STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00630A000100040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: STUDY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOL. 22 No. 3 FALL 1978
TR-SINT 78-003
SECRET 0436
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Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to U.S.
personnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this iournal
is to be treated as information privy to the U.S. official community.
All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered
serially, accountable, and subiect to recall. Copies which are no longer
needed by recipients must be returned to the Editor's office, 1036 C of
C Bldg., or may be destroyed if a Destruction Notice showing Volume
number, Issue number, and Copy number is sent to the Editor.
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors.
They do not necessarily represent the official views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other component of the
intelligence community.
M/arning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be
written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or
historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsilrility for accepting or rejecting
an article rests with the Editorial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or not, in
the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribu-
tion to the literature of intelligence.
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Helene Boatner
Maurice C. Ernst
Harry E. Fitzwater
Sidnev N. Graybeal
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Sayre Stevens
John Waller
Additdonal members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from
any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside.
Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room
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0
'THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AND
SHERMAN KENT AWARDS
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the
literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the Studies. The prize may be
divided if the two or more best articles submitted are fudged to be of equal merit, or it
may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional $500 is
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Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subiect
within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be
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CONTENTS
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Assessing DUO Human Source Reporting ................................ Fenton Babcock
Evaluation + feedback =guidance ~SECRET~
A Bible Lesson on Spying ........................................................ John M. Cardwell 59
Another critique of Moses and Joshua ~UNCLASSIFIED~
SECRET MORI/HRP THIS PAGE
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There is no phase in the intelligence Prosiness which is more
important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself
and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, this
relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automati-
cally, does not do this. It is established as a result of a great deal
of persistent conscious effort, and is likely to disappear when the
effort is relaxed.
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence
for American World Policy
ASSESSING DDO HUMAN SOURCE REPORTING
Sherman Kent's call for close and continuing contact between intelligence
producers and consumers came in the CIA's formative years. It is appropriate to sound
it again as centralized management of the intelligence community takes on new form
and importance and new life. In recent years, the Directorate of Operations (DO) has
been making a particularly conscious effort to get closer to the people who use its
products, as it seeks to produce better intelligence, on a wider variety of subjects, with
fewer resources. The DO has gotten direct payoff from this development; hundreds of
consumers and users of DO reporting have found benefit in responding to the DO's
techniques for getting their evaluative feedback; and closer communication has
brought some problems and solutions that could well have relevance at the intelligence
community level.
This is a record of producer-consumer contacts that have settled into awell-
defined relationship that is, in Sherman Kent's terms, both proper and effective. As a
result, progress has been made toward the goal of producing valuable reporting from
economical exploitation of resources. Much remains to be done, however, in relating
collection results to resources in a systematic way. Human source reporting does not
defy centralized management; it simply requires that the development of systems for
this purpose proceed with extra care and attention to the human and security factors
involved. This applies to the collection and production of HUMINT as well as the
assessment of its effect, impact, and value. The DO record of improvement in its
evaluation system is one of careful pioneering. It has involved:
a. increasing the field collector's responsibility for pre-selection of
intelligence information according to its projected value;
b. shifting emphasis in the headquarters reports officer's role from that
of intelligence processor to that of quality control specialist responsible for
providing reliable value readings and projections to the field; and
c. developing communication with consumers and users so as to
increase the regularity, scope, and depth of evaluative feedback for
collection guidance, resource allocation, and budgetary purposes.
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VaCue Assessment in the Field
Historically and typically, the DO reports evaluation process begins in the field
with the quality control applied by the individual case officer overseas, or the
Domestic Collection Division (DCD) intelligence officer in the United States, under
the supervision of their chiefs. The important task of the field collector has already
been well described in terms of fundamental responsibility and technique by Bruce L.
Pechan in "The Collector's Role in Evaluation." ~ In brief, the case officer must
provide up-to-date evaluation of his source's reliability, and as collector he is also
responsible for giving a current account of changeable circumstances surrounding the
acquisition of the information being reported. In addition to these evaluative inputs,
the field collector must also apply his iudgment on the relevance, importance, and
timeliness of the information obtained. If he kills his own draft report, his iudgment is
usually final, and his right to do so is virtually uncontested. Indeed, he is enioined not
to process information that he confidently fudges to be marginal.
In recent years there has been fairly steady increase in the percentage of the DO's
overseas field reports that are received in cable form for dissemination. Much of that
reporting is held briefly (at the field's request) for special review by the controlling
area division, but it arrives in finished form designed for consumer use in response to
expressed requirements. Headquarters evaluation may result in stopping dissemina-
tion or adding commentary which is clearly labelled as such and differentiated from
any field comment or source comment the report may contain. Field comment rarely
addresses the basic value of the information reported, for that is implicit in the
finished form of the report. Determination of the value of a disseminated report is
properly left to headquarters, where a good basis for comparison with other
information exists and direct reading from Washington consumers can be obtained.
Intelligence information of a largely tactical nature is frequently passed by the field
collector to the U.S. mission directly concerned without formal dissemination. In those
cases, the local consumers of such "actionable intelligence," on narcotics for example,
are obviously most accessible to the field collector for his evaluation purposes.
Field evaluation as a basic responsibility is similar in the case of DCD's domestic
voluntary collection.2 Only a small percentage of DCD's reporting is processed in
cable form, but it is nevertheless prepared by the field intelligence officers in finished
form, ready, in their iudgment, for dissemination in response to legitimate need.
Again, the individual collector is acting as initial evaluator and is expected to equip
himself constantly through the reading of available collection guidance, standing and
spot requirements, and collateral material such as finished intelligence.
In recent years, the DO has been pushing and improving its training courses on
reporting for both clandestine and DCD collection officers in order to sharpen not
only their processing capabilities but also their evaluative skills and iudgment. There
has been direct payoff in terms of quality control exercised by the field collector on his
own and his responsiveness to the headquarters quality control measures described
below. The best evidence of this is the substantial decline recorded in the Directorate's
total volume of reporting over the past few years and the assessed general increase in
quality relative to the total number of reports produced. What makes this assessment
possible is the advent of truly systematic collection of consumer feedback by a
Directorate-level evaluation staff.
' Studies V/3, pp. 37-47.
E'I'he term "domestic voluntary collection" is introduced here as a substitute for the misleading
expression "overt collection," as applied to the Domestic Collection Division of the DO.
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ssessmg UU
Value Assessment in the Headquarters Divisions
Evaluative comment to the field collector is routinely made by the operating area
divisions on nearly all clandestine reports that are published, DCD similarly sends
comments to the domestic field offices concerned on most of the reports they produce.
In both cases the comment made and the grade given each report are supposed to be,
and often are, directly reflective of consumer evaluation obtained by the headquarters
reports or desk officers. In general, such contacts are limited to obtaining timely
feedback on current reporting. Most such comment is obtained by telephone, but often
the desk-level officers consult directly with one or more analyst consumers of the
report. Consistency in this desk contact procedure is spotty, however, and increasingly
so as it extends to the analyst consumers outside the CIA headquarters building and to
the users at the policy and program level.
The grades given to DO reports by headquarters are weighted to reward quality
and discourage reporting that is of minor value. In 1974 the criteria for grading reports
were standardized throughout the Directorate, By 1978, however, it had become clear
that the area divisions were applying the "standardized" grades with different degrees
of strictness, while DCD had developed its own quite different set of grades. In
general, grade Category V, for reports that "contribute substantially to an identified
national intelligence need," has been overused. In part, this is because the next lower
grade available under the existing system is Category I, for reports that "fall near the
lower limit of acceptability." The result has been inflated use of the V grade. This,
combined with the differing standards of application among the divisions, prevents
use of grading results for central management purposes.
Within the various divisions, the grading of reports has generally served its
original purpose of improving quality relative to quantity. Judicious use by the
divisions of the higher grades, on the whole, has contributed to this pattern of
improvements the grade X (10) is applied to reports making a "maior contribution to a
national level need," and XX (20) to a report that is "outstanding in its significance to
the well-being of the U.S." It is on the assignment of these higher grades that consumer
influence often is brought directly to bear. The bi-weekly grading sessions on China
reporting, for example, are regularly attended by NFAC analysts who comment
specifically on the grades being assigned.
Value Assessment at the Directorate Level
Complementing and following up on this ad hoc communication with consumers
of the Directorate's human source reporting is the systematic process carried out by
the Evaluation Group, a direct staff element of the Deputy Director for Operations,
This group makes regular, personal contact with across-section of key consumers and
users of the DO reporting throughout the intelligence community and beyond. The
irnmediate Washington customers for both the DO's foreign clandestine and DCD
collection products range from specialized analysts in NFAC, State/INR, and DIA to
departmental policy action officers. The ultimate users of the DO's intelligence
information are the policymakers of the Cabinet and the National Security Council,
the heads of U.S. missions and military commands, and the U.S. military R&D project
managers throughout the country.
The 500 key Washington consumers and users who are interviewed quarterly by
members of the Evaluation Group have been remarkably responsive to this evaluation
effort, many of them recognizing that regular, active and responsible participation in
the process pays them direct dividends. In anticipation of the Evaluation Group's
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Assessing HUMINT
direct periodic contact, many of the analyst consumers and policy-level users not only
read the DO reporting with a somewhat different perspective, but many save up
specific comment in mental or written note form. In the interviews they are called
upon to react to monthly computer listings of the reports by title. In this way, memory
of a certain report often serves as an initial indicator of effect.
The interview becomes successful, however, only when the customer spells out his
actual use, or non-use, of an individual report or the reports in an identifiable stream.
When circumstances call for it, he or she will be asked to explain as exactly as possible
ho~v a certain report affected the writing of an item of finished intelligence or a U.S.
policy action, or haw it may have frustrated the customer, or failed to meet
requirements. In the interviewing, the Evaluation Group contact specialists have been
successful in getting a mix of candidly critical and complimentary feedback because
of the personal, substantive nature of the dialogues they sustain with the customers.
Thorough preparation for the interviews is made through prior reading of all the
reports being evaluated along with the pertinent operational messages, plus other
agency reporting, finished intelligence on the subiects being pursued, and open-source
information that bears on them. The subiects covered in interviews are: the "hard
targets" (USSR, PRC, Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, Indochina); some 50 non-
communist world countries; and international functional topics, including economics,
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics.
Significant comments on individual reports, critical or complimentary, are passed
on to the collecting divisions to complement the results of their own earlier ad hoc
contact with some of the same customers on some of the reports. Usually, the source of
a particularly candid comment made to the Evaluation Group officer on a report, or a
collection effort, is not revealed to the division. The retrospective evaluation obtained
by the Evaluation Group is frequently passed on farther by the operating desks and
reports officers to the collector in the field. The independent character of the
Evaluation Group's feedback from customers often complements very effectively the
earlier feedback obtained by the division at the time of a report's dissemination. In a
significant number of instances the value of a report will have risen or fallen
substantially since it was assessed by a consumer on a current basis.
It is the continuum of feedback and its cumulative weight that contribute so
effectively to desk-level or field decisions on reward or termination of a reporting
source and to their review of progress and direction in individual collection operations.
The customers appreciate this pattern of discreet and effective use of their comments,
and many have come to feel personally involved in an evaluation process that they like
and respect. They and their supervisors fudge their time to be well spent in responding
to requests for current evaluation, and they value and use the privileged channel to the
Deputy for Operations and his collection managers that the Evaluation group
provides.
The results of the Evaluation Group's interviews have other uses after they are
compiled and synthesized in narrative form every six months. Combined with
statistics prepared by the Group, the customer commentary provides the DDO with a
semi-annual independent evaluation of the Directorate's foreign intelligence
production. The DDO uses portions of this material frequently in responding to
oversight inquiries, and a significant portion of it feeds into the human source
collection part of the CIA's annual budget presentation. The narratives are sent to the
collecting divisions, which use them in overall collection guidance and send specific
extracts to the field stations concerned.
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A Careful Approach to Quantification of Value
The feedback achieved through personal contact with consumers and users of DO
reporting stands in sharp contrast to the unsuccessful use of cover sheet questionnaires
in the past, which were designed to`bring a degree of quantification to the evaluation
process. Quantification of the unquantifiable in human source reporting is not now
being attempted by the DO. The use of cover sheet questionnaires on approximately
one-third of the clandestine reports disseminated came to an end in the mid-1970's. By
then, many analyst consumers had been turned off by that mechanistic technique for
obtaining evaluation, and the unreliable results had fallen into disuse within the DO.
The Domestic Collection Division still uses such forms for some of its S&T reporting
but mainly for obtaining follow-up requirements and direct collection guidance, as
opposed to evaluation.
The Evaluation Group's system of direct, personal contact with customers has,
however, been used in a measured approach to value quantification. In 1976 the
Evaluation Group's personalized approach brought consumer identification of certain
streams of DO reporting that pointed toward dollar value impact among the ultimate
users of the intelligence information in the U.S. military R&D community. From DIA
and the service command intelligence staffs, the trail led to many U.S. military sub-
commands, their foreign intelligence officers, and on to individual R&D project
managers in a variety of military and civilian installations and institutions throughout
the country. Tracing the reporting through its use in finished intelligence proved to be
no problem, for the same warm response was encountered among the ultimate users of
the DO human source information as had been the case in the Washington community
of customers. Most quickly came to recognize that the DO needed to include in its
budget preparation and resource allocation processes what evidence it could of actual
effect, impact, and value in its reporting product. The tangible benefit feedback thus
obtained by the Evaluation Group over the past two years has identified utility gains
associated with certain disseminated information, including beneficial redirection of
some U.S. funds in very large amounts and some actual dollar savings. In many cases,
the evidence of impact has included information on certain U.S. military
vulnerabilities and capabilities that carried an obligation for the Evaluation Group to
give it the most careful protection.
A few examples will indicate the scope and magnitude of human source report
impact that has been certified under the Evaluation Group's tangible benefit feedback
program. In the course of several years, DO reports provided information on Soviet
electronics countermeasure capabilities and tactics that transformed the U.S.
perception of that threat and led to very extensive beneficial change in certain U.S.
equipment and troop training procedures. In other instances, the DO's human source
reporting has combined critically with the results of technical collection, often
providing the confidence factor required by analysts before publishing their findings
in vital areas of research and development. This has been the case in many fields
including naval weaponry, electronic warfare, aircraft, and missiles. In most cases,
very large amounts of R&D funds have been involved, with the cumulative total
related directly to DO intelligence information running into billions of dollars.
Specific correlation between this human source reporting and dollar value impact has
not been pressed by the Evaluation Group in most instances during its personal
contacts throughout the U.S. military R&D community. This is because the direct
nature of the impact has been so readily certified by nearly all of the key customers
involved, and because of methodological difficulties that are encountered in moving
the last mile toward quantification of value.3
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SECRET Assessing HUMINT
Conscious of the fundamental difficulty in quantifying the value of human
source reporting, the Evaluation Group has moved carefully in extending its effort in
this regard beyond the tangible benefit feedback program. At one extreme the Group
highlights for the DDO many instances of reporting where intangible benefit of
considerable significance has been identified by policy users. A good example here is
frequent reporting on bilateral or multilateral negotiations involving the United States.
Cabinet-level officials have been quick to certify direct, heavy impact of DO
intelligence upon negotiations they have conducted, particularly in the field of
international economics. Similar hard evidence of impact, however intangible, has
been readily forthcoming with regard to nuclear proliferation. Here, policy users have
several times been able to trace for us the connection bet~yen the DO intelligence they
received-often a combination of clandestine and DCD reporting-and successful
U.S. diplomatic demarches made to foreign governments.
At the other end of the Evaluation Group's quantification spectrum lie the
tentative steps taken so far toward possible scalar valuation of the Directorate's human
source reporting. So far, this has involved learning about the efforts made under
professional guidance at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, for
example, in placing numerical values on the intangible results of some of its programs.?
The Evaluation Group's contact specialists have undertaken some systematic use
of specific value criteria in their interviews on an experimental basis. This has been
done with a view to bringing outside methodological expertise to bear in analyzing the
results, for possible use in moving toward limited quantification where it is feasible.
The Evaluation Group's approach to the quantification of value in its human source
reporting has been one of alert carefulness, and the appropriateness of this approach
has been confirmed by the experience of other collection managers in the intelligence
community.
Along with its narrative accounts of key customer feedback in synthesized form,
and the certifiable evidence of impact and benefit noted above, the Evaluation
Group's comprehensive semi-annual production reviews have included various
statistical arrays designed to give the DDO semi-quantitative evaluation of the DO
reporting product. These have included recorded use of reports in finished
intelligence; responsiveness to Key Intelligence Questions; and responsiveness to those
national-level information needs identified in the course of FOCUS reviews (carried
out by the National Intelligence Officers and the DCI's Human Resources
Committee), which have been accepted by the DO as suitable for clandestine
collection and levied as requirements on the field. In addition, the Evaluation Group
has tracked reporting responsiveness to portions of DCID 1/2 and some of the draft
National Intelligence Topics, on an experimental basis.
Relevance at the Intelligence Community Level
Many of the Evaluation Group's regular contacts have sought to use it as a
channel for levying requirements and giving collection guidance. Although generally
discouraged by the interviewers, this type of customer feedback is recorded by the
Group when it is evaluative in nature. Most of the consumer analysts know well that
other, regular channels exist for requirements and guidance, but a dismaying number
simply don't know exactly what those channels are or how to use them. A substantial
number of customers have felt frustrated in their use of regular, formal channels over
`See "Effectiveness Assessment in Government," by Lynn P. Madden (Management Sciences Training
Center, U.S. Civil Service Commission).
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the years, and have overloaded the informal channels that exist or stopped using either
effectively.
The Evaluation Group's experience over several years has shown, for example,
that the present system of communication between some U.S. military end-users and
CIA's collectors of human source intelligence is not adequate. In many instances, the
fact that certain human source information, if collected within a certain time frame,
could have tremendous impact on very high-cost U.S. military programs has just not
found its way through the existing communication circuit. That circuit contains
various filters that serve the good purpose of preventing tasking overload, but they are
counterproductive when they stop the kind of directional feedback cited above from
reaching critical points. The present system for U.S. military tasking of human source
collection lacks a reliable, centralized tuning capability, Clear beneficial results have
come from careful correlation between HUMINT collection effort and ultimate
potential yield in this realm of very large U.S. military payoff; but they have often
stemmed only from special task force approaches or crusades carried out key individual
users.
This tasking-type feedback on relative priority among customers' needs for
information from human source collection has made up an integral part of the semi-
annual production reviews prepared by the Evaluation Group for the DDO. For the
division reports officer, who may upon occasion get too close to the intelligence
information he is processing, and the operations officer who may get overly bound up
in his particular collection effort, this type of directional feedback from key customers
can be very useful. This is particularly true, of course, where all-source comparison by
the customers brings out undesirable duplication of collection effort and helps to
identify those areas of intelligence need where human source collection can contribute
best, if not uniquely.
Reliability in consumer and end-user feedback on the effect, impact, and relative
value of intelligence information depends much upon the nature of the relationship
between the collector and these customers. If it is a proper relationship, both
systematic and personalized, then built-in dangers such as human error and bias can
be dealt with professionally.5 Statistical support to evaluation and the goal of
quantification can, as a result, be kept on the right perspective. With the array of
techniques now in use, and direct customer participation steadily adding scope and
depth to evaluation, the DO can proceed with some confidence in matching its
shrinking resources to the increasing demands of our time.
Could other intelligence agencies and the community as a whole benefit from the
DO's experience? Several agencies have been interested enough to request detailed
briefings on the DO system, and a community seminar is being organized on the
problern of quantification in assessing human source reporting.
As the DO has found, close consumer contact, with evidence of results obtained
therefrom, is the best way to make intelligence consumers and users clear on both the
potentialities and the limitations of human source collection, as compared to other
forms. Good, regular communication on through to the field, by extension, has also
helped many customers better assess, sort out, and articulate their intelligence needs
and. priorities. Such, then, can be the mutually beneficial results of the proper,
effective relationship between intelligence and its users that Sherman Kent called for
some thirty years ago.
' See Richarcls J. Heuer, Jr. "Cognitive Biases: Problems in Hindsight Analysis," Studies XXII/2.
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One more round with espionage
by Moses and Joshua
A BIBLE LESSON ON SPYING
For the past few years the Central Intelligence Agency has come under
considerable scrutiny. Major issues have been raised regarding oversight and control,
the intent being to insure accountability and legality. With the advent of the Carter
administration, the issue of morality has also been made a major concern. Today the
CIA and the nation are confronted with a perplexing situation: how can we engage in
secret operations with oversight of these operations lying essentially in the public
domain (Congress) and conduct inherently insidious spying activities that must also
conform to traditional non-spying standards of ethical conduct and morality.
In an effort to seek some solutions to these problems, it is natural that we should
explore historical precedents to determine what lessons and. insights the past might
offer. One rich source of information that should not be overlooked is the Holy Bible.
The purpose therefore of this discussion is to explore the issue of spying as it occurs in
the Bible and examine the lessons it might offer. Perhaps new perspectives can be
found that will offer guidance regarding how "...one Nation, under God ..." should
go about the business of spying.
The subject of spying appears in numerous places throughout the Old and New
Testament. ~ Spies were used by the Israelites against their adversaries, and on occasion
various factions within the tribes of Israel used spies against each other. In the New
Testament, spies were used by the political forces opposed to the emerging Christian
movement and by members of the early Christian church to protect itself. There are
many additional incidents in which individuals clearly engaged in espionage activities
but are not normally referenced using those terms. For example, Judas could be
described as leaving been a secret agent for the Sanhedrin because of his role in the
betrayal of Jesus.
Spying as an activity is not treated as an issue in either the Old or the New
Testaments and is discussed or mentioned only as an event worth reporting. As a
consequence, the lessons to be learned from examining the Scriptures must be inferred
in the context of narrative experiences. Guidance to be derived from the study of
biblical spying events is therefore subjective and dependent upon the approach and
depth from which inferences are drawn. In this discussion, however, the objective has
been to emphasize the facts and keep interpretations to a minimum.
The earliest mention of spying i.rt the Old Testament occurs in the story of
Joseph,z After Joseph had been sold 1>y his brothers into bondage and had later
maneuvered himself into a position of influence in the Egyptian government, his
' All references cited in this article can be found in the Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, Thomas
Nelson and Sons, New York, 1959.
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Biblical Spying
brothers came to Egypt to buy food during a famine, They were brought before
Joseph but did not recognize him. Joseph, however, did recognize them, and in an
effort to hide his recognition, accused them of coming to Egypt not to buy food but to
spy. Evidently spying was an established fact of life, well familiar to Joseph.
There are only two spying incidents in the Bible in which methods and sources
are discussed in any detail, and both occur in the Old Testament. The first incident
occurred under the direction of Moses shortly after he led the Israelites out of Egypt.a
They had camped in the wilderness of Paran near the boundary of the Promised
Land, and Moses used spies to determine what the Promised Land was like. The
second occurred approximately 40 years later under the direction of Joshua.' At that
time, the Israelites had completed their soiourn in the desert and were again about to
enter the Promised Land. There is a remarkable contrast not only in terms of methods
and sources used by these two outstanding biblical leaders, but also in the different
administrative procedures governing these two operations and the kinds of people
involved. From an analysis of these two operations, biblical experience and
perspectives with respect to spying are revealed.g
The children of Israel were divided into 12 tribes, or family groups, each tribe
having its own leaders and hierarchy. The society was predominantly patriarchal in
nature with the leader of each tribe acting as a kind of benevolent dictator or governor
over his group. In him was vested the responsibility for providing administrative, leggy,
military, social, economic, and religious guidance and leadership. Moses was~the
overall leader and spokesman of the tribes but he exercised final authority only upon
the consensus of the people and the leaders of the 12 tribes. Forty years later Joshua
occupied roughly the same position as Moses. Both men, therefore, were not absolute
rulers of the tribes of Israel. The people could, and occasionally did, reiect their
leadership.
Moses conducted the earliest spying operation recorded in the Bible. As
previously mentioned, the purpose of this operation was to "spy out" Canaan.g He
chose 12 prominent individuals, one from each of the 12 tribes, to be his spies and
instructed them to go into the Promised Land and learn what the land was like. To
provide proof that indeed it was a "land flowing with milk and honey," he instructed
his spies to return with samples of fruit. These spies spent 40 days in the Promised
Land, returned as instructed with information regarding the cities and the population,
and delivered samples of fruit. Upon their return, they reported their findings
publicly to Moses and the 12 tribes. They brought back a uniform opinion regarding
the cities, number of peoplet lay of the land, and the fact that the countryside was
indeed "flowing with milk and honey." Ten of the spies, however, reported that the
people were so physically large and well organized that if an invasion was attempted,
the Israelites would be destroyed. Only two of the spies reported that they were
confident that they could succeed and argued strenuously to go forward with the
invasion. In the ensuing public debate, the Israelites became frightened by the
negative report of the 10 spies and lost confidence that they could succeed in an
invasion. They advocated stoning the two spies who said that an invasion should be
attempted.
? Numbers 13-14
' Joshua 2
?Intelligence operations by Moses and Joshua have previously figured in "Decision Trees" by Dr. Edwin
C. Sapp, Studies XVIII/4, and "Scientific and Technical Intelligence" by Robert M. Clark, Studies XIX/1,
pp. 46-47.
? The complete story of the espionage mission can be found in Numbers 13 and Numbers 14:1-10. The
consequences are described in Numbers 14:10-34.
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Moses was distraught at the loss of confidence by the Israelites, especially after
they had been safely delivered out of Egypt and had successfully crossed the Red Sea.
Their attitude brought them dangerously close to losing their status as God's chosen
people, but Moses argued successfully on their behalf. They were nevertheless severely
punished for their failure. They were told that they would be required to remain in
the wilderness one year for every day the spies spent in the Promised Land, that is, 40
years for the 40 days spent spying. They were furthermore told that everyone over the
age of 20 would be denied entry into the Promised Land, and that the only exceptions
would be the two spies who maintained their faith. Even Moses was told he would not
enter the Promised Land, and he did not,' Thus the first spying operation discussed in
the Bible ended in failure and had disastrous consequences for the population.
Forty years later the Israelites found themselves again preparing to enter the
Promised Land, this time under the leadership of Joshua.8 Joshua was, by the way, one
of the two surviving spies who had participated in the operation conducted under
Moses.9 As before, there was a need. to send spies into the Promised Land to get
intelligence to support the invasion. Joshua, however, went about things quite
differently. He chose two young men whose names are not recorded and instructed
them to go into Canaan and to reconnoiter the city of Jericho.10 The spies went to
Jericho and visited a harlot named Rahab. Although the presence of the spies was
reported to the local authorities, Rahab hid the spies and kept them from being
captured. She told the two spies that the people had been expecting an Israelite
invasion for some time. She reported that-despite the fact that the city was well
fortified and the army well trained-tl~e people were frightened of the Israelites and
had lost the courage to stand up to them. The escape of the Israelites from the
Egyptians, their successful crossing of the Red Sea, the subsequent destruction of
Pharaoh and his armies, and their exploits during their 40 years of wandering in the
desert were well known to the people and had convinced them of the Israelites'
superiority. Rahab likewise was convinced the city would fall and made an agreement
with the spies that she would help them leave the city and not reveal what she had
told them if in return they would spare her and her family during the attack. The
spies agreed and with Rahab's help they successfully escaped capture and eventually
made their way back to their own people. The spies reported to Joshua everything that
had happened, especially the information given to them by the harlot regarding the
fear of the people.
Using this information, Joshua made plans far the invasion and reported his plan
to the 12 tribes. The plan was approved, the invasion proceeded, and the attack,
capture, and subsequent destruction of the city of Jericho was successful." Rahab and
her family were, as agreed, spared by Joshua during the battle of Jericho.12
'The contrast between these two incidents is significant. Moses used 12 people, all
amateurs, each with both political and military responsibilities in his own tribe. Each
was a prominent individual who is named in the Bible. On the other hand, Joshua
apparently used two professional (throughout they were referred to only as "spies")
anonymous (their names are not given) people to conduct his mission. Moses' spies
brought back reports only of the physical characteristics of the land, whereas Joshua's
also reported the attitude of the people. The spies Moses sent made their report
? Deuteronomy 1:37
B Joshua 1:1-2
e Deuteronomy 1:38
10 The mission into Jericho is described in Joshua 2.
"Joshua 3, 4, 5, and 6:1-21
12 Joshua 6:22-25
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openly, and the discussion that followed was conducted in public. Joshua's spies, by
contrast, reported only to Joshua, who then made the necessary decisions. Moses' spies,
who also would have been principals in any military actions to be taken, participated
in the decision-making process. Joshua's spies neither had leadership responsibilities
nor did they participate in the policy-making decision process. The consequences of
these two operations are significantly different. Moses' operation, conducted by
amateurs more or less in the public domain, resulted in a weakening of Moses' position
of authority, led to a loss of the people's confidence in themselves, and precipitated an
extended period of severe national punishment. Joshua's operation, conducted in
private by professionals, led to an achievement of national destiny.
An implicit point is made regarding the procedures used during these two spying
operations. It is not specifically stated, but one is left with the impression that the 12
spies sent by Moses more or less went about their business as tourists, and the report
they brought back is typical of the kind of thing that a tourist would report. The
information reported to Moses consisted both of facts and conclusions drawn by the
spies. The negative report given by the majority of the spies, for example, reflected
their perception regarding the consequences of military actions, which, if taken, they
would be called upon to lead. The people agreed with the negative position, not
because of facts reported, but because of the negative interpretation given these facts
by individuals of prominence.
Joshua's spies, on the other hand, went in secret (although they were discovered)
and visited a harlot who gave them valuable information regarding the attitude of her
people. The spies did not interpret this information but simply reported to Joshua
what they had been told. No moral judgment was made regarding the fact that
Joshua's spies visited a harlot, nor is the information provided by her fudged to be of
questionable validity.
'Che relationship between Rahab and the spies was evidently amoral. No
conditions of "conversion" were imposed in the recruitment, but merely an agreement
for conspiratorial silence in exchange for a harlot's life. Joshua made no recorded
comment or judgment regarding his spies' recruitment of or the agreement with the
harlot. He did, however, honor the agreement, despite the fact that he had not given
his prior approval and took no part in making it. After the Battle of Jericho, Rahab
joined the Israelites and lived with them. No mention is made of whether or not she
continued to practice her old profession. All references to her, in both the Old and the
New Testament, refer to her only as "Rahab the harlot."
I:f there is a lesson to be learned, it would appear that a strong case is made for the
conduct of spying activities in secret by professionals, unencumbered by other political
or military responsibilities, and that these professionals should report in secret to
higher authority who would make policy decisions without debate. Spies should
definitely not participate in the policy-decision-making process, nor should they take
their cases to the public. When that occurs, although stoning is passe, the people are
likely to throw figurative rocks at the wrong people for the wrong reasons.
It can be argued that the Moses operation suffered from complications that arose
because of oversight and political issues. The selection of twelve spies, one from each
of the twelve tribes, was probably motivated by political considerations, and the very
specific instructions given by Moses to the spies were probably necessary in order to
define the specific objectives and procedures in order to obtain approval from the
twelve tribes. All the Israelites knew that the operation was to occur, who was going,
and what they were to accomplish on the mission. When they returned, their report
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was likewise made in public, the results of which have been noted earlier. It is
noteworthy that the spies successfully accomplished all mission objectives. The point at
which the Moses operation actually failed can be traced to the negative comments
made during the public "mission debriefing." Taken overall, it can be argued that the
negative report of the spies and the loss of control over the situation was actually
stimulated because of too much oversight and the tightly controlled administrative
procedures used. In summary, this episode is a classic example of an operation that
was successful, but in which the "patient" died.
The contrasts offered by the Joshua operation are startling, Joshua certainly did
not have an oversight problem, nor did he worry about defining a politically
acceptable mission scenario. His spies were sent in secret, were given absolutely
minimal instructions, "Go, view the land, especially Jericho," and reported back only
to Joshua. The operational scenario could. hardly have been predicted, and if it could,
it is questionable that it would have been met with approval. Joshua handled all
administrative matters alone, provided Flexible and responsive support to his spies by
keeping their bargain, and made the necessary judgments required to successfully lead
his people to victory. From a purely administrative point of view, the Joshua mission
was a nightmare; nevertheless, the operation can only be judged as an unqualified
success.
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