SURVEY OF SOVIET REGIONAL STATIONS FROM TURKEY AND IRAN 13 DECEMBER 1956-4TH JANUARY, 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00765A000100040039-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: January 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SURVEY OF SOVIET RFEX IONAL STATIONS FROM TURKEY AND IRAN
The report on the Iranian Survey is given first although
chronologically this was preceded by the survey from
Turkey.
SECKET
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A. SURVEY OF SOVIET REGIONAL STATIONS FROM IRAN
(23rd December 1956 - 4th January 1957)
Reception Conditions
Tehran and Gulhek are both screened by a very high
mountain range in the north. It was feared that this factor
would affect reception conditions materially, but on the whole
these fears proved unfounded. Tehran's and Gulhek's altitudes
(3,800 and 4,700 ft. respectively) constitute an advantage, and
although medium wave reception is poor from approximately 0400
till 1200 (GMT), it is good during the remaining hours. Long-
wave reception remains fairly good throughout day and night.
The time difference between Iran and, say, Stockholm is a factor
of extreme importance as far as coverage of the more remote equi-
distant stations is concerned. Kuibyshev for example is at pres-
ent audible at Stockholm at 0345 GMT - i.e. in conditions of dark-
ness there - but inaudible at other times. The same station is
not very well received at 0345 GMT in Iran as daylight starts at
approximately 0315 GMT, but can be fully covered later in the day
when some of the most productive programmes are broadcast. In
cases of this sort coverage from Stockholm and Iran would be
complementary.
Advantages of Interception in Iran
Interception of Soviet regional stations in Iran offers
certain advantages and these can be conveniently considered under
three headings:
(1) Transmitters of Republican Capitals in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
(2) Short-wave Transmitters of remote Provincial Centres
in Soviet Asia.
(3) Other Stations inaudible or only partially audible
in Caversham, Stockholm or Cyprus.
(1) Transmitters of Republican Capitals in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
Broadcasts from the Republican capitals in the Caucasus
and Central Asia generally were very well received at Gulhek through-
out the day. Thus 100 per cent coverage of Ashkhabad, Stalinabad
and Tashkent is possible from Iran during the winter. Summer
conditions will naturally affect reception from all these stations,
but it is possible that they will further emphasize the advantages
of the listening site in Iran as compared with that in Cyprus for
certain stations. The following differences in winter reception
conditions were established:
Station Cyprus Reception Gulhek Reception
Ashkhabad Unmonitorable 0600-1130 Satisfactory, but on
the whole this period
is unproductive..
Stalinabad Unmonitorable 0600-1130 suite good on the whole;
this period may contain
some useful material.
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Tashkent Unmonitorable 0600-1230 Good, but this period
appears to be
unproductive.
(2) Short Wave Transmitters of remote Provincial Centres
in Soviet Asia.
The survey has thrown light on an aspect of broadcasting
in the remoter areas of Soviet Asia which has not been fully
appreciated in the past. It has been found that a fair number of
broadcasting services in these parts of the Soviet Union are main-
tained with the aid of short-wave transmitters (some of low power)
which appear to be situated at various provincial centres. These
operate for very short periods of the day and, as a rule, broadcast
both in Russian and the local language. Apart from those already
known, the following stations were heard, but it is likely that
prolonged operations would reveal others:
Pavlodar on approx. 4080 kc/s. Operating 1200-1305
Mediocre reception
Petropavlovsk on approx. 5090 kc/s. Operating 1300-1400
(Kazakhstan) Good reception.
Kokchetav on approx. 5090 kc/s. Operating 1400-1445
Fair reception.
Tyumen on approx. 5700 kc/s. Operating 0320-0345
and 1230-1300
Very good reception
Unidentified on approx. 7055 kc/s. Operating 1230-1400
(possibly (or 1430)
Karaganda) Reception varies
according to proximity
of Cairo frequency.
As already known, some of the stations in this category
also contribute studio programmes to medium or long-wave services
of large broadcasting centres, e.g. Omsk, but these are not always
audible outside the Soviet Union.
It might be mentioned here that on New Year's Eve Tyumen
carried relays from Khanty-Mansiysk and Salekhard in the extreme
North.
(3) Other Stations inaudible or only partially audible
in Caversham, Stockholm or Cyprus.
The survey revealed that a number of fairly important
Soviet stations north and north-east of Gulhek were better received
there than at any other established listening post. Reception
conditions at Gulhek compared with those in Cyprus as follows:
Station Cyprus Reception
Gulhek Reception
Astrakhan Suffers from interference Good: it should be
from 1500 and completely noted that the most
obliterated when Cyprus productive programme
jammers active. begins at 1500.
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Kuibyshev Practically unmonitorable Quite good from 1430
owing to Skoplje which includes the most
transmissions. productive programmes.
Nukus Unreliable owing to On the whole fair
fading
Ordzhonikidze Unmonitorable On the whole cuite
good.
Stalingrad Unmonitorable On the whole quite
good.
Blotted out when Nicosia Very heavy interfer-
transmitter on the air ence from Nicosia, but
not always totally
blotted out; improved
aerials might be
effective.
Observations in the course of the survey seem to confirm
the importance attached to Kuibyshev and Stalingrad as both stations
appeared to include a considerable proportion of industrial items
in their programmes.
Novosibirsk should be considered in a separate category,
its network comprising both a long wave and a short-wave transmitter.
The latter, when operative, is well received at Gulhek, while reports
from Cyprus indicate that no Novosibirsk programmes are monitorable
there between 0300 and 1230 GMT. It must be borne in mind, however,
that transmissions from Novosibirsk are monitorable at other listening
posts during certain periods.
Recommendation
The above observations are, of course, based on winter
conditions. Bearing this in mind, it is recommended that an
experimental recording operation covering six months should be
conducted in Iran. Its objects would be:
(1) To review the value of material hitherto unobtain-
able from other listening posts.
(2) Further to investigate the existence of other short-
wave transmitters situated at remote provincial centres in Soviet
Asia.
(3) To obtain a picture of reception conditions during
the summer months.
The period under review should include both winter and
summer months if optimum results are to be achieved.
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B. SURVEY OF SOVIET REGIONAL STATIONS FROM TURKEY
(13th December - 21st December, 1956)
Reception Conditions
Reception conditions generally at Ankara seem not un-
favourable. The proximity of European and Middle Eastern trans-
mitters naturally presents an obstacle as far as interception of
Soviet Regional stations is concerned, but the general atmospheric
conditions (altitude of app. 3,000 ft.) offer an advantage which
should not be overlooked. The contrast with the disturbed
atmospheric conditions in Cyprus is very marked indeed.
Advantages of Interception in Ankara
Reception of Soviet regional stations at Ankara was
compared with that in Cyprus, and the following advantages rel&ting
mainly to stations comparatively near Turkey were noted:
Station Cyprus reception Ankara reception
Astrakhan Suffers from interference On the whole good: it
from 1500 and completely should be noted that the
obliterated when Cyprus most productive programme
jammers active. begins at 1500.
Chernovtsy Unmonitorable 0800-1300 On the whole quite good,
owing to Jerusalem but 0800-1300 period appears
transmissions. to be unproductive.
Kharkov Somewhat variable. On the whole fair.
(with studios at
Belgorod, Orel, Sumy,
Kursk, Poltava)
Krasnodar Largely unmonitorable
(with studio at during Sarajevo
Maikop) transmissions.
Suffers considerably from
Sarajevo transmissions,
but could probably be
separated to some extent
with improved aerials.
Nalchik Very poor Poor, but could be intelli-
gible in parts with
improved aerials.
Saratov Unmonitorable 0400-1330 Rather poor, but not
(with studios at always unmonitorable
Balashov, Tambov, Pensa) 0400-1330.
Stalingrad Unmonitorable Variable; partly quite
good, although suffers a
good deal from Cairo
transmissions.
Voronezh Unmonitorable 0430-1000 Suffers from Cairo
(with studio at owing to Cairo interference but can be
Lipetsk) transmissions. largely separated.
Conclusion
From the above it appears that practically no advantage
would be derived by covering Chernovtsy from Ankara.
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Coverage of Kharkov and Nalchik would be advantageous,
but it is felt that the amount of additional material yielded by
this operation would be comparatively small.
The advantage of Ankara as an interception site in the
case of Saratov and Voronezh is governed by the availability of
Stockholm as an additional listening post. The early morning
transmissions of both stations - unmonitora.ble in Cyprus - are audible
in Stockholm (during the winter); but in the case of Voronezh there
is probably also a certain amount of quite useful material which is
at present inaudible both in Cyprus and Stockholm.
Coverage of Stalingrad from Ankara is likely to produce
useful results but it should be noted that this would be by no
means comprehensive.
Observations relating to Astrakhan. and Krasnodar seem
fairly promising by comparison with Cyprus, and improved technical
facilities might produce useful results.
It must be stressed that all these observations are
based on winter conditions, and that the conclusions above may have
to be modified in the light of experience during the summer.
Recommendation
On the basis of these results, it is felt that the
establishment of a listening post manned by BBC personnel in Ankara
is not justified, as long as Soviet regional coverage is maintained
from Cyprus.
In view of reception conditions observed in Iran it
appears that both Astrakhan and Stalingrad are more advantageously
covered from Gulhek than Ankara. This leaves only irasnodar and,
possibly, Saratov and Voronezh as useful targets - the latter two
particularly if operations in Stockholm were to be discontinued.
A temporary recording operation from Ankara might prove
useful in special cases when local developments and seasonal
reception conditions combine to create circumstances warranting a
special effort of this kind, and this possibility should be borne
in mind.
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