ARMY MUTINY IN MARCH 1947

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500340085-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 85
• Publication Date: January 4, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

U.S. Officials Only
S E C R E T
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
Germany (Soviet ZMA)
Army Mutiny in March 1947
Or 7.C 1..1700 .7.700. . T.1. T+0 .1?.1.. 07 TIOLC U. 0077.000 700
?0. 70?. 07 7+. O. . COOL, ?0 #10001'0. 1T. T04 1017010. 00 00v0.
unw o? T. CL+Trrr? 70 0. .?CnrT .? u 1..w?+o. u7o 700.0. n
a) Stnrnq of fraternization between the
German (Soviet Zone) population from
b) The removal of "certain elements" of
Germany (Soviet Zone) to the ISSR in
c) The mutiny of these Soviet troops on
Furstenualde S,,.tion
d) The repressive meas es taken by the
Marshal o o n i
DATE DISTR. Y Jan 54
NO. OF PAGES 1
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
Soviet Army and the
Jul-lug 45-47
the Soviet Army from
March 1947
1DI LIHIEU710$ STLTE X oo FBI YI.av7 1 1.1?ia X rei -QBILEylI
n
50X1 -HUM
-011
0i
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50X1-HUM
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SLGP. FI.
SECURITY Ik(C2;.`~%i 311
THE MARSHAL PUT DOWN THE ttEBk LLION
The Mutiny in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany in 1947
Background:
The regime of relative personal freedom, established in the Soviet
occupation army at the termination of the war, lasted a very short time.
hhereaa, at the beginning of the transition of the Soviet military
forces to conditions of peace, there were occasional measures restrict-
ing the freedom of troops - and then only by way of "a fatherly warning" -
such as observations that "it is not recommended to visit such and such
a place," by July 1945 an order directed to the Occupation Troops Forces
appeared, signed by Marshal Zhukov, "concerning the necessity of the
strictest observance of the occupation regulations."
The sharp orders brought to the attention of all personnel of mili-
tary units concerned "vigilance" althougn there was no fundamental evi-
such
dence to Justify measure'-
All intercourse wiv v with the local population was categori-
cally forbidden. The following, measures ensured the observance of
regulations:
a) t;,e billeting of troops away from populated areas or in
quarters from which the Germans had been evacuated.
b) the tr.insfer of all personnel (independent of ranks
and position) to barracks.
c) the prohibition (regardless of the length of time) of
absence of military and civilian personnel from the billeting area
without the special periii.ssiua of the commander. An officer, not
to mention rank-and-file and sergeants, wishing to receive a pass,
wps re?:uired to explain the reason for needing a pass and to fur-
nish the exact address of his residence while absent. All military
personnel were required to i)e in the billeting area by 2300 hours.
For a breach of the order, there was iimnediate punishment. In
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SHSEl
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particular, soldiers and #0U,.; guilty of fraternizing with the
local population were subject to transfer to the disciplinary
battalions, and officers appeared before a ccu rt-martial, with the
subsequent possibility of dismissal and loss of rank.
According to the policy of the Political Administration of the
Occupation Forces, directives were circulated informing all military units
of the need for strict observance of the order and the obligation to
inform the command about every violation, however small. Corresponding
instructions for the implementation of the order were received by the
Special Sections of the military units and the special agents of SMERSli
attached to the military units. *
On 14 - 16 August, 1945 a "combing of the territory" was carried out
by all command organs and S:?itRSH in the populated places of the Eastern
Zone, manifesting itself in a general evening and night raid on uerman
was
dwellings. This measure officially interpreted as "rooting out" of
hidden S.S. men and other t.azi elements." In reality, it was aimed at
uncovering cases of forbidden "fraternization with the population." As
a result of the "search," there was a large number of arrests and deten-
tions of Soviet servicemen discovered during the search of German dwell-
ings (the arrests took place regardless of the nature of conduct of the
servicemen), with subsequent investigation of the culprita.in their mili-
t.ry uni ts.
ouch "combings" were repeated throughout the winter of 1945-46, each
time in total secrecy," in order to take the servicemen by surprise.
during the winter, panic grew among the troops of the occupation
The author has considered it necessary to discuss the above-mentioned
order in detail, because of its significance for all organizations of the
"occupation regime." This order, at first, was not always fulfilled, nor
in every detail (it affected too deeply the interests not only of the com-
mon soldier, and the officer, but of the senior command as well and for a
fairly long time there was a passive opposition to its execution). It served,
nevertheless, as the basic point of departure for all subsequent general
and special command directives.
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Forces as netts spread about an order signed by liar hal il.:ukov, in which
the contraction of a venereal disease was termed incontestable evidence of
"fraternization with the local population." The culprit in this case, wax
accused not only of a breach of the Uccupstion regulations, but of evasion
of militar service
y (linteational maiming," and'4nalicious damage to health"),
i.e.,the betrayal of the oath of allegiance, with all the consequences
from
flowin, theree order was not carried out (ratification by Moscow
did not follow); however, the author of the present work later succeeded
in establishing th-it the draft of such an order actually existed.*
With the passage of time, the regulation of the conduct of Soviet
troops in the Eastern Zone became more complicated from month to month
unofficial,.:
with a series of orders, official andstrtia:f-ions disseminated through-
out the command of the ;omman,ier-in-chief of tu,e Occupation rorces., through
that of the Uommander-in-chief of the Soviet Ailitary Administration,
through the Political Administration of the SVAu [--oviet Military Adminis-
tration of 'Jermany] the Central Commandatura, and finally the MVD and
St: tS
Servicemen and their families were strictly #orbidde., to visit
Jerman theatres, movie houses, restaurants, hotels, and the "black
market." Already in 19h5-4e,, in addition to ' fra s rnizatinn with the
population," association with representatives of former military allies
became subject to penalty. Thus, for exan?,ie, 1?SaJ,or t: was reduced in rank
and oontenced to a five-yoar term of imprisonment for an unauthorized
trip to the western Lone as a guest of an Anerican officer friend. (.&
crimilal or political element in the action was es,-ablished). Officers
F. a.id G. were arrested by S,?,F:R&i organs for a chanco mseting and a short
friendly conversation in a restaurant :ith troops. After lengthy
inquests, both officers were transferred to military units in hussia.
Testimony of a member of the Iiisitiry Soviet of the 1st uelorussian
front and, later, admi::iatrati:'c worker in the S,)viet M litary
administration in Germcurv, Lieut. Gen. i3okov.
The official title of Marsaals hhukov and Z;okolovskiy, and General of
the Army Chuykov.
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There followed at the beginning of 191+7, the order of Marshal Sokolobskiy
forbidding servicemen and their families, as well as civilian officials of
SVAG, to visit the western sector of derlia. Those found guilty of such visits,
regardless of their intentio:Ls, were subject to removal to ttussia, where, for
officers "who had made a slip," there were special, remote, service bases
at Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
At approximately the same time (the second half of 1947), employees of
the central and provincial administrations of S'iAG and of the Central Com-
mand, who were formerly in a privileged position, were deprived of the right
of living in private (Qerman)apartments, participating in German-Soviet
joint-stock companies, etc. They were all obliged to move to special zones
so-called "cantonments" (gorodki) which were forbidden to Germans, where
bachelors were quartered two and three to a room, so that they might more
easily, "keep an eye on one another."
The number of Command patrols on the streets of populated areas was
increased, and the western sector of berlir swarmed with MVD men in civilian
clothes. And, later, as is well known, a crescendo followed-the Berlin
blockade, open conflict with the former allies, unlimited intensification of
Vigilance and hostility toward everything capitalistic.
More and more frequently, and on a greater scala, special trains were
made up to transport to the Soviet Union those guilty of violating the
~Occupation Kegulatiores."
It is natural, that as a result of all the briefly enumerated "politi-
cal-educational," disciplinary, and punitive measures, a mood of protect
gres and became increasingly strong a.:,ong the troops of the Soviet occupation
army, especially among groups and persons, guilty of breaching thin or
that order, who grew more numerous with each passim day. A clear example
of the explosion of such a mood appears in the case cited below, which
occurred on the eve of the "cold war."
The Circumstances and Substance of the Event
Over a period of several days in March, 1947, in the region of the
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Erkner Station (near Berlin), a railroad transport was formed dp for
dispatch to the USSR. The passengers of this transport were servicemen
of various ranks (the majority were common soldiers) from various units, who
were being forcibly removed, according to order, to the motherland. The
"ahtrafiki" penalized person as the passengers called themselves, for
the most part, did not know the location of their new service destination,
further east; to the Aleutians," they gloomily replied when questioned.
A part of the passengers came "voluntarily" in individual fashion,
to the entrainment and were allowed to choose their seats in the cars.
Another port, 3140 persons, transported as convicts had been brought from
Berlin in trucks, convoyed by Command personnel, and were put in six freight
"pullmans" set apart for them. The doors of those cars were supposed to
have been shut immediately which, be it said, was not lone in this case,
and later served as grounds for a charge of 1Mick of vigilance, leading
to subsequent mutiny against the chief' of the echelon . At the entrance
to a "pu1lman;' an armed guard was stationed.
At 11430 hours on the ltth of March, the train, carrying approximately
LAO passengers, left &kner station bound for Frankfurt-on-the-Oder in the
Ftiretenwalde district (the Berman-Polish frontier). A small detachment
from the Central Berlin Comvnandatura,uumoering ten roen, accompanied the
train: one officer (echelon leader), two sergeants and seven privates.
The command was disposed in the last car of the train; the soldiers guarded
the cars containing the "stagers" Zc-onvict] in turn. The detachments'
equipment numbered Lw,) automatic and six rifies,with the usual supply of
cartridges, not counting the personal arms of the echelon leader.
At 17145 hours, a telepnone message arrived at, the office of the Com-
mandant of ?= Iles is ration (Soviet, sector of Berlin) from the com..andant
of Ftirst' :olde Station to the ef:'ect that the echelon arriving lo2A hours
mutinied avid a group of ringleaders had escaped in two cars in the direc-
tion of the city of Frankfurt, using a locomotive which they had detached
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from a German train as a means of conveyance; the remzinder adrtlwooMb of
the mot of soldiers wore still rioting in the stati.,n; it was urgently
requested that re-exib rcemunts be sent. The commandant of the station
explained the belated dispatch of the telephone message by the physical
n
impossibility of making it earlier; he had been seized by the rioters, who
The facts of the matter appear to be as follows: en route to the
F{irstenwalde Station, the people on the train behaved quietly, without any
apparent desire to provoke any sort of conflict.
The inquiry held later revealed no evidence of any sort of advance
agreement or plan for revolt. Passengers of car do 3, where the mutiny
began, Lieutenant P., First Sergeant U., and Sergeant 3, subsequently said:
".:wring the trip, we did not think of such actions nor did we speak of such
a thing. naturally, the trip was not welcome and we talked about that, but
nothing more than that. No one suggested anything or wanted to boat up the
detachment. They talked among themselves.,mure about old service experiences,
about the war."
However, the mood of all was embittered, and in the final moments this
was undoubtedly strengthened by conversation about the past war, and in
the
connection with it, ealized hopes for a free life afterwords. "They
spoke about how good it was, at first, after the war," said Sergeant G.
Upon arrival at Ftlrstenberg Station., the chief of the echelon was given an
were -
order not to lot anyone out of the cars. The guards on watch,' and to carry
out the order. ntil this moment, such a watch was absent in cars 1,2,3,4
where the "voluntary" passengers were travelling; therefore, when the watch
(four soldiers) came up to these cars, they found a group of ten men from
car no. 3 on the station platform. Tk.e watch demanded that they leave the
platform and go back ir.t,. the car. Imnediatel}exclamatory replies wore
huard: "Are we under arrest, or what? ne refuse to go anywhere." The
sergeant of the watch attempteu to push the transportees back into the cars
by force and in so doing struck Senior :.ieutenant A in the chest. A scuffle
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began. Out of the doors of the neighboring cars came still other groups of
men. Cries resounded: "We've had enough! Get them all!" The sergeant and
his patrol were disarmed, and only a precipitous flight saved them from a
severe beating, rho aisturbance quickly spread to the cars of the "stagers".
They poured out of their cars en masse and disarmed the guard,wtile the
latter made no attempt to use their arms in self-defense or to keep the mob
in the cars. "They were disarmed easily, without unnecessary talk," testi-
fied Private I. Sergeant K. and Junior Sergeant u. On the platform, the
riot continued with the arrival from the station of the station commandant,
Senior Lieutenant Kh. The affair quickly became a hand-to-hand fight again.
The commandant and the troops of the commandants office, who hastened to
his assistance, were beaten up. They, too, were relieved of their army.
Three tierman policemen, who were taking no part in the business but were
present in the station, were disarmed (their pistols were taken). The
echelon leader hid himself from attack in the city of Ffrstenwalde.
The "stagers" lockea the station commandant in the lavatory of one of
the cars, releasing him only an hour later, having threatened to shoot him
if he called for assistance from the city or from Berlin.
In the F(iestenwalde area, there was, among other, an artillery brigade
which knew nothing about the affair until the end. The commandant, upon
release, concealed himself in the quarters of the German station master and
through him, transmitted a telephone message to ?erlin.
A group of soldiers, the "ring leaders," num;.erint; sixty raen detached
two cars from the traLi.)coup_e: ?.hem to an engine from a German passenger
train, ands threatening the German engineer with a weapon, compelled him to
take them separately to Frankfurt. The mass of the "stagers" remaining
continued to throng about in the neighborhood of the station for about
half an hour. A nu:uuher, banding into a group, searched for the troops of
the Conmandants' office, who had concealed themselves, and for the echelon
leader; some returned to the cars continuing to mare an uproar and shouting
abuse.
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Characteristically, there was a total ac?sence of incidents with regard
to the Germans in the civilian passenger train (excluding the uncoupling of
the engine); there was not one attempt at robbery, violence, or any form of
coercion, which at that time was far from rare. All the anger of the "stagers"
was focused on the representatives of their Soviet "leadership." Correctness
relations with the Germans characterized the event, as if there had been
political direction to the affair (which was also noted subsequently).
At 1820 hours, the echelon proceeded further toward Frankfurt. R.epre-
"_`~tivoo l .he "o Lagers" a roaches the German engineer and said: "Take
us to the Polish frontier." what did they intend by this'r nhather they
had decided to continue their protest in a new place or whether fear of
punishment had prevailed, and the desire to attempt to smooth over the events
in Fdrstenwalde by further carrying out t.%e order "to return to the mother-
land," remained undetermined. Apparently, it was partially that, and, in
part, other things. "he spoke variously. Some were for staying, others
for going farther. Some proposed that we disperse in various directions,
every man for himself" so testified the "stagers." Some actually die-
parsed. About 70 persons from the transport were subsequently detained in
the ryretenwalde area
,and ld of them put themselves under arrest at the
Commandant's office.
Thus, when a military detachment (a mixed group drawn from two of the
commandant's battallions and the i J troops, numbering in all L0 men,arrived
at 1900 hours in FUrste:.walde from iserlin, the echelon had already passed
beyond reach. The first "special train" arrives in Frankfurt in two cars
and a locomotive at 1450 hours; and then at 1940 hours, the main part of the
train came up by the same rcute (No 4 platform).
The Soviet military commandant and the German administration of the
Frankfurt Station,,at the time of the arrival of the first group, had no idea
of what had happened in Fdrstenwalde. However, a quarter of an hour later,
a telephone message arrived from there, briefly reported the "outrages" and,
under the signature of '
of oh~a~f a military detachment dispatched from Berlin to rflrsten-
walde, comnunicnted the f01lo.-ing: "Anticipate the arrival of the main de-
tachment of "stagers"; lot it pass through to the location whore the first.
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detachment halted and then quickly surround both with an armed guard."
I: conclusion, it advised that the Berlin troop detachment was following
swiftly behind them on the route from Ffirstenwalde to Frankfurt.
Acting on the information raceived,the first steps were taken. The
=rantfurt oommandant, colonel Korzhukov, detailed 25 soldiers to the station
commandant's officoand 25 Uerman policemen were attached to them as^supple-
mont. Shortly, notice of the arrival of the "stagers" waa received. The
mixed detachment of the cormandant's office under two otficere~ mowed to
surround both of the groups who had come by rail.
Uz til uLw,,L&oILe of the mutinous trans
portees had appeared in the station
area. As witnesses and participants in the affair testified, the doors of
both cars were for the most part closed. i_he "passengers" sat within and
conferred as to what to do next. When the detachment from the ::ommandant's
office approached the tracks, where the cars were standing and began to
surround them, their action was noted and cries were heard from the cars:
"Get out of here! 6e don't want to gu anywhere. Jown with the jailers1"
A group of soldiers emerged from cars No 3 and No 6 and, approaching the
officers of the detachment, demanded that the detachment cease the encircle-
ment action and go away. "We are not bandits, and fought for the mothorland,
and here you are coming at us with arms at the ready." One of those present
cried that they "would bring this to the attention of Sokolovskiy, that they
wore being treated unjustly."
The loader of the Lommandant'a detachment refused to grant the request
of the "stagers" and threatened to use arms in the event of opposition. The
group of "pariiamen tarians" returned to the cars andypassing along them,
loudly reported the results of the talk. From the cars, cries again resounded:
"Let them go to the devil! We are tired of the 'old men' and the brass.' We
know what to do without them. We aren't going anywhere!" The commandant's
detachment meanwhile completed the encirclement. The troops and the uerman
police were disposed at a distance of 10-15 meters fron the cars. Sebing
this, the "stagers" shouted: 'They are got-.iiig ready to shoot us!" A great
noise rose along the cars.
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A crowd of mutineers, among them two women, poured out into the tracks.
"Jet back to the cars or we'll fires" ordered the senior officer of the
t:ommandatura, Major S. At this moment, a pistol shot resounded from one
They cvident y fired ! ^to the ni r, of mini, at no onn. The
of U&" earz. commandant's troops and the police were ordered to arm their weapons. "We
will firel To the cars!" the Soviet officer shouted again.
In r eply, a mob of the "mutineers, " 200 in number, advanced on the cor.-
voy guard to break through to the side of the station building. A number
had rifles and pistols. Major S. gave the order to fire. Fire from both
sides followed simultaneously, and the rage of the attacking "mutineers"
reached the limit. "Hit them, the scumf :_it them!" I the shouts rang out.
The encircling guard line was broken, and the clash turned into hand-to-hand
fighting. There were wounded on both sides. The officers and troops of the
commandatura and the German police retreated to the station building. Here
they succeeded in holding the mutineers, who turned toward the coal dumps,
wishing to get to the city through them.
By this time, the seriousness of the situation became known to the city
commandatura. A force of MVD troops from the 38th Battallion., situated in
the city, appeared in the station area.
The rioters did not succeed in making their way through the coal dumps.
They were met here by volleys from rifles and automatics. A group of
mutineers burst into a neighboring dairy farm, taking away 6 cans of milk
and cream "for removal to the echelon for nourishment." Another group
penetrated the food storage room of the station commandatura and again "con-
fiscated for the needs of the group" a part of t..e supplies. The commandant 'e
troops who were found there offered no resistance. One of them whispered
to the intruders: "Help yourselves, brothers. Only hold firm. . ." (The
identity of the person who spoke this could not subsequently be determined
There was only one case of robbery and, interestingly enough, it re-
mained unknown which side was responsible, the suppressors or the spppressed.
In the station area, returning from Berlin t' her residence in Frankfurt,
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was the widowed former empress of Germany (the second wife of the ex-Kaiser
Wilhela II, by birth the princess von Gotha. She and her adjutant were
exposed to the attack of a group of unknown soldiers, were stripped to their
under clothes, and,in this garb, were sent home in peace. however, the ex-
empress was left the adjutants' cloak "so that she would not catch cold."
At the climax of events, the train bearing reinforcements from Fffraten-
walde arrived, and finally, from the Potsdam headquarters, two tanks came
up. 6 group of senior officers., headsd by Marshal Sokolovskiy, also arrived
from there in two automobiles.
The information received about the mutiny gravely disturb_d the heads
of the Soviet administration. The event was considered extraordinary, the
only military rebellion during the entire period of occupation, a political
scandal whose consequences might seriously reflect on a number of service
careers. There was the possibility of the arrival of an extraordinary
commission from Moscow, an inquest, and a shake-up in the leadership of
Berlin and Potsdam. Added to that, the intelligence received by the staff
of the Head of the Military Governmer_t concerning the dimensions of the event
was exc,?edingly vague. Stationed in Frankfurt wore a number of military
units, many military hospitals and transient -german war prisoner camps.
low complications might break out from hour to hour
Fear of further developments resulted in the arrival of the Commander-
in-chief. "Drive the scoundrels back into the cars," ordered the Marshal.
Again the firing commenced, lasting roughly another 40 minutes. Again
there were casualties on both sides. The stat_ur. area was surrounded by
troops. As a result of the measures undertaken, with the aid of two mixed
detachments totalling about 120 persons - the military personnel from the
Berlin and Frankfurt Commandaturas - the 38th battallion of the XVD, and the
3erman police, the mutineers were driven back by 2230 hours. Tanks, with
their guns trained on the rioters ap.roached thecars. Only then did the
rioters return to the train. "Throw down your arms!" Reluctantly the rebels
throw their rifles and pistols on to the ground by the platform. Subsequent
curses directed at the suppressors were heard.
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Along the tracks and around the cars a heavy guard was posted, armed
with aut natics and light machine guns. 'Three heavy machine guns were
mounted on the platforms. A general search followed. Bach member of the
echelon, and everything in the casr. was carnrull e..;-,;.ne d. Several were
clubbed with rifle-butts during the search.
"All the transportees are under arrest. They will be sent by direct
routs, without transfer, to Siberia. There it will be decided - who will
be shot and who left alive," so ran the ensuing order of Sokolovskiy.
The wounded rebels were dumped in a pile into une car without any
mask. aiu. The doors of all the cars were tightly shut, locked,and sealed.
The tanks remained to guard the convoy.
The same night the transport started for Russia. The final fate of the
suppressed rebels is not known. All those seized and :laced under arrest
on the anotr-v.' the who had dispersed and fled from the echelon, three were
found ii. Q.-c. environs of the town Muehlrose near Frankfurt after a prelimin-
ary' search conducted by the MVD administration in Berlin, in the district
of Weiesensee-were sent to the UaSR for final deciaio: concerning their fate.
This was done out of tactical ConsIdrrar.i was, in order to hush the sandal
and to prevent It from bocrrr.ing widely known in the occupation zone. No
orders were sent to military units concerning the incident.
The losses among the suppressors were: t soviet soldiers and 11 German
policemen (the latter were the worse armed) killed and up to 15 injured
t,,e losses among the rioters - 18 dead, 32 injured. The weaknesses and
reasons for the failure of toe: uprising were:
1. The absence of clear-cut orgardz?,tiorr-("there was no leader-
ship; all theortees rose up together," was the unanimous testimony
of the participants in the revolt-- '.'.e absence of a preliminary plan
for revolt., the spontaneous fore of the protest.
2. In the course of uprising -
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500340085-8
a. the absence of a clear decision as to "what to do next."
b. tae lack of precise, realistically formulated demands
and slogans.
c. the absence of attempts to get in touch with units stationed
in the area.
d. the inadeque.te intensity and the raFidity of the action
(again, apparantely due to the absence of a clear understanding of
the tasks and objectives).
The initial state of the revolt in ootn cases, in Fdrstenwa.ide auLd
in Frankfurt) was of a diffuse indecisive nature; "they sat and waited,"
and then, under the proddinb repression, there was an unorganized, violent
outburst of wrath.
Un the positive side of the ?vent, as has been previously noted, there
was, for the first time during the occupation, an open and highly determined
protest against the regime. The uprising bore a clearly anti-governmental
political character and created great. confusion in the governing spheres
of the Soviet administration.
The present work was assembled by the author, who was in the service
attached to the Staff Ileadquartors, SVAG (Berlin) at the time of the event,
on the basis of testimony of eye-witnesses (Soviet military personnel and
Germans) and from the narratives of those who took part in the suppression
of the revolt and the conduct of the pre-trial inquest.
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