RECOMMENDATIONS OF SEMINARS ON CREATIVITY AND ETHICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00473A000800010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 25, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
FROM E. H. Knoche
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Recommendations of Seminars on Creativity
and Ethics
1. As you are aware, two seminars dealing with the
subject of creativity and ethics in CIA have been conducted
in recent months under the auspices of the Center for the
Study of Intelligence. The first seminar was composed of
senior Agency officers while the second seminar group was
made up of younger personnel and included a broader repre-
sentation of the Agency population. With a few exceptions,
the conclusions of the two groups tended to coincide as
regards basic issues. I believe the findings that have
resulted are thoughtful and deserving of serious study
regarding implementation.
2. As a result of a recent discussion I had on this
matter, it was concluded that all the recommendations do
not necessarily lend themselves to across-the-board Agency
-implementation, at least in terms of applicability or
emphasis. Another question presents itself and that is
whether or not a more broad-based constituency would agree
with the findings. In order to pursue both these points,
I would appreciate your doing the following. In the
course of the next two months would you or your Deputy
hold a special staff meeting with each of your operating
components to discuss these findings. I believe some are
more applicable to specific Directorates than to the Agency
as a whole. Your meetings would be helpful in validating
this opinion. Such meetings also would either enhance the
Downgraded to Unclassified When E2 IMPDET
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS CL BY M
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t o r" cj v : i s o m d ~ 7 r s J i ( nt 1 n jh L`; .
for Study 0 t 11 to I 1 i ~l,, rice tr sh.;tly
l:rt an officer to de,otCC I1 r::1f for so;:e r,rriod of time
this matter. The rcesu I Ls of your meetings w i l 1 be made
i1able to third: indiivi dual for correlat-ion.
3. Attached for your convenience is a combined listing
of the most significant recomme;ldotions of the two groups.
This combined listing may serve as a useful summary o; the
recommendations I am asking you to consider. Since it is a
;i;mmary rid a coii?l)i na t:'i on, i t should not be considered a
siubStitute for the more detai led and separate' recommendations
contained in the two reports distributed by the Center.
4. The recommendations of the two seminars are of
personal interest to me, and I look forward to continuing
progress reports from both the addressees and the Center as
regards their implementation.
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1. Innovative Approaches to Decisionmaking
Decisionmaking authority should be delegated down-
ward to a greater extent. In addition, interdisciplinary
approaches to decisionmaking should be used to include all
office-level components involved, even across directorate
lines, where appropriate. Pre-decisionmaking periods should
be designated to allow open discussion and dissent prior to
a final decision.
2. Receptiveness of Management to Innovation
Increase the use of non-cost methods of recognition
to demonstrate management's continuing interest in fostering
individual initiative.
3. Improved Personnel Management
Develop programs to improve career opportunities
thru better counseling, accurate evaluations, and increased
rotational assignments. Periodic zero-base review of such
programs will ensure effectiveness.
4. Fostering Creativity
Review the application of MBO to determine whether
it stifles creativity and, if not, that it is implemented
uniformly with the degree of participation necessary for
success. In addition, encourage development of informal
"think tanks" to allow officers to express their original
idea without fear of supervisory reprisal.
5. Liaison Relationsh~s
Take a cost/benefit approach to liaison relation-
ships and prepare defense papers for justification to critics.
In this regard, request officers volunteer ideas for alterna-
tive collection techniques to compensate for future liaison
losses.
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6. Ethical Issues
Develop a canon of ethics for CIA and establish
an open forum for discussion of ethical issues relating to
operations. In this regard, disseminate a statement of
Agency policies on covert action and other constraints
under which CIA operates.
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DD/A Registry
3 0 NOV t
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT . Conference on Creativity, Ethics, and
Controls in CIA
1. Attached is the report of OTR's Center for the
Stud of Intelligence on the two-day conference held at
recently to discuss creativity, ethics, and controls
n C A. I hope you will find the content responsive to the
issues you raised when you talked with the group to open its
deliberations.
2. The Center recommends that you approve a limited
distribution of the report to about 50 senior officers of
the Agency. It further recommends that the Center be author-
ized to gather together a younger and somewhat more mixed
representation of the Agency's officers for a one-day review
of this report in which they would be provided the oppor-
tunity to air their views on its subject matter. With a
report back from that session, you may then wish to consider
wider discusssion of the entire subject and/or adoption of
whatever elements of the associated recommendations you deem
appropriate.
John F. Blake
Attachment
I approve disapprove ( ) limited distribution.
I approve ( disapprove ( ) one-day conference.
M 7(
Deputy Director of Central Intell ge ce Date
Distribution:
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 CO I IDENTIAL
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Report of a Seminar on Ethics and Creativity
in the CIA
SUMMARY
A representative group of senior CIA officers met recently
to discuss the existing climate for creativity and responsible
dissent as well as the nature of ethical consciousness today
within the Agency. The group concluded that the controls and
inspections visited upon the CIA have not curbed the imagina-
tiveness and spirit of innovation among its officers, but that
individual initiative has declined. Preserving and nurturing
the best climate for creativity involves a number of important
elements. Among these are:
--a clear knowledge of the aims and goals of the
Agency--now somewhat lacking;
--a reversal of the trend toward the "sucking
upward" of authority for decision-making;
--preservation of the new, more intensive spirit
of concern with the potential impact of proposed
initiatives;
--a more vigorous exercise of assigned authority
by those at middle levels of the Agency's
management; and finally
--conveyance of a "style of leadership" in. the
Agency which trusts, encourages, and is willing
to accept the risks of individual initiative
from below.
Some current aspects of management by objective and certain
personnel practices were also cited as incumbrances to creativity.
While adequate channels exist for dissent in the CIA,
there is room for improvement. Many officers still appear
to believe that the way to get ahead is not to dissent from
.the views of authority. There is more awareness now of
the existence of forums for the expression of_di. sent
on legal or ethical grounds, but dissent grounded in concern
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for the wisdom of policy is still dampened in the view of most
of the participants. The solution lies in assuring that the
decision-making process at all levels encourages and truly
reflects the pros and cons of a given situation. A willingness
to tolerate and give a fair hearing to alternate views gets
quickly communicated through an organization.
A general raising of the ethical consciousness of the
Agency was deemed desirable, and one method to accomplish
this is to strive for some sort of charter or code of ethics.
The effort itself is important, in the view of the officers
assembled, even if an actual code is not achieved. Some
participants believed the latter might not be desirable at
all, though they favored the effort. The group agreed that
the issue of ethics in CIA was an Agency-wide issue and not
one confined to the Operations Directorate alone. There was
agreement that the Agency might be wise to set forth its
policy toward, and the ethical and professional justification
for, continued covert action programs, and to disseminate this
internally. In our training programs we should strive not to
teach ethics per se, but rather to raise ethical consciousness
and to provide a means for trainees to face frankly and dis-
cuss openly the ethical aspects of the profession of intelligence.
The group was asked to address certain aspects of liaison,
and it saw a need to concentrate on marshalling our best defense
of the flexibility, benefits, and propriety of maintaining in
some form our foreign liaison relationships. There is an
interest vital enough here to draw the line to defend, as well
as to engage in a concerted effort now underway to review
alternatives to such relationships. (A detailed list of the
recommendations of the group is at Annex A.)
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Report of a Seminar on Ethics and Creativity
in the CIA
Has the long trial of the Agency in the past three years
put a damper on the creativity and initiative of its employees?
Is healthy dissent constrained? Is our ethical consciousness
dulled? Do we, in fact, need a canon of ethics in the CIA?
These were some of the issues discussed by eleven senior officers
from across the Agency meeting on 11 and 12 November under the
auspices of OTR's Center for the Study of Intelligence.*
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. E. H.
Knoche, opened the session, asking the group to suggest ways
of advancing innovation and creativity in the CIA under the
constraining impact of inspection and controls. Is the
Agency open enough he asked; does it allow enough opportunity
for dissent; and how might a climate be maintained that does
not discourage responsible dissent? Mr. Knoche said that the
American people now accept intelligence as within our consti-
tutional system, but that the need remains to define the
bounds of propriety for intelligence within this system.
Should the ethics of intelligence be viewed only against the
nature of the perceived external threat at any given time, or
are there some "ethical eternals" for intelligence that can
be reflected in a canon? Should we try to develop one?
*List of participants at Annex
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Mr. Knoche noted the increasing external criticism of the
Agency's liaison relationship with certain repressive
foreign governments (and of activities of these services
in the United States) as an example of "a problem involving
the propriety of CIA activities. He asked the group to
consider whether we are creative enough to find other ways
to secure the positive intelligence benefits now accruing
from these liaison relationships should we have to modify
or terminate some of them.
A recapitulation of the group's discussion following
Mr. Knoche's remarks is set out below, along with the group's
general conclusions and recommendations.
Creativity in the CIA
If creativity within the Agency is defined as the ability
to stimulate new and fresh ideas on what to do and how to do
it, then creativity is alive and well in the CIA today; it is
less healthy if measured in terms of individual initiative,
and willingness to take risks. This was the near-unanimous
view of the participants in the discussion. In terms of
innovation and imagination, we are as strong today as ever.
If the need is there, sequels
are well within our creative grasp, although
the pressure of budgetary constraints may be causing our more
imaginative thinkers to be somewhat less assertive in putting
forward the grander schemes. On the other hand, some
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participants noted that the budgetary problems have actually
stimulated the expression of good, alternative and cheaper ways
of doing things than in the salad days of the past.
Our experience with real creativity is that it is irrepressible
and cannot be held down. With a really good idea, there is still
room in the CIA to try it. The DDI has just reorganized some of
its structure, seeking a fresher, more effective product and a
better climate for creativity. There are imaginative new
collection activities underway in the DDO. The DDA, it was
said, is a sharper and more perceptive outfit than in the past.
From this perspective, the challen,e with creativity is probabl
that mainly of protecting the climate we have now and of en-
couraging it more.
But creativity in terms of imagination alone is not the
whole of it. If creativity is assessed in terms of certain
important ingredients closely related to it, such as the
willingness in routine situations to take new initiatives
or to take risks, then the present CIA prognosis is not
nearly so favorable in the view of the participants. They
expressed the view that individual initiative down the line
in the Agency has been dampened in the past several years
to the point where a lack of it is having serious negative
consequences on our overall performance. The reasons for
this are numerous, and many are plain to be seen. The
solutions, however, are not nearly so obvious, or confident,
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or easy. Among the reasons and the solutions advanced by
group for the decline. in initiative were:
--that the motivation routinely needed for it stems
in large part from knowing clearly as an indi-
vidual and as an organization where you are going
and what you are doing. Our notion of this as an
Agency is foggier today than in the past. Not
only have we more people from new outside quarters
telling us what we should be doing, but our own
internal leadership has changed repeatedly in
recent years causing rapid changes and some
contradiction in marching orders. It takes time
for this to clear; while the effect persists,
the unfortunately typical reaction is to keep
one's head down and mark time.
--that the outside scrutiny of the Agency has
inevitably accelerated a trend toward centraliza-
tion and a "sucking upward" of the authority for
decision-making in the CIA, undercutting at lower
levels at least, the climate needed for creative
initiative to flourish. The diminished role of
the branch chief in the DO was cited. With less
authority for decision than in the past, he is
not looked to as much for leadership and thus
loses the motivation to take innovative initia-
tives. In contrast, our overseas chiefs of
station, in whom we still entrust considerable
individual authority, were cited repeatedly for
responding well in that climate so propitious
and stimulating for creativity.
--that the spotlight on the Agency is not altogether
unhealthy by any means. It has resulted in a
greater concern than in the past with the poten-
tial impact of a given initiative and with a
more realistic concern for its potential value.
Employee attitude surveys tend to confirm this,
although some in the group were not sure it is
a view fully shared by the younger officers.
The trick, then, is to retain the constructive
caution, but not stifle the initiative.
--that the responsibility for accomplishing this
trick must in part rest with the individual
officer. He can put his head down, be over-
careful in checking with his supervisor, with
the Inspector General, or the General Counsel's
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office, or he can keep before him the vital need
to exercise his responsibility and authority to
the fullest with prudence, but not with over-
caution. (Some in the group believed that the
present trend to ovorcheck the propriety, indeed
even the substantive wisdom, of many proposed
Agency initiatives would lessen as we become
more familiar with the new regulations and
controls on us. Others believed that more
checks will inevitably descend on us in time
to come, thus perpetuating the present situation.
Some believed there was a tendency to seek more
from the Inspector General and General Counsel's
offices than what either should provide, that
is, legal opinions rather than policy decisions.)
--that apart from the individual officer's duty to
fully exercise his authority, the solution also
lies in p art i.n a "styl o bade rs hi -in the
Agency that must demonstrate a real trust an -
interest in initiative, that in fact demands it,
is receptive to it and sincerely tries to
utilize it. In t e view of the group, tie way
an organization is operated is the primary
influence on the way its employees respond.
I IPeople repeat rewarded behavior and try to
stay away from what gets them in trouble. An
overly-cautious leadership that fears to use
the opportunities for a delegation of authority
promotes an overly-cautious response in its
employees. If the Agency leadership does not
repeatedly demonstrate its trust and confidence
in the rank and file, the Agency as a whole will
not be able to show it is worthy of such trust.
(Some in the group sensed an isolation problem
developed in the Agency leadership in recent
years. In the smaller, more closely knit CIA
of old there was not the private elevator, the
executive dining room, the vast building itself
that made it possible for a top manager to come
or go or to spend his whole day, if he wished,
with no real exchange down the line that might
feed him new suggestions, new initiatives from
below).
While the tendency of the group was to place the onus for
lagging initiative on attitudinal factors in the CIA, and not
on the growing strictness of actual regulations, or on the
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seemingly ever-more structured and formal mechanisms for
operation, management and decision in the Agency, there was
a considerable unease evident about how these mechanisms arc
influencing our creativeness and initiative. The MBO system,
in the view of some participants, tends artificially to drive
our activities, resulting in the setting of objectives that
may not represent a true consensus on what is really needed
in any given unit. False goals, thus set, can camouflage real
needs, meanwhile orienting the unit much more than is needed
to an information-feeding process of progress reports and
similar activity. In the view of these officers, creativity
and initiative usually suffer when activity is overly focused
behind a few formal goals.
But others took the position that MBO and similar manage-
ment techniques often provide not only the linkage for dialogue
on objectives and activities that has not existed. in many units
before, but an orderly and time-bounded procedure for the
solution of problems and completion of goals. Accordingly,
it has Thus enhanced the opportunities for lower-level
initiative and participation. The group perceived a current
lack of a sense of participation as an inhibitor of initiative.
Another factor impinging upon the climate for initiative
and innovation is the amount of frenetic distraction from our
proper intelligence role which many view to be the main result
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of the manhours spent on such things as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, the Privacy Act, and endless responding to investiga-
tions, and the simple but possibly more pernicious threat that
attention to form and artificial deadlines will outweigh
attention to substance in our work.
Age nc -personnel practices were also cited as barriers
to creativity and initiative in some instances. Much of the
individual's stimulus for initiative springs from the degree
of job satisfaction he feels. If he is constructively busy
and believes that he is contributing, his initiative and his
creativity are usually good. The trick is to construct the
division and management of work responsibilities so what the
individual feels needed and purposeful in his endeavors. This
is, of course, easier said than done in a bureaucratic organiza-
tion, especially one, according to some participants, with
serious personnel surpluses in some units at Headquarters.
The group endorsed more serious Agency efforts to develop a
"selection-out" process early in employment as one means of
coping with the personnel surplus and ma.i.ntaining job satis-
faction. Continued effort at broadening rotational assign-
ments between components and Directorates was also suggested
as an important means of infusing fresh perspectives and,
thus, more creativity throughout the CIA:
*In encouraging broadened creativity and initiative among CIA
officers, it is of course important to continue striving for
the improvement of the caliber of our people. In the view (contd.)
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The Suggestion Award System
In considering how to enhance creativity in the CIA,
attention turns naturally to the already established system
for suggestion awards in the CIA. The group discussed this
system, and the question of whether it could be further used
to encourage creativity--possibly by rewarding good ideas
that for one reason or another could not actually be implemented.
It was noted that the suggestion award system is already
one of the more successful in the government. However, its
image (somewhat inaccurately) connotes a monetary reward.for
suggestions that are mainly intended to cut financial costs
in procedures or save time. for the Agency. Altering this
image to encourage substantive initiatives on operations or
other matters might be worthwhile and is probably worth some
careful study. However, this could. result in explicit rewards
to people for simply doing their job, thus creating a psycho-
logical aura not favored by the group. Informal mechanisms,
such as "developmental" or. "think" units within individual
components did find favor as mechanisms for stimulating an
attitude or climate favoring creativity, as long as they were
sufficiently flexible, informal, and closely tied to the every-
day lifeblood activities of the units.
of the group, to do this it is necessary for management to get
a better multi - dimensional. view of its personnel for rating and
promotional purposes. One step in this direction would be the
inclusion of a peer-rating system along with supervisor-written
fitness reports. The key to such a system's success would be
to keep it focused on the positive qualities of the employee and
avoid allowing it to become a stereotyped and routine procedure.
Other steps suggested included additional emphasis on leadership
training.
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The Foreign Liaison Relationship
In response to Mr. Knoche's expressed concern that the
Agency may come under pressure to drop or alter its foreign
we should creatively attempt now to develop alternate col-
lection sources, the group arrived at a dual consensus.
One consensus was that the Agency needs to muster in
the most effective fashion it can the many good points to
be made in favor of our liaison relations. In brief, those
include:
--the fact that our entire clandestine operations
in a given country often depend on the nature
of the liaison relationship.
--the fact that we do often gain useful leverage
on a country through the liaison relationship,
leverage that is in our national interest.
--the fact that such relationships do not need to
be viewed simply in terms of maintaining or not
maintaining them. There is room in each for
limitations and alterations tailored to fit
the specific situation.
--the fact.that such relationships can and should
be used for good example purposes by showing
that our service does not engage in repressive
practices.
--the fact that, contrary to many outside critics,
our liaison relationships have not been the seed-
bed for questionable covert action operations.
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-the fact that a full public disclosure of the
reasons for relationships with foreign liaison
services cannot be made without endangering
such relationships (for example, telling the
public what a golden opportunity it presents
for us to penetrate the services with unilateral
agents).
-the fact that liaison relationships need at the
least to be studied carefully on a case by case
basis with the long-term costs and possible
benefits fully perceived. It is not possible
to develop some general moral "litmus test" on
liaison relationships. Many services, among
them some of our allies who share our general
ethical standards, have engaged in repressive,
brutal activities under certain circumstances.
In terms of alternates for liaison arrangements, the con-
sensus of the group was that we can assess rather well at this
time what we would lose by terminating them, but that the possible
substitutes are not very susceptible to analysis at this point.
It was deemed worthwhile, however, that the appropriate Agency
management specifically request ideas on substitute collection
means from the concerned units as well. as more broadly in the
DO, hoping ariier ideas from officers with varied-perspeC-
tives. (More of this type of approach on other problems was
also recommended.)
Additional. points made on the liaison question included
the view by several DO officers present that guidelines on
these aspects of liaison relationships are insufficient and
.thus have not been disseminated effectively in the ranks,
leaving many officers in the dark. The need was also sug-
gested for support of those chiefs of station who believe
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they can cause beneficial change in a foreign liaison service's
methods of operation by standing up for principles.
Opportunity for Dissent
Closely related to the encouragement of creativity and
initiative in the Agency is the creation of a climate that
does not discourage responsible dissent. The participants
in the discussion generally agreed that some of the Agency's
past difficulties and transgressions might have been avoided
had adequate channels for dissent existed.. In the past,
dissent was essentially an individual initiative, with no
guaranteed institutional reaction. The opinion was offered.
that some of our ex-employee critics may have been spurred
to publicly turn on the Agency by the inadequacy of effective
internal dissent channels in their day. Most participants
believed that today more officers are aware of the existence
of explicit institutional channels; for example, the strength-
ened. Inspector General's office, although a minority questioned
if this channel was effective for all categories of dissent.
Nevertheless, the participants agreed that many officers in
the Aeencv stilll ippear to believQthat the way to get ahead
is not to dissent from the views of authority. One attitude
survey was cited in which some 60 percent of the respondents
said they feared opening up and expressing their views. How
does the Agency overcome this frame of mind?
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The group noted that two basic types of dissent ar.e
important to consider. Each has different consequences.
There is on one hand dissent over the wisdom of a specific
operation or policy. On the other, there is the question
of dissent over the propriety in terms of ethics or law of
an operation or policy. In the latter case, channels for
registering dissent and for management to react to it are
probably adequate. This was held by the group to be true,
for example, with covert action planning. While there are
still difficulties in this field (see section on ethics in
the Agency), opportunities for dissent either in terms of
the wisdom or propriety of the planning are not among them.
But the climate for dissent in terms of challenging the
wisdom of a policy is another matter. Here, there is no easy
institutional answer. An employee seriously dissatisfied with
policy in his unit can approach the Inspector General's office.
But this constitutes a major step, traditionally used only for
issues of wide and serious significance. What about the day-
to-da.y process in any individual unit of truly exposing the
pros and cons of proposed activities? Does the climate exist
to encourage this in a healthy way? Efforts to formalize or
institutionalize the process at this level would. be counter-
productive, according to the participants, who feared it
might spur the "Sam Adams mentality." Some present, in
fact, contended that the growing formalit and organizational
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discipline in our overall managerial and control structure
is ~_robably undercut t__ iI~ expressions of _dissent~__forcin~
it to be registered with such formality__and finiteness that
employees find. the~rocess seriously intimidating.
But the problems should not be thought of as simply one.
of expressions of view from the lower level upward. The issue
is really the degree of openness existing_abov_e _the_ level of
the individual ofF_icer's sp}iere of res~onsibilit~.^.The wad
to 'achieve this o~enness,_ said. the discussants unanimollsly,
is to make sure that the decision-maki.I~_~-rocess up and down
the line is open and encour_a.~~s ~artici.pants at all levels,
that it is a process that truly reflects the pros and con`s_of
a given situation. This is accomplished a managerial
attitude that encaur~es alte7?nate views, is willing to
tolerate them, and to give them a fair and responsive
hearing. If this attitude exists, it is quickly communicated
throughout the organization. The need for formal channels or
official mechanisms is di.minishec}, if not eliminated.
}9here institutional mechanisms are needed, some l.n the
group suggested the value of recent experiments with so-called
"A and B teanr" approaches in which a policy option, recommenda-
tion, or proposed operation is formally examined by groups
with opposing points of view, each seeking to muster the best
argLlments for its view, but with each required to address the
issue from comparable perspectives. Obviously, such an approach
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is most useful. on issues of real significance and considerable
breadth where time is not of particular essence. One group
member a.1 so suggested that the Agency study the utility of
an ombudsman system similar to that existing today irx a number
of public and private organizations.
hthics i.n the ~l~cnc~
The issue before the discussion group in this sphere was
whether. the CIA as an organization should give explicit atten-
tion to the nature and adequacy of its ethical values and, if
so, how this should be approached. Before focusing on this
general issue, the group attempted to identify the major Agency
activities that often appear to raise questions of moral
standards or values. It was asserted by some present that
Agency employees as we1.1 as outsiders tend to view the ethical
issue as focused primarily on the D0. While there is reason
for this, it is clear that issues of ethical standards also
arise with significant consequences in the other Directorates.
Some of those mentioned for the DDI were:
--how to deal with requests for intelligence
analysis that partially involved assessments
of. t1.S. domestic developments. (The student
attitude memorandums of the 1960'x.)
--dealing with requests for intelligence analysis,
especially from Congress, where the encl use may
be to prove a partisan political case, or even
to support a re-election campaign.
--dealing with requests for intelligence analysis
where it appears t}tat a jttdgrnent supporting a
policy position is desired by the rec}uestor.
This is cornplieatcd. by institutional coordina-
tion problems. .
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Some ethical issues in the DDSFT involve:
--the proper control of contract activity to avoid
opportunities for gr. aft or other fiscal abuses.
--.the extent to which the analysis of foreign civil
technological developments can be conducted.
-Issues of i.ndustri.al espionage arise here, as
do c{uestions of the release of the analysis
without unfair benefit to U.S. firms.
In the DDA some of the main issues involve contract
control and the Tnaintenance of the proper relationship between
For the most: part, however, the group concentrated its
discussion on the agent-ca_se afficer relationship in the D(~
and ora covert action operations. }yith regard to agent
recruitment, some participants said that ethically the agent
is considered a "consenting adult," usually more aware of the
personal perils of his espionage activity than his case officer.
Strategies which obtain his services under duress are not to
be ruled out, although it is clear that most successful agent
recruitments, certainly the more productive ones, usually are
based on more positive factors. Two areas of agent x?elati_on-
ships that were mentioned as warranting strong ethical concern
by case officers involve recognition of the duty to protect
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the agent from danger and identification if at all possible
and to arrange a fair and equitable termination settlement
when that point arises. In bath relationships, according to
one participant, the Agency has a.t best been inconsistent.
There was unease expressed over the Agency's future ability
to protect the identity of. its agents and in turn the moral
conviction with which. the officer can promise protection to
the agent. Mast of the participants expressed themselves as
against instructions to an agent that his handlers know would
place him in extreme danger of identification or personal
harm. It was also generally agreed that the Agency does not
really take a needed long-term view of its agents, and that
ethical issues arise for the most part from the short-term,
pragmatic decisions made with regard to agents. MI30 pressures
which are akin to "seal}~ hunting" exacerbate the problem.
With respect to covert acti_on_o~erations, the_~_roup
agreed that a serious attitudinal problem exists throu hoiat
the .Agency that not on~_ questions the ethical propriety of
the covert action conceit, but also involves the willingness
of many officers to take pro~~osed operations seriously enough
to do adequate planni~ and evaluation in connection ~,rith them.
With regard. to the ethical propriety of the covert action
concept, it was agreed. that there is little use within the
Agency in debating it in the abstract. An official statement
aimed at our employees ex}~laining the ~enc~s~olicy on
covert action was deemed worthy of consideration by the
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Agency's leaders}_ lid. 'T'his, it was believed, would help
generate a climate of openness about CA activity within
the Agency that would aid in reassuring those employees
who question the Agency's ethical stance on this issue.
It would be difficult to avoid phraseology in such a
statement that might negatively restrict the Agency's hand,
if times and circumstances of external threat to the U.S.
change. An effort to develop such a statement was neverthe-
less seen as worthwhile.
With regard to the adequacy of planning within the
Agency for covert action, there was a consensus that an
explicit educational effort_i.s necded~to increase under-
standing and acceptance of how the CA lanning and decision
rocess now operates. Such an. effort would seek to make
clear the opportunities in the process for evaluation of the
pros anal cons arfd the desire of. the Agency to consider proposed
CA operations not only in terms of: the efficiency of the plan,
but also i.n terms of its chances of achieving its intended
result and the likely consequences of that result.
The issue of whethex the Agency needs to develop and
promulgate a general ethical canon or coc}e for its activities
drew a mixed reaction from the participants. It was asserted
that younger officers in the Agency have a strong concern over
ethical issues, and feel the weight of past "transgressions"
by the Agency together with the resporlsi.bi.lity for preventing
them in the future. Unless we develop a canon, according to
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one participant, wa really have no coherent way to pass on
the traditional ethical standards of the Agency to younger
officers. Another participant said. that any organization
with a mission as structured as that of the Agency has a
de facto code of ethics whether it is written down or not.
U.S. mi].i.tary organizations, it was noted, have recognized
this and have attempted with some success to develop ethical
canons responsive to the military mission. Agency critics,
of course, are heavily concerned with the ethical Question
and, in the view of some participants, the Agency has failed
to answer them effectively because it has not consciously
developed a full and explicit ethical stance. hie need to
set some clear norms for ourselves, one part:i.cipant said,
because we are a.t our worst when we feel we can act dif-
ferently from others. Our ethical responsibility to each
other as intelligence officers and as at least one officer
believed, to the people of the United States, is of vital
importance in maintaining the esprit__de_corps and effective-
ness of the Agency. Although no code can guarantee to slop
ethical abuses ,_ i.t cau.ld help.. One thing no code can be
expected to do, in the view of the majority oi' the part.i.ci-
pants, is to ec{uip the Agency to say no to an outside admin-
istration or to Congressional pressure. If a code were
developed, it was the unanimous view of the group that the
Agency leadership, to make it effective, would .have to stand
consistently and clearly behind it.
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There was a clear awareness that an attempt to develop a.
formal code would be a formidable task, and might have some
adverse effects. Such an e:rfort could be viewed on the out-
side as hypocritical. Does an espionage organization really
want to set professional standards for itself that put it on a
_par_in a sense with established professions li.kc medicine
and law which aperate with canons of their own? How specific
should. such a code be? How general? 'There would be so many
twists and turns and subtleties of meaning to consider that
the chances for misinterpretation and indeed the lack of
clear understanding woul_d_ be very large. One participant
feared that such a code would. only confuse the case officer,
making him tend. to shy away from the tougher agent decisions
and initiatives--often the vital lifeblood of espionage.
The opportunities for various perceptions of such a canon
wore illustrated in a discussion of one such code that has been
developed in draft. and. circulated. far comment. Some Agency
managers to whom i_t was shown abject.ed on grounds that i:t added.
unnecessarily to their responsibilities; middle-level officers
liked it, seeing it in part as a wedge with superiors to fight
objectionable orders; the young officers in the DO liked it
because it offered. them an ethical rationale for engaging in
espionage.
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One participant who was not enthusiastic ,about developing
a code ox canon of ethics suggested that if such an effort
wexe made it should be cast in the form of a sort of charter
in which the ur ose of the organization i.s set forth in
positive terms rather than i.n terms of ideals such as objec-
tivity. Such a charter would permit Chef.desired ideals to
flaw from the positive statement of purpose. There is a danger
in setting up a list of negative "do-not's" in that we woulc}
appear to be stating that we would. on]_y execute those orders
which fit within some stated set of ethics.
Whether or not it would prove possible to develop a satis-
factory and defensible canon, there emerged a general co~isensus
amon~the group that the Agency should probably make a serious
attempt at it, while takingsome other specific steps aimed at
focusing the ethical_ consciousness of CIA above the subliminal
level of concern at which it now exists. The very effort
itself, whether. we ever get to a fixed canon, may be the most
wor.i:hwhile part of it. Discussion of ethical issues is needed
far new people coming into the Agency. It offers them the
opportunity to confront, and to explore problems they may
face later in the course of their careers. Discussion of
ethical issues should be made a part of the training program
with specific time for the subject built into a variety of
training courses including those for operational officers,
analysts and support officers.
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ANNEX A - RECOh11viENDATIONS
of the Seminar on Ethics and Creativity in CIA
held 11 and 12 November 1976
1. To Pxeserve and Enhance Employee Creativity and Initiative,
the Agency Should:
a. take every o~~portunity to stress that individual
officers should try to exercise their responsi-
bility and authority to the :Fullest, avoiding
unnecessary referrals of minor matters up the
line.
b, take every opportunity to stress the interest
in and receptiveness of ma.nagemeiit to individual
initiative.
c. continue to stress and develop personnel programs
designed to cut the. size of the Agency's work
force, improve i.ts evaluation systems for
employees and provide opportunities for rota-
tional assignments.
d. seek to stem the trend of decision-making
authority to rise to ever-higher levels by
a conscious effort to delegate authority
downward, and. set a tone oI, trust to~tirards
the levels to which that aut:hori.ty has been
delegated..
e. take a detached look at the extent to which Iv1BO
and other formal management systems may be
inhibiting crea.t:.ivity.
f. encourage the further deve]opmcnt at a component
level of informal "developmental" or "idea" units.
2. In Coping With Criticism of CIA Foreign Liaison Relation-
ships, the Agency Should:
a. explicitly develop far use with the critics the
best possible case for maintenance of- responsible
liaison.
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b. explicatl.y request interested Agency officers
to come forward with ideas for new collection
techniques to compensate for any future losses
in liaison information.
c. encourage initiatives designed to modify
objectionable behavior of liaison services.
3. To Enhance a CIA Internal Climate that Does not Discourage
Responsible Dissent, Management Throughout the Agency Shotald:
a. take every oppoxtuni.ty to maintain an open
decision.-making process up and down the line
that truly provides opportunities for pro and
con cansid.eration. of issues i.n a given situation.
b. avoid the creation of, further formal mechanisms
f.or dissent, while seeking to apply, where cir-
cumstances seem appropriate, such techniques as
the A team, B team approach to problems and.
issues.
4. To Enhance Our Ethical Consciousness, the Agency Should:
a. authorize an explicit, broadly-based effort to
develop an ethical canon, recognizing that this
is a tricky, difficult task, but that the benefits
of the process itself will. probably be well worth
the effort.
b. provide explicit opportunities in the training
cycle of the Agency for the discussion and
exploration of ethical problems that arise
in all parts of the Agency.
c, consider the dissemination of_ an official
statement aimed at our employees clclimiting
and explaining the Agency's policies and
processes on covert action.
*This recommendation was supported by a majority; a minority
believes t}iere should be further formal mechanisms on major
issues.
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