INTERVIEW WITH PHAN HUY DAN, FORMER POLITICAL ADVISER OF BAO DAI AND FORMER LEADER OF VIETNAM ANTI-COMMUNIST POPULAR MOVEMENT/DAN'S VIEWS ON FRANCE-VIETNAM AND ON VIETNAMESE CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500330063-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: December 23, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/11: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500330063-3
U.S. Officials Only
C ONT IDs- ITTAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT 25X1A
COUNTRY Vi.tnam
SUBJECT Interview with Fhan Huy Dan, Former Political
Advise: of Bar: Dai and Former Leader of Viet-
nam Anti-Communist Popular Movement/Dan's
PLACE ACQUIRED Views on France-Vietnam and on Vietnamese
(BY SOURCE) 2 _QQ 1/"S e.-
DATE ACQUIRED
(BY SOURCE)
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25X1 X THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
DATE DISTR. Z B Dec 53
NO. OF PAGES 4
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
1. "In 1945-46 I wag the leader of the Vietnam tnti-Communist Popular Movement,
which in February 1946 organized mass meetings and demonstrations to demand
the withdrawal of the Communist government of Ho Chi Minh and its replacement
by a nationalist government which would be headed by Vinh Thuy (Bao Dai's
'citizen name'). When the French signed with Ho Chi Minh the agreement of
6 Mar 46, we were compelled to go to China. I became the political adviser
of Bao Doi and remained sc:, officially, until March 1949. During that period
I participated in all the negotiations with the French.
2. "In May 1948, in order to avoid a rupture with the French which would result
from endless and unsuccesefui negotiations without any effort of practical co-
operation, I promotel the idea of creating the first national government of
Vietnam to replace the three lrcal governments which at that time governed
separately the three region= or 'kyE' of Vietnam.
3. "As Minister of Iriformution in that first Vietnamese national government, I
created the first Vietnamese news agency known as 'Vietnae Prmae' ad organ-
ized over 50 civic schools to teach the population elements or democracy and
to point out to them the fa:Jac.y of Communism.
4. "I resigned in March 1949 when Bar- Dai signed the Agreement of 8 Mar 49, which
I connidered as nnsatiefactory a I unable to rally the Vietnamese people.
5. "1 have since then refused many offers of the post of Minister of National De-
fense and of the pOc:t of Mini.ater of the Interior.
6. "It deems now that France 1 going to widen the scope of Vietnamese independ-
ence, thus offering un the utetnemesej the opportunity of cooperating whole-
heartedly in the fignt agates; Communism.
U.S. Officials only
rONF] ENTIAL
.9r1 -x ti0l't X I AIR _X I I FB'
I STR IBUT, 'ATE _E
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7. "But a new treaty with France sill not automatically solve every difficulty.
It will be equally important for Vietnam to have a truly representative gov-
ernment capable of railyina all anti-Conmunint forces in Vietnam. Such a gov-
ernment is of prime and urgent importance to ensure the continuity of the
struggle against Communism ehp.':.ially now that in France truce negotiations
with the Communists are m_?re ard_ more talked. about.
8. "A Vietnamese arbitrary government without popular support and merely backed
by the French would b:w to any French decision while a Vietnamese representa-
tive government coul-i assert its anti-Communist stand and exert an effective
influence on French cic.:.i9ions. Without such a Vietnamese government [Viet-
namese representative government, ] the French National Assembly might suddenly
decide to give up the fight in Indo-China, as has been clearly expressed by
at least one article published in the US press _7. The anti-Communist
forces in Indo ':hina would collapse and all the blood and money spent so far
to build them ap would have been 9. horrible nonsense.
9. "The Vietnamese National -nge convened in Saigon last month October
19537 is a praiseworthy effort toward the organization of a Vietnamese repre-
sentative government. Worries have been voiced concerning certain 'extremist'
motions of that congress. But we should not forget that it is acting as an
opposition party againe'. the present government of Saigon, which did not re-
ceive any popular approval.
10. "A government coming out from the Congress--and it might be the preeent one
or might at least include some members of the present one--would certainly be
more realistic and moderate.
11. "Circumstances are creating ever closer ties between Vietnam and the US. My
purpose has always been to help develop understanding and strengthen the
friendship between the 'JS and fibs Vietnamese people. In this connection, you
m~a?' be interested to the opinion of one Vietnamese on the Vietnam Congress
L as follows-7:
12. "To defeat Communiem,etrcng popular support is needed. But could there be
popular support without. popular participation?
13. "VS.etnameor! governments, appointed and dismissed by decrees, have been ruling
without populn>: part.ic.ipat ion and without constitution. Any such regime sever-
ing itself from the people 'sh?_uld not be surprised at finding itself floating
like fallen leaves on rough water instead of growing like deep-rooted trees.
14. "The Communists have be.n outlawed. But why should the anti-Communists also
be deprived of their rights to participate in political life?
15. "The Congrer.e movems-rit abornUng in Vietnam is being opposed'ad'undesireble be-
cauned it refused to limit itr ex etence to two days and to subscribe to an
agenda imposed upon it. Yet what congress would accept such restrictions
without losing all its meaning?
16. "1 an reminded of another congress which M Emile Bollaert as French High Com-
missioner in Indo-China tried to organize in 194 n O5 Dec 47 at the Lnvita-
tion of M Bollaert. Bac Dal went alone to meet him in the Bay of Along. Aft-
~.C :.: er lip fa: two dayss, thi., ....i ;;is1el a owia . locuulent i.no.iu as the 'Pru
tocol of the Bay of Along.'
17. "Bao Dai was assured that by initialing the Protocol he was incurring no re-
sponsibility, but vas merely gi?ing the document authenticity as basis for
further diecussione.
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25X1A
18. "But., as it. Hjipeci.!'?_,. 1at:t M T3, 1 rc' bind i;j D1ri t_ Cleat document
for good. Bao Dai_ hcwe'r-=r, a*. _!iut Cline was bet e Vi,:tname;a refugee in Yong
Kong. It was ne- e:!m : cry in,t,.:*. him with .=ome rffi,: cal authority before that
Protocol co,uu t Pr^du r__ ae Fcar:_ -`/ictnarne aprr_ement.
19. "Ono month later [ Tana y t art 7 'Bar, Dar., as_ irted by myself and two other
Vietnamese adrlr_r::, met ge.:n wiih N Bollaert in Geneva, Switzerland. On
this occasion we were t,-,ld that n a comma would be changed in the Protocol
and the Bao na.i had sig:ei it and -h?'+.ld hon:r it.
20. "Then on 12 Jan 4d at ?tce Hotel de Bergues, M Bollaert presented u- with a let-
ter which euggeeced no e:ganizatron of a Vietnamese National Congress to elect
Bao Dai as the only qualified representative of Vietnam to carry out negotia-
tions with France. The letter further stated: 'It is my duty to warn Your
Majesty of the dangers such a congre=s would present if precautions were not
taken to predetermine its agenda in the most precise way.
21. "'It must b(-_~ urider.stoed that the session of Congress should not exceed three
days and that the. Congress should dissolve immediately after having, as its
only objective, designated Your Majesty as Vietnam's most qualified representa-
tive.
22. "In part.cu tar, it 1, ct' the utmost importance to have it clearly stated be-
tween us that the Prota_cl.which both of us initialed in the Bay of Along on
7 Dec 47, and which dteterrninea- the future relations of Vietnam with France,
will not be reveale,t at th' time of the Congress meeting and that no allusion
to It, either direct or indirect, will be publicly made.'
23. "M Bollaert was not. given the chance to carry out his stratagem and during the
That five year=. many new Fren:b high commissioners have succeeded M Bollaert
in Indo-China. But last month October 19537 that same stratagem has been
revived. Similar rer,trtctiorin have been forced, without success, upon the
Vietnamese Congress convened in Saigon.
24. "Shouldn't France and t.h' flS favor a democratic government?
25? "Who wouldn't see that it i> much easier to deal with a person responsible to
no one than to deal with a democratic government responsible to a congress?
At the same time. when France Mill wished to maintain her prewar World War
II) policy in Vietnam. it was expected of her, naturally enough to resort
now and th!!n to political devices not quite democratic, such as the above-
related rotratager_7 of M Bollaert.
26. "But now that France ho d-r.ldad to grant complete independence to Vietnam
within a French tlnion, to define liberally, the problem for her ['France_7
should no longer br to maneuver to have her own way in Vietnam by supporting
some sort of arbitrary government. She should on the contrary refuse to deal
with any such government and should insist that Vietnam have a democratic gov-
ernment able to win strong popular support through a large popular participa-
tion.
27. "And shouldn't the 113, which it contributing more and more to the defence of
Vietnam, attempt a similar attitude?
- r l t^"ce-e- poor' e haw` secs.-.,r +,.~ ' cng all klnde of .: Lcfortunes, a.:..-
anxious to get out of the present political confusion and disorder. They
strive to have a democratic government able to rally all nationalist forces
in an efficient anti-Communist drive to restore peace.
29. "The Vietnamese National Congress, which has been convened in Saigon, is a
praisewor by move towards this and.. It should not be chained up. It should
be weleor . It should be turned into the first democratic foundation of Viet-
nam. It should be made into a Vietnamese Constituent Assembly with two prin-
cipal duties:
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a. Designate a 9ietnameae government--which may or may not be
the present one--and invest it with the responsibility.of fighting
Communism, negotiating with Dance, and prepare general elections;
b. Draw up a provisional constitution based on the respect.of
human dignity and individual liberties."
-3arv^=l.)BJECT & AREA CODES
103 52L/E
121.5 52L/E(6M)
121.5 6M(2L)
CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY
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