structure and strengthen the numbers involved in this
process. Will this not create a rather powerful assessment
force which would tend to override or dominate INR and DIA
and their abilities to present not only departmental but
national intelligence?
A. Can you hear that in the back?
That is a very good question, and it is one that
people have raised the media. I would say that I am certainly
dedicated to overlapping in competing analyses. It does not
seem to me that we should let the DDI-NIO become substantially
more proficient in military analysis in the DDI. They
should be good competition for them. It does not seem to me
that we should let the DDI-NIO become vastly superior to the
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INR political analysis. I think we have got the monopoly on
economics; I do not think anybody touches our potential
there. I certainly want to see that overlap from the
military on the one side and the political on the other with
us having the capability to do all three disciplines very
well. I think the real answer to your question is I do not
view the NIOs and the DDIs as that separate or competing
today. I think they are onetailed together, but I think
they are onetailed in an inefficient way. This bringing
together will get better return for our money. I certainly
do not want to be a czar of intelligence production. I
think we ought to have it (I do not want to use the word
because it will get misconstrued), but I do think that there
has got to be more unity in the collection side. That is
where the money is, and that is where the real errors can
be. If you do not collect properly, you will leave a big
hole in there. In the production-analysis-estimating side,
we have got to have overlap competition. We can afford it,
and we must have competing views going all the way forward.
We will have to watch what you say very carefully as we move
ahead.
Q. I remember you spoke of strengthening counterintelligence.
Does that mean or may we take for granted that the President
has approved the establishment of a national counterintelligence
committee as discussed in PRM-11?
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A. No. That has not been finally decided as yet. We have
really only bitten a piece of the PRM-11. There are other,
we have bitten off one piece with the wire tapping bill
which has already gone forward to the Congress. We have
bitten off this piece which is the fundamental structuring
of the Community, but the piece that what was really PRM-11,
part I, is still gestating up through the decision process
and has not reached the PRC let alone the President. But we
have got to have something like that.
continuation of question....
A. Oh, I think we will get to that in September. You
know everything is sort of in a lull right now. Tony, have
you got any prediction on that?
I really do not. I think September is as good a guess as
I could make.
We have plenty of cooperation with the Attorney General,
but they do not move too fast. There is sort of a waltz
going on. The Attorney General wants to make me the Chairman
of the Counterintelligence Committee, and I want to make him
the Chairman of the Counterintelligence Committee. I only
want to get out of it because I just do not want the CIA,
in particular, associated with domestic activities, and
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counterintelligence has to be domestic, too. The Attorney
General has his reasons for not feeling it is good for the
head justice man of the country to be that publicly in
charge of counterintelligence activities. So there is that
one basic difficulty of who is going to head this committee
organization. It could go to the National Security Council,
or it could go to some third party. I suspect it is going
to end up on my shoulders. I do not know. I am not going to
fight it., but I want to make the proper position here that
I do not think it is necessarily the right place for it. I
would appreciate your views on that.
Q. With your assumption of full budgetary authority of the
Intelligence Community, is there an intent for you to have
an appropriation of your own, and will it be an open appropriation,
either single one-line item or otherwise?
A. No. There has been no decision on that yet. As you
know, the Senate Select Committee voted nine to eight to
disclose a single budget figure. They have not yet, I
guess it has been two months now, or more, taken it to the Senate
floor for decision. Whether they will or not this session,
I do not know. If they did vote that, whether we would then
ask for separate appropriation there with everything hidden
under the one figure, I do not know either. I have not
really thought that one through. If they do not, of course,
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So, the answer is uncertainty to your
question.. Though the intent of the Presidential decision is
that not only will the DCI formulate and present to OMB, the
budget to the Congress and justify it before the Congress,
but he will receive the appropriated monies through OMB or
from OMB and disperse them or not disperse them, as the case
may be, to the appropriate agencies for whom they were
designated by the Congress. The control will be up and
down.
Q?
As the chief control of the strategic reconnaissance
resources, will your control also extend to tactical reconnaissance?
A. No. If the element is not in the national foreign
intelligence budget, then I will have (Is John McMahon here?
Sorry, John. I have been looking for you down here.) We
put the term in the Executive Order about the advisory
tasking. Is that the word? Right, advisory tasking. I
have full tasking over all the elements in the national
foreign intelligence budget. Now, if the Defense Department
leaves the airplane in that budget, it is mine to task--as
are a lot of the SIGNIT airplanes. If it is a tactical
element in the Defense budget as opposed to the NFIB then we
have advisory tasking. I mean if we want a tactical element
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to try to do something good for the national element we, in
effect, ask them and let our requests be known. Of course,
they do the reverse, too, with the national.
Q. Admiral, the NIOs have been responsible for estimates
and special estimates of national intelligence up until now.
Do you see their role expanding into other kinds of finished
intelligence in view of the NIOs to the DDI?
A. The NIOs are responsible for national estimates and
national production today. Do we see any expansion of that
with the merger of the DDI? Bob, do you want to try that?
Dr. Bowie: I do not, off hand. I think Mr. Stevens
and I visualize that there would be more involvement in the
preparation of estimates which would be only those through
the DDI :For example. For the purpose of multi-disciplinary
and othe:r types of estimates which might require different
offices of DDI.
I am sure we gave you what you wanted, Robert, I think the
answer is basically no. The NIOs will be sort of the top of
the pyramid of this now consolidated. organization. They
will be the contact point with the policy makers. They will
be the contact with those other elements of the National
Intelligence Community to bring together what must be
national estimates. Now, feeding into that will be what
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the DDI comes up with, but they can not, for instance, as
was brought out here. If they are doing a military estimate,
they can not ignore the DIA's position. Right? So they
will have to be the one that merges that.
Dr. Bowie: I would try and answer the question about
additional functions. The assumption is that they will
continue to perform the existing functions with respect to
the coordinating of national intelligence in which there is
participation by the DIA and by the INR. The additional
function would be the one I described; namely, some effort
also to coordinate in-house estimates which might not involve
INR or DIA but which might involve several offices of the
DDI. The principle function will continue to be essentially
the Community function, or the function of pulling together
the different components of the Intelligence Community for
the purpose of producing what is commonly called the NIEs.
Q.
How do you see the interrelationship, if any, between
your production and collection vice president's with expected
product evaluation?
A. How do we see the vice president's production and
collection interfacing with respect to product evaluation?
I think that has got to be stimulated by the DCI himself.
It has got to be part of his NFIB responsibilities to use
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that Board as his way of taking reports that have come out
of the Budget and Evaluation Vice President, for instance,
as a stimulus or tasking the Board :itself to look at various
products, to look at various situations and opportunities
that were presented missed opportunities, bad results, good
results, and try to see what this Board as the DCI's principal
advisers for overall community matters recommends be done
better or differently in the future.
Q. Admiral, with respect to the IG function, what requirements,
if any, will you levy on DIA, NSA, or will you levy any
requirements at all?
A No. The Presidential decision has a phase in it about
the Inspector General functions remaining basically where
they are,, So I do not have a license to go in and conduct an
inspection of the DIA. The old Executive Order had something
about I was to assure there were Inspectors General. It
was really not very meaningful. I am not sure what wording
we will end up negotiating into this one, but I do not see a
major strengthening of a Community Inspector General function.
I am not sure that that is proper. I started at one point
to argue for a Community Inspector General, regardless of
how the -.,Line of authority went with NSA, but you do not
really think you like somebody coming in and inspecting your
house when you the boss of it. I backed off on that one,
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frankly, It is a problem, and I would like to have that
ability, but that is one of the compromises we have had to
make here. I think we can work around it satisfactorily.
Q. Admiral, regarding the reduction in the DDO, how was
the figurewlus arrived at?
A. Well, as I mentioned, Bill came to me with a larger
figure, and it was my feeling that I didn't want to take
that much risk. I wanted to have if necessary still a
little surplus, in part because I am anxious if we can get
authority to increase the overseas contingence. I want to
have that opportunity anyway, and so I arbitrarily without
scientific calculation reduced his figure to this number.
Q. Admiral, under the new organization, it appears that
there will be four deputies. Will there be one DDCI, or
will there be four DDCIs, and will these deputies require
confirmation by the Hill, by the Senate?
A. This again is a question that can only be answered
after we have negotiated with the Congress. The DDCI is a
statutory position right now, and he is the number two
fellow in the Community really, because he's the only other
Presidential appointee. So if the Congress does not want to
change that, that is your answer. My view would be that I
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would rather have four coequal people in this spot. That
way it gives me a little more flexibility. There are times
when I want somebody to represent me in a PRC meeting, or
some place, that you know, and the DDCI just does not happen
to be as well qualified for that particular function. So I
would rather have it that they are all on the same level.
When I go out of town, as I am going to go on Wednesday for
a week of leave, I would pick one of them and pat him on the
shoulder and say, "For this week you are it." It might vary
according to the personality, it might vary in accordance
with what was going on that week, and what I thought was
going to have to take precedence. Whether they should all
be statutority confirmed or not. My only hesitation is I
think they probably should be. My only hesitation is you
get to much graven in statute and it is hard to change and
adapt. I think I am balance if I could I would just as soon
not have them statutorily approved. That is one I have not
thought through, nor have I even talked to any of the key
people about.
Q. Admiral, people in the DDI are already asking the
question.--are we no longer employees of the CIA? What is
the answer?
A. You are employees of the CIA, and there is no way I can
change that. You have to go to the Congress to change that.
We may or we may not, but we will not go to Congess tQ
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change it unless every right, privilege, an ene it is
fully protected. That is part of a much bigger issue and
probably is some time down the pike. There is no way. I
mean, the NIOs all belong to the CIA today. Right? A good
bit of the IC Staff belongs to the CIA. Is that right or not?
Mr. McMahan: Legally, all of it.
A rose is a rose is a rose, I guess. Please assure
people of that. You know somebody came up to me and asked,
"Can I still use the Credit Union down here?" For heaven
sakes, we are not going to do anything to jeopardize people's
rights or benefits and so on. There is one thing I believe
in that an organization like this is built on people. If
you do not take care of your people, you have not got anything
left. I am not going to let any of the people be run roughshod
over by any kind of organizational stuff. We may want to
shift the organziation around over a period of time, but we
will never do it without being assured that it is equitable
and it protects everybody's interests and rights and so on.
Nobody'; retirement is going to be put in jeopardy, and
nobody',,; CIARDS are going to be run down the drain. There
is no way until we get legislation, and I cannot possibly
get legislation through until next spring. You know, the
Congress will not even be back until after Labor Day, and
they abandon ship on the 21st of October. I have got to
stop using that nautical terminology. I am trying, but it
is hard. Anyway, we are not talking about anything imminent
here in any event.
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