SOVIET AND SATELITE RADIO COMMENT ABOUT THE FIRST CFM SESSIONS IN PARIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730095-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 95
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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UErTaacntnl I0I\
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
i
SUBJECT SOVIET AND SATELLITE RADIO CODM ENT ABOUT THE
HOW r)ATF niQT 7. T,,-- i o, o
onit
B
d
SHED
ore
1 U
LI
+?
Radio Broadcasts
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 FORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ^SFIONASE ACT' 00
S. S. C.. 1 AND ll. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION ON THE NI LTION
OF ITS COST1SMTE IN ANT RAPINES TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON.,.'. FRO.
..SITS. ST LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS FROMIEITED.
Nor OF PAGES 3
THIS IS UNEV LUATED INFORMATION
II 1 1I
To date, Radio Moscow?s broadcasts about the first
CFM sessions have been devoted primaril
to e
t
iv
y
a
en
e and widely distributed reports of
Vishinshys stat meets.
v
.-but less extensi
ely, and
The remarks of Acheson, B vin, rnd Schuman have also been reporter --
.
sometimes in a slanted fashion. The few Soviet commentaries about
the Conference .ar~.d little to the se'ostanee of Vishin's
1qr's proposals and argwnents. As was
the case during the London Conference, the Soviet de
legation is credited with respors:i bility
for the prompt agreement on quertions of procedure--and for the "pleasant
atmospher.e."aCae
Despite the "{auspicious begi;:ning," however, occasional references to Western-inspired
"difficulties" continue to appear--to the Bonn Constitution, for exa plc; to the Berlin
railway strike, w ich is interpreted as a "provocative" incident encouraged by the Western
occupation authorities and timed to 'coincide with the CFM Conference and to "reports" thati
this time too" the U.S. would attempt a "Diktat" policy. And TASS,
reporting Acheson?s
"disappointment" Aver Vishins:!qr?s initial proposals, says that "Acheson thus let it be
clearly understood that the U.S. has, no intention of eliminating the
splitting activities in Western Germany, but, on the
established there to all of Germany."
This tendency to present tho Soviet viewpoint
primarily via the words of the chief
Soviet delete
rather than 'hr;
m
t
,
o
men
aries of its own, has also been characteristic
of the Soviet ~adio during the initial stages of previous international conferences.
It is worth no'ing, however, that in other contexts there has yaa
in the cope or, degree of the Soviet radio's propaganda a no stpthent letup t the "wermonger:tng" Western forceE of "aggression andimperialism~'-igwhich iare identified in
to n Wti +.11 Am?'^?'?.^
,MST,
DISTRIBUTION
I
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CLASTIFICATION
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But the most recent available Soviet commentary, an IZVESTIA article about the 25 May session,
Ilk
uses such relatively mild language as: Acheson "came out against the proposals submitted by
(Vishinsky) and made it quite clear that the U.S. delegation held to its forruer position";
Schuman p tt_foZ?th a "vague proposition"; and Bevin made a "very contradictory" statown t.
Furthermore, i4, is worth noting at, as of this date at least, the Soviet radio.11 1" 4111t
resorted to e charge that Western propaganda, ant cipating Conference failure, s.gtting
the stage fox?iRttributing blame to the Soviet delegation. This is in marked contx>S#i,to
the Soviet propaganda line developed immediately prior to the London Conference; at that
time it was implied that the Western Powers were intent on scuttling the Conference and
that the4'etore American
propaganda was preparing "toiblame the Soviet Union from the
for failures of the Conflrence, to represent the Soviet Union as
policy of delaying and plreventing joint decision."
chiefly responsible
SCPTIFT-CONTRA LED GE {ANY--TAIL: FAIT. OF SHANG_NAT AND THE, CFM: Soviet-'controll,,la German
radios continue to plug the theme of "German unity,"
as does Moscow. Some of them also hold
I
out qualified hopes that', as a result of the sincere and righteous Soviet efforts the GIN
Conferenca,aay..prove successful. ."We must not be disheartened," says one commentator..
"The fac+,,.# at full agreement has not been reached within the first three days need
cause for pessimism."
be no
ll
The most startling
contributions of Soviet-Zone broadcasts about the Conference, how ever,
are the explicit and pointed references to the alleged significance of Shanghai's fall.
Berlin commentator, Herbert Gessner,
peace two yeaz ago,, says:
"Now that Chiang Kai-shek and his American backers have learned the consequences
of $ g,Tpr.eting as weakness the constant readiness for peace on the part of the
progressive forcesit may rerhaps teach some other politicians of similar inclinations
to Issess more realistically the chances of success for their noicier--also in Europe."
Contendi'Ag that the world balance*of forces has again shifted in favor of the "progressive
camp," Gessner concludes that a point has been reached which conforms with Stalin 'sidea that
iL: as 'pel.'4 'tat CyP possible for such different systems as capitalism and socialism to live
a
fo
pe
cerly side by side
r a long time to come.
"The dIonment
prozress j negotiations in Parj. ... It now depends on Anglo-U.S. diploz y
whether they will really learn this great lesson from the China example and apply
it t the Paris Conference."
The contl4ptal _ also derides Acheson's rejection of the proposal to discuss'' the Japalneso
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recalling Mao Tze-tung's declared readiness for
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730095-3
peace treaty at Paris; the rejection is attributed to American displeasure over the prospect
of having to discuss it with the USSR and "New China" on one'side and the U.S. and Britain
on the other. Another Soviet-Zone German commentator, Leipzig's Zoeger, interprets the
fall of shanghai as proof that the libelration of peoples suppressed by t;:e imperialist
powers cannot be halted by financial enslavement or the power of high finance; "those of
the Conference partners at Paris today who are concerned by this should draw their own
I ~ I
SATELLITE RADIO--EECHOES OF MOS6 : Following Moscow's lead, most of the Satellite
radios report fully In Vishinskyts statements and give consjierably less attention to the
statements of the other Foreign Ministers. There are occasional references to Western-
inspired "difficulties," as well ps occasional expressions of "cautious optimism" about
IESlicit
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