NOTE TO JACK BLAKE, DD/A(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000700090005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 103
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 25, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

STATINTL
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Office of Legislative Counsel
25 February 1977
TO: Jack Blake, DD/A
Attached is a copy of
Admiral Turner's transcript for
your information and for your
action (corrections, follow-ups,
and identification and suggested
resolution of problems which fall
into your area). A copy is being
sent to Morning Me g participants.
pu y egis a lye ounsel
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'7-7-'1063
ILLEGIB
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STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER., U.S. NAVY,
NOMINEE FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral Turner. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee,
I am very pleased to be here this morning and to have the
opportunity to express to you some of my views on the conduct
of our national intelligence activities, and on the President
decision to nominate me to the post of Director of Central
Intelligence. May I first, however, thank Senator Stevenson
for his very kind words, and Senator Percy for his in absentia.
I.would like to start by noting that governments, no less
than any of us as individuals, depend upon accurate and timely
information to make decisions. The collection, the evaluation
the dissemination of information to protect our national
security, and upon which to base the foreign policy, is essential
for any sovereign state. And in this day when our state has
such international responsibilities, a good intelligence
collection organization is absolutely vital.
? Today, however, we are in an era of effort to reduce
international tensions, and in this era, the United States, in
my opinion, needs an organization for intelligence of high
quality and responsiveness perhaps more than any other time.
The Congress itself has recognized the fact that the success
of our ongoing negotiations for SALT and MBFR may very well
depend in part on our ability to verify that past agreements
are in fact being carried out. Thus, our intelligence will
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be one factor in developing that mutual trust which will be
essential to further progress in this important area. If our
intelligence is faulty, we may misjudge; if it is inadequate,
we may read the signals incorrectly. Without good intelligenc
we may simply miss opportunities to ensure the world of
peace. I believe, then, that we must have the best intelligen e
agency in the world. I think we can do this and still be
fully consistent with American values and law.
At the same time today that we are working toward inter-
national. understanding, we are also witnessing the substantial
investment of the Soviet Union in their military forces,
whether their forces are larger or smaller than ours, stronger
or weaker, better or poorer is a subject that could involve
interminable debate. It does seem clear to me, however, that
we are going to require all of the. leverage which good intelli
,gence can give to our military posture if we are going to
remain adequately strong in the future.
However, today there are more than military requirements
for intelligence. Our intelligence must be acutely aware of
foreign political, economic. and social trends, as well as the
military ones, and must be able to relate these in assessing
the prospects for our future.
There is no doubt'in my mind that we possess the capa-
bility to have the best of all intelligence services in all o
these areas. To do that, though, we must ensure that our
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intelligence resources are employed in an optimal manner.
In this connection, the President has within the last few
days made it expressly clear to me that he expects the Directo
of Central Intelligence to be able to ensure him that our
total national intelligence effort is being conducted in
accordance with established priorities and with minimal dupli-
cation of effort. He also wants to be certain that the
foreign intelligence work of all agencies of our government is
being conducted strictly in accordance with law and with
American values. The President indicated that while he belie es
that existing law and executive orders encompass these objec-
tives, he intends to work closely with the Congress on any
revisions of law or executive orders that may be desirable to
assist the Director of Central Intelligence in fulfilling thes
charges.
I believe that we can adhere to the President's guidance
for greater efficiency and responsiveness within full legality
while simultaneously maintaining the individuality, the
imaginative initiatives, and the independent voice of the
various agencies of our national intelligence structure.
I appreciate the importance of Maintaining a degree of inde-
pendence in our subordinate national intelligence activiteis,
as well, of course, as in our tactical intelligence operations
I have already discussed this question with the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense and know that we all approach
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it with open and cooperative minds: We all seek greater effec
tiveness and efficiency from better direction and coordination.
We all abhor any though of such a degree of centralization tha
alternative judgments cannot be heard, and uncertainties
discusied.
Again, the President stated that he feels that the
decision -makers in Congress and in the executive branch will
be better served if they all work from the same foundation of
intelligence. This is not to say that consensus among the
various elements of the community need be forced, or that
dissenting opinion need by stifled. Contrary views must be
presented, but in such a way that the rationale for such
dissent is clearly evident.
In fact, were the Senate to confirm me for this position,
I would look upon maintaining the objectivity which comes from
considering divergent viewpoints as my highest priority.
Objectivity benefits both the producerand the user of intelli
gence. The user obviously benefits because he is given all
reasonable alternatives. As a frequent user of intelligence,
I understand, I believe, the importance of approaching
decisions with a range of choices in hand, not simply one
option. I also believe that I am aware of the dangers to
military planning and operations of intelligence estimates tha
are biased in one direction. The producer of intelligence als
benefits from an emphasis on objectivity because he is not ask d
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to sacrifice his intellectual or scientific integrity to suppo t
an established position, but rather, he is asked to lay out al
sides of a case indicating the level of confidence he has in
the deductions he makes from the facts at hand. Objectivity
simply must continue to be the hallmark of our intelligence
effort.
My second point of emphasis would be to ensure that the
work of the intelligence community is conducted lawfully. I
believe with my deepest conviction, that the greatest strength
we have as a world power is our moral dedication to the rights
of the individual. If any part of our government is perceived
to function Outside of this fundamental American tenet, it can
only bring discredit on the whole. I believe that it is the
solemn duty of every agency of the United States Government to
protect the constitutional rights of our citizens.
also believe that there are valid national secrets
and recognize that the Director of Central Intelligence is
charged by law to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods. Thus, though American
citizens can rightfully expect their government to operate
openly, there must be a relatively small amount of information
and activity which is kept secret. As long as representative
groups of elected officials such as this Committee and the
Chief Executive are kept informed,, and as long as they can act
for the society in regulating the secret information and
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activities, I think that the difficult balance between necessa y
secrecy and an open, democratic society can be maintained.
From the discussions I have enjoyed over the past two
and a half weeks, it appears to me that this Committee has
taken great and successful strides in improving communications
between the Congress and the intelligence community. I fully
support this progress and philosophy. Within the limits of
the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch, I
would intend to do my part in ensuring that Congress remains
a full and knowledgeable partner.
Similarly, I believe that it is incumbent upon the
intelligence community to make a serious and continuing effort
to avoid the overclassification of information and even to
attempt selectively to publish unclassified information which
is of high interest and value to our citizens.
Even though the various disclosures of questionable
intelligence activities during the past several years were
quite necessary, they have had an adverse impact on the
reputation of our intelligence community. A third area of
emphasis which I would sugOst would be to continue to rebuild
this reputation. The intelligence community is, by and large,
composed of well-qualified, hard-working individuals who are
as dedicated to our national ideals as are any of us. As in
any organization, they need a clear understanding of what is
expected of them, and a clear recognition of the importance of
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the work that they would do. I intend to make the realization
of these goals my next highest priority should I be confirmed
in this office.
To achieve this, we must continue the work of restoring
confidence in the credibility of the intelligence effort, and
this can only be done by actions, not by words. Redundant
programs, parochial causes, needless controversy within the
community must be eliminated. Everyone's full effort must be
turned to producing intelligence information and estimates of
the highest quality. That product will measure our intelli-
gence community's worth. And coupled with good communication
with the Congress, maximum permissible disclosure to the
public, we should be able to create that measure of confidence
and credibility which is vital to a successful intelligence
program.
There is much work ahead, and if I am confirmed by the
Senate, I would be excited by the challenge. I have been in
the service of our nation for 30 years, and I view this appoin
ment as another opportunity to continue that service in an
area of special importance today.
Since you have my biography, I would not want to detail
further my experience in managing large organizations or in th
analysis and rationalization of defense programs.
I would like to conclude simply by reiterating that I
do respect the dedicated professionals in both our civilian
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and military components of the intelligence organizations. I
hope to encourage them to realize their full capabilities, to
be innovative, questioning and objective in their approach to
all problems. At the same time, I believe that I also under-
stand the need for honest, rigidly accurate intelligence
assessments if they are to be useful to the Congress and to
the President.
If I am confirmed, I would work to re-establish the
full credibility of the community's work, to ensure that a
worthwhile contribution is made in support of our decision
making process, and to require that the gathering and
dissemination of intelligence for the United States is consis-
tent with the ideals upon which this country was founded.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, I would be
proud to be the Director of Central Intelligence, , and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to work
closely with this Committee in helping to provide this country
with an intelligence service second to none.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral Turner.
Before proceeding with the questioning by the Committee,
may I administer the oath, sir?
Admiral Turner. Please.
The Chairman. Do you swear that the testimony you are ab
ut
to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the tru h?
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Admiral Turner. I do.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Because of the interest shown in this nomination, the
Chair would like to once again institute the ten minute
rule, and so I will begin with the first ten minutes.
Admiral Turner, as you know, one of the purpose of the
creation of the CIA in 1947 was to ensure that United States
intelligence would be independent of military control.
Although the DOD related intelligence represents the
largest part of the annual U.S. intelligence budget, I believe
that purpose still continues, and so the question ,I ask, sir,
is whether you might be able to better serve the intent of
civilian control were you to resign your commission prior to
becoming the Director of Central Intelligence?
How do you react to this issue, sir?
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral Turner. Mr. Chairman I come to this nomination
as an active military officer. The law provides that an
active officer may serve as the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. In fact .there have l?een nine -- there have been eleven
military officers who have served either as Director or Deputy
Director. Nine of them served while on active duty.- Seven of
those nine returned to military service after completing their
duty in Central Intelligence.
Having thoroughly enjoyed serving my country in active
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military service for 30 years, I am anxious not to foreclose
the possibility I may follow in the footsteps of those seven.
The Chairman. Do you perceive any conflict of interest
in your serving with your commission?
Admiral Turner. I do not, sir. To begin with, I am
charged, or would be charged by law not to accept any responsi
bility to or carry out any responsibility with the military
services while serving as the Director of Central Intelligence,
and I would intend to fulfill that law, not only in its letter
but in its spirit.
The Chairman. Have you discussed this relationship with
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
The Chairman. Or with the Department of the Navy?
Admiral Turner. I have discussed it with the Secretary o
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I believe tha
we have a thorough understanding, and I think that is the leve
on which I will be communicating with the Department of Defens
primarily.
The Chairman. What are the thoughts of the President on
this issue, sir?
Admiral Turner. The President has told 'me that it is
his strong desire that I remain on active duty.
The Chairman. If you retain your military commission whi e
serving as the Director of Central Intelligence, your Deputy
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Director must be a civilian.
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Do you have in mind as to who should be the Deputy
Director?
Admiral Turner. I ;am very pleased with the incumbent
Acting Director who came from the position of Deputy Director,
but I would not feel it appropriate at this time, having such
a short acquaintanceship with him and with the Community to
commit myself irrevocably to maintain him in that position. Bt
I am pleased with him and I would certainly want to consider
him as a candidate, among others.
The Chairman. You are speaking of Mr. Henry Knoche.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Now, as a senior ranking military officer,
I believe you are entitled to personal staff. Do you intend
to maintain this personal staff while serving as Director of
Central Intelligence?
Admiral Turner. I have asked the Chief of Naval Operatio s
and obtained his permission to maintain four officers as a
personal staff.
The Chairman. And will these men be drawn from Naval
personnel?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Senate Resolution 400, the Resolution
that created this committee, expresses the sense of the Senate
that the head of any department or agency of the United States
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involved in any intelligence activity should furnish any
information or document in their possession, custody or contro
whenever requested by this Committee with respect to any
matter within the Committee's jurisdiction.
' Do you intend to honor this request of the Committee with
regard to any information requested which is within the juris-
diction of this Committee?
Admiral Turner. Within the accepted prerogatives of the
executive branch, I certainly intend to do that, and it is
my pleasant impression that the arrangements that currently
exist between this Committee and the intelligence community
are working well to the satisfaction of both the Committee
and the community, and I would pledge myself, sir, to continue
that spirit of cooperation in every way.
The Chairman. I am glad you brought that up, and I would
like to say publicly that as Chairman of this Committee -- and
I believe I speak for the members of this Committee -- I have
been extremely pleased with the cooperation that we have
experienced with all of the agencies of the intelligence
community. They. have been Most forthcoming and forthright and
open with us, and I look forward to the. same type of relation-
ship with you, sir.
My first question on Congressional oversight related to
whether you will honor our requests for information.
Will you also, without a request, advise us as to informa ion
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which you feel we should know about?
Admiral Turner. I feel that is an absolute responsibilit
sir, not only to your Committee, but to the entire Congress.
I think that the intelligence community should be acutely
aware of the activities of all the Committees of the Congress,
and anxious to offer intelligence information that may be of
assistance to any of them.
The Chairman. This Senate Resolution also expresses the
sense of the Senate that each department and agency of the
United States involved in intelligence activities should repor
to this Committee immediately upon discovery of any and all
intelligence activities which may constitute violations of the
conStitutional rights of any person, violations of law, or
violations of executive orders, Presidential directives, or
departmental or agency rules or regulations. The Resolution
further provides that each department and agency should also
report to this Committee what actions have been taken or are
expected to be taken with respect to any such violations which
occur.
Will you pledge to mak such reports promptly to this
Committee with respect to any and all such violations?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. There are established proce-
dures and regulations within the executive branch for reportin
such improper activities, and I pledge myself to follow those
absolutely and completely.
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The Chairman. One of the major problems in maintaining
the necessary secrecy has been the proliferation of Committees
and members of the Congress involved in intelligence activitie
I believe at one time the Director of Central Intelligence
theoretically had to call upon about a dozen committees.
Do you have any thoughts on this?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I would draw a distinction
between information concerning sources and methods of intelli-
gence collection and covert operations, and information of
an intelligence nature. It is very important that we maintain
and that is the legal responsibility of the Director of Centra
Intelligence to maintain the secrecy of our sources and method
of intelligence, and of course, covert operations must be
dealt with very discretely because people's lives may be at
stake as well as other great matters of importance for our
country.
I would think it would be very desirable if the dissemina
tion to the Congress in these categories of sources and method
and covert operations could be limited to a committee in each
of the houses of. Congress tlilat could assume responsibility for
adequate dissemination and adeqUate measures of control else-
where. I don't think there should be any restriction at all
on the number of committees who are given the product of our
intelligence effort as it applies to their work.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. My time is up.
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? Senator Goldwater?
Senator Goldwater. Thank you.
Admiral, you have the dual_x-oleApiTg,g9r of Central
Intelligence and Director of the CIA.
Do you feel that these two positions should be separated
and headed by two individuals?
'Admiral Turner. T....do not at this time, Senator, but I am
certainly open to looking at that suggestion. I have in the
last couple of weeks here heard arguments on both sides of the
fence, but I am really unwilling to jump down at this time
one way or the other.
Senator Goldwater. Will you keep us posted as to your
thinking in this matter?
Admiral Turner. I certainly will.
Senator Goldwater. As Director of Central Intelligence,
you control only a small percentage of the intelligence budget
The remaining is mostly controlled by the Secretary of
Defense.
How can the Director of the entire intelligence community
operate effectively when sorrone else controls most of the
money?
Admiral Turner. If I might, sir, say that the executive
order of February 18th, 1976, which created the Committee on
Foreign Intelligence, I believe gives that committee consider-
able authority over 100 percent of the intelligence budget, an
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aremir
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I as Director of Central Intelligence, if confirmed, would be
the Chairman of that Committee.
I think that is a very important tool. It is one that ha
been exercised in this last budget preparation for the first
time. The preliminary view I have had of that is that it was
reasonably effective in so doing. It is possible that the
budgetary authority of the Director of Central Intelligence
might be strengthened, but again, I feel it would be prelimina
for me to pass such a judgment.
Senator Goldwater. Thank you.
As Director of Central Intelligence, which includes the
operations of the DIA and others, you have a responsibility f
them but not the authority over them.
Do you think this would be a problem, and how would you
handle it?
Admiral Turner. I don't think it need be a problem. It
certainly can be. I think it is a matter of good leadership
and particularly persuasive leadership. There are tools, such
as the budget power that I just mentioned. There is provision
in the executive order I described also for the establishment
of priorities by the Director of Central Intelligence. All of
these things have to be worked out on a coopbrative basis, and
there may be some need for strengthening the law or the execut ve
order in addition.
I think it can be done, and particularly with men of good
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will, and I am very impressed that both Secretary Brown and
Secretary Duncan are men of good will, and I intend to coopera e
with them in every way.
Senator Goldwater. Thank you.
That's all I have, Mx. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Bayh?
Senator Bayh. Admiral, I want to add my welcoming voice
to those that you have already heard.
Let me go directly to one of the critical questions, it
seems to me, that past CIA Directors have had to confront, and
which I assume you might be forced to confront yourself. I
say this in no way with the intention of suggesting that eithe
you or the present Commander in Chief will be tempted or
succumb to temptation to do something that you feel is basical y
wrong, but individuals differ in their appraisal of factual
situations and legal guidelines.
You-have to have the trust of the President of the United
States to fulfill this role, trust that you will do your job
right and report to him honestly. Also, it seems to me, the
country has a right to demand a degree of independence so
that where your judgment conflicts with that of the President
,you will have the capacity to say no, Mr. President. As
past Director Helms has mentioned, it is difficult to say no
to the President of the United States.
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I guess what I want to know, Admiral, is if you are
Director of the CIA, and your assessment of the situation is
that something should not be done and'the President thinks it
should be done and countermands your order, are you prepared t
.say no, Mr. President, and if you say no 'and he continues to
say yes, what alternatives are available to you, and what
alternatives are you.willing to pursue?
Admiral Turner. The issue in my mind, Senator Bayh,
would be whether I viewed this as a disagreement with the
President on the proper course of action, or whether I felt
that the President was proposing an action which contravened
my.sense of morals and ethics or the law of the country.
Surely if I just think the President's course of action is not
as wise as another one, but is perfectly legal and moral and
ethical, I feel a responsibility to make my views known to
him, but I am not a policy maker if I am confirmed as the
DCI, I am a provider of intelligence.
If, however, I am put in a position of being asked to
execute something I feel is immoral, unethical or illegal,
.I believe I have only one Option, and.that is to make my
point extremely forcefully to the President of the United
States, perhaps calling upon the new Intelligence Oversight
'Board for counsel, advice and support, and then, if I am
.unable to reconcile, that difference with the President, simply
to resign, and I would be prepared to do so. I have discussed
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this with President Carter, but I would not be sitting here?
today, sir, voluntarily if I thought there was any possibility
that I would be confronted by this situation by this President.
Senator Bayh. As I say, I don't anticipate that possibili y,
but we have been confronted with some rather unusual circumsta ces
?
in the past, and I think that is a question a lot of American
people are asking themselves? Have you explored in your own
mind the possibility of the alternative of reporting those
significant differences to this Committee?
Admiral Turner. Yes, I have explored that, sir, and I
do not believe that I would report such differences to this
Committee. I believe that as long as I am employed in the
executive branch of the government, my loyalty is to the
President of the United States. I believe that if every
member of the executive branch who disagreed with the Presiden
went to the press or went to the Congress independently, we
would have anarchy in the executive branch.
Senator Bayh. Well, Admiral, if you will excuse me,
we are not talking here, again, about your definition with
differences, simple differences. We are talking about -- and
I accept your definition, that petty differences, even
differences on policy, you have to follow the Commander in
Chief, but if you are talking about a President who is embarki
on something that is clearly illegal, clearly unconstitutional
don't You have a responsibility not to go to the press or not
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to go to Congress generally, but to go to one of those
committees that might be in a position to change that policy
or say wait a minute, Mr. President, let's rethink this?
Admiral Turner. I would come to you, sir, but after
having 'resigned my office.
Senator Bayh. That's a fair assessment.
Let me ask you to go again, and here I guess we are talki
about hindsight and hoping that that ci-1 be it's normal 20/20,
and keep us from getting into situations that we have had
before. This last session, the Congress was considering the
matter of how we can limit if not totally avoid the invasion
of individual rights, civil liberties. Our Committee and the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 3197 which tried to
strike a balance between the right of individuals to be pro-
tected and secure under our Constitution, and their right to
be secure from foreign invasion and this kind of danger.
Could you give us your judgment of this kind of legisla-
tion? We were dealing in that area specifically with limiting
wiretap legislation. We were trying to provide the same
protection in the foreign intelligence gathering area that now
exists as far as the application of electronic surveillance to
domestic matters.
I would like to know whether you would support our effort
to try to put reasonable guidelines, protections, the use of
a warrant, not only on electronic surveillance but other invas
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such as surreptitions entry, the mail openings and the other
2
invasions that we are painfully aware of that had taken place
in the past.
5
Admiral Turner. I certainly would support those efforts,
Senator. I am not prepared at this early time to make specifi
6
comment on specific provisions of the legislation, or which of
7
them are better served in the executive order as some of those
8
you mentioned already are, or better served in legislation, b
9
I think the intelligence community, as I briefly mentioned in
10
my opening remarks, needs a real sense of direction to be give
.'11
to it by the Congress and by the Executive Branch so that
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people know the rules within which they are required to work.
13
Senator Bayh. You see nothing inconsistent with doing
14
your job of collecting information necessary to protect the
15
country and protecting the rights of American citizens by
16
requiring that warrants be used?
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May I ask you to expand this to apply also to American
18
citizens who are abroad? There seems to be a rather unique
19 distinction where if you are an American citizen at home your
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rights can be protected, bliit if you are an American citizen
21
abroad, there is significant leeway, so far at least the way
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the intelligence community has looked at this.
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24
Admiral Turner. On the first part of your question, yes,
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the individual and conducting secret operations, but I don't
think that that means that we should 'not spell out reasonably
explicitly how we are going to draw the line between those
conflicting interests. That is the whole problem of conductin
intelligence in a democratic and an open society. And each
instance is going to be a judgment call, and some guidelines
laid down by the Congress and the President can be useful in
making those decisions.
As far as protection of Americans overseas from invasion
of their proper liberties and rights, I believe here again we
must recognize that although it is more difficult,overseas
because we are not in full control of the situation, we must
extend to Americans there the protection of the Constitution
to the degree at all possible.
And we must conduct our activities over there in accordan e
with American law.
Senator Bayh. I guess the key lynchpin of what we are
trying to do is in most instances apply the same standard, the
same proof on intelligence agencies in foreign surveillance
and gathering area that is now applied domestically, which
basically has been the criminal standard, and in the legislati n
which we passed through this Committee, in all areas save one,
we did apply the reasonable cause standard, the criminal
standard, to the foreign area. The one area of exception was
where we could find someone who we could say had reasonable
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cause to believe, and could nail down he or she was on the
payroll of a foreign intelligence system involved in clandesti e
activity. Given that one roughly minor limitation, do you see
any problems? Would you support asking a Federal judge for a
warrant before this kind of activity could be initiated as
fax as American citizens are concerned here and abroad?
Admiral Turner. I am really not prepared to jump into
that degree of detail, I am afraid, sir. I can just guess tha
'there must be considerable problems in doing that kind of thin
overseas with a judge in the United States in a timely fashion
and. I am not opposed to it, but I am not ready to endorse it
at this point because I simply haven't been into it deeply
enough?
Senator Bayh. Are you -- would you support that as far
as intelligence activities in the foreign area as they applied
here at home?
Admiral Turner. I think we should conduct our intelligen e
activities in foreign areas in as close a manner to those in
the United States as we possibly can.
Senator Bayh. Does this include your support of an
effort to require a Federal judge to give permission before
electronic surveillance and mail opening and surreptitious
entry can be conducted?
Admiral Turner. I beg your indulgence, sir. I am simply
not that familiar with either the problems that that would
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create or how that would be executed to pass that judgment her
but I will certainly look into it with all dispatch and be bac
to you if I am confirmed for this office.
The Chairman. Your time is up.
Senator Bayh. Let me make one observation, Mr. Chairman.
If the Admiral is confirmed, he will soon find out,
The Chairman. Senator Mathias.
Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief statement
which I request be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The prepared statement of Senator Mathias follows:)
COMMITTEE INSERT
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Senator Mathias. Admiral, again I congratulate you. It
is a pleasure to see you here today.
Admiral Turner. Thank you.
Senator Mathias. You have expressed your opinion that
Congress should be a knowledgeable partner within the limits
of the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch,
and I certainly agree with the first part of that statement,
that Congress should be a knowledgeable partner, but if we
are to exercise oversight, we have to have'access to knowledge,
full access to knowledge.
So I am wondering if you could tell us what your concept
of the constitutional prerogatives may be which could in some
way impinge upon this Committee's need for information.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I think there are two that
come to my mind. One is I believe that the deliberations on
policy decision making within the executive branch are not
necessarily or well transmitted to the Congress and are not a
necessary part of the information the Congress needs.
Secondly, I also had in mind in that phrase that the
Director of Central Intelligence'does have a statutory
responsibility to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of sourc s
and methods of intelligence, and it seems to me that there are
some very delicate details of covert intelligence operations
which the Committee may not want to hear.
It is my understanding that this, as I said earlier to
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the Chairman, is an area that has been working well in the
present arrangements, and I would hope to certainly keep it
that way.
Senator Mathias. Well, I would say to the Admiral that
that phrase "may not want to hear" is a little bit of a
sore phrase around here.
Admiral Turner. Sorry.
Senator Mathias. There are some very senior members of
the Senate, no longer -- I can't think of anyone still here --
but who used to employ that phrase: "I don't want to hear it,
"I don't want to know," and there are a lot of things in this
life that we don't want to hear and don't want to know, but it
seems to me that we have some constitutional responsibility to
know and to help bear the burden, and I don't think that it
should be a criteria of withholding of information that it is
something that this Committee would not want to know.
Admiral Turner. I apologize for using a phrase that coul
be interpreted in several ways. I did not mean it as a part
of the traditional doctrine of plausible deniability. I don't
mean that at all.. I simply mean that I feel a great sense of
responsibility for the protection of, say, individuals who are.
involved an covert intelligence operations and whose lives may
well depend on their being kept secret. I would think in a
case like that what I am talking about is being sure the
Committees of the Congress are advised fully of the extent and
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nature of the operations, but perhaps not the detail of such
sensitive significance that would not be germane to their
making a decision on the case.
Senator Mathias. You are not asserting this as a right
to withhold information.
Admiral Turner, No, sir, I am not. I think this can be
amicably worked out between the Committee and the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Senator Mathias. When you were kind enough to come and
see me a couple of weeks ago, we discussed a very sensitive
question of conflicting loyalties that might someday confront
you. I hope they never will. I hope that we in this country
will all be moving with such common purpose that you won't
have a sense of conflicting loyalty, but you have spent your
professional career as a member of the Navy, you hold very hig
rank and very high responsibilities in the Navy, and in those
circumstances, .the orders of the Commander in Chief, the Presi
of the United States are unquestioned.
Do you have any compunction about revealing to this
Committee information it needs to know, even though it might
be the wish of a President -- I *am not talking about the
incumbent President, but a President who might clearly indicat
to you that you are not to communicate that information to the
Committee?
Admiral Turner. As long as in my personal view the
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Committee had a lawful right to that information, ?that is,
it was not in the categories we have just discussed, sir, I
wotld not.have any such hesitation.
Senator Mathias. But if a President were to lay that
upon you as a positive injunction, how would you resolve that?
Admiral Turner. I would do as I 'discussed with Senator
Bayh a few minutes ago. I would go to the President and make
my position absolutely clear to him. I would not come to you
before 'I had done so. And if we could not resolve that, my
alternative is only to leave my position and resign.
Sdnator Mathias. Admiral, do you draw a line between
national intelligence and tactical intelligence?
Admiral Turner. There certainly is a line, Senator.
The line, I believe, is becoming fuzzier. The tactical intelli
.gence used to be the man on patrol. Now it may also be an
overhead reconnaissance system controlled from thousands of
miles away from the squad leader who would have sent the man
out on patrol. There are still, of course, the patrols, the
individual reconnaissance aircraft controlled by the local
tactical commander, and those, I believe, the commander must
retain his control over. But we are going to have to in the
near future rethink this definition of the dividing line
between national and tactical intelligence and how we best
apportion those collection assets that can serve both purposes
simultaneously. It is a difficult issue.
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Senator Mathias. In view of the fact that the tactical
intelligence removes them from the DCI's management, have you
thought out and are you prepared now to give us some idea of
the guidelines that you yourself would like to see applied?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, I am not anywhere near that, b
I think the definition may have to go to something like the
source of the control of the intelligence asset. But it would
be foolhardy of me to try to jump in and say I had reached a
conclusion in this short a time.
Senator Mathias. Having in mind your previous concern f
protection of sources and methods, would you be inclined to
provide on a regular basis to this Committee counterintelligen e
information about hostile activities of foreign intelligence
and foreign security services which might be of some use to th
Congress in developing a comprehensive national policy?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Again in each case we have
to make a difficult decision as to how much of the detail is
needed for your proper oversight responsibilities and how much
of it is very, very sensitive and needs to be protected for
the legal responsibilities 'F.f. the DCI.
Senator Mathias. Well, to give the Committee at least a
sense of the level at which these activities are taking place
the kind of direction that they may have or the kind of
impact that they could have on policies that we should be
either adopting or policies that perhaps we ought to alter?
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Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, that gives me no problem.
Senator Mathias. What level of priority do you give in
your mind.to counterintelligence activities? Do you feel that
they ought to be a major function of the intelligence communit
that cdunterintelligence deserves to be treated on a level wi
other functions of the community, or do you think it is a less :r
concern?
Admiral Turner. I don't know that I have really made a
judgment as to where it fits with the collection, the analysis
covert operations activities. It certainly seems to me a
very important one, but it seems equally important that it
be strictly in accordance with law which my understanding is
that Counterintelligence by the intelligence agencies, particu arl:
the CIA, is an overseas responsibility and the FBI a national
responsibility.
Senator Mathias. Would you plan to give this some person
attention as you shake down in this particular period?
Admiral Turner. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Senator Mathias. And make your own evaluation as to
exactly the relative prior4y that it ought to receive?
? Admiral Turner. Yes, indeed.
Senator Mathias. And will you communicate your judgments
to the Committee when you have reached them?
Admiral Turner. I certainly will.
The Chairman. Your time is up, Senator.
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Senator Stevenson?
Senator Stevenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I would begin by following up on some of the
questions raised already by the Chairman and by Senator
Mathias.
Effective Congressional oversight is a recent phenomenon
and. a little-understood phenomenon, and I say effective
because this Committee is kept informed, imperfectly, but we
are continuously informed, and misunderstood or little-underst od
because we are informed in secret.
Now, perhaps it is possible for all of us today to
relief some of the anxieties that I believe you alluded to
earlier about intelligence activities by being a little more
specific.
Now, I recognize that you can't go very far without
touching upon sensitive subjects.
Will you inform us in advance of covert operations?
Admiral Turner. I understand the sense of the Senate in
Resolution 400 with regard to advance notification, and I woul
anticipate no difficulty in(making every effort to comply with
the sense of that resolution, and in complying strictly with
the law in the Hughes-Ryan amendment.
I would think it would be an extremely rare occasion when
it was not possible to provide information on covert activitie
in advance. .
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Senator Stevenson. The Hughes-Ryan amendment speaks
of timely notification, and it has been the source of some
confusion. The resolution to which you referred to speaks
of advance notification.
I 'think that answer is satisfactory, and I think we can
assume that all of your answers are subject to your earlier
remarks about your relationship with. the President.
In addition to the extent it is possible, advance notice
of covert operation, will you likewise inform us in advance of
collection operations which carry high political risks?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevenson. And I think you mentioned this
earlier --
Admiral Turner. And again -- I'm sorry, sir -- again
with the same provisions.
Senator Stevenson. And qualifications.
Admiral Turner. There is always that possibility that
something comes up in the middle of the night where a decision
absolutely has to be made right now, and that is the kind of
thing I have in mind of not wanting to be pinned down
absolutely.
Senator Stevenson. We can't expect more of you than is
.possible, and we are not unfamiliar with such situations.
Senator Mathias. If the Senator would yield, our Chairma
sleeps lightly.
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Senator Stevenson. In fact, he has a beeper which wakes
him up.
(General laughter.)
Senator Stevenson. The same question with respect to
improper or unlawful activities which come to your attention --
this is after the fact -- you will inform us?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, through the normal or the
established procedures for this.
Senator Stevenson. And our mandate makes specific refererce
to, in this connection, to security problems, breaches of
security, unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information.
You will again inform us, and to the extent it is possible, of
your own knowledge, of such actions?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevenson. Of unlawful activities.
And how do you feel in this connection about public
disclosure of aggregate budget figures for the intelligence
community?
Admiral Turner. My inclination at this time is that we
should publish an aggregate budget figure for the total
intelligence community, but I hive not, sir? had an opportunity
to hear all of the arguments on the contrary side, and I feel
that it would be imprudent to make a final judgment until
I have heard people out. I know there are certainly those who
.dx) not agree with that point of view.
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Senator Stevenson. Now, this Committee is assigning
a new Congressional emphasis in connection with oversight to
the quality of American intelligence, its collection, its
analysis, production, and its communication to appropriate
policy makers. In addition to the disclosures to the Congress
that we have already discussed, will you view the Cbngress
and its appropriate agencies as a consumer, that is to say,
undertake to bring to the attention of Congress information
available to you which is relevant to deliberations in the
Congress?
This has not happened in the past, and yet this is the
policy making branch of the government. Can we feel that you
will make an effort to inform us of relevant information that
will help us in our legislative committees make sound policy?
Admiral Turner. Absolutely, sir. I think that is a
responsibility of the intelligence community, and I think that
one of the ways to restore the credibility and confidence in
the intelligence community is to do just that.
'Senator Stevenson. Now, there is some feeling in the
-Congress, a feeling which I share, that intelligence, both in
the collection and production, has been too narrowly focused
in the past, and that new priorities are required, priorities
wh:Lch attach more importance to economic and political
matters in this interdependent and rapidly changing world.
In this connection, the quality of intelligence, what
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in your opinion are the principal deficiencies in the intelli-
gence community, the principal problems which you face?
? Admiral Turner. I think the principal problem that conce ns
me, from the preliminary view f have had of the intelligence
community, is ensuring that all of the shreds of intelligence
?
which are available, whether they are in ERDA or Treasury or
FBI or DIA anywhere else, are brought together and synthesize
so that we take advantage of all that is available to us, and
so that we are sure that the President and the Congress are gee-
ting the most balanced view of the situation that we can possi ly
construct and the operation is so immense, there are so
many different interests involved, that I don't think that is
an easy task, but it is one that I think must be continually
approached. It has been in the past, and I intend to continue
efforts in that direction.
The Chairman. Your time is up, sir.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join in the congratulations to you,
Admiral Turner, for your selection, and congratulate the
President for having chosen you.. It has been my privilege to
have been associated with you for many years, and I must say
that every job you have done, you have just been superb.
Admiral Turner. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. I would like to ask one question.
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Under the 1947 Act, as I read it, it talks about the
Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Now, it seems to me we come down in this modern era to
a dilemma, a dilemma in that I think Congress and the nation
feel that they were burned by overclassification, by what
were considered improper actions in the intelligence community
and therefore it is perfectly proper for those people to have
made these disclosures, yet -- and now we have a torrent of
books and news articles and scoops and even stealing classifie
documents. And we don't as a nation seem to be able to do
anything about this.
Do you see it as one of your responsibilities, if you
consider this a problem, to come to Congress and press Congres
to get on with the enacting of some laws that can somehow
handle the situation, or do you think it is just up to Congres
to take the lead in this area?
Admiral Turner. I certainly think that the Director of
Central Intelligence is charged with a very difficult task
here under the existing ability or inability to prosecute
people who violate these trusts of security information.
And I would be very happy to endeavor to study this to the
degree of being able to make recommendations to the Congress,
thcugh of course it is the ultimate responsibility of
Congress to decide whether a law is needed here.
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Senator Chafee. Well, I am not suggesting there is any
easy answer. I think it is a dilemma, particularly based on
recent history, but certainly as we go along, I would be
interested in, first of all, whether you have considered the
problem. as you proceed in your activity, should you be
confirmed, which I certainly hope you will be, and then the
burden falls on Congress, it seems to me, to carry the ball
from there based on the recommendations that we look forward
to you to come forward with.
Admiral Turner. All right, sir.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Hathaway?
Senator Hathaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a brief statem nt
be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
(The prepared statement of Senator Hathaway follows:)
COMMITTEE INSERT
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Senator Hathaway. I would like to pursue the covert
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activities questions that have been asked you. You indicated
that you are, of course, in favor of pre-notification of any
covert activities. Would you go a step further and advocate a
pre-clearance by the Committee so that no covert activity coul
commence until the Committee had given its okay, within a
certain length of time, say, a week or ten days?
Admiral Turner. Senator, I think that in my position as
the executor here for the executive branch, it is my responsi-
bility to comply with the law of the Congress, and if the
Congress wishes to make that the law, certainly. Otherwise,
the resolution of the degree of approval that the Congress
is going to have over these must be something taken between
the President and the Congress, I believe.
Senator Hathaway. Well, would you support such legislati e
action on behalf of the Congress?
Admiral Turner. I would personally have some qualms here
again as to the issues of timeliness that I raised with
Senator Stevenson previously, because it seems to me there are
practical problems involved. But I surely have not had the
time to study this in enough depth to answer you with a
definitive yes or no. I will certainly look into it further.
Senator Hathaway. And how about the Congress establish-
ing certain guidelines with respect to covert activities, suc
as ones that we don't think should be carried out: to-wit,
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assassinations of any kind, and other categories, whether we
are going to approve influencing elections, payments to foreig
dignitaries or whatnot, do you think that you would welcome
Congressional guidelines along that line?
Admiral Turner. I would, sir. Which and how many is
another issue that I just am not prepared at this time to be
specific on.
Senator Hathaway. What about the paramilitary operations
_
of the CIA? What are your thoughts on that? Should that be
discontinued?
Admiral Turner. I do not think that we should deprive th
country of that possibility. I think in this particular time
,in our history, the possibility of wanting to rely on
paramilitary operations is very low.
Senator Hathaway. Let me ask you some questions in regar
to classification. You mentioned something in your statement,
that you would welcome a classification legislation from the
Congress.
Would this be along the lines of establishing limited
authority -- because I understand now that almost everybody
in every agency has a rubber stamp that he can stamp a documen
with, with the result that we have a lot of documents that
have been classified that shouldn't be classified, and many
that have been classified for many, many years without being
reclassified, and there has been a movement on in Congress to
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both limit the authority, to limit the number of classificatio
and to limit the duration that a document could remain classi-
fied, not that it wouldn't be subject reclassification, but
at least every year or two years at the most, it would be
subject to re-examination.
Would you support legislation along that line?
Admiral Turner. I am not sure whether I believe that
legislation or executive directives -- and there are, of cours
directives today that require many of the things that you have
just suggested, sir -- is the best way to handle this. My
feeling is that with regulations and legislation ,it is going
to be very, very difficult to curb the overclassification
problem.
My particular approach to it, as Director of Central
Intelligence, were I approved, would be to conduct periodic
reviews of what information can be gleaned from existing
secure sources and classified information
and deliberately
,
either declassify it, or if it is unclassified extract it.
We often find a document with one secret paragraph in
it and ten pages --
Senator Hathaway.. Right.
Admiral Turner. -- of unclassified information, much of
which is of value to the public as well as to the Congress.
I would like --
Senator. Hathaway. When you say periodic, do you mean at
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least annually?
Admiral Turner. Well, yes, sir, but I mean, I would look
to-taking particular subjects that are of current importance t
the country and making sure that we are not withholding informa
tion that would improve the quality of public debate on them,
unnecessarily withholding it. So I think it would be an ad
hoc thing in many way. What is really important that the
public know that we have today and can share with them?
Senator Hathaway. Now, with respect to organization, you
mentioned in answer. to Senator Mathias' question the knotty
problem we have separating national from tactical,intelligence
and I don't recall whether you came to any conclusion on wheth
this Committee should have jurisdiction over all intelligence,
regardless of whether it is classified as tactical or national
or whatever way it is classified, but should we be establishin
the budget authorizations for, say, tactical intelligence?
Admiral Turner. I think that I would respectfully like
to stay out of the crunch between you and the Armed Services
Committee on this one, sir. I think that is as difficult an
issue as deciding where Defense and Central Intelligence divid
their jurisdiction over the two intelligence activities.
Senator Hathaway. We could use your recommendation,
provided it is favorable.
(General laughter.)
Senator Hathaway. There has been some talk, too, of
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consolidating our intelligence activities rather than having
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each/ the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and so forth, have
their own intelligence arms, that we have just one intelligenc
unit, whatever you may call it, and each one would simply
refer to that one for whatever information they might need.
Do you think that is a sensible step to reorganize the
intelligence community that way?
Admiral Turner. I think we must look at a number of
alternatives for reorganization, but I think we must at the
same time be very clear that we cannot so centralize that we
?
in any way make it too difficult for dissenting, differing
views to come forward. We must not ever think that somebody's
prescient in the intelligence view. We must let different
evaluations come out, and I think in any reorganization, a
careful compromise has got to be made between centralization
in ?order to effect necessary control and efficiency, and
decentralization to be sure that there are differing views.
Senator Hathaway. Along that line, do you favor maintain ng
or continuing this Team B approach that was used recently
with respect to .evaluating our posture internationally?
Admiral Turner. I believe that there is a place for
outsiders to evaluate what is being done inside the intelligen e
community. I believe there is certainly a place for a wide,
divergence of biases, attitudes, opinions to be brought to bea
on any intelligence problem. I don't think you necessarily ha e.
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to go outside to get the wide variety of attitudes and opinion
but I think that there_ are good opportunities for something
like the Team B-Team A operation, but I would not necessarily
endorse that particular method of having done it. But
particularly --
Senator Hathaway. But the concept of having some other
independent group evaluate the data and come up with its
conclusions you are in favor of.,
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, very much so.
Senator Hathaway. What about disclosure of the intellige
budget?
Do you have any views on that,whether we should disclose
the total figure, or detailed disclosure, or just what dis-
closure do you think is necessary to keep the public informed?
Admiral Turner. My inclination is to disclose the one
total and go no further, but I mentioned earlier that I am
reluctant to make that a commitment to you until I have-heard
more of the opposing views.
Senator Hathaway. Fine.
Thank you very much, Admiral.
Admiral Turner. Thank you, sir.
Senator Hathaway. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar?
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Turner, do you
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believe that the armed services have traditionally resisted
attempts at oversight and Consolidation in the intelligence
area, and if so, how do you presume to try to overcome that
resistance?
Admiral Turner. I don't think there is any bureaucracy
.in the world that hasn't resisted its collapse into some
more central organization, and I think one has to overcome
that resistance by a combination of persuasive leadership,
by a combination of encouraging the executive to issue the
proper. executive orders, and working with the Congress to
ensure that the adequate legislation is there to effect whatev
changes may be necessary.
Senator Lugar. Earlier on you tried to reflect and
answer this question, but let me pursue for just a moment the
problem that might be analogous to that which faced George
Bush when he came before this Committee, and because George
Bush was a politician, it was suggested that he ought not to
move on to further office in the political realm, at least
not too rapidly after his service.
What sort of problems do you see in terms of your naval
1
career, granted the desire to continue with the commission and
to move on in that service, and given very difficult decisions
that you may need to make with regard to the other armed
services, or very unpopular decisions with regard to future
colleagues or those who might be in command over you when you
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resume that career?
Admiral Turner. Senator, throughout my career to date,
I have felt it was always necessary to transfer one's loyalty
completely to the job at hand and let the future worry about
itself,. and I am 'convinced in this instance if, having
transferred my loyalty, if I am approved, to the President
of the United States, to whom I would report directly, if I
ever showed a subsidiary loyalty to the Navy, to the Departmen
of Defense, the President of the United States would detect
that very quickly, and my usefulness to him and to the
country would soon diminish rapidly.
Senator Lugar. Will you have unrestricted access to
President Carter, and have you discussed that access or some
modus vivendi for reporting with him?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. We have discussed it. He has
assured me that I have direct access to him, and we have or
are working out an arrangement for regular meetings between
the two of us.
Senator Lugar. Let me carry on a point that you made
earlier on which I am certain is the right course to follow
in the event that after a discussion with President Carter
176u came to a very severeJdisagreement or the constitutionalit
of an action, or its illegality, and therefore you resigned
and then informed this Committee. Still, as a practical matte
a resignation under those circumstances of course is bound to
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lead to questions by friends and foes alike, not only of the
President and yourself, but of this country as to what is goin
on, what soNt of problems are involved. There is no easy
way to make certain that at some point reconciliation occurs
all the way along the line, but is it your judgment of the
conversations you have had with the President or with others
in his administration that they are so sensitive to the course
of history, at least with regard to intelligence in this
country, that they are of a mind to make certain that they do
not transgress -- in other words, put all of us in a situation
in which there is a blow-up, literally, that would cause your
resignation, cause perhaps difficulty with this Committee and
with Congress and with the public. In other words, probably,
the question I am raising, asks itself, if we are all sufficie tly
sensitive in this country about the things which have occurred,
the misuse of authority, that we are all on guard not to do
this again, but I am just simply curious in exploring this
relationship which you will have to have with the President,
to what extent he or others have really thought through what
would occur in the event of your resignation, as a matter
of conscience, you saw-that you could not perform?
Admiral Turner. I am very persuaded 'from my several
conversations with the President that he is most sensitive in
these areas. I am persuaded and very pleased at the high
degree of interest that he has shown in the intelligence
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function, and the surprising, to me, amount of detail that he
has absorbed about it in the brief time that he has had.
So I look forward, if confirmed, to working for a man
who I think has an intense interest in the job he is asking
me to take, and that is a wonderful way to start.
Senator Lugar. As a matter of detail, are you prepared t
log all contacts, the President included, and everybody else,
with you so that there is some record for yourself or
the President or this Committee of all persons who contact
you with regard to CIA business?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I certainly am, and I think
it would be a very prudent thing to do.
Senator Lugar. What assurance can you give the Committee
that improper influence will not be brought to bear, not
by the President, but by his staff members, by other interveni
persons or by persons in business or labor or public interest
groups or other? How will you guard against persons who,
albeit from good motives, at least as they see them, want to
see you and to have a word and to suggest ways in which you
might further your mission?
Admiral Turner. I can only assure you, sir, that one
in public office has to develop a sense of propriety here. At
the same time, I would also assure you that I have always had
a great quest for contact with people from a wide variety of
'attitudes and diverse opinions, and I would intend to maintain
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that here, but certainly being very careful that none of them
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placed me or themselves in a position of impropriety in so
doing.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask this question finally. Throug
out your career, obviously, you have been a consumer of
intelligence. You have some ideas of its value in regard to
command decisions or staff work in which you have been involve
In what ways could you work effectively with this
Committee, or for that matter, with Congress generally, in
thinking through what ought to be the role of your agency in
providing intelligence for the Congress?
I am thinking in this case not simply information as to
covert activity or sensitive data, but I suppose I am thinking
more-in terms of the fact that the legislative body has a
mission to perform, sometimes independently of the President,
in legislative initiatives, or at least having good data with
which to work, and this comes from all sorts of sources, but
have you given any thought as to how the development of your
role might proceed so that you not only serve the President
directly and are part of his administration, but think of
yourself in more national sense; serving the legislative body,
too, for that matter, the Supreme Court, should it have need
for your services?
Admiral Turner. I hadn't thought of the Supreme Court,
.good idea, but yes, sir, I would hope that my experience as a
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consumer would help me to take the point of view of the Committ
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of Congress who are approaching national problems. I would hop
that I could stay abreast of what the principal interests of
the Committees of the Congress were, and charge my staff to
be sure that we were carefully seeking out that information that
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we possess whidh could conceivably be of value to these
Committees and I speak not only of the Intelligence
Committees, and the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services
Committees, who are major consumers, but it seems to me we shold
be scrutinizing almost virtually all of the Committees.
Senator Lugar. Well, for instance, take a look at
agricultural data and think of food supplies and other energy
supplies and sources and what have you that may very well be
universal in their application.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, very much so.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Huddleston?
Senator Huddleston. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent that a short statement that I have
prepared be included in the record at the beginning of the
session.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
(The prepared statement of Senator Huddleston follows:)
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Senator Huddleston. Admiral Turner, in looking at your
statement, I find on page 3 an indication of what your objecti
with the President are, as detailed to you, to paraphrase,
that we explore ways of improving the efficiency of our intelli
gence gathering, that we see that all elements of our intelli-
gence operate within the law and within the values of Americans
There is also the statement there that indicates that the
President believes that this can be accomplished under the
existing executive orders and the existing law, and it goes
on to say that you will consider any new approaches that the
Congress may suggest along this line.
Is it correct that the President, then, has an open mind,
and you, too, as to the need for additional statutory charters
for the various elements of our intelligence?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Do you believe that the executive
order under which you are now operating, 11905 plus the
1947 Act, gives you the authority that you need to success-
fully manage the intelligence community2
?Admiral Turner. I am rpt prepared, Senator, to assure you
that r think that is optimal. I am drawing a fine line, here.
I think it can be done under the existing orders and laws.
I think it might be --
Senator Huddleston. You don't rule out the possibility
that it might be done better.
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Admiral Turner. That is just what I was going to say.
Senator Huddleston. Under statutes that might be develope
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, easier or better, or both, if
there were some changes.
Senator Huddleston. Is there any way to really manage the
?
intelligence community without having the authority., for instan
of the purse, being able to assign the various appropriations
to them on the basis of assignments that you as DCI would direc
them to undertake?
Admiral Turner. I am not actually a believer that you
have to have control of the purse in order to control
bureaucracies --
Senator Huddleston. It is usually a pretty effective
Admiral Turner. -- but it is very helpful and whether
we need in the DCI's hands more control than presently exists
through the executive order and the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence, I am not really sure at this time.
Senator Huddleston. The previous investigative committee,
that was chaired by Senator Church, and on which I served, in
reviewing the act of 1947, described it as no longer an
adequate framework for the conduct of America's intelligence
activities. It went on to say that it was a vague and open-
ended statement of authority for the President.
Do you disagree with those findings?
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1 Admiral Turner. Tam not in disagreement with them, but
2 I am not sure I would be quite that explicit or emphatic.
3 Senator Huddleston. But you are willing to review with
this Committee the possibility of additional statutory
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Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. And to the extent of even separate
charters for each element of the intelligence community.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I have not formed an opinion
on whether charters are appropriate or necessary, but I am
certainly very open to considering the subject.
Senator Huddleston. You are not foreclosing the possi-
bility.
Admiral Turner. NO, sir, in no way.
Senator Huddleston. One of the things that we found was
that it was virtually impossible to ascertain to what extent
the President knew about some of the activities specifically
the assassination activities, even though those who were in th
field carrying out those activities or attempting to, seemed
to be certain in. their own mind that they had approval "at the
highest level" which was either. the President or someone
speaking for him in the White House.
Do you believe it is important that we have a system
whereby the accountability is clearly defined?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
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Senator Huddleston. And can be determined who gave the
orders, what they knew, and the total line of authority
discerned so that 'persons all the way from the top to the
bottom can be held accountable?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Is that possible under the present,
or likely under the present system of operation do you believe?
Admiral Turner. I believe that the current procedures for
gaining approval of covert operations give a very high
assurance that that would be the case, but it still would
depend on the Director of Central Intelligence absolutely
demanding that he knows that it iS the President who has given
the approval and not one of his subordinates, and I would
intend to take that position.
Senator Huddleston. On this approval, certainly the
awareness ought to be of just precisely how a policy or an
action, a covert or clandestine action, is to be carried out,
so that the President, the highest authority, might be aware
of specifically what is taking place down on the local level,
so to speak, in order to carry out an assignment that is given
by the National Security Council or the DCI.
Admiral Turner. It would be an act of irresponsibility
to fail to inform the decision makers through the entire chain
of command of that kind of information and ask them to make a
decision on a covert operation.
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Senator Huddleston. In other words, lam saying if it
becomes important or somebody at the top might believe that it
would be better for this country's interests if a certain
leader were disposed of, then ?that terminology ought to be
explicit, and it ought to mean whether or not disposed of by
supporting a candidate who might defeat him in a free and open
election, or whether he ought to be incapacitated in some way
that wctild eliminate his presence. I would agree that those
are extreme cases, and we have dealt with assassination, but
the point is, the manner in carrying out a directive sometimes
is Ear different from what might be perceived in the directive
itself.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I do.
Senator Huddleston. Your experience indicates that to you
The 1947 Act doesn't specifically give the CIA the
authority to collect intelligence. Do you think that the Act
ought to be amended or specific authority ought to be given
for that purpose?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Rather than the vague terms that
do whatever else the National Security Council might direct?
Admiral Turner. I think there is undoubtedly room for
improvement here. We can operate under the existing one, and
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have, but I am certainly amenable to reviewing --
Senator Huddleston. But not always in a way that might
be termed exemplary.
The investigating committee found a rather wide use by
the CIA.of various types of individuals and institutions, use
?
of the media, use of academics, use ,of the clergy, in carrying
out covert activities. In the case of the media, new directives
have altered that to a great extent.
What is your feeling about using institutions that if it
became knowledge, might seriously reflect on or be detrimental
to those institutions themselves?
Admiral Turner. I don't think that the intelligence
function of this Committee should attempt to shape the opinion
of students on our campuses or to use academic institutions as
a tool for propagandizing in any way. At the same time, I
would be reluctant to think that a member of an academic
community would be denied his right of serving his country in
any legal way that he wanted, whether it was in helping the
Agricultural Department --
Senator Huddleston. But you feel he ought to be knowledgea le
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about what he is doing.
Admiral Turner. I don't feel that the intelligence agency
should recruit assistance from people on our campuses without
making it clear that it is the intelligence community that is
doing it.
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Senator Huddleston. Admiral Turner, do you consider the
Congress as a legitimate user of intelligence?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. And you would treat it as such.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. Even if such intelligence- might be
contrary to stated policies of the President?
Admiral Turner. My responsibility, if confirmed as the
Director of Central Intelligence, is to provide intelligence,
not policy.
Senator Huddleston. Even if the intelligence might be
embarrassing to the President.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Huddleston. You would supply that.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I have had a new-found feeling of power sitting
here. I don't know of anybody who has ever kept Pat
Moynihan waiting, and I am able to do that for ten more
(3,4e
minutes.
(General laughter.)
Senator Biden. The more he thumps his foot, the more I
will hurry, though.
I would like, on a bit of a humorous note, to raise
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another question.
I never thought of the Supreme Court as being a consumer,
but in light of recent decisions on busing, I would like you
to investigate the counterintelligence activities in that
area. It would be very helpful to me.
I would like to make a brief comment. I feel very, very
strongly, as I indicated to you in my office when we had an
opportunity to speak, that the issue raised by several members
of the Committee here as to the need or the suggestion that the e
might be a need for the DCI to have greater control over the
entire intelligence community, including the purse strings,
particularly that aspect which is part of the Department of
Defense. I feel very strongly that -- and I realize you can't
make that push, even if you agreed, and I don't know that you
do or don't, but I would hope that this Committee will pursue
with you and with the President of the United States, the need
for there to be one person, if you are confirmed, you, who has
control of the intelligence community, not maybe, not sometimes
not part of the time, not part of it, but all of it, and I
would hope that as we investigate that, which I, as one member
of this Committee am going to pursue with the President, and
I suspect the whole Committee will in some way or another, that
you will be amenable to listening to our suggestions to move
the DCI into a position of greater authority, because I think
is absolutely critical that when the President turns to you,
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if you are confirmed, and says, what is the situation, that y
know, that it is not -- that you do not have to be embroiled
in a controversy, in internecine warfare with the Secretary of
Defense or some underling in the Defense Department or any other
agency,.and that I think that is very important.
You also mentioned, and it has been mentioned here, the
need for the Administration, executive branch, and in concurre
or in conjunction with the -- with this Committee, to determin
a more definite policy as to what constitutes classified
material, what constitutes secrecy, what should and shouldn't
be treated as a document, as a classified document, and what
sanctions prevail for violation of any directive in that
regard.
I know it is the intention of the Chairman of the Committ
to, if not have a subcommittee, but for the whole Committee at
one point to pursue that issue with you, and we look forward
to your cooperation when that time occurs, assuming you are
confirmed.
I would like to raise a few specific questions within
the remainder of. my time, if I may.
With regard to covert activities, I have been somewhat
disturbed as a member of this Committee that there is a very
fine line between what constitutes clandestine activities
and a covert activity, and as I understand the law -- and staf
may correct me if I am wrong; I wish they would correct me if
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I am wrong -- the -- under the present situation and the
situation which you alluded that you agree with, that is, infor
ming this Committee, if not prior, at least simultaneously,
with a decision to undertake a covert activity.
Everyone agrees that that is the case, but in my experienc
on this Committee, there, are certain potentially, there are
things categorized as clandestine which have potentially more
danger to our national security and embarrassment to the
United States of America were they to be uncovered, that are o
greater consequence and importance, than the covert activities
that are going on, and I wonder whether or not you feel there
is a need for you to advise us prior to, if not at least
simultaneously, with the initiation of a clandestine activity
which is obviously of major international consequence?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I think that ties in --
Senator Biden. It is clandestine, I am told by the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky, who said you all.
Admiral Turner. I think it is part and parcel of the
overall package of proper oversight of our activities.
? Senator Biden. Do you agreethat there are clandestine,
secret activities on the part of the intelligence community
that can be of greater consequence to our national security
than certain covert activities?
Admiral Turner. I would suspect that is the case. I have
not yet read into the covert and clandestine activities
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of greatest sensitivity other than those that I have known in
the course of my military activities.
Senator Biden. Well, again, assuming you are confirmed,
I would hope that the Committee will pursue that question with
? you and with the President of the United States.
I would like to move to an area that we have already
discussed and ask you, because I am sure, I suspect the press
is going to ask us why we weren't a little bit harder on you
in terms of the -- your retention of your rank of Admiral, and
we did go through, and I was one of the several who voted
against the confirmation of George Bush, we went through this
great long debate as to whether or not his activities subseque t
to service as DCI should be within the purview and scope of
consideration by this Committee or the Congress as a whole, an
it was concluded that it was, and yet we haven't asked you
yet whether or not you -- how long you plan on serving as
DCI, if you are confirmed, assuming you stay, you keep the
pleasure of the President.
Admiral Turner. I intend to remain in that office, if
confirmed, as long as the President of the United States desir s
me to do so.
Senator Biden. Now, that jamn spite of the fact that
? in July of '78 the position of Chief of Naval Operations and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will become vacant.
_
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
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Senator Biden. You are aware that that vacancy will
occur in 1978.
Admiral Turner. I have heard about it.
Senator Biden. And are you in a position to indicate to
this Committee- that it is not your intention to seek that
Chairmanship and Chief of Naval Operations of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. Fair enough.
And I have another question in that regard..
I am not quite sure why you want to remain on active
duty. I am not sure I understand. I understand your feeling
a commitment to the service and your love for it, and your
not wanting to preclude the possibility of becoming -- of goin
back to the same function or similar function you had prior to
becoming DCI, but why is it required that you remain on active
duty in the interim?
Admiral Turner. Thirty years of -- retiring after thirt
years of service will in no way change my accumulated backgrou
and attitudes. The law specifically provides for an active
duty man to be in this position. In the years since the first
founding of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the exceptio
of the last seven months, there has never been a time that
there has not been one military man in either the post of
Director or Deputy Director, and the majority of those have be .n
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on active duty. I see no conflict arising.,
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Senator Biden. I am not suggesting a conflict. I am just
looking for your rationale. You will have no command, and so
I am not sure why the need to remain 9D_ ctive duty, why you
want to other than -- I mean, does it affect if and when you
go back where you come in?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. The law specifically provides
that there is no impact here, so far as that is concerned, and
I am not worried about where I would come or go in that event,
in any case.
Senator Biden. The question of the -- you indicated
earlier that at least you have requested four naval officers
remain on your personal staff.
What is the general capacity of those officers? I mean,
you know, we hear a lot about Admirals having people who wait
on their tables and that kind of thing. I realize this seems,
may seem inappropriate in light of the gravity of this hearing,
but it is not, in my opinion, in terms of the need to establish
the degree of public confidence which we all feel very strongly
as you do, that must be established there. I would not want
any impression left in the minds of anyone in this room, or
the viewing audience, if any of this is played, and/or the
reading audience after this is covered, that we are in effect,
you are maintaining your active duty status to ensure that you
have four personal servants.
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Admiral Turner. No, sir, that is not my intent in any
way, and these I don't view as personal servants whatsoever.
They are highly qualified officers. They are officers who
have served with me in the past few years. They are officers
who I hive a great rapport with in writing speeches, in per-
forming duties that are necessary in au office, answering laxg.
volumes of correspondence, taking care of the schedules and
Senator Biden. Administrative kinds of --
? Admiral Turner. Administrative.
Senator Biden. -- kinds of duties.
Admiral Turner. Yes,sir. I would anticipate that after
I have settled into this job, if I am given it, I might find
that the need for them atrophied. I am reluctant to step into
what looks to me like a maelstrom of activity without this kind
f support that just takes day to day burdens off your shoulde s.
If I do not need them in the course of time, I would certainly
not ask them to stay.
Senator Biden. I quite frankly think that is appropriate.
But my time is up. Thank you very much.
Admiral Turner. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Now, Senator Moynihan.
Senator Moynihan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I don't want to take issue with my good friend
Senator Lugar, but I don't see why you shouldn't show a little
partiality to the Navy.
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Sir, I should like to take the opportunity to express
my own great pleasure that you are before this Committee in
these pleasant circumstances, and to take the occasion to put
to you a question which, while specific in its particulars,
has, I believe, a general bearing of the role of the Central
Intelligence Agency in world affairs.
I have recently been in Jamaica where I had the honor
to pay a call on Prime Minister Manley, and as I am sure you
know, during the recent general election in Jamaica, there was
much discussion of the role of the CIA in that country. I
asked the Prime Minister about this and his answer was somewha
.general. However, he did say most explicitly that the opposit on -
that during the campaign the opposition party, the Jamaica
Labor Party, received funds from the CIA. I replied that if
this were true, it was an outrageous act upon our part, and th t
we would owe, at very least, an apology to the government and
the people of Jamaica.
On the other hand, it is my understanding and my belief
that this was not true, and is not true, and in that circum-
stance it grieves me to consider the damage this charge may
have done to the JLP. As you know, the Jamaica Labor Party is
an established and staunchly democratic political party which
on several occasions has formed the Government of Jamaica,
to use the parliamentary term.
As you also know, Jamaica is one of those few nations --
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there are scarcely three dozen of us -- which not only carry
out democratic elections, but in which those elections have
brought about a change in the political party governing the
nation.
Inevitably, a party's opposition accused in the manner
that the JLP has been accused bears the impossible burden of
disproof. In the nature of things, any disavowal on our part
is of not much greater avail, and for these reasons, accusations
of CIA involvement have become a feature of the political
rhetoric of our time around the world.
And I ask yo q sir, if as Director of Central Intelligence,
you would not give some thought to ways in which the United
States could make such charges less rewarding to those who
make them in circumstances where we know the charge is not
true.
Admiral Turner. That is a most interesting though,
Senator, and I certainly agree with it. I agree that we
should make efforts to make unjustified statements against our
country and its activities less rewarding. I can see that
in some instances this could be done-by policy decisions of
the executive and legislative branches, decisions that would
bring the weight of the authority of this country to bear. I
can see that the intelligence community itself can also play a
role, but largely by a gradual process of enhancing our
credibility in the world, enhancing the confidence that people
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will have that when we say we have not done something, that tha
is in fact the case, and I would hope we can move in that
direction over time.
Senator Moynihan. Thank you, Admiral.
YOU recognize; Admiral, that the reputation of respected
political parties are at stake, and respected people are at
stake.
I have two other quick questions, sir. I assume that for
thirty years now there has been a fairly consistent effort by
the Soviets to infiltrate the Agency, and to some extent they
have succeeded.
Would you want to share with us now or sometime your
judgment of just how much they may have succeeded, if at all?
You have your first major defector in Mr. Agee. I think this
Committee would want to know -- has Mr. Agee gone over to the
KGB? Is he now a Soviet agent, in your knowledge, or what do
you think he is doing?
Admiral Turner. I do not have knowledge of that at this
time, Senator, no.
Senator Moynihan. Would you let us know what you think
has happened?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I will look into it if I
am confirmed for this office and let you know.
The Chairman. The Committee will call upon the
of Central Intelligence at one of our later meetings
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Director
to advise
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us of the type of activity you have just described.
Senator Moynihan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A last point, and again it may be of the same order, but
again these are so public things I don't know how -- I think
the public in the end will want to know, too. The Boston Globe
?
on February 11 reported that the British Intelligence in early
1973 brought to the United States a document which they regarde
as of extraordinary importance, comparable to the text of the
1956 speech in which Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and
detailed his offenses, and I quote now from the Globe, it
says, speaking of the British report: "It quoted Brezhnev
as telling a secret meeting of East Europeans, Communist
leaders in Prague, that detente was a stratagem to allow the
Soviets to build up their military and economic power so that
by 1985 a decisive shift in the correlation of forces would
enable the Russians to exert our will" -- I am quoting the
story. -- "exert our will wherever we need to."
This was not accepted in our government, at least some
parts of government, as trustworthy, and was dismissed, and
yet it is now very public and I gather it appeared in the
national intelligence estimate in 1976 after a sort of
subterranean life.
The nation, I think, probably ought to know what our
judgment of the validity of the report, the accuracy of the
report, did Mr. Brezhnev make such a speech, and is that
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text as.we understand the case?
Would you propose to make any general statement about that
sometime?
Admiral Turner. I am not at this time specifically
familiar, with that document other than, as you report, in the
press. I would be very happy to investigate its authenticity
and also determine whether, with an eye to protecting the
source from which it was obtained, we can release more informa-
tion on this to the public, but certainly to you in this
Committee.
Senator Moynihan. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, too, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my apologies to you and the Committee, and
to you, Admiral, for not being here until just a few moments
ago. I was in the Foreign Relations Committee, and we had
actions to take on behalf, of the Administration in another
field which I was obliged to attend to.
I think I only have one, question that I would like to
raise with you, and Senator Biden I believe raised it before.
would like to sort of underscore it. That is the great
importance of the period of continuity of single strong
leadership in the CIA, and while no one would want, and I would
not want to inhibit the President from choosing you for any
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post that he might find you qualified for -7 and I can imagine
many posts which I would want to engage you in -- that I want
to underscore the importance that this choice of you for this
post I think makes in respect of an indefinite, at least,
period of continuity of leadership in this Agency. I under-
stand you have said you would not seek another post and that
you would, of course, serve as long as the President wanted you
to.
Have you any indication from the President as to how long
he has in mind for you to serve in this post?
Admiral Turner. I have no indication of how long he wants
me to serve. I have no indication that he has any ideas of
any other use of my services.
Senator Case. Well, that, obviously you cannot bind the
President not to ask you to run, say, NATO or the Armed Service
of the United States or anything else, but choices have to be
made, and I do just want strongly to underscore the great
importance of the choice that is being made here now. You are
choosing to do this, and my own view is -- and I am not asking
you to make any further comment -- is that you ought to stay
at it until the job is thoroughly done.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very. much.
Before recessing this hearing I would like to make two
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announcements.
First, this hearing will reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon,
and Admiral, sir, if you can be ready to answer questions
because I am certain other members would like to ask further
questions, and receive the testimony of three other witnesses.
The second announcement is at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon the
Committee will meet to carry on Committee business, including
the confirmation discussion and hopefully the vote of Admiral
Turner.
The Chair intends to make that portion of the Committee
meeting tomorrow open to the public, the portion relating
to the debate and vote on the debate and vote on the confirma-
tion of Admiral Turner.
So with those two announcements --
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, there are certain
questions I didrilt think I should delay the Committee for,
be asnwered for the record?
The Chairman. Without objection your questions will be
handed to the Admiral, sir.
With these two announcements, this hearing will stand in
recess until 2:30 this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12:03 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed
to reconvene at 2:30 o'clock p.m., the same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
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(2:39 p.m
The Chairman. We will now resume the hearings.
Senator Stevenson?
Senator Stevenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a few holes that I would like to plug in the
record.
First, Mr. Chairman, I know there are questions about the
so-called Hussein affair.
Is my understanding correct that that will be taken up
by the Committee in executive session?
The Chairman. Yes, tomorrow at 2:30 I will be presenting
this to the Committee.
Senator Stevenson. Now, Admiral getting back briefly
to covert operations, both the President --
(Pause)
Senator Stevenson. Admiral, both the President and the
Secretary of State have said in words which I can't seem to
find at the moment, that covert operations will only take place
in the most extraordinary of circumstances. Covert operations
are difficult to discuss because the phrase signifies one
thing to the public and it means something that is much broader
including conduct of activities which in the main is innocent.
What is your own attitude about the wisdom of covert
operations? Could you just address yourself to the general
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subject?
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER -- Resumed
Admiral Turner. I would be .pleased to, Senator.
.I think no covert operation should be undertaken until
two standards have been met. The first would be that there was
a thorough exploration of any alternative ways to accomplish
that objective in an overt manner. The second would be that
there was a very careful weighing of the potential value to the
country of what might develop from the operation versus the
risks that have to be accepted, and I would urge that we
think of the risks in two categories: the risks of disclosure
of the covert operation becoming overt against our desires,
and then simply the risk of undermining our own respect for
the fundamental laws and values of our country.
Senator Stevenson. Now, I detect some interest, there
certainly should be, in your general attitude towards the
Soviet Union. Your impressive article in Foreign Affairs shed
some light on that subject.
Is the Soviet military build-up in your opinion due to
aggressive or imperialistic'idesigns, or is the Soviet Union
reacting to a perceived threat or in your opinion is the reaso
some combination of both?
Admiral Turner. I believe that the Soviet Unoin today
finds itself at a disadvantage with respect to us in the field
of economics. They do not have the economic power or the
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economic access to the rest of the world that the United
States does, and they see little prospect of being able to
close the gap with us.
I believe that you might say politically or culturally the
also find themselves behind us in their ability to deal in the
international forum: witness their debacle in Egypt with their
heavyhandedness.
The Soviet Union, however, is quite accustomed to using
military power at home as well as abroad, and I think they
believe that the existence of strong military forces can be
translated into political advantage for them, and I would think
this is a primary motive behind their very considerable efforts
today, the great expense that they are accepting to build up
their military power.
I would be reluctant to hazard a guess as to whether that
means they intend to use it in an active, combative fashion or
whether they hope that they can simply gain enough political
leverage with it to satisfy their needs.
Senator Stevenson. Well, you have referred to their needs
and the political advantages,.
What are their needs? What political advantages are they
seeking? Are they basically defensive, or are they offensive?
Is this Russian imperialism, or is it a response to a perceived
threat which could also be explained against Russian history,
or as I said, some combination?
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Admiral Turner. I think it is a combination. Their
actions in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslavakia it seems to me
clearly indicate a'total resolve not to give up their empire,
so-called. I think that they
world's last empire. I think
no means lost sight of in the
are Still attempting to be the
that Russian imperialism is by
Soviet Union today, and I believe
that they would be very happy, at least by political means,
including the application of military pressure, to try to
dominate western Europe, and through it,
Senator Stevenson. So you wouldn't
squarely in either the Russians are cord.
the United States.
place yourself
g school or the,
whatever the other extreme, on the other side.
Admiral Turner. I think they are neither benign nor
warlike, but I think we must be cautious, we must maintain a
strong enough posture economically, socially and militarily
to be sure they do not translate such advantages as they have
into political leverage against us.
Senator Stevenson. Well, that sounds like a neutral and
a pragmatic, a reasonable approach to me.
Has the President assured you access to him whenever in
your judgment you have information that he should have?.
Admiral Turner. He has, sir.
Senator Stevenson. And now getting back to where I think
I left off earlier on the quality of intelligence and the
estimating process,. I believe in response to Senator Lugar
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earlier you indicated that you felt intelligence should be
concerned about such sources of authority in the world as
food supplies, natural resources, the economic sources of
authority as well as the more typical military concerns that
?
have tended to dominate the intelligence community in the past.
Is that correct?
Admiral Turner. Absolutely. There are many more factors
than military that determine the fate of our country today.
Senator Stevenson. On the estimating process, do you
think the NIEs make a significant
policy making process, and if so,
contribution to the
or if not, how can they be
improved?
_
Admiral Turner. I think they do make a significant
contribution. I hesitate as a near outsider to suggest a
this short time exactly how they could be improved, but I
would emphasize that I think we should be sure the divergent
views, the alternative conclusions that could be drawn from
the facts that are the foundation of thgse estimates, must be
clearly displayed, and I would like to see a confidence level
displayed in many of our intelligence judgments as opposed to
? factual statements.
I have seen cases, Senator, where people come to an
express conclusion from a set of facts in intelligence, and
don't allow that maybe another line of deduction could have
taken you to another conclusion, and I would hope that we woul
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express, oh, several lines of deduction and show some level
of confidence that one was right and the other was wrong, maybe
one was 90 percent and one is only 10 percent, but it sometimes
is worth showing that there is at least an alternative.
Senator Stevenson. Do you think regular competition
between estimating teams is desirable?
Admiral Turner. I would hope that the very process within
the intelligence community that brings estimates forward would
have built into it an adequate opportunity for the 'expression o
these divergent views, and that the creation of special teams,
if that is done, would be reserved for special occasions rather
than just the routine. But I certainly want the divergent
views to come forward one way or the other.
Senator Stevenson. If I understood you earlier, you
indicate that you approved of competition between estimating
teams inside and outside the intelligence community. Is that
right?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevenson. Good, I'm glad to hear that.
I might just mention for the record, Mr. Chairman, that
since the subject came up earlier -- I think Senator Moynihan
mentioned it -- that this Committee is conducting a major
study of this estimative process, including the recent A-B
Team controversy, and we will welcome your help and
cooperation in conducting that study, Admiral.
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Admiral Turner. You will certainly have it, sir.
Senator Stevenson. One question more, Mr. Chairman.
For many years the Office of National Estimates has
served as the focal point for production of the intelligence
community's national intelligence estimates. In 1973 the
Office of National Estimates was disbanded. The successor
mechanism, the National Intelligence Officers, has been criti-
cized as an inadequate substitute.
Will you review the present mechanism for producing
those NIE's?
Admiral Turner. I'm sorry. You asked if I would review
it?
Senator Stevenson. Yes.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I intend to.
Senator Stevenson. And are you considering any organiza-
V11?11.........su,,,,,SY ,n,""
tional changes now with respect to national intelligence
officers?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevenson. Would you care to tell us what they
are?
Admiral Turner. I would prefer to keep my counsel until
I have a more firm judgment, sir, but I am certainly exploring
- -
that as a matter of high priority.
Senator Stevenson. We will have additional opportunities
Thank you, Mx. Chairman. My time has expired.
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The Chairman. Admiral Turner, regretfully we will have
to take a short recess. There is a vote on the final passage
on Senate Concurring Resolution No. 10, the budget. So --
but before we do, I am pleased to recognize a very illustrious
member of the United States Senate. He is from the State of
Illinois. He wasn't here this morning. He wanted to be here
very much but because of some flight schedules he was unable
to make it. Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, Senator Goldwater, I will
be very brief indeed because of our vote, and also that I
just simply wanted to express my appreciation for the opportun ty
to be here with Adlai Stevenson to present Admiral Turner.
My distinguished colleague has spoken about him this
morning. I had a lengthy discussion with Admiral Holloway,
whose judgment I consider very good indeed, and with other
members, I might say, of my own branch of the service, the
United States Navy, six or seven flag officers who have known
directly or indirectly of Admiral Turner, so that I speak with
the conviction that his own colleagues, both those who have
been subordinate, worked along with him, and his superiors,
think that the President's judgment in making this appointment
is just outstanding.
We in Illinois are very proud to have such a distinguishe
native son. He is a man of many proven abilities. He is a
recognized scholar, capping his number one position in his cla s
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in the Naval Academy with a Rhodes Scholarship. He has made
a significant contribution to the intellecual world through his
writings, and as an innovative and extremely effective President
of the Naval War College.
But Admiral Turner is more than an intellectual. He has
consistently proven his merit has a commander both Of U.S. and
Naval forces. Through his naval career he has commanded min
sweepers, destroyers, guided missile frigates, a carrier task
force, NATO Strike Fleet, Atlantic, and he is presently
Commander in Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe.
In his Washington assignments he has been in the vanguard
of Navy and Defense decision making, in highly competitive
assignments in the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, and
as aide and executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy,
he compiled an outstanding record of performance, and certainly
Admiral Holloway emphasized what he considered to be an
extraordinarily important asset, not only the work that he has
done in syttems analysis -- and I happened to head a systems
analysis company.for a number of years. I didn't understand
half of what the engineers and scientists did, but at least
I gained a competence or a recognition of a competence for
someone who can engage in that process, but even more
complicated, he feels that he thoroughly understands Congress,
and has had a relationship here that will stand him in good
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stead as head of the CIA as well as in the duties and functions
performance that we have directed the CIA to perform to this
very, very vital Committee.
Now that Admiral Turner has reached the top rank in the
Navy, has been acclaimed for his creativity, lauded for his
administrative abilities, and proven himself an outstanding
diplomat in varied assignments. The President has called upon
him to make use of all of these considerable talents.
I can think of no more difficult challenge than that
facing him as the Director of Central Intelligence. I can thin
of no one better qualified to assume this key assignment.
We in Illinois have no doubt that he will meet all of
the challenges and take all of the frustrations in side. I am
sure that you will find Admiral Turner an excellent choice for
this critical and sensitive post. I trust at the end of severe
years experience working with him, that you will have even
greater admiration for him than you have today, because I
think he will work intimately and closely with you, and having
spoken to him, I know how sensitive he is to the position that
we must restore the CIA to in the eyes of the world as one
of the great intelligence gathering agencies the world has
ever seen, and in the vanguard of the protection and defense
of this country, absolutely crucial and essential. And certain
I think he will be respected by all of the professionals inside
by intelligence all over the world, which is important, but I
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think he will have the respect of the American people, which
is absolutely crucial.
Thank you.
Senator Goldwater. Might I say to my friend from Illinois
that the Chairman and I have decided that the Air Force and the
Army like him, too.
Senator Percy. That's either all bad or all good. When
I was in the service they didn't get along very well.
(General laughter.)
Senator Stevenson. I will just add a word for the
Marine Corps, since the Navy is a subsidiary of the Marine
Corps, we will accept him also.
The Chairman. The Committee will stand in recess for
15 minutes.
(A brief recess was taken.)
The Chairman. Let us now resume our hearings.
Senator Huddleston?
Senator Huddleston. I have no further questions, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Mathias.
Senator Mathias. Admiral, under Executive Order 11905
the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency is
required to make reports to the Intelligence Oversight Board
with respect to any improprieties that may come to his atten-
tion within the Central Intelligence Agency. Now, my question
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to you is, would you as DCI provide this Committee with the
substance of those reports, and I am careful to say the sub-
stance, having in mind our colloquy this morning as to certain
fine points, but with the substance of those reports, the
Committee can carry out the oversight function with respect to
any improprieties which might arise in the future.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Mathias. Now, in the same connection, the
Executive Order No. 11905 provides for the Intelligence
Oversight Board to report to the President any activities which
it deems to be improper and which it discovers within the
intelligence community as a whole.
Will you-as Director provide this Committee with the
substance of those reports so that the Committee can carry out
its oversight function again?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Mathias. So that we get it at two different
sequential stages.
Admiral Turner. I see the difference you are --
Senator Mathias. In the event that it moves to two
different sequential stages.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Mathias. Well, I am very gratified to have your
unequivocal answer to those two questions.
Admiral Turner. I may be in uniequivocal problems, but
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I will --
Senator Mathias. Well, I don't anticipate that you will.
I hope that we won't have such questions arising, but I
think it is of the greatest importance for this Committee to
be advised of them if those problems do,exist.
Now, turning to another question, in our original study of
the intelligence community, one of the most difficult problems
that we observed was the lack of statutory charters governing
the activities of different elements of the intelligence
community. Where there was no statutory charter, the boundari s
of jurisdiction were very difficult to define. They could
lack permanence. Individuals who might be affected by the
activities of the community would find it difficult to ascerta n
exactly where their rights began and where they ended.
It has been a subject of concern in the Congress that we
should develop statutory charters for the different elements o
the community that are not governed by charters at this time.
Do you have any problem in working with the Congress in
the development of that kind of statutory base?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, none whatsoever. I mentioned
this morning that I don't have a preconceived notion in my
mind as to where charters or other instruments may be the
appropriate vehicle, but lain certainly openminded to view it
and would look on the Congress's interest in better definition
f the responsibilities of each of these agencies as something
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that could be a bit help to the Director of Central Intelligen e.
Senator Mathias. I believe it could be a substantial
help to the Director, to future Directors, to have a clear
understanding of the guidelines that the Congress adopted with
the concurrence of the President, as to what was the proper
role and sphere of activity of the intelligence community, and
I think that is really the opportunity which lies before us
because this hasn't been done. In some cases jurisdiction is
defined only in executive orders and directives, some of which
are so classified as to be unavailable to certainly the averag
citizen, and in many cases, to senior government officials,
and if this could be embodied in a code of law which was
sufficiently flexible to make it possible to operate, but
sufficiently firm and defined so that people knew where they
were, I think we would have made a substantial advance, and
I appreciate your willingness to move forward in this area.
Admiral Turner. I think the problems you have mentioned
flexibilty and of security are very real in developing such
charters, and again, having read a few arguments against
charters and a few arguments for them, I can only say I am
open minded at this time.
Senator Mathias. And you have no fundamental personal
reservations.
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Senator Mathias. All right, thank you.
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The Chairman. Senator Hart.
Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, let me add my welcome. I am sorry I missed
this morning's session.
As you know, when we discussed your appointment before,
I have personal reservations based not on your record or
qualifications, but rather on the nature of the Central Intelli
gence Agency about a military director, and I raised that with
you, and I feel because I have those reservations I should rais
them for the record.
I don't think at this point it would. be sufficient as far
as my vote is concerned to vote against you, but the record of
the purpose and history of the CIA is such that it was estab-
lished to provide an independent analytic capability separate_
from the capability of defending this country, so that those
who were assessing the threat and those who were responding
to it were two different groups of people.
I think you are extremely well qualified for this position
and I think you will be confirmed and will do a very good job.
I think it would .be? unfortunate if. we got into a pattern over
a period of time of'having the DCI and the Director of the
Agency being from the military side.
Having said that, I would like to get -- and I know
that you have responded to questions in that area, so I am not
going to repeat them merely for myself -- I would like to get
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to the area that concerns me the most, and that is the inde-
pendence of the intelligence, the CIA's analytic capability.
As you know, there has been a deep discussion in this
community here, this town in the last several months, over the
so-called A Team and B Team reports, and with your background
in the Navy, in the military, I would like for you to repeat
anything you have already said to the Committee in summary font-
or to give your thoughts on what you as the head of the
Central Intelligence Agency can do or should do to protect the
independence of that Agency and its analytic capability from,
let's say, outside intimidation by those who do not agree with
its assessments or its analyses.
Admiral Turner. I think one of the primary devices, sir,
is to be sure that nobody feels he has to intimidate the
Agency or the analysts, by being sure that there is adequate
opportunity for the divergent views to be expressed. When it
comes to the crunch as to which one is the view we express
with the greatest level of confidence, when there is a real
issue, I am going to be the one who makes that decision
personally, and there is no way I can guarantee you that I
will be unbiased, but I can assure you that that would be my
certain intent.
Senator Hart. Let's say over a period of time, just to
repeat what has actually happened, hypothetically, over a
period of time other elements within the intelligence community
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do not agree with or do not share or like the analyses or the
judgments put forward by the Agency analysts, and pressure is
brought to bear on you to construct or develop a B Team which
with the purpose of challenging that assessment, and challengin
it from one direction or the other, not just from a more
conservative point of view.
Would you share with -- what would be your response to tha
pressure?
Admiral Turner. It is very difficult to hypothesize
response to a particular pressure, but I said this morning I am
not opposed to outside review, I am not opposed to A-B Team
type review where one side is all on one spectrum and one on
the other. I personally would prefer to make sure that all
spectra were represented in the initial review, or in an outsid
or post-analysis review. So I only want to make clear that
I don't think -- I would not want to respond to pressures for
these reviews; I would want to be persuaded that they were real
needed and not being done because somebody wanted to have them
done, if you see what I mean, sir.
Senator Hart. I see exactly, but I would like to put you
in Mr. Bush's shoes, your predecessor's shoes, and that was
exactly_ the pressure he was under six or eight months ago, I
think, and if you were in his shoes, given those circumstances,
and you were convinced that the analysts under your direct
control in the Agency represented different points of view, wer
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not all hawks or all doves or all anything, but were selected
for their independence and their unbiased analytic capability,
and had in fact over a period of time come up with accurate
assessments, and pressure was brought to bear on you by those
who didn't sharedyour conviction, that you should appoint an
outside group with a bias, what would be your response?
Admiral Turner. My initial attitude towards that would b
negative, towards having a group with a bias. I can see that
there is merit in that under some circumstances, but it seems
to me you are inviting problems when they come in with a
?deliberate bias under a pressure situation.
If you construct a bias here and a bias there, I think ye
have a better opportunity of keeping control of it.
May I elaborate on one point?
Senator Hart. Please do.
Admiral Turner. I think the way to avoid these crises
is to try to make those who feel the estimates are erroneous
be more specific and more quantifying in their reasons for
objecting. I think if we say we think there are in the
Green intelligence estimate, we think there are 32 submarines
in this situation and somebody else says it is 52, I am going
to ask that they give me concrete evidence as to why they
think it is 52, the building rate is higher in their estimatio
they think our intelligence has only detected 50 percent of
the ones that are in existence. I mean, there must be some
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basis for this.
And it would be my hope that you could develop your estim te
in such a way that the driving forces of difference were readi
apparent and nobody could have a complaint that his view was
not adequately stated, and yet the decision maker would not
just know that one party thought it was a very dangerous
situation and one thought it was a negligible situation, he wo id
know that it is because of certain differences in the way they
made their calculations.
Senator Hart. Well, I think that is one of the things
that disturbed me so much about the so-called B Team, ,and that
was that one of the, according to published accounts, not
getting into classified information, one of the areas they
looked into was what the Soviet intent was based upon undis-
puted data.
B Team took data which they did not dispute and reached
different conclusion about what was going on inside the Soviet
mind, as if there were, first of all, a Soviet mind, and that
is where they quarreled seriously with the Agency. Well, that
is a very subjective judgment.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Hart. And my own view is it is very demoralizing
for the analysts at the Agency to have their judgments attacke
on a subjective basis.
Shifting to another area, my understanding is you testifi d
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this morning that you would not accept an order from the Presi
to conduct an illegal activity.
Is that correct?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Hart. Was there any circumstance under which it
was determined that a head of state represented a threat to the
security of this country and had to be eliminated, and you woul
agree to plot the elimination of that head of state?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, not in peacetime.
Senator Hart. It has been suggested that it is very
difficult for a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to
know all the things that are going on at any given time inside
the Agency.
Can you suggest to us, either through a completely indepe der
and highly authorized Inspector General System or some other
system, that you intend to be satisfied in your own mind that
you know everything that the Agency is up to at any given
time, that you can go to bed every night thinking, I know exac ly
what is going on there?
Admiral Turner. I don't think that will ever be possibl
sir, but I certainly expect to be able to know the things of
critical importance, the things that could lead to problems, a
I would lean heavily on the existing Inspector General and his
staff. As far as I understand at this point, their charter
-.460.64-Ak
is clear and adequate. I will certainly be reviewing it to
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see if it needs any strengthening.
But getting control of any large organization takes more
than rules and inspectors and others. It is in part the tenor
of leadership that you exert. It is in part the example that ye
set when somebody pulls a surprise on you and I am going to
make it clear in my first days in office that I d n't want any
plausible deniable theories with respect to my stewardship.
I am going to make it clear that if I ever have to come before
this Committee and confess that I didn't know what was going
on, and it was not good, that I will not ask you for excuse.
I will accept thd responsibility, and thereby my subordinates ?
the Agency, if I am approved for that job, had better be
prepared to accept the responsibility also, and if I ever
find that their sense of their own responsibility is such that
they are entitled to hide anything from me or in any way
feel I am not entitled to know every detail of what is going
on, there will be some fireworks out there.
Senator Hart. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Admiral Turner, a number of significant
CIA policies are embodied in CIA internal regulations rather
than being fixed by law.
If you become head of the CIA and you find that you can
waive the application of these regulations or simply change
them without notifying Congress, would you do so or would you
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ensure that this Committee would be notified of any change
in CIA regulations?
Admiral Turner. I have no problem with notifying you
of change of CIA regulations, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure what
detail these get into and how much detail you want to get into.
My only hesitation is that I would be very happy to be sure you
were advised of those which seem to be of -- seem worthy of
your attention.
The Chairman. Fine.
Admiral Turner. And if you feel there are others that are
worthy of your attention that are not, why, I will happy to
go deeper.
The Chairman. I would like to apologize.
Senator Lugar, do you have any questions?
Senator Lugar. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, following up Senator Hart's questions a
moment ago about the control of the Agency and your knowledge
of what was occurring, you know, obviously this is critical
in terms of the relationship with this Committee or the
Congress or the nation, that you have this control.
Now, having examined the organization, do you feel that
you have sufficient control with regard to personnel policy, or
maybe to state it another way, without doubt are going to have
the loyalty of persons who have been affiliated with the Agency
for a long period of time, so that they are going to accept
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without any difficulty your leadership, the chain of command,
or whatever the organizational relationship is.
The reason that I ask this, in a parallel situation, much
less grave, from time to time a Chief of Police may be appointed,
and he may come in from the outside, and sometimes all of the
police officers who are members d that police department do
not share enthusiasm for the chief. As a matter of fact,
they may feel that the attitudes that he is adopting are very
different from the code that they have followed, and they
believe they are going to outlast him, that they will still
be there after he has gone, and maybe four or four successors.
What is your basic feeling as you enter this situation
prospectively, about your ability, really, to obtain management
control and to have knowledge and to have loyalty and to have
the sort of feeling on the part of subordinates that they woul
really geniuinely care that you knew and that you were thus
able to represent the truth to this Committee?
Admiral Turner. Senator, I think that the tools, the
official legal tools available to the Director for those purpo es
are adequate today. From there, I think it is a matter of
personal leadership. You must not only have a threat of some
sort over people, you must be able to win their enthusiastic
support for what you are doing.
I cannot guarantee you I am that leader, but I can only
say with some sense of immodesty that I don't think I have
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ieyerfailed to be in control of an operation I have commanded.
Senator Lugar. But you perceive the importance of that,
obviously, from Senator Hart's questions and from mine, that
if this was not to be the case, then we are all in trouble.
In other words, that you have been appointed and maybe confirm d,
but there is somehow rather a, I suppose some would feel on
occasion that people might be going off doing their own thing,
and your feeling is that whether that has been true historical
or not, that it will not be true in your administration of the
Agency.
Admiral Turner. Sir, I am not so immodest as to agree th t
it will not be true but I will be making every effort to be
sure it is not true.
Senator Lugar. This morning the wire services report
that President Carter was disturbed over leaks in intelligence,
and at least the wire service report suggests that from the
executive branch standpoint, he felt that the number of person
who had a need to know ought to be reduced substantially. At
least one ticker tape story that I saw mentioned a reduction
to as low as 5 persons, although I am not certain what type
of information that might have referred to. Apparently he
left the ball over in Congress's court as to what the response
Of the Congress ought to be.
Let me ask you now as a professional in the intelligence
business, if you were to have the best of all worlds and to
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indicate how many persons ought to have a need to know in the
Congress, about how many persons can safely be entrusted with
information, given the normal odds of hearsay and problems of
security and so forth, what sort of target would you advise us
to be aiming at if we were to have the sort of control that
we would want on behalf of the people we represent, but at the
same time, from the standpoint of national security and
intelligence, the odds would be substantially diminished,
as apparently thought they needed to be in his distress this
morning.
Admiral Turner. It is my view, sir, that I would feel
more comfortable, if confirmed in this office, and assuming
the responsibilities under law for the protection of sources
and methods of intelligence, if I could report these very
sensitive clandestine collection operations or covert operatio s
only to one Committee of each chamber.
Senator Lugar. And you feel that the Committees, at leas
constituted as they are, about the size that they are, are
appropriate, at least, that this is a reasonable situation.
Admiral Turner. At this point I see no problem with that
sir.
Senator Lugar. In the regulations for the Agency --
and you have offered to share those with the Chairman or with
the Committee, as the case may be, so that we can have some
surveillance, are you satisfied, having read through those,
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that there is an adequate code of conduct for persons affiliat
really, in all sorts of activities with the agencies, in terms
of how they ought to conduct themselves in interrogating perso s
for example, or in a worse case, maybe, of capture, how they
ought to react if they were under capture? Are you satisfied
that that situation has been explored and that the rules are
reasonable, and that everybody involved has a good anticipatio
of what he or she ought to do?
Admiral Turner. No, I am not satisfied, but only because
I simply have not probed into this in depth as yet, sir. I
am sorry, I just have not had the time.
Senator Lugar. Would you agree that this is a reasonably
serious proposition that probably ought to be looked into,
given the debate in the military services from time to time
on similar situations, especially the prisoner of war
situation?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar. The code of conduct there, and what ought
to be anticipated in the national service.
Admiral Turner. I certainly agree.
Senator Lugar. Finally, what in a general sense do you
see as an ideal course for the development of superior intelli
gence gathering or evaluation in this country? I suppose
two prongs of my question: is there a part, at least, of your
administration, as you look at it, that would be devoted to
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research capability, discovering new ways in which information
can be found. Obviously the discovery means that we don't know
precisely which technique we are looking at, but the research
and development aspect, if that is appropriate, will that be
a part of your outlook as to how we refine technique, and then
I suppose secondly, what should be the objectives of intelligence
finding, what sort of capabilities, and beyond that, has the
President discussed with you his philosophy of what intelligence
ought to be about, in other words, any new dimensions that
he sees or that you see in conversation with him?
Admiral Turner. I certainly think we must pursue a
vigorous research and development program. There is a prospec
that new developments in intelligence collection techniques
can perhaps make unnecessary some of the more risky ones that
we must suffer today. In addition, we must always stay ahead
of the competition. This is one of the great strengths we
have, it seems to me, over the Soviet Union is a more
advanced technology.
The President has shared some of his philosophy with me,
particularly his, great desire for a well-coordinated intellige ce,
drawing upon all the sources that are available to us, particu
larly his desire for a very balanced presentation, perhaps,
as he said in the press several times, with several sources
coming to him separately, and again, as I said this morning,
I am just very encouraged because of his intense interest
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in this whole area, and I am sure that means that I and you
are going to have lots of interchange with him and lots of
cooperation.
Senator Lugar. Did you mean in that last answer that the
President might on occasion encourage the publication of -- tak
this A and B Team controversy, suggest that A, B, and C Teams
have looked at identical data and have come up with these
evaluations, and for the good of the national argument, he
might say I want to share this with you, or does that go
well beyond what the President's intent would appear to be?
Admiral Turner. It goes beyond any specific discussion
I have had with him, so I don't wish to commit him there, sir.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. It appears that I will be the one to
wrap up the questioning, sir.
Reading some of our front pages and books being published,
I gather that many Americans have reached a conclusion that the
CIA and the other agencies in the community are insidious,
close, ultra-secret, conspiratorial type organizations. The
very nature of the work requires secrecy, but I think the
record should show that of all the intelligence gathering
organizations in the free world, ours happens to be the most
open.
As you are well aware, Admiral, in a great democracy,
Great Britain, the identity of the head of MI-6 is not known
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to the people of that country. In fact, the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Minister are the only two who are aware of the
identity of the Chief of MI-6.
Here we are having an open hearing on the Chief of our
MI-6, and tomorrow we will have an open discussion, and open
vote as to your confirmation.
As Senator Lugar has pointed out, the President unquestion
ably is and should be concerned with some of the unauthorized
disclosures that have been appearing in the press and elsewhere
and my question is this: employees of the Government who are
made privy to highly sensitive material, such as those who
are working for the CIA, are required to take a special oath,
and the oath would in essence say that we will never divulge
the information that we have received during our service to
this country, and yet we know that in violation of this oath,
articles have been written, books have been written, names have
been printed, operations have been described.
Do you believe that criminal sanctions should be provided
for by law to punish those who violate this oath?
Admiral Turner. Yestsir.
The Chairman. Do you have any suggestions as to what sort
of criminal sanctions?
Admiral Turner. I really do not at this time, Senator.
The Chairman. If confirmed, do you intend to work with
your colleagues in the Community to come forth with some sort
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of legislation that we can look at?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I would certainly be very
amenable to doing that and bringing any legislative suggestions
through the normal channels of the executive branch to the
Congress and to your Committee.
The Chairman. You have indicated that you would like to
be required to just respond to one Committee. Here in the
Senate we have this Committee. Then you have the Appropriation-
Committee with a special Subcommittee, a highly secret
Subcommittee handling intelligence appropriations; the Armed
Services, I think will jealously guard its prerogatives over
the activities of the Defense Intelligence activities, and I
presume the Foreign Relations Committee will insist upon
having its hand in the foreign policy aspects of intelligence
gathering.
How do you think we can improve the situation?
Admiral Turner. What I intended to say, sir, was I
would hope that for very sensitive, clandestine collection
efforts or covert operations we could report those to one
committee who would assume the responsibility for oversight of
these delicate, risky operations. I certainly see -- I certai ly
do not propose, for instance, not reporting to the Appropriatio
Committee on appropriations matters, but I am not sure that
need carry through to the degree of detail that I am suggesting
on the sensitive side.
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The Chairman. Well, I believe I speak for all members of
this Committee when I say we are very much impressed by you,
sir.
Admiral Turner. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. And we appreciate your forthrightness and
your responses to our questions, and although this may sound
rather premature, and maybe uncalled for, but I don't see any
problems tomorrow at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
So if you have an assignment in Naples this evening, I
would say to you, bon voyage and you can go ahead knowing
that you will be confirmed, sir.
Admiral Turner. Thank you very much, and may I think
all the members of the Committee for their generosity and for
the stimulation that I have received and I do look forward,
if confirmed, to working very closely with all of you, sir.
The Chairman. And Admiral, if we may, we would like to
submit to you questions that were prepared by members who were
not able to be here today, and by some of the staff people,
and your responses will be most appreciated.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Admiral Turner. Thank you.
The Chairman. Our next witness is the President of
Common Cause, Mr. David Cohen.
Welcome to the Committee, Mr. Cohen. We have received
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your statement.
Without objection, your statement will be made part of
the record in toto.
(The prepared statement of Mr. David Cohen follows:)
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