SOP PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED BY THE SOVIET RADIO

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• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT sFaa`.
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DATE
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This paper attempts to describe some psychological aspects of the Soviet radio's propa-
ganda method, ae distinguished from its sploifto content (which latter was the subject of a
I '' I
report issued on 17 June 19119*). The ward "techniques" is here rather broadly defined; the
paper oovers not oncv some of the specific tricks or devices used in Soviet radio propaganda,
but also some psychological aspects of Rad o Mosoow'a morepasio propegenCla strategy. Oa
the other hand since this is a preliminary approach to the problem; there to no attempt to
,
cover eyetemalically all of the elements the problem. It should be noted that it is
Impossible toIldraw sharp line between ties Soviet radio's content and. method; method in-
volves the principles of content-selection, and these principles will be briefly considered
here, although they are more fully illus l ted in the above,-mentioned report on the Soviet
radio's propaganda content.
The methods of Soviet. radio .propaganda considered here can .be ;grouped (ecmewhat ........ .
arbitrarily) -under two. broad headings: (a) those which ? are regularly. used by. a wide :variety .
of propagandists in zany different fields of comunioation and which are not peculiarly
Soviet except with reference' to the subjects to which the. Soviet radio applies, them;. a n d .
(2) those which are open to serious question from either an ethical' standpoint (i.e., ti*th ?)
or a practical standpoint vulnerability to exposure !'or exploitation by.skillful
oounter-propagganda) For the purposes of this paper, the first group has been labeled
"standard" teohniq is; the second group, "more vulnerable" techniques. The first group in-
volves principles w ioh may be, considered more or leas basic to most suoceasful propaganda
and which are not of themselves necessarily open to question frau either an ethical. or
J
practical eta point. Ths. second group. includes. those techniques xh.ioh, because they iavolve
gross dietort.'ion, Ise the question of whether that distortion can be pointed out and/or
exploited by alert propaganda opponents. (It should be pointed out, however, that some of
the ways in which Radio Moscow implements the "standard" techniques are actually open to
serious question. For instance, the "enormous emphasis on:the lying and hypocrisy of the
enemy," which is here mentioned in connection with the "effort to appear objective"
if "standard` tech iqu~, is not itself e ther standard ors basin to propaganda in general. )
* "The Moot Prominent Thames and Sub-Themes in Soviet Radio Propaganda (April 1919),
17 June 19119,1
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'STAN) RD" TEMN S
1. Un tv and simplicity of basso theme-content. The one moot inclusive these to that
the world is engaged in a gigantic struggle between Right and Wrong. The lire drawn be-
tween the two camps is not simply between Eaot and West; considerable stress is also placed
on the contrast, within Bach Western nation, between the small "imperialist" ruling.
mine t.y and the groat peace-loving, democratic majority. This device seems designed to
cirounwont the antagonism that might be created if "America" or "Britain" were often,attackod
as such, and it also adds to the impression of overwhelming numerical superiority--and
therefore inevitable ultimate victory--cf the "democratic" camp.
2. Diversity of aubthomsSand ilLilatrat,ons. Repetition and boredom are avoided, not
3. Universality of appeal. The old appeals for revolution and the dictatorship of the
proletariat have almost disappeared (at least in propaganda beamed to foreign audiences); in
their place is a stress on more "universal" values--peace, democracy, national independence,
morality in general.
h. Effort to appear objective. Though it does r,t claim neutrality, Moscow does in
many ways build up the impression that its version of evene is the simple and obvious
truth. For example, the commentaters* tone of voice is unemotional, their material: gives
the impression of being factual, there are frequent phrases such as "the whole world knows,"
and there is an effort to appear self-consistent (e.g., by not contradicting to one national
audience *hat is said to another).
5-,Selection and omission. Though it rarely indulges in obvious lying, Moscow con-
tinually forces events to fit into and support its awn propagandistic picture by the device-
of selection and omission. Events which are headlined in the Western press are-regularly
soft-pedalled or omitted entirely from Moscow's output if they represent areas'af Soviet
defeat, Soviet moral vulnerability, or conflicts (such as the conflict between Democrats and
Republicans) which do not coincide with Moscow's two-camps picture of the world;
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6. Slanted intera'etation. An equally omnipresent device is the use of emotionally
loaded words-- e.," "people," "admits," "demands," "uzaeka," "obedient"--which,
In their contexts, imply the Soviet interpretation of events. As Ia rule it in made
difficult or impoesiblle for the listener to diet ieh between fact and interpretation.
"MORE VUIIMABlz" CHABACTCR]ST
F - i i -
1. Evasion of ke issues, such as individual freedom in the Soviet sphere, the imple-
mentation of atomic-energy contrc, Western fear of Soviet aggression and the historical
basis of that fear, direct ' econcanlo ocmparieons between East and West, the Soviet rob e ' in
the Satellites, and differences between Eastern ind Western definitions at '"democracy."
is misleading.
e
atedly given that the conclusions are so
rule, factually supported; the impression is rep
obvious and nni. sajly aooepted that they do not need proof.
4.-Blurring of d'ist h oti4PnG. The anti-Soviet ]Rigbt and the anti-Soviet heft in the
Western -+orld, are oft course equally "bad" from the standpoint of the Soviet State. Mo cow
does not confine itself, however, t;+ pointing up the "bad" or anti-Soviet character of both
groups; it often explioit1y denounces the anti-Soviet left as "reactionary.'" It thus re-
peatedly blurs the distinction between Right and Left in Infra-national Western politico--
a distinction which, fro n a strictly Marxian "class" point of view, might be considered,
rather important. 'WallStreet" and the 010, fo~ instance, are described as equally "reaction-
ary." Similarly, on the white side of the blank white dichotow,'!there is I'no clear
distinction made between S ocialism and Commnuuism, or between Socialism and "people le
democracy."
"Slide-in. " An acceptable idea is often followed immediately by a, lose acceptable
. ..?, .. - - IIIalAi1CMM+MMIRIAl01 ,i?P.. ?????.'..-.. t
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2. Avoidance of basic Bolshevik doctrine.
such as the necessity of violence, the
isle (with "dictatorship" 'reserved for the
distinction between proletariat and petit bourge
former), "iron discipline" within the Party, and
the earlier Marxian ohallgngeto property
rights, religion, patrio..ism, and parliamentary democracy.
3.-Unsupported. d'ogneatiem. The factual appearance of Soviet propaganda
Its essential conoluelions, though presented with
one--apparently on the assumption that the itstenerla attitude of unoriticil receptivi'
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6. Overalantix1'. 'The stam . lard technique of slanted interpretation becomes oxtram
enough to raise a qpeation of vulnerability in at least four aspects cif Saviot p2ropagar4a:
automatic shifting ; of implicit assumpticaiu; slanted parapbraoo (which in anoh acre
trogtiiont than outright midquotation); omitting the context; and "diabolism."
adopted toward the
a;ooeptablo idea
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will also carry over to the, less aooeptablo me.
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I. STA1 1 D TBCHA
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A. UN= ARD SD[PIamr w Bum ' -CCAMl1r
A basic propaganda Principle, succinctly! stated by Hitler is t b% to be effective
"Propaganda has to limit itself to a very few Pointe and to use', them like alogaxa until
I
even the very last mauli.s able to imagine what in intended by such a word," Soviet radio
propagandt acrupuloualy.adheres to this principle, ae far an its basic theme-contenct
is concerned. Practically everything that the Soviet radio says supports in one way or
another al single over-all theme: that the world in divided into two opposed and ir-
reconoilable camps, with the Soviet Union end its allies representing all that Is good,
and thei Western "ruling circles together with their lackeys throughout the world repro-
renting all that is evil. The followinglquotatione are typical:
"A etr#ruggle between two camps is going on throughout the world.., The anti-
Imperialist of socialism and democracy hoe never been as strong an it is
to~ay ... Let than (the imperialists) not forget that in the! struggle of
peoples against the crimiml schemree' of the imperialist camp, the loading place
belongs to the mightiest power in the world, our Soviet union, champion of the
groat idea of friendship and fraternity of nations." (24 September 1948, B2*)
`the Soviet .proposals for disarmament and a ban on atonic weapope, no obviously
in the interests of mankind, but consistently rejected by the Britain and
other capitalist governments.... 11 (13 October 1949, A3) U.S., '
`the present ruler of the U.S. need ' this trial (of the Cc?aa)Aniete) as a pretext
f or doatroying remnants of ddemocracy In the United States. (Hitler had to do thu
thing. The warmongore are trying to sweep from their
not in agreement with their the w all those who are
Program for the onalavoment of the word by the
American financial magnates." 20 October 1949, 1 1)
There era subtleties in Soviet propaganda, but they do not lie in axle complexity of the
basic ideas which the Propagandist tries to establish. There is a m -.f--um of abstract
ideology 11 content; the p~rc+pagandiet a
the deep ertlblack and the y' points a picture of Glaak va. white, using
purest white.
The eimpiioity of the p yohological Proceslses called for in the llistener should also
noticed. The smearing of one camp and the be
Psychological p?~ocesn more a g1aQ'ificatiaa~ of the other do not call for
a~ amplicated'l than ordinary aeaociatgon. In the above
quota tions, for ig?tance, direct and explicit associations are =ado between the idea of
the Soviet Union And the' Ideas of anti-imperialism, democracy, strength, friendship, and
disarmament; and there are equally direct associations between the "American financial
magxmtea I and imperialism, criminal scheming, refusal to prohibit thel atom bomb,
destruction of democracy Hitlerism, warmongering, and enslavement of the world. Neither
abstract ideology nor the cceploxiti.es of practical action are allowed to complicate the
picture. Nothing Is said here, for instance, about how disarmament Is to be effected, or
how the ban I on atomic weapons in to be enforced, or about the actual issues in the
Communist trial.
Another illustration of
Moscowla typically Dimple aseoclation of ideas In to be owA In
the following quotation:
"The all a of this extensive (military !aid) program are clear.', Making use of it,
Wall Street monopolists hope to keep the Production of the American war induetriee
on high! levels and to make a profitable sale of the eurplueee of war material. "
(13 October 1949, A13)
The reforencee throu out this report are' to the issue of the SURVNY OF UM RADIO
OA MDCAS which appeared on the date that Is given, and to the page on
hich the quo ion appeara.
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Here, the oatenaibly factual character of the assertion is somewhat more detailed and
specific. Yet the essential technique is still simply the enunciation of certain
ideas which presumably arotase negative emotions in the listener art, +J juxtepoeitian of
them with one of the elements of U.S. foreign policy, i.e. the H111tary Aid Program. In
this coca, the simple equation is:
"monopoilste...war...prof i.ts...war" equals ?%P.
The use of the label "monopolist" in this example is especially characteristic of the way
in which Moscow n.altipli,es enormously the number of emotional associations supporting its
own version of the facts. A large part of the emotional impact of Soviet propaganda
comes not from the things that are said about the friend or the enemy, but simply from
the labels and eppelatives used in referring to him; the friends of the Soviet Union are
"the forces of peace, " "the democratic forces, " "the people, " while its enemies are
"reactionaries, " "monopolists'" "imperialists. " The longer of the two sentences quoted
above is typical to that it smears the enemy at least twice, once in the use of the word
'monopolists" as the subject of the sentence and once in the war-promoting character of
the activity in which the "monopolists" are said to be engaged. And in both oases--but
especially the first--it is a matter of simple association and au,Zgestion, rather than
any more complicated psychological process. Moscow almost never presents evidence that
nionopcly Is prevalent in the United States or that monopolists control the Government;
instead, it relies on the simple and continually recurring use of the word "monopolists"
in contexts in which another reporter of the same event would perba?s say "CmQ reras " of
"Washington" or "the United. States. "
In this connection another fact should be underlined. In its treatment of the basic
two-ramps theme, Moscow does not define its primary en=W as the U.S. per se, but as the
American imperialists, warmongers, 'monopolists, etc., and their "lackeys" throughout
the wor?d. Mary persons in the United States', apparently assume that Soviet propaganda
is directed primarily against America as a nation. But this is true only to the extent
of frequent appeals' to the vri.de of non-American nations who are allegedly being reduced
to impotent subservience--"eannosdodder"-- by! the American imperialists. For example:
"The U.S. plan for an aggressive war is no secret!. . Western Hurope must
supply the eannonfodder, .... Under the pretext that the atom bomb will not now
play a decisive part, it was decided to concentrate mainly on the land forces
which are to consist of Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Belgians, Italians, and Germans."
(13 October 1949, A 3)
Generally, however, the Soviet propagandists take pains to draw a distinction--a distinc-
tion that is often explicit and nearly always, at least implicit--between the diabolical
"ruling ,
circles" In America and the democratic, peace-loving American "people":
"The Congreasi debate on MAP reflects the or is is experienced by the bipartisan
bloc--a crisis hioh is developing under' the pressure of the growing diaeatis-
faction of the American people. This dissatisfaction is assuming an increasing
scale both in' the United States and in the Marshallized countries. The wall
of popular resistance is growing ever higher in the face of the American war-
mongers and their West European partners;" (13 October 1949, A 5)
And similarly, although the British "ruling circles" are often described as aocourplicea
or vassals of Wall Street, the British "people" are pictured as belonging to the camp
of peace and democracy:
"The British' pe. ople have experienced the woo of war and to not want to fight.
They are a great and hone it people. , ... Let the British people pronounce judge
went; let them condemn those who speak on' their behalf and defame their name."
(29 September` 1911.9, 15 )
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CV"" FU03 E 14 TI AL;'
This technique presumably serves two purposes: (a) It takes into account the basic
-cpaganda principle that the audience must be flattered, or at least not directly
antagonized. Since almost every radio listener can consider hiraoelf as part of "the
people" of his country, he need not necessarily take offence at even the bitterest
Soviet attack on the policy of his.government. According to Moecor,~it is not his
policy but one that has been adopted in spite of him, with no oonsiderstion of his
wishes, by those 'ever-present forces of evil whose paver is allo ed]y guaranteed by the
capitalist system, (b) This technique also sustains the basic Soviet appeal to
"democreoy," the argument being that the WSR and the People's Democracies are not
opposing Western Nations as such, but are allying thaameelvea with the "people' in every
capitalist nation against their 'iulers,"
An approximation to these general~zationa can be aoheotioally represented by the
following diagram.
C A P ITAT.T8 T
NATIONS
U.S. Britain
'Camp of
Imperialism..
Camp of
Democracy
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leaderr in the democratic nations (o.g., the Com7w.iniet Forties) are pi turea as uait-
ed and in intimate touch wit2'.their awn people.
(5) the areas representing th? "people" of``..jtha U.S. and Britain are here slightly
shaded. This shading is intended to represent the fact that in certa in contexts
there is condemnation of the policies of those nations as nations, without ex-
plicitly excluding the "p pp1Q"',from thisloondeA ation. For example, the rational-
ism of other) capitalist,*tio~e, coloniellalnd' non-colonial, is appealed to by
picturing the threat of "Anglo-American" dou-ization and imperialism. By talking
about "the ruling whcles in Jmerioa," Moscow thus kills two birds with one stones
it maintains the diatinction between rulers and people, in all the contexts where
this distinction 1s useful; ai1'at the same time it appeals to (and fosters)
nationalistic anti American (end anti-British) sentiment in other parts of the
world.
Five points should be noticed:
(1) The absolute contrast is between the camp of imperialism
West) and the camp of demnoera (all the teat of the world).
'
, is not
(2) The chief dividing line between the two camps
separating the capitalist frc?~I "democratic" ,nations, but
separating the rulers in the west from *L 1r own peoples
countries (i'l e., these under Galnuniet oorx rol).
(the rules in the
the vertical line
the horizontal lines
and from the "democratic"
(3) The overwhelming numerical!,superiority;ofthe "democratic" camp, a
here, is well calculated to burp 'up th, morels of those who accept thi
sustaining their belief in thq certainty v i ultiroote victory.
pictured
picture by
(4) Distinctions within either camp--represented here by broken lines-Tare extreme-
],y vague and as a rule are viirtualli ored. The middle classes as well as the
workers in the West are impli itlyincluded so part of "the people," and the
DIY= ITY OFD SBBTEMM
-COMP, IBE T I A L
With all of its basic unity, howev x Soviet 'propaganda is not crudely repoitloue. It
also cultivates up-to-dateness and variety, inltho; spirit of the advice giv n by Lenin:
"We must blame ourselves for being arable as yet to organize a sufficlontlyTwide, striking
and rapid exposure of these despi ble outrages;]. When we do that (and we must and can do
it), the most backward worker wiliunderstand 1 ~dr will feel, that the students and
religious sects, the muzhiks and t]eauthors are being ab'eed and outraged by the very
same dark forces that are oppress ipg,,and crushing him at every stop of his life.... As
yet we have done very little, elm t, nothing,, to. hurliuniversal and fresh oipoeurea among
the masses of thei workers." (WHAT 3S TO BE DOlQ?, 1902) Similarly, there a now an
obvious effort tol provide the listener with aontinualiy fresh concrete "exposures" of the
"despicable outrages" perpetrated 1ythe enemies:of the Soviet Union. Interest is
maintained by varying the context nd by bringing up continually new illustrations, while
preserving the essential simplicity', of the themes which these "facts" serve to illustrate.
The keynote is not repetition as s11 oh but unity-in-diversity.
lenin's prescrip ,Lon has in fact besn elaborated and systematized. Thera is a pyramidal
or ramifying structure of themes a1A subthemesIconnecting the over-a11 two-pampa idea
with the thousands of specific i11 trations.' our levels can be rather clearly distin-
guished.* At the) apex of the structure is the most general statement of the Soviet
position: the tw -Damps picture I self. On the second level of differentitir - there are
These ?.evels are, of course, "copatruots" whichoversimpliiy~ the reality. In practice,
the structure is much more complex with several types of differentiation and an intricate
Interweaving of themes.
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perhaps eight or ten major themes, each having both a positive and a negative aspect,
and differentiated from each other on the basis of the major motives or values to which
they appeal. For example, corresponding to the desire for peace,', there are on this level
two aspects of a single major theme: "We stand for peace, while our enemies are in-
stigating war," Other such pairs correspond to the desires for "democracy," for national
independence, for economic welfare, etc. On the third level, supporting each of these
major themes, there is a considerable number of aubthemee. For instance, supporting the
major theme that "crar enemies are instigating war" there are a number of subthemow made
up of more specific claims and charges: "the Atlantic Pact is aggressive"; "they are
rearming for aggre@sion"; "they are undermining the United Nations--the bulwark of
peace"; "they are ramilitarizing Germany"; etc. And on the fourth level, each of these
subthomes is illustrated in a? variety of contexts consisting of specific topics, events,
situations, etc. For instance, condemnation of the Atlantic Pact appears in such forms
"The People's Democratic ii ont therefore demands that all parties solemnly pledge
to reject under al{jr conditions Italy's adherence to any association, coalitions or
bloc 'which directly or indirectly aims at unleashing war. " (16 April 1948, G4)
"The peoples' struggle age inst the military bloc is growing, not only in Britain,
but ais,> in all the other countries participating In the North Atlantic Bloc."
(2 Juno 1949, A 4)
"Is it Russia who proposes to replace the United Nations by an aggressive military
coalition?" (20 May 1949, A 6)
"The so-called Holy Alliance.., represented the alliance of European monarchs,
exponents of the worst reaction, militarism, and the inhuman, oppression of the
people.... The organizers of the North Atlantic Pact today are bringing to life
under new conditions the same spirit of reaction, war and violence propagated more
than a century ago by the alleged Holy -Alliance." (6 May 1949, B 5)
Whether the degree of variety is enough to preserve the listener from boredom is a question
which obviously, could be answered adequately only by a direct study of the reactions of
the listeners themselves. The existing degree of variety, however, should not be under-
estimated. In -these quotations (whose variety could be multiplied at length), for example,
the Atlantic Pact is discussed in two different national contexts (Italy and Britain), and
in conjunction with two other topics (the United N tions and the Holy Alliance). Also--
apart from the frequent recurrence of a few key words such as "military" and "aggressive"--
the?variation of wording is considerable.
The policy of diversity is shown also in the way in which new developments are handled.
A major new topic, such as the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, or currency dovluation,
is ordinarily given a great deal of concentrated attention when it first appears in the
news. bony commentaries are devoted specifically to it. Then, after a period of weeks,
the amount of such concentrated attention typically drops greatly, but simultaneously the
new topic is worked into a great variety of specific contexts. The Marshall Plan, for
instance, is no longer the subject of many concentrated oommontariea, but is repeatedly
referred to in discussions of specific countries such as Franco, Belgium and Italy, as a
cause of their economic woes; and the "enslaving" character of the Plan is casually
referred to in innumerable contexts as if it were a universally recognized, self-evident
fact. The "Marshallized countries," for instance, are referred to as if thin expression
alone were enough to damn them. By this process of defocalizatlon and dispersion, a fair
* The process by which a word like "Marshallized" comes into use is reminiscent of a
passage from Ionin's WHAT IS TO BE DONE? in which he attacks the uncritical use of
certain catch-phrases by his "opportunist" opponents. ''Evidently thin slogan, " he said
(criticizing his opponents9 use of the phrase, "freedom of criticism"), "is one of the
conventional phrases which, like a nickname, become legitimatized Eby use, and become
almost like an appellative, "
CONFf ENTIAL
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degree of freshness and diversity in the noto iel is maintained without necessarily
docraa' rg the total emphasis on the topic in question.
Lf11 ALITY ~.F APFrdH~, -
C.
The appeal l of Soviet radio propaganda today is not primarily to the 'working close but to
the universal conscience and.. ae]. -interest of , the peoples" of the world; and it
identifies (itself not primarily with revolution but with moat of those universal. or
near-universal values which nearly all of its (listeners presumably accept: peace,
International cooperation, "democracy," national independence,~pavosperity, economic arm
social justice, etc. In a sense, therefore, its appeal is not revolutionary, but--
peychol:ogi ally--conservative"
The ai-tent of the change in this respect, ainoQ
is not. always fully appreciated. To bring out
r?aa.ali aomel earlier statements from the-period
etatemen'sa of a type which almostneever occurs
foreign audl ences).
the earlier days of Marxist propaganda;
the oontract, it ''will be worth while to
I
before the Popular Front (1934-35)--
today (at least in broadcasts beamed to,
,"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare
th that their ends can be ettain~id only by t~q forcible overthrow of all existing
a k:ial conditions. " (QC* MUNIST MANnF'ESTO,1 lM)
?Thg replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without
a violent revolution, " (Lenin, STATE AND F~'POWTION, 1917)
"A working close without a revolutionary party is like an az' without a General
Staff. The Party Is the Military Staff of the proletariat. " (Stalin, FOUNIVTIO
OF IENIN1 M, 1924)
In peace of such candid references to violence, revolution, and military organization,
and in plrsoal of such frank appeals to the proletariat as a class,', we now have such
aniversal appeals as the following:
Peace, "Who understande the full value of peace better than the Soviet citizens?
Who hates war more deeply? ,.. We won theilwar because-we hate war, and aftor
winning I It we joy idly replaced the militar - caaoiunIquoo with modest reports about
the auger-'beet harvest, the production of saucepans, and preparations for the
school year." (Ehrenburg, 6 October 1949, 2)
Democ'rac. -. 'The workers of France demand a government of democratic unity. ...
The pree'aure by the masses has forced the rp aigration of Queuille, who had
carried out the policy contrary to the people's interest. The French people say
the same to Mayer as to Jules Mooh--'Away with you.'" (27 October 1949, G 1)
National Independence. "Soviet public opinion does not doubt that sufficient
t'cwce will be found in the Yugoslav peoples ,for regaining once more their in-
de,pAndence, and for occupying a worthy place in the camp of peace and democracy
headed by the USSR." (6 October 1949, D 1)
or a eystenetic presentation and illustration oP~("universal",values to which
oecow now appeals, the reader is referred to the Iu report on the content of Soviet
die propaganda (see above, p. 1), It may be noIod here, however; that the three
uotetiona given above are typical in several respects: (1) They ! do not argue for
evolution, nor even-oxpllcitiy--four socialism. (2) They do-not use the word "class..".
or draw explicitly air class lines whatsoever. (3) The connotations which Soviet
opeganda gives to the word "democracy" include ioetillty to a email exploiting
inority, most frequently described as "ruling oi~olaa" or "monopolists." There is
re an Unplic~t drawing of a class line, but it is definitely not between proletariat
petit bo'.rgeoicie; it is between "the people" (implicitly including all middle class
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n especially atri1Eing'Yf1uatratton of 'this moral emphasis is the way in Which Moscow
ndles the topic of military. paver. It almost-never diacnesaa.Soviet military power ,
pacifically, or in a way which could clearly be interpreted an threatening or tntimi-
tang its neighbors. The lack of specific military discussion could. be attributed to
he general Soviet policy of secrecy, but the relative infrequency of even vague state-
nts extolling Soviet power calls for acme further explanation. In this respect, acme
ereona in the United States have made erroneous''(predictions--perhapb because of
esuming that Soviet peacetime propaganda, like Nazi wartime propaganda, would auto-
tioelly "capitalize on" any opportunity to advortize its corn military strength. For
astance, at the time of President Trt>mon'-s annoibaooment ofI Soviet' possession of the atosio
osb, some. peraons in America predicted that Moscow would capitalize on its possession
the new I'apon to strike fear into its Western neighbors; Actually the treatment of
his development was, like most of the previous Soviet discussion of the atomic bomb,
xtremely cautious,, modest in volume, and wholly aubordinateO. to al now emphasis on the
oviat desire for peace. Ebrenburgrs statement that "from Macaw to Philadelphia it is
s far as from Philede2 gria to Moscow"-41statement quoted by the American press- wsa mint
ore nearly an open threat,,tJ*". gthing else in'SovIo1 .radio propaganda; and even this
tatemerrt, When, seen in its complete context (xhioh included an especially idyllic Image
peace) could hardly have suggested a threat of Soviet aggression. Similarly, it is a
ery striking :?~ot tl>t;t the undoubted superiority of Soviet I land forces as compared with
hose in Western Europe has almost never been "capitalized on" in any way by the Soviet
oAla; Moscow never conjures up an image of a Re'ljuggeyaut rolling across Germany and
ace, even in response to Western "aggression": by air against Soviet cities.
clue to the Soviet reasoning on this matter is ' provided by the fact that Moscow hoe
ooaslonally in the post a,Scused the Western warmongers of "brandishing" the atom bomb
nd using it to "blaolcail the Soviet Union and the Peoples Democracies. A recent evoob-
'ion of the same picture is the following:
"When we speak of peace, it is not because . we are afraid of the threats of the
British and American bourgeois who now menacingly brandish their weapons but, when
the shooting starts, will be eager to press them into other hands, the hands of
Negroes, Frenchmen, or Germans...." (13 October 1949, A 5)
once Moscow goes out of its way to detect a "brandish
y lag" of weapons by its anemias, it
y well be anxious ! not to lay itself open to the j charge of "brandishing" the Rod Army.
't may reason that foregoing a chance to enhance Soviet military p,estige is (at least in
flue of peace) a price well worth paying in order Ito preserve intact the propaganda image
the Soviet Union as a peaceloving, non-aggressive, highly moralinetiom.
? .
JaFJ%fflT TO APPL kR t JC TIYS
basic and complex characteristic of effective propaganda (though one which bas only
rely been discussed in detail) is that in a certain sense It must appear to be objective.
the case of any propaganda as inherently belligerent as that of the Soviet Union there
of course a need to define carefully the kind of "appearance of objectivity" which it
trustee. Certainly it flgRa?jgj .toy to appear neuter =.undaoi.ded in the great world
truggle between Right and Wrong. The impresaionllit tries-
ries t1o create is, rather, that the
orld struggle is between Right and Wrong, and that any soberly clear-headed and truthful.
d
rson woul
necessarily sqe it And_,%9aoriDe it in th .,,xmy.
of the indications of this effort are:
it
Unemotional) Tone of Voice: Sevr*al listeners have noted that Moscow's news broadcasts
ccrmtenterlesi are as a rule not given In an emotional "soapbox oratory" style. The
inner of the commentator Is confident and definite but not excited.
Seemingly Factual Emphasisc There is much news, and the oomaontaries also contain
Loh presumably factual material. The impireasion (given is that "this. happened" or "this
true "--not that "I say" ihie" or "our position is that. "
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CONFIL& 1w1IAL
9 fnaemtant Cot?antatar'at Apart from caaementariee by Ilya Ehronburg and an
S. pa..f f
eacaec ic.:.s 1. asV3n'mous satirical pleas, (such as they extraordinary "fable of Senta Claue"
whia.*s appeared on Christmas Day, 1948), there is'a marked uniformity in the style of Soviet
cc en'Atzxs and the -articles quoted by the Soviet radl~-, The pronoun "I" is very-jrare.
In general, the listener is not reminded of the existence of the human medium through which
he sees The Truth.
Ass the Obviousness" of the Soviet Version of the Fasts:
P:.e nt Phrases Sue tUe
A9 l .4" "the whole world , " needless to sa " "there can no longer be
ary Isab+.?.'.," "no one even tried to deny... "--such phrases are innumerable. F examplet
" l'.- a whole war ld follows now with emotion the speeches of the representatives of the
Soviet Union, Belorussia, the T1hains, and Poland at the U.N. General Assembly In
defense of I the victims of morAroho-fascist *?errorism. V1shinsky in his first
tip-3e ,'hoc at the last U.N. session drew atteacion to mcnnarchist-fascist terrorism in
rnd suggested that the U.N. should take the necessary steps for the caseation
at terrorism in Greece." (13 October 1949,1? 2)
P?^it~ g'.atsrtion illustrates at several points the )rather subtle devices used to create an
imprp::yion of obviousness. It is not only that the horrible facts are assumed to be so
p~pin'.r-i that the "whole world" feels the same emotion when the facts are described. There
1fi aloo th.e fact,t t 4iahinalzy "drew attention. He did not need to "claim" or to
nr u"--or so this cc*m antary seems to suggest. All he needed to to was to "draw
attention." Similarly, the steps he "suggested" were "the necessary" steps. He did not
r..i.a in or urge that they were necessary; they were simply "the necessary" steps. l it to
1r+p1i.,.I that their nsaieseity was as self-evident 'ia fact as the "moneroho-fascist' terrorism"
ttnylf0
Avni iAnce of Obvious hyli E: Truthfulness a Ind objectivity are not identical, but they
both Vip1y that' the picture presented is a true one. It is therefore pertinent to note
t.het--cnntmrary to the impressions of some persons in America--the Soviet radio clearly takes
pa lrw t,7 avoid obvious lying. The out-and-out lies that are obvious enough to be' spotted
by the cn+dinary newspaper reader are few and for !between. Even though the number' of actual
out-and-vat lies is probably somewhat larger than this, it is doubtful whether they represent
the larger part' of the distortion that occurs; both selection and slanted interpretation
are probably fair more important.
h. not contradicting to one 'audience what is said to another,' Another
C? tenc? i e
Y
m'~a~scrzM9ptiart of the nature of Soviet propaganda !, is that it often lays itself open to clear
proses of irlco aistency by saying contradictory things to different audiences. There are
Meal, 3ifferemo'ea of emphasis on some points in broadcasts beamed to different areas, but
to gensral'the,se do not represent actual self-contradiction. For example, the theme '
German unity; which is greatly stressed in broadcasts to Germany, is soft-pedalled in broad-
casts t. France'; yet Moaoaw has never said to Frenchmen that it does not favor German unity.
(. Av-!Piding Predictions That Might Not Came True: For example, in discussing ,he "Western
eoonecaio rrrisis" Moscow has not made specific predictions as to when the full-blown "crisis"
would. materialize.
FS. En,a3ous n Emphasis on the ItylpS and ILypooriez of the E : Moscow does not often
explicitly boast of its own truthfulness or objectivity, but it is continually attempting
to smear its opponents on this ooore, with the implication that what the Soviet radio says
is, by contrast, the sober and unva:onished truth! For instance:
"He (Acheson) node laughable assertions that the Bonn 'Goverrmnent' had al3.egedlyy been
created on a truly eonstitutiesnal basis." (20 October 1949, B 2)
"U.S, newspapers, whether Damrroratie or Republican are all alike, for they can
alvays be(relied upon to publish the same lies." (22 September 1949, I 2i
The Point Four program "entaila jk oor camouflaged plan for the colonization and
total subjugation... of countries too weak to resist the expansion of U.S, mono-
polies." (29 September 1949, A 4)
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- 10
'd. FeWi Direct Appeals to Action or to'Emotion: If the horrible facto create fear of
Anger in the listener, then that is his business; the business of the ocmaaentator is simply
to describe The Facto; Such, at least ,I is the impression the Soviet oommentatcr conveys.
lthd.io Moscow very rarely makes statements in the imperative rather than the descriptive
farm; it noes not say "Arise, ye prisoners of starvation,'" Ostensibly, it sorely doscribee
title "et ai va ..ion and leaven to the prisoners the decision as. to whether they should "arise. "
Nnr arc there, merry direct appeals to emotion; far excmr,l?, with two or three exceptions,
ttarn hive been no monitored- instances of explicitly glorifying hate.
10. A Medium--Not a T.ow--Intellectual Level: In content, Soviet propaganda follows
Hitler's principle that "propaganda.., has to adapt its spiritual level to the perception
of the least intelligent of those towards whom it intends to direct itself," In form,
however, the Soviet radio does not givol the impression of talking down to its listeners.
In vocabulary and in sentence length, far example, it represents a medium rather than a low
intellectual level. This combination of a basically simple black-white propaganda content
with a somewhat dignt!ied and oven occasionally a scholarly-sounding farm is well illus-
trated by tt 5 following passage:
'Me victory of Chinese democracy has been prepared by the whole course of historic
Imvr .opment. The Great October Socialist Revolution signified a cardinal turn in
tb.e history of mankind, undermined the power of imperialism in colonial and dependent
~~~an.ssies, awakened the oppressed masses In the Far East, and opened a new chapter in
their struggle for lib- ration. ...I The existence of the Socialist Soviet State in
the neighborhood of China, its mighty development, its revolutionary experience and
Its fraternal solidarity were facilitating and inspiring the anti-imperialist and
enticefeudal struggle of the Chinese working masses." (13 October 1949, 12; quoted
f'.r:m PRAVDA)
This passage represents approximately the upper limit or "intellectuality" in present-day
Soviet hrce lasts. InIits use of such expressions as "historic development," "cardinal
turn, " "e.c1cxaial and dependent," 'facilitating, " and "anti-feudal" (as well as in its
frank use of the word "revolution") it is mildly reminiscent of the more scholarly writings
of Idarx, E=gels and Lenin. ? Yet It is not very different in this respect from the average
or the least "intellectual of Soviet broadcasts; the fact is that they are rather
homogeneous in their level of apparent intellectuality, seldom deviatt much either above
or below the medium level which is apparently considered appropriate. (And as far as con-
tent goes, they are squally constant in their extreme simplicity. This passage deals in
high-emending generalities without defining "democracy," without specifying how "imperial-
ism" has "oppressed" the :masses in the For East, and without differentiating in any way
between the present social and cultural conditions in China and those of Russia in 1917.
And, like this passage, nearly all Sovi-+ broadcasts are on a homogeneously low level of
actual intellectuality. )
E. SE11rCTION AND OMISSION
While the Soviet radio can not often resort to obvious lying, it continually resorts to
two other standard propaganda techniques which depart from strict objectivity: selection
(which always implies omission of, or underomphasie on, certain parts of the total
picture),, and slanted interpretation. In later sections we will consider certain ways
in which Moscow .;arrise both techniques to an extreme which perhaps defeats its own
end by making the techniques as such more vulnerable to counter-propaganda. The basic
techniques themselves, however, could scarcely be effectively criticized; they are the
necessary, taker..-for-granted characteristics of all effective propaganda. For example,
examination of a single issue of the SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS (20 October 1949;
see especially p. V) brings out the following types of emission, some of which are absolute
ur4 scm-3 only relative to the,amournt of attention given to the same topics by a relatively
inclusive news source such as the NEW YCRIC T]} S.
1. Areas of Defeats For example, curr Int Communist setbacks in Greece and in the Austrian
elections wore ignored or given alight attention. Similarly, current evidences that the
Western economic situation is not one of acute "oriole" were ignored; and specific evidences
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of. Western rearmament! and increasing military strength were discussed only very broadly,
in a moral context, as evidences of Western militarism.
2. Areas of "l Vulnerability: The State-Church struggle and the mane arrests in
Czechoslovakia wart --ignored. Western charges of violation of civil right:, in the USSR and
its Satellites,." Were I ignored or evasively handled. The trial of top Communists in the
U.S. wool capitalized on as evidence of American fascism, but without oisouseion of the
actl2bl issues involved, such as Commmnist reaainess to use force and violence. The
question of world control of atonic energy was given little stress, and was handled with
the evasiveness that has characterized Soviet treatment of this issue since the beginning.
3. Irrelevant Conflicts: The two above-mentioned types of omission could have been
easily predicted o-: ,the basis of common-sense aeiumptions about the nature of propaganda.
There is a third major type of omission, however, which could not have been so readily
enticipsted: the general (though not univb%sal) policy of ignoring or minimizing all
confiiu is other than' the one great two-campki conflict between imperialism and democracy.
Erphvasis on the: one great cleavage is maintained partly by not allowing the listener to
bp ;listracted by other cleavages. One illustration of this policy is the' very alight
+ittetntiiin given,,to the differences between Republicans and Democrats in the United States,
and t. their contest in the presidential e?ections of 1948. Moscow gave perhaps forty
ar fifty; times as much attention to the Soviet-sponsored Paris Peace Congress in April
19419 n0 it had given to the American election of the previous fall (apart', from Wallace to
pant in this election, and the alleged persecution of his followers). Similarly, the
B:rititih Labor and Conservative Parties are treated as virtually identical.
In the;S 1 MWEY of ;20 October 1949, this policy was represented by at least three major
avoi,asncee: they (Navy;-vs?-Air-Force conflict, which was currently dominating the headlines
in th-f Americen',press; the coal and steel strikes in America; and the persistent conflict
in Palestine botsjeen Jews and Arabs. One might perhaps have supposed that at least the
coal and steel atrikee would have been vigorously "capitalized" by Moscow' as evidences
of labor iureet ind class conflict in the U.S. The avoidance is understandable, however,
in v l e+ta of the fact that both Murray and Lewis are in Moscow -s ideology more lackeys of
Well Street; it!;lwould have been difficult to depict this conflict as coinciding with the
parti!.:u1ar. cleavage which Moscow considers crucial.
The onej mjor eicep'_Lon to this policy is the fairly frequent playing up of "contradictions"
within the oapitiliet world, and especially rivalry between Britain and the United States.
There i.s a real. paradox here. The Soviet radio is torn between two propaganda advantages:
the advantage oo minimizing all differences except the major one; and the advantage of
showing 'that the enwm is disunited and therefore weak. The conflict between the two
tendencies z.:--epeoiai1y clear in the case of the treatment of Anglo-American relation-
ships; there isla vacillation between treading "Anglo-American imperialism" as a single
entity and. playing upreal. or alleged rivalry between the two powers, especially in the
M1.ddle East.
4. No -Comnnitmontt 1 A fourth possible type of miss ion should be mentioned for the s+ke
of completeness.: concrete issues on which the Soviet Goversmuant has not yet taken a firm
official stand, or his not t'ully clarified its rosition. It is understandable* that the
Soviet Goverztme ~t should not want its propaganda arm to commit it in advance on issues, or
aspects of issues, relative to which it wants a frtse hand for negotiation and bargaining.
The remarkably small:1propaganda investment11in the Berlin situation during moat of the air-
lift period is perhaps a case in point; the Soviet blockade itself was virtually ignored
by Moscow, :o'th at when it was lifted there was relatively little loan of face. The
avoidance of'the' concrete issues involved in the Austrian treaty is perhaps another
11lustration.
In place of al.L.~these avoided topics or sub-topics, the Soviet radio concentrates, day in
nrd day gout; ob.; those events or those propagandistic generalizations (such an the aggressive
character of ths'~Atluntic Pact) which moot directly support its own two-camps picture of
the world. For-example, to take a single example, it freely makes use of quotations
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which aup,:ort its position, preferring (when they are available) quotations from poreane
who cannot be accused of Commmuniat bins. A typical way of' introducing such quotatione is
tc say, for instance, that "even such a reactionary ae Senator TA t" points to the weak-
neeeee of the military aid program.
F. SIANJED I1hi?RPRETATION
The ctb.er -'standard" and basic Sar det technique of dietwtlon Is slanted into
rpreation.
Perhaps the moat i.ntereatl lthing about Moscow's slanted intorpretat4ons is their explioit-
neee. As we have pointed out, the action-Implication of the material are not'epellod out.
All other implication, however, are, as a rule, fully explicit. goodness or lbadnesa of
an actic-n, for instance, Is made abundantly clear. On such points there in nooffart to
give the listener the feeling that he is being allowed to draw hied own conclusion from
the facts. Rather, the impression in given that the interpretations which need to be drawn
are ,a wholly obvious aspect of the facto themselves. The Soviet propagandists do? sot
arpear t_ assumes like acme 'other propagandieta, that objectivity or the appear* InIno of
objectivity) implies an absence of explicit interpretation,- their apparent assumption Is
that fact and interpretation'are inseparable. For example:
'A-ring the' electors in mind, a nvrber of Senators (who criticized the military aid
grogram) do not wish to connect their fate with the aggroasiva cause of the White
Ro:aae. " (13 October 1949, A 5)
"I I+?aly, M. Moch has heart-to-heartta]1m with his Rme counterpart, Soelbi, whose
:oa+..talle are also stained with the blood of innocent victims " (20 October' 1949, G 2)
Each. of these Items has the appearance of factual description; each of them makoa' fully
explicit a highly controversial interpretation of events; and each presents the inter-
pretaatiom an if it had the same obvious, factual character as the tangible facto which are
referre t~. In f the case of the senators who criticized MAP, two elements of interpretation
are unobtrusively, Introduced. the motive for their criticlam (fear of~ the "electors") and
the '!aggressive" character of the policy of the White Mouse, It is also clearly, iarplied
that this a.ggreeaiveneoa" is obvious to the "electors." In the second case the essential
controversial interpretation Is introduced unobtrusively with the wloord' "innocent" 4e applied
to 1Qvtct 1me, If andl this interpretation is treated me if it has the same factual oharaoter
as the Moch'?.Sf sibs Converaaticyne which represent the starting-point of l the iter.
' iJtcecor
does 'not. eat Moch talked with Scelba, whom democratic elem into 1n Italy accuse cf.?murder-
I g innocent viotlma. To put it in such a way would have withdrawn the halo of ttaotualnoae
and obviousneae from the "innocence; of the victims, which was the Peaontial pro -i inda
point that n~seded to be oetabllahed it would have encouraged the listener to sepa ruts fact
and Interpretation, and perhaps to challenge the interpretation while accepting ths fact.
But--to judge by to coneiato it policy--that is exactly what Moscow does not want !iota
listeners to do.
Other illustration of the technique could be multiplied indefinitely. One of the cmuni-
preeent tams of it, for instance, is the use of ve;.-be, as troll an tuna , which Izply the
major themea of the Soviet propaganda line. The use of nouns such "monopolists"j and
"people" has already been illustrated. Some of the moet'well-worked verbs which uervo?
a aiTnilar function are "admits, " "unmasks " and "demanda." At the time of devaluation
Crisis "admitted" (that the price of bread would .rise--implying that he would normally try
to conceal ouch a(fact, but that in thin case concealment was impossible. Viahinakyland
others are continually "unmasking" the warmongers--implying th*t they are ainiat'or;
criten as well me inatigatora of war. The U.S. "demands" British"dova'luation--list I',g
vrita in has been reduced to the status of a vaeaal f Wall Street. Similarly, Pranca does that
,tic agree to U.S. propoaals, it "aubmite" to U.S. "orders"; Sforza does not talk ,kith U.S?
representatives, he is "aumamonod" to talk with them; American milit z'y leaders do',not
ask for European aeelatanco, they want to "compel" the Frenoh', Italians and othergj to "pull
their', chestnuts out of the f{.ro." Adjectives and adverbs too are continually proae d. into
eervi:io. "AllogedIly" is a prise favorite; e.g., when Westerners ape Iak of poeoiblelooviet
aggroasion, this is "a loud noise of an imaginary danger allegedly threatening. "Obedient"
is also a favoritoi? when the Soviet delegation 1e out-voted in the U.N., the majority is
typioal]y.an "obedient" majority, obedient to the "dictates" ! of the Wall Street mcuiupolists.
When translated into ouch terms', there is hard],g a political event or the face of the globe
that cannot be described in such a way as to support the Soviet ?oronanarnea n4nt1uro f t
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II. MORE VUIla'ERABLE CHARACTERISTICS
EVASION OlriKEY ISSUES
The selection or "cardetacking" which is described above involves an avoidance of
ertain kley dsuss--en avoidance which in some cases is extreme enough' to raise a
unction if whither an opponent might make propaganda capital by exposing the evasions
a such? psomelof the major issues evaded in this way are:
` Individualoedom in the Soviet Sphere: Recent Western charges have brought about,
~1,,ome cons ]date ion of this issue, but the typical reply is to charge "slavery" in the
Yost rather tks' to attempt a direct defense of Soviet and Satellite practices. For
'natance, in rev ly to charges of forced labor in the USSR, we find the following:
"The natur'4 of this galley-slave work (in Britain) can bejudged'by the fact
that !nobody ia prepared to go voluntarily into the mines, although there are
, 400,pOO unemployed in Britain. The manpower in the mines is supplemented by
sen?ing d obilized soldiers compulsorily into the pits, by recru'ting white
cloves -,cps the ranks of the so-called DP's, and by setting conon criminals
`I
I to vprk.i,, is, then, is the much-vaunted freedom of laborlin present-day
FL
Britain n (4 August 1949, I 7)
ectern charge :'In the U.N. with regard to violations of human righ;ain Hungary, Rumania
j nd Bulgaria bs~ e- been met chiefly by accusations that the sovereignty of these countries
s being attacked, and bylreiteration of official accusations againstMindszenty, Rajk,
and others, at;f the truth of those accusations were self-evident. The right to. deal
tornly with ~fpscists" and spins is stoutly maintained. And similarly, on the very rare
aeaeions when i,"the Soviet corrective labor system" is specifically deaerlbpd, it is
iseuased only in terms of the treatment of "criminals," and the treatment Itself Is
ascribed as mu ph more humane than the treatment of criminals in the West. On the
qually rare 016' anions when free speech and freedom of the press in the USSR are discussed,
,here in repetition of the official thesis that the press is freer in the USSR than
plsowhere, bed Viso all groups are given not only freedom but also paper and printing
~~resoon- -ihich: orkers in the West cannot afford. The methods of Party control are
ever discussed In, thin context, nor is there ever a discusslonlof what constitutes
o
l"
"
litlcal
p
ar aality.
The Implementation of Atomic-Energy Control: The way In which the' concrete Immune;
f atomic-energy control have been evaded--without seeming to ovaA--t?3iom--rtprosonto
~Qne of the sutt~.ost aspects of Soviet propaganda technique. Both before and after
'lroxidant Nrrumi 'a announ-ament of Soviet possession of the bomb, Moioow'ploturod its
tm campaign fob prohibition of atomic weapons *an "clear and concrete,'" In contrast
t~o the ovmsivs` eehnloaiitiee of Its opponents; yet it has consistently tended to
vold any real_."iscussion of the actual points at issue: the nature ofladequate inspection,
international'sinership and management of atomic energy facilities in distinguished
from mereI nsp'etion, the veto, eta. There has also been (withl,certain notgble exceptions)
systematle ad t-pedslli g of the whole issue, giving it dust enough attention. so
that, in all proability, few listeners are aware that the soft-pedalling haO existed
*t all. I-.he!lpviot campaign to "ban the bomb" has been strongly amph~eize4 only at
ose partioul times (the fall of 1948, and again more briefly and %1143? In the fall
of'1949) wheniw~~rld attention would have been concentrated on this issue lu any case.'
At these times{4'some Soviet initiative was clearly called for me ia defensive counter-
attack, balm
nc'ing and distracting attention from Western charges of $dviet obstructionism.
1(For more ldete .ad'discussion of this complex topic, see the SURVEY?OF USSR
'RADTO
$ROADCASTai, osp cielly 2 April 1948, pp. J 1-3; 26 November 1948, pp.'A 1-2; 13 October:
949, pp. A 1 2,)
Western Fish of Soviet Aggression, and the Historical Basis of That Fear: In any
4iscussior? oflW~atern "militarism" or of the At an is Pact, the ear o ov et
aggresslo which'ba? amused these developments Is ordinarily Ignored; and tkta result
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as that the So let interpretation ofl them as purely a
P ggreesi appears as the only
possible explanation. On tie rare occasions when Western references to Soviet
aggression are mentioned at all, such references are dismissed as palpably dishonest
propaganda; they are a loud noise of an imaginary danger allegedly threatening."
Another example:
"Time and again Speak opoks in a'hysterical manner. Thus, turning to the Soviet
delegation, he declared that the poeition!of the Western Powers were bgaed on
fear, ..of Ithe USSR. 'We feel you,' Spaak exclaimed, 'on the frontier. 1of the
Rhino, and we are afraid.' It vas' easy, however, to understand' that tl4ese
theetricalJ tricks were needed for the very definite purpose of produciz;q an
impression upon 'the rerreeentativea of the yellow press, who feverishly recorded
Spaak'm yelling," (1 October 1948, A 7
At the same tuna, there is almost never any defense of the numerous historical episodes
which are often interpreted In the Westlas instances of Soviet aggression. The
Finnish war, for instance, and the ways in which Soviet control of the Satellites was
established after "liberation" are almost never discussed. And the same blaokout
exists (with rare exceptions) for the' whole pe:',iod of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
4.1 Direct Economic Comparisons Beth.In Bast and West: When Soviet figures ale given,
they a compared with other Soviet figures, showing remarkable progress; when Western
figures are given they are compared with, other Western figures, showing deal no or
stagnation. SL 'lot and Western?figures are rarely, if ever, directly compared. It is
rarely if ever stated in so many vords--though it is often vaguely implied--that the worker'
standard of living I. higher In the Soviet Union than in the West. Social services and
the absence of unemployment in the USSR are discussed, but there are no direct comparisons
between the daily life of a Soviet worker (the kind of clothes he puts on in the morning,
the kind of food he has for breakfast'the kind!! of house he lives in, *to.) and the
daily life of workers elsewhere. The Soviet radio does not admit a lower living standard
and than defend It on the ground of Russia's Initial backwardness, World War I, civil
war, and World War II. Instead, it simply avoids the issue.
5.I! The Role of the USSR (and the C
l
i
omm
un
et Parties) in the Satellites: it is always
blandly assumed that the Satellites are not only democratic- in every sense of the word
: o wholly ovoreign sad inde
d
t
pen
en
. The two crucial questions--the question of
Nether these :o'intrIea are dominatedb
C
y
ommunist Parties, and the further question of
Nether those Communist Parties are dominat
d b
e
y Moscow--are not recognized gwsj as
uastions existing in the minds of Western
iti
cr
cal. Western charges In this respect
re vaguely referred to (if mentioned at all) only as "baseless Blenders" against the
People's Democracies
"
.
B
.-,Differences
ot~reen Sovlot and Western Mtsnq~gg of "D
oes, there are two fairly emocrac As far slclear differences bet"-
o__. .~p~s1
th
c
-
e
o
i
h
-- --, -? ??,
-?
c
.re Inferable from the nature of the
contexts in ?which the Soviet radio uses the word. (a) The very small Soviet emphasis
an individual freedom--even on the propaganda level--suggests that this essentlil corn-
Fonent cf Western conceptions of democracy Is not important in the minds of Soviet
propagandists. (b) The word 'Idemocrsoy" is used' as if It were
synonymous ,.ustice; for exam le, "the camp of democrac
" is
ft
y
,o
en contrasted with of
reaction," as if lthe,oppositeof reaction were necessarily democratic. This su
esta
hat; in Soviet minds "democracy" connotee'governm
t f
en
or the people--i.e., th
People, the works s--much more than iticonnotes for the common
Bovernment ~.Y the people. Majo
ity rule
a such Is seldomrif ever discuased
r
.
vagueness of the Soviet ra
io on ideol
i
l
og
ca
issues is well illustrated, however. -
d
b the fact that theme differeno,.d have never been made explicit. Moscow haq never
a id "olasq justice is more important than fro-i speech or majority rule." Instead the
a eollutaneas of the two-camps dichotomy is' :.:,aintained even here; ,
it is never admitted
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or a moment "-et the West places more
emphasis on free speech or on majority rule than the
owlet Union does. The word "democracy", in treated as if it had a single clef-' and trans
rent meaning, which is violated in every respect by the "ruling circles" in he Veat.
r' instance:
Trying to make a joke of it, Bevin said that one should appoint a special asset or of
Ministers' Deputies in :der to establish what 'democracy' and 'sovereignty' wire. I
Bevin'e joke, however, failed to J' tthe mark. It is well known that the U.S. and
British reactionary press have recently on many occasions been trying to assort in all
seriousness that the conceptions of democracy and sovereignty were 'vague,' unclear,
and' lent themselves to different interpretations. Is it befitting, however, forl,a
Labor Minister to make such remarks?" (5 December 1947, A 4-5)
AVOIDANCE OF BASIC B0L$HEVI8 DOCTRINE
was polnnted out above that passant-day Soviet propaganda is characterized by r 'hnlversallty
appeal which strongly contrasts with the earlier and more candid revolutionary appeals"
the proletariat as such. There are Western writers who do not take the change at its
as value. "Histortcue, for example, concludes that "the Marxist doctrine to'whioh',he
telin)lis committed is uncompromisinglyrevolutionary."* It Is therefore legitimate to
ppose that the Soft-pedallinL'of the older doctrines is primarily propagandistic in!,
ture, and that it is designedlto minimise the opposition of two non-revolutionary groups.
)?demoo-vatic socialists who share the desire for socialism but who oppose the violent
d undemocratic methods of olaae or Party dictatorship; and (b) non-socialist elements-
rhaps chiefly in the middle or white collar classes--who can be appealed to in theme of
ace, democracy, national indepenaence,,etc.
though the ahrewdneee of this strata
BY seems evident, it would Boom to be also a
culiarly vulnerable one
since it could be ex
os
3 b
th
,
p
~
y
e simple device of quoting earlie atemente by Lenin and Stalin (still current and taught in the USSR), and by pointing to
a present infrequency of similar statements. A direct self-contradiction could not !be
iced, since the Soviet radio dose not' Stalin did in hi
1
6
s
93
interview with Roy
ard) make any statements that appear jtoldeny directly the revolutionary aims of inter-
tonal moaeunism. Here, as in many other instances, Soviet inconsistency is primarily
tter of differences of emphasis rather' than of outright self-contradiction. But the
orence of emphasis is in this case so great that it might be relatively easy, to 'lemon-
ate it to a non-revolutionary Western radio listener who was familiar with the current
iet line and who, if confronted with the earlier line, would probably find it both
amiliar, and disturbing.
so illustrations of the older line have already been given (p.6). Surveying now more
tematically the types of older statement which are now relatively rare, we can say
t they include:
(a) The words "revo lution"i and "revolutionary."
(b) The phrase "diotatorehlp of thl proletariat." Although recently somewhat
revived on the Satellite beams and occasionally mentioned in some Service broadcasts,
this phrase is extremely rare in Moscow's regular foreign broadcasts; and the
rarity Is the more striking when compared with the central importance of proletarian
dictatorship in, for example, Stalin's "Problem of Leninism." The single word
"dictatorship" is of course I wholly out of key with the current Soviet stress on
"democracy, even though, in the Soviet ideology, it does not by any means imply a
one-man dictatorship. And 'in addition, there to the demonstrable fact that it does
?imply~an exclusion from the "dictatorship" of middle class and peasant groups, aonae
of whom are perhaps not now aware of how definitely they could be excluded from at
least the initial stages of Soviet "democracy."
(a) Other class concepts, such as bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie.
OREIGiY III AFFAIRS, January 1949, p. 214
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L : {{
(d) The concept of "iron -',isoipline" within the Party. For Instance: I "Whoever in
the least weakens the iron discipline of the party of the' proletariat (especially'i
"
during italdictatoreh1p) actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.
(Stalin, quoting Lenin; In FOUNDATIONS OF LNNI11ISM) 1924)1
(e) The earlier outspoken challenge tb existing property rights; "abolition of
private property.
(f) The challenge to religion; religion is "the opium of the people."
(g) The challenge to patriotism; "the working men have no coon try."
(h) The challenge to arliementar democrac; "disrupting parliamentarian from within."
(i) The frank acceptance of vio l ence; "force is the midwife of every--old sooiotylil
which is pregnant with the now."
UASOPPORTND DOGMATISM
he air of abso lute certainty which characterizes most of Moscow's aasertiore stands in
triking contrast with the frequent absence of facto supporting those assertions. AndlIn
his oontraot there may lie another major weak spot in Moscow's propaganda armor.
be contrast is not necessarily immediately apparent. As has been pointed out, Soviet)
ropagando gives an impression of factualness. It is factual, however, only in the sense
hat it regular.y uses news items as page on which to hang its propaganda themes. It is
of factual in the sense that it supports these themes themselves with any systematic
resentation of 'data; rather, the themes ordinarily appear in the slanted wording of the
factual" item itself, or in the form of generalizations which are p~reaented as If they
are so obvioua;as not to need factual support. For Instance:
"Not one ol ~ those who took part in the debate even tried to deny the facto showing the
interference of the U.S. and Great Britain in Greek affairs." (17 October 1947, S 2)
"It is Inc bent on the aforementioned states (gungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria) to
wage a struggle against organizations of a fascist type and other organizations which
aim at depriving the people of their democratic rights." (20 October 1949, A 2)
he factual pegs on which these two items hang are discussions in the United nations; but
he essential c'onclueions which are drawn- -Anglo-Amer loan "interference" inlGreece and
he "fascist" a racter of those who have been liquidated by the Satellite governments'--
facto w at.ever ,
b
`
y any
e not r
t can be contended that this technique represents one of the: strongest aspects of Moeoow's
ropaganda approach. Statements such as those quoted above probably convey Ia very otroatg
preseion--at least in the minds of uncritical listeners--that the Soviet generalizations
re in fact wholly obvious and not in need of any:: factual support. The technique also has
he advantage that it makes no demands upon the Intelligence of the listener; the speaker
atere to the mental inertia of the listener by not asking him to weligh or assemble faota.
or listeners who are already more or lose committed to the Soviet version of events and
eceptive to Soviet interpretations, it may well be that unsupported dogmatism is much
ore effective than an approach which, by attempting proof, might s6 am to cast doubt on
that is "self-evident." But it could also be contended that, In the minds of unc mmsityed
ioteners, such dogmatism is vulnerable. While initially affective even with such
istenors, it may in the long run be vulnerable to counterattack by a propaganda opponent
ho makes contrary statements with equal confidence, who supports them withlab-.ndant
acts systematioally presented, and who repeatedly challenges the dogmetistlto do the
amo.
BLURRING OF DISTINCTIONS
o force the infinitely complicated real world into a crudely simple two-camps ideolcay
evolves ignoring or denying many distinctions which are in fact fairly obvious. It
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,involves, for inatanoe, ignoriL or denying the difference between capitalists and
socialists--a distinction which 'lies at the heart of Marxism itself, considered as a
,social ideology--whenever this distinction does not coincide with the line that the
Soviet Government draws between those who are subservient to it and those who are not.
In Soviet propaganda we therefor, got such strange bedfellows as Wall Street and Tito,
Churchill and Bevin, De Gaulle and Blum, Hitler and Schueaoher, NAM and CIO. All,
according to Moscow, are "reactionary." Philip Murray and Norman Thomas, as well as
Tito, Bevin, and many others who are ordinarily considered as socialists or representatives
of labor, have all been depicted by Moscow as "lackeys" of Wall Street.
One aspect of this tendency has already been discussed as an Illustration of the general
Soviet policy of ignoring "irrelevant conflicts." If it manifested itself only by giving
,slight attention to "irrelevant" conflicts (such as the election contest between Truaan
and Dewey), the technique could hardly be called a vulnerable one. If such a distribution
of emphasis were "exposed" in the eyes of an ordinary radio listener, he would soaroely
consider it very heinous; he might presumably grant to Moscow the privilege of emphasizing
what it considers important. But the question of vulnerability can definitely be raised
when Moscow posses from ignoring to an outright denial of the differences between, for
example, Well Street and Tito. And such outright denials do often occur. For instance:
"This trip" (Tito's proposed trip to Paris and London) "is being organized by the
U.S. intelligence service in Europe on direct orders from Washington, which has
decided to exhibit the Yugoslav Marshal to the European peoples." (20 October
1949, D 1)
"No sooner were the elections over (in Norway) before the labor loaders cast off
the cloak they had adorned themselves with during the election campaign." (20
October 1949, E 1)
"The most varied reactionary groupings in the U.S. and Europe, such as Churchill,
Hoovez?, Norman Thomas, Leon Blum, and other right-wing Soolaliota are grouping
together." (30 April '1948, A 3)
There are also other ways in which the blurring of important distinctions, within either
the black camp or the white camp, helps to maintain the sim;llcity and inclusive-
Iness of the black-white contrast. For example, the perfection already achieved by both
the USSR and the People's Democracies is not marred by drawing any clear distinction
between the nature of a "People's Democracy" and the socialism of',the USSR. Nor is the
socialism of the USSR allowed to seen imperfect by comparison with a subsequent
Comaaunist steer of development; the expression "progress toward Communism," or "aarchiag
toward Communism" is. used., but without clarifying the nature of the Communism toward which'
the USSR is marching--whether, for example, it will actually mean! "from each according to
his ability and to each according to his need," and whether it will include the "withering
away of the state."
And, on the black aide of the great divide, some of the other blurred distinctions are:
(a) Between being anti-Soviet and being ready to wage aggressive war against the
Soviet Union. For instance, "admissions" in the Western press that the Atlantic
Pact ;a "directed against" the USSR are taken as proof that the pact is "agcessive"
in nature--ignoring the distinction between fear of Soviet aggression and desire
to provoke war.
(b) Between opposing the "unanimity principle" (i.e., the Soviet veto) and opposing
international "unity" or cooperation. The verbal similarity between "unity" and
"unanimity," and also between "unanimity" and "unanimity principle" has been skill-
fully utilized to make opponents of the veto appear as opponents of the very
spirit of international cooperation.
(o) Between "military" and "aggressive." For instance: "The revival of military
unions of a similar character (to that of the Axis) is very dangerous for the cause
of peace. It is characteristic that Bizonia 1s becoming the'imain aresenal of the
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(d) Between appeasing Hitler
is handled with a suppression
CONFTI TAT
S.
18 1
(17 December 1948, B 1)
military unions of Western Potters."
and deliberately "unleashing war." The
Munich period
of all' evidence that Chamberlain and Daladier were
result ig that the
y are made to appear as willing
accomplice, rather than victims of Hitler, (For further description of the rather
complex propaganda techniques tsee ii the Soviet reinterpretation of recent history,
see the STIItVSy OF ASSR BADIO BROADCASTS, especially 13 February 1948, lpp. A 5-9;
20 February 1948,''pp. A 1-2; 16 April 1948, pp, B 1-4. These Issues of the SURM
descri'he the "battle of the douments"i'Vaieh began with the State Department's
publication of documents on No i-Soviet relationships.)
"SLID -1ir"
Coupled with this blurring of distinctions there is often a particular sequence ukioh adds
greatly to the effectiveness of the blurri
g
n
: an acceptable idea is followed by a lean
acceptable one, with an unobtrusive shift'inirording such that the unwary listener may
not realize that he is being led farther and' farther away from his starting point. We
have already pointed out the particular kind of "blurred distinction" whichlconsists in
treating an interpretation an if it were anintegral part of the "fact" which is being
described? The illustrations given 4t that point also illuatra3e the "^t+,-a_,.." device
which is naw being consi ere The
probab - ~~ vA-Au.rlly presen;ea rirst with a "fact"--
ly a true fact, or at least Nothing that sounds like a fact, which he can accept
in a relatively passive, uncritical frame of mind
With
.
no change of pace, the pro-
pagandist then casually brings in a highly lslanted interpretation, in such a way that the
listener who is not on his guard naturally carries over to the interpretation the acme
uncritical' attitude which he had adopted toward the "fact." For Instance:
"In Colombia, as in all the other Latin Amerioan countries, the hand of the-United
States is not for away; the Colombian newspaper FL TIEMPO discloses the smuggling
of arms from the United States both by sea and land. In view of the increaso of
the democratic movement .through put the' Latin American continent, the American
imperialists can mair..,ain theirldomination only by helping to set up reactionary
and pro-fascist regimes. Such a process! is now taking 'mane in "
ere the initial statement that "the hand of the Unit
d St
a
e
ates 1a not far aw
y," whether
rue or not, is at least plausible from the standpoint of mares listeners. The reference to
he smuggling of arms is perhaps only, a little, less plausible; it purports to be a
actual statement on a subject about hioh the listener cannot claim any contrary know-
edge. Than, after sliding into his listener's mind with these two relatively
cceptable statements, the speaking tykes advantage of this accept_ag attitude to make a
or more extreme interpretation: the United States itself In using deception and
iolence to oppose "democracy" and majintain'"pro-fascist" regimes.
"There is no doubt that devaluation of the pound sterling the currency s
number of other countries economically tied to Great Britain dor dependent onfher
Is proof of a sudden increase In the economic crisis sweeping the wholeoapitalieb'
world.' (22 Septienber 1949, A 2)
o devaluation of the pound was an indubitable fact; +
s whole capitalist world" was ~ the p cture of a crisis"stroepiug
ampler perhaps notquite so factual is nature. Still anoAtar
"The arithmetical relation between the so-called majority and :minority in the U.N.
loos not correspond to the real relation 0:f
Political forces in the international
arena. This is evidenced by the zany favorable comments on the Soviet proposals,
afraid of war itself, and the
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received from the broadestieocial spheres in various oountrias. Vishinsky is
perfectly right in saying that the peoples will not support those who are coming
out against the Soviet proposals, and' that the adoption of these proposals would
be regarded as a triumpbaatiproaouncenest of peace." (22 October 1948, A 3)
Here the essential but unobt ualve leap is from "many favorabl^ comments" to "the peoploc."
The statement that there hadibea "many" favorable comments' is plausible enough; from
this, however, the speaker slims over to the statementths't "the' peoples "--not some
individuals, nor some of the peoples, nor most of the peoples, but "the peoples"--are in
favor of the Soviet proposals!.
OPSRSLAI4Ti[ G:
It is of course impossible to draw a sharp line between ordinary slanting, which we have
listed as a necessary and probably legitimate propaganda technique, and "overalaating."
There is perhaps a qualitativediffaronoo between explicit 11aterpretatIons which the
speaker believes to be "true"and those whioh he himself recognizes as exaggerations or
disitortions. Here, however, ve;aro applying a less stringent criterion; we are asking
only whether the distortion is so gross and tangible in nature that it might perhaps
be made the basis for an effective "exosure" by an opposing propagandist. Four types of
slanting 'Uhioh night in Some cans come- under this category' are:
1. Automatic Shifting of Inilliolt Assumptions: For instance, every Soviet victory in
the U.N.. is interpreted as a victory for the democratic forces--the assumption being that
those who voted for the Soviet proposals did so of their own free will. To Illustrate:
"Those defeats (of the U.S.)prove that the democratic peoples have no desire to
be and will not be silent witnesses of the imperialistic methods used by the
colonial powers, methods whioh are contrary to the principles of the United
rations." (17 October 1947, A 2)
On th-, other hand, every Soviet defeat is interpreted as proof of U.S. domination--the
assumption now apparently beingt hat those who voted against the Soviet proposals could
not have done ^o of their own;lfree will (even though they are, in some cries,. the memo
individuals who on,other occasions Toted the other way). For instance:
As for the Interim Committee where there would be no unanimity principle, there
the U.S. counts on ruling the roost through the use ofIits voting machinery."
(211 October 1947, A 1)
Thee are similar ready-made rules for the interpretation--of many other types of events.
For example, whenever Truman or my other member of a non-Co unistgovernment does
something which Moscow disapproves oft it Is likely to be attributed to the direct
or indirect influence of Wall Street;~and whenever he does amfthisg which Moscow has
been advocating, it is interpr eted as an attempt to win the .^aTCr of the "democratic
forces" in him country--a step,, "forced" upon him by the growing strength or the aroused
indignation of these "democratiol,jforoes." In organizations which the Conaunists dominate,
such as the WFTU, all opposition'his automatically a "splitting" of the unity of the
democratic forces; while in organizations which they do not dominate, such as the U.N.,
their own opposition to the majority is a courageous defense of national sovereignty
or of some other high principle
2. Slanted Paraphrase: MoscOwusually uses its own words rather than actual
, quotations,
when it describes what one of opponents has said. This leaves room for any amount
of distortion without being accused of literal misquotation, and same distortion usualyv
occurs. Typically, it takes place by the substitution of some of Moscow's words, slanted
to support its line, for the verdr that the speaker originally used. For instance,
Irving Brown 1s said to have told; 'theAFL annual conference tiat the "chief task" of the
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recentiiy formed non-C sat international labor organization will be:
"tc assist in overthrowing the popular democratic oror
well as to s 8 nmients is Eastern Europe es
trugglo~against the democratic forces in the oloniee. . One is o
left with surprise at how far these gentleman have gone in exposing their true
rple-??the role of direct agents of imperialism in the workersr crgsnizatione
(13 October 1949, A18)
Several propaganda devices are illustrated here. Slanted ra
tutionof the term ' " Pa as appears in the subati-
" 'populrt? democratic govorrm:onts for the torte "Co~nist -dominated
goverrAaente, which is what Brown is much more likely to have sid, and of demooratic
farces, for. "Comnuniste 'is the colonial context. By this device, It In made to appear
that Br
own "exposed" or admitted his upon opposition to domocr;' itself when what he
a ctaally did was to appose Coamouniets And '
in addition, we
haws a complete blurring of
the distinction between non-CoMMmist labor loaders and "imperiialism" itself, introduced
bbyy B e skids ?in technique. Starting with the slanted but relatively plausible description
Opposition to Communism, the writer ends with the direct! ent, of imperialsm. " rp^etation that he is "fa
3. Omittir the Context': It is not only quotations which ca be distorted, by ignoring
the context. A paraphrase or, in fact, a description of almost a
different sty event can be given a
meaning by leaqing a listener in ignorance of the to 11 situation or factual
context in which the statement or event actually occurred. The outstanding example of this
in Sovi t propaganda is the description of Western rearmament, the Atlantic Pact, etc.
withcutrar r mention. of the fear of Soviet aggression which oohs itutos the chief reason far
and errs) Justification of those developments. In the absence of this context milita
exam preptrat1cma can moan only something sinister--"militarism," a ession, and war. Forty
example
"The overseas loaders of the American Party in France want to militarize the c
They need a French infantry and a French artillery, armed pith ount7
standardized Americmn
we pc-,,e..,. However, the Western Union Permanent Defsnso Council reckons without the
peoples.... Neither, the plane of the capitalists nor those of their military staffs
will make them abandon the peace camp." (6 May 1949, B 3)
Qmbined with an appeal t
"mili 10nalism, we havq,J4=P.,{k ractoristio reference t
tarization with none, of the defensive context which might give "militarization"
3maoth?i' other than an aggressive connotation. (And, in addition, the use of the word
Plane" m d the implied opposition of all this to "the peace cams" directly suggest
~ggrossion. ) In other attacks on Western 'militarism" a oharactpristio phrase is "propor-
tions for wax, " The use I Of this phrase, with no reference to the defensive character of
he war which is feared b the West inevitably suggests dolibe to
hich ie a ,tunny desired Jand intended. Preparation fora wad
in illustration of a e eo sic quotat reported out of oomrtext :1.s found in a broadwlst of
he official Soviet note ct protest against "warmongering" by Mr,
1he article also outlines the plan of making use of the U, .sir force, air f rce
basses, and atom bombs ,against the U:SR, in particular for tie destruction of such
Sov~ot towns as Mosc0W, Leningrad, Kiev, Hharkov, Odessa, and others. ... The article
states that U.S. etrategiste are planning to create a oirou!r network of air bases
around Russia with the 'slow to tightening this network until is Russians are
strangled. Thisarticla... constitutes an example of u~b ridled, ro
now, war against the S1SSR, " P pagazxia of a
(18 June, 1948, G 2)
e NLWS RTFK article was concerned with what would be the U.08. a atoS3' in case of S d
3grosalon, but by using the word " oma e
seem almost synonym "plan without its defensive deotation it In here made
oue n
with a des ire or intent to create Ouch a war, 'And in the lent'
xatonce thin in '=do explloit; the description of what might be one in case of Soviet
ass inn is called "unbridled propaganda of a now war.
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4, Diabolism. MM -.'s moat ortreno departures from poyohologioil jroalism came at the
poii ts', at which it ascribes diabolical motives to its adTeraaries--motives such an an actual
desire '* frItomio war, an actual desire .to impair the .eoonomio otabil~lty of Western
Surope; etc. There is more then an echo, in Soviet 'radio propagasdi, of the fantastically
diabolical acts and intentions which appeared in the "confessions" of tho defendants in the
MWOCM:' triads. For examples
"1Rzama'n, Aoheaon, Dulles, Vandenberg, and the speculators who prP!it out of the cold
war are showing not the slightest intention of putting-an and. to their plans for an
atcaio war, on-which all-their hopes are founded." (29 September; 1949, A 2)
Taking ad.antago of the dollar shortage of the West Ruropaan o tr ies, the U.S.
monopolies decido4 to ti n the credit noose around the nooks at their TIotirm (by ..
insivt~ing on devaluation)." (29 September 1949, A 6 . 1
"As t the dollar hunger in Europe, it is not only the result ofd the war expaMitu'l'Aa
howovor groat this may'bmTe been. It was planned by the Wall Street brain trust,
prepared and put .I4to lzraotioa by the ramified agencies of the latter." (12 March 1948,
`A';2)
Suoh.umroallsm in closely linked with the similar unrealism involved in a total denial of
the elements, of fear in the psychology of the Western peoples. It is linked also with the
goneral 'tend enoy to think 'in -terms of absolute blacks and whites.
co I. 'El1TI-NI
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