COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND VOA RADIO PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730210-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 210
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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? CLASSIFICATION DELL' A
CENTIjAL INTELLIGENCE,"AGENCY
1,7td
FORMATION FROM
I
N
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
'COUNTRY
SUBJECT
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
THIS DOCUNCMT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TOO NATIONA1. DEFENSE
CF TIC UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MIANIIIS OF 1SFIO'1A$IYELATIO ACT SO
Y. i C.. 11 ADD SS. AS AMC MDOD. ITS TRANSMISSION ON T1~6 NIO
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANT MAMNLN TO AM UMAUTIOIIE1D -ANSOM IS FNO?
MIIITID ST LAW REPRODUCTION OF THIS TOM" 1S PNOHI01710.
lvam
1. The comparison of Soviet and Voice ofAmerica propaganda is intended to pG41.
vide (a) clues to the mentality which shapesjUSSR propaganda techniques and (b) co
parative material for the examination of propaganda techniques. ap~ L.-
1 .1 7rRwv:uTxr ...'.-il
2. The resemblances between Soviet and American,propaganda are greater than
generally supposed. The differences are matteie 'o? : degree, not of kind. The semeg,.~;
universal values are invoked in both; both illustrate'the same set of principleslo 1cs
effective propaganda; certain limitations aaalvobserved in both.
3. The differences in degree appear tolbejfunctions of the following psycholgfia3 ;
peculiarities :
`~ S.i.YASiLL'E1[I
a.
b.
Soviet'conflictmmidedness, dicYh' mining propensity, and class-
n
mindedness. ' 4I., .
fact-mindedness,
vidualism,
i
i
n
i
American enter tainment-mindedne8d
e
.
'
traditionalism, and defensive posCrt
yu r
Al'"
t.
A. FOREWORD;;'
impressions of Soviet propagand~are derived rom several years of continuous observation
some 300,000 words, 'taken chief;
The differences are of interest
1. Each of them raises a
policy or emphasis differs from
inventory of differences should
what propaganda methods are mos
y from Ithe Tnc=tins. or i,ecemoer J.' 7u ana 1,nuunry 17/1.
from two standpoints ' ,
uestion as to propaganda policy. Wherever the Soviet
ours, it may or IDayr not be more effective than ours. An
provide a numier,of starting-points for examination of
-: effective kl'
2. The differences may be clues to the mentality of the Soviet propagandist, to
his values, his beliefs, his mental lities. These limitations STAT
and vulnerabilities',were outlined in e data of the present
study may serve to round. out the picture and un er ne cer ain aspects of those papers.
The resemblances between Soviet; and a:nericanjp>COpag*ida are great--much greater,, probably,
alit
f
y o
than most Americans, realize. Tiey der vne fro~jtlp principles: (1) the univers
V 1 f~ 1 .' ASSi'filtD
STATE
ARMY-
FOR EsxRE011 C111
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STAT DATE OF
INFORMATION
STAT
DATE DIST. 9- I M ~ tiq 9 s"~
NO. OF PAGES. 8
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the human value-system to which all' propaganda necessarily Ippea~s(the desires for
peace, democracy, national independence, class justice, economic welfare, reliable
knowledge, etc.), and (2) the common assumptions of propagandists as to the techniques
they must use to be effective (clearness, simplicity, human ',inte est, selection,
slanting, avoiding obvious lies, distinguishing between rulers and people in an enemy
nation, etc.) For a list of 33 similarities, see section D! elow.
Those differences which do exist are almost entirely differences~of degree rather tha
of kind. For instance, one of the most extreme differences s in'the amount of
emphasis on free speech and other individual freedoms. But when
mentions free speech, it resembles us in seeming to take it for
speech is desirable, and in claiming that it has free speech,, and
The similarity is in fact so great that it may well jbe due to something more than the
realistic and universal exigencies of propaganda; it, may also bel due partly, to mutual)
imitation as between hostile propagandists. A convrgence-tendency is historically
demonstrable; Communist propaganda is more like ours than itlwaslin 1934, and ours is
more like that of Moscow than it was in 1949. Hitler's propaganda! was much' closer to
the general patterii in the 1930's +',an it was in the 1920's.l The evidence suggests
that there is such a thing as an international propagandists' culture, which like all
cultures tends to accept its own assumptions uncritically, without empirical test. It
may well be thet some :,- the "principles of propaganda" which are more or less implicitly
taken for granted by propagandists throughout.-the world would bel found to be false ifs
they were subjected to experimental' study. For example, it may be that both we and the
Russians underestimate the propaganda values of modesty and easonableness.
C. DIFFERENCES
The observed differences between VOA and Moscow propaganda can 'be grouped under eight
main headings:
1. aovi.et Conflict-Mindedness
This term means not necessarily desire for war, but a tendency to assume a state
of conflict as inevitable and to see everything else in terms oflit. If there is a single
key word in Soviet thinking and writing it is the word "struggle.!' Every economic effort,
every attempt at negotiation, every 'honest difference of opinion between blundering human
beings tends to become struggle-ized as it passes through the; distorting lenses of the
perceptual process in the Soviet mind. The person with different, views is seen as a deadly
enemy, and the way to peace is seen not in a meeting of minds but in a steel-like deter-
mination to expose the enemy's deceptions, to resist his aggressions, and perhaps, by
11
To some extent this type of,thinking is characteristic of All nations engaged
in the merciless game of power-politics. It has also been accentuated in our own country
during the past few years, under the double impact c.2 the atomic bomb and the danger of
Soviet aggression; and there are some who fear that we have already become "as bad as the
Russians" in our conflict-mindedness. The evidence of propat;andr"analysis.. however,
suggests that we still have a long way to go before reaching tha-til point. :'~e specifi
differences are as follows:
implication, to destroy him if possible.
were much more frequent than during the period 1935.-39.
- ' II
a. Greater frequency of denunciation. In average number of denunciatory wo ds
or ideas per minute, Soviet broadcasts greatly exceed ours. They fairly bristle with
words like aggressor, warmonger, monopolist, imperialist, reactionary, incendiary of war,
lackey, slander, treacherous. This is perhaps partly a merem.atter,of style. Our broad-
casts are now decidedly hard-hitting on the whole, but in a more factual-sounding way and
with fewer denunciatory epithets per sentence. It may well be that'our style is fully as
effective in smearing the enemy as the Soviet style is. But even If it is only a
differe e in style, that has some significance. 111 'is as ifIthe1Soviet propagandists,
taking their version of the conflict for granted, are unaware of the fact that they may
have to prove their version to an unconvinced listener, and of the fact that he may be'
repelled by a frequency of verbal mud-slinging out of proportion to, what he now believes
to be realistic.
Of all the quantitative measures of conflict-mindedness this is probably
the most significant as well as the most accurately mea'aurable. was the chief singe
difference between the propaganda of 7-itier and Roosevelt during the pre-war years;
Hitler denounced just about three timer as often as Roosevelt jdid. '' It is also a useful
measure of increasing war-mindednesE Roosevelt's denunciations during the period 1939x41
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Moscow occasionally
granted that free
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b. More military metaphors and words for physical violence. In Soviet propa-',
ganda there are more military t arms such as camp, march, cadre, banner, hero, front,
vanguard, rear,cpmpaign, and also more words for physical violence such as crush,
annihilate, unleash, strangle, cannon odder, cannibal.
c. More words connoting susnicior,~. There is a special paranoid flavor in other
favorite Soviet terms such as unmask, expose, plot, undermine, traitor, betray, forced to
admit, not attempting to conceal, lie, slander.! The underlying assumption seems to be
that any appearance of innocence in the enemy is necessarily deceptive.
d. Fewer words representin the gentler virtues. In VOA broadcasts as con-
trasted with Moscow there is is occasional ional occurrence of words of a radically differenti
sort: kindly, decent, gracious, good, sympathy, mercy, compassion, humility, neighborli-
ness. Moscow has a few words in this general meaning-area--friendly, cooperation, co-
existence, etc,--but with the Soviets the field!, of the gentler virtues seems to be less
differentiated than it is with us. iThis is typical of the nature of differences of this
sort. There is in Soviet propaganda la meaning-area corresponding to every major meaning-
area in our propaganda, and vice versa; the differences show up in the degree of
differentiation'.)
The term "good will" is especially, interesting in this connection. When it first
appeared in the; Stockholm Appeal in March 1950 it stuck out like a sore thumb.; It was as
un-Soviet as the complete absence ofldenunciation in the Stockholm Appeal. Roth were
apparently shrewdly calculated (perhaps by Ilya,Ehrenburg, who was active in the Stockholm
meeting) to appeal to non-Communist Westerners. The term 'good will" continued to appear
very frequently during the next several months,! but only in connection with the Stockholm
Pppeal, and only in a stereotyped slogan-like fashion; it was an alien intrusion which
never became assimilated into the body of Soviet propaganda.
e. Fewer words for moderation. The VOA is more likely to use words such as
evolution, liberal, adaptability, elasticity, ethical restraint, and conversely, to
condemn its enemies as extremist, died-in-the-wool, fanatical, dogmatic, grim.,
f. Less reference to civilian life: home, childlen, etc. Ehrenburgis againlan
exception, but in Soviet propaganda as a whole, unlike the IVOA, there is an almost total
absence of terms such as Daddy, Santa1Claus, doll, Christms present, comfortable homes.
g. More terms for determination. Tnelmartial spirit of Soviet propagandists
appears in expressions such as firmlyconfident, steeled in the struggle, iron lliscipline
(frequent in Stalin's writings, but soft.-pedaled in current propaganda for general
consumption), peace forces, democratic forces, "we do not beg for peace, we demand it.
h. More terms for strength. For instance, mighty, bulwark, irresistible, in-i
vincible, triumph.
I. More terms for unity, For instance: unanimity, union, alliance, moral and
political unity of the Soviet peoples),' the peoples of the world are struggling lfor peace,
the democratic camp, the-Soviet-Union-and-the-People s-Democracies, This is somewhat
related to the claim of universal acceptance of 'the Soviet version of reality:', as is 11
known, everyone knows, the whole world knows. The VOA talks much about unity in the West,
and also uses the "as is known" device, though probably not nearly as much as Moscow does.
It may be that our total attention to unity is as great as theirs in view o7 our
exceptional need for it at the present time,
2. American Entertainment-Mindedness
In America the entertainment industry accounts for a far larger part of the
national income than in Russia, and has become closely allied to the art of verbal ex-
pression, It is understandable, then that the ,Voice of America should greatly surpass
Moscow in the entertainment-.value which it provides. Specifically:
a. More human interest. The VOA talks much more about concrete individuals;
it has more dialogue, more anecdotes, I more drama. It relates itself more directly to the
daily lire of the listeners ae individuals. Its commentators are more personalized, and
express more personal feelings.
'b. More humor. The number of outright ,jokes is far greater, satirical dramatic
sketches are much more frequent, and the number of ironical) twists in oruinary'commentary
is considerably greater.
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c. Nore variety.) The VOA has far more variety in style of presentation and in
the illustrations given to' support major themes.) It probably has a much more varied
vocabulary. And it is also more varied (perhaps much too varied) in the subthemes which
it uses to support its major themes.) VOA w_ .ters seem much more sensitive to the
possibility of boring their listeners by excessive repetition. This quality is good from
the standpoint of keeping listeners specially those whc have no strong political
interest, but it raises a question as to whether a greater concentration of fire might
bring greater results. We' could be ,nearly as varied as we are now in the concrete
.liu trations we use to support a given subtheme (such ..s slave labor in the USSR, or the
historical record of Soviet aggression) and still concentrate our fire on a smaller and
more carefully selected set of subthemes.
d. Evaluations in terms of interest. The word "interesting" occurs in VOA
broadcasts, and so do opposite terms such as "drab." They are almost if not completely
absent from Soviet broadcasts.
3. American Individualism
a. individual freedoi. As mentioned above, orl important difference between
the two verbal value-systems lies in the emphasis given to individual freedom; Moscow
claims to be in favor of it, but gives it only a tenth on a twentieth as much emphasis as
the VOA does. This is the', one great exception to the generalization that their basic
criteria of evaluation (peace, democracy, national independence, economic welfare, etc.)
are essentially the same as ours.j It appears in the infrequency of the term "individual
freedom" end related terms such as civil libertine, freedom of speech, freedom of press,
freedom of religion, academic freedom, Bill of Rights, free expression. It, also appears
in the sheer frequency of the word freedom as compared with the word democracy. While
Moscow speaks continually of the democratic camp, we speak continually of the free world.
There is a significant difference in connotation, since the natural and usual context for
the word "free" is an individual context. It appears too in the way in which Moscow handles
such events as the trial of top Communists in the United States. The usual line is to
claim that such persecution of "peace partisans"' proves the opposition of the American
ruling circles to peace; it is the opposition of; the ruling circles to what the victim
stands for, rather than the violation of his rights as an individual, that is emphasized.
b. Other references to individuals. Terms like enterprise, opj;ortunity, in-
dividuality, private, one's own, personal preferience arelcommoner in VOA material. The
personal pronouns--I, me, we, us,'you, your--aremuch more frequent. This reflects the
greater "human interest" mentioned above, but also suggests a basic person-mindedness
which goes beyond mere entertainment-mindedness.!
c. More varied terms for democracy andtyranryy. While the terms "democracy"
and "democratic" occur with enormous] frequency in Soviet broadcasts, as well as the terms
"popular" and "people," the concept of 'democracy is not much elaborated or differentiated.
There are few terms such as constitutionalism orlrepresentative government. On the
negative side especially the VOA broadcasts show more differentiation. Corresponding to
the Soviet term "ruling circles" and'' related words such as reactionary and monopolist,
the VOA has a large armory'of terms such as dictatorship, totalitarian, tyrann;, serfdom,
deified state, secret police, regimentation, slave labor.
(This is perhaps related to the Soviet tendency to identify c.emocracy with
class justice and to identify anti-democracy with class exploitation. They confuse govern-
ment for the people with government by the people more often than we do. In a sense,
therefore, their concept of democracy is at thisjpoint broader than ours, and terms like
exploitation and oppression should be included under it.)
4. American Fact-Mindedness'
The Soviet assumption in!,geleral seems to be that those who are in the wrong are
necessarily wrong because of inherent evil or ill will rather than because of i. :sunder-
standing. This could be merely al matter of sound propaganda policy insofar as it applies
to the "rulers" of the opposing campt the need for basic simplicity probably necessitates
pair-tiny them as wholly evil and calculating in their wickedness. There is, however, a
strong tendency to apply it also to the followers in the opposing camp. The idea of the
Western masses being misled by their capitalist rulers does occur in Soviet propaganda,
but it is remarkably rare.',
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The more usual position is the patently unrealistic one that "the people" in
the ilest are already in "the democratic camp." It is ?oubtfuJ. whether this is sound
propaganda policy. It must give many listeners the impression that Moscow has strayed far
from reality, and it also fails completely to meet these non-Communist Westerners on their
own mental ground. It therefore suggests that this isla real mental blindspot in the
Soviet propagandists, and that they are relatively incapable of thinking in terms of
varying degrees of knowledge and understanding. Their frames of reference are nearly
always moral good vs. moral evil and strength vs. weakness rather than understanding vs,
misunderstanding.
Greater American fact-mindedness is also suggested by the following character-
istics of VOA propaganda::
a. More terms for inadequate knowledge. The VOA seems to use more terms such as
knowledge, wisdom, reason,, realism and understanding; and it certainly has a greater
variety of non-condemnatory terms for!! inadequate knowledge, such as misunderstanding, being
misled, losing one's way,', hesitation, doubt, surprise. It also recognizes the existence
of opinions as distinguished from having or not having The Truth; it uses the term )"public
opinion" more often, as well as terms, like expressing an opinion, exchanging views,
optimism, pessimism, etc. '
b. More facts. The VOA is somewhat less inclined to rely on sweeping un-
supported generalizationsi or on the phrase "as is known." In its commentaries the pro-
portion of facts used as illustrations or proof is higher, and the ratio of news to
commentary is probably higher. Also,':'although the VOA has very few neutral facts without
clear propaganda implications, Moscowl has practically none.
c. Less spelling out of interpretations. Whether wisely or unwisely, the Voice
more often presents facts "without rubbing the listener's face in its own interpretation of
those facts. This policy! certainly eItails no great loss, since the implications are
nearly always fairly clear; and there may be a great gain in appearance of objectivity.
In any case, the policy shows greater'jsensitivity to the possibility of fact-mindedness
in the listener.
d. Less denunciation: fewer epithets. This has already been mentioned asl an
indication of Soviet conflict-mindedness. It is also relevant at this point as an in-
dication of a kind of emotionality which may interfere with fact-mindedness. Whether this
kind of emotionality is a propaganda advantage requires empirical evidence. The most
effective and genuinely hard-hitting kind of mud-slinging may be the kind which throws the
most factual mud.
e. Are historical material., In its "Do You Remember?" series as well as' at
many other points the Voice of America now uses historical material, and the amount of it
is much greater than Moscow's. It seems likely that this makes our broadcasts seem much
more substantial in the eyes of an intellectually curious and politically conscious'
listener.
f. More direct discussion of opponents' ideo. =, In its comment on Stalin's
recent PRAVDA interview, for instance,' the VOA gives some idea of the conter-t of that
interview. Both VOA and Moscow seem to have a fairly firm principle that ~J.ie opponent's
propaganda should not be dignified nor carried to new listeners by quotin, or attacking
it unnecessarily. There is a real question as to whether the VGA is not too similar to
Moscow in this respect; it may appear to many listeners to be on a par with Mosco* in
evasiveness. But at least ', it is somegqhat less evasive than Moscow is, and somewhat!more
ready to meet a skeptical listener onlhis own ideological ground.
g. More specific !military and economic comparisons. Two especially interesting
instances of greater factualness and specificity are the VOA's specific comparisons between
East and West in economic success (production, standard! of living) and military strength
(e.g., number of divisions). The former is perhaps entirely interpretable as due to a
capitalizing on the real fact of Western economic superiority; the West is now on a'higher
economic level, and the Voice would be foolish not to hammer the point home with
comparisons as specific aslpossible. The reverse is true in the matter of military',
strength, however. It is therefore definitely noteworthy that Moscow relies on vague
generalizations about the "mighty" Soviet Union rather than getting down to specific
elements of strength, partly out of desire not to appear militaristic, partly not to give
away military secrets, but partly in general lack of appreciation of the propaganda', value
of specific facts.
l j
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oviet Dichotomizin
It is noted above that the keynote of Soviet, propaganda is the ward strugg'e."
A closely related fact is that Soviet propaganda is characterized by an especially siimple
andlxigid division of its world into two parts, one wholly black and the other wholly
white. It is true that we dichotomize in the opposite way, but our black is not quite
so: *holly -lack, ~''our white is not quite so wholly white, and the dichotomy itself does
not quite so completely monopolize the whole picture. Soviet dichotomizing shows itself
n..tiseveral ways ;
a. No self-disapproval. Unlike Moscow, the Voice has on occasion admitted that
those on its side' are not always in agreement on everything. It has also admitted that the
West'lis weak in land strength-20 divisions in Western Europe, facing 170 Soviet
divisions. OnlyjStalin has ever said anything comparable to this on the Soviet radio.
b. No approval of the enemy. The VOA once quoted an Indian who had been
visiting Shanghai and who had a few words of approval ;for Mao's government. It had
accomplished sometthing, he said, in land reform and in reducing governmental corruption.
Probably since 1946 Moscow has never given its opponents so much credit.
c. No disapproval of allies. The VOA has on occasion quoted people who expressed
the idea that our. allies should bear their full share of the burden of collective security,
implying that they were not yet doing so. Moscow does not do this sort of thing.
d. Assertions of complete uni-y. To the VOA, Western unity is something that is
urgently needed --nd is in process of being achieved; to Moscow, "democratic" unity is'
alre'dy complete and leaves nothing to be desired. Elections are unanimous, etc.
e. Blurring distinctions within the enemy camp. Moscow identifies Truman with
Dewey and with Wall Street, Taft with Philip Murray and Norman Thomas, Blum with De Gaulle,
Wall! Street with Tito. All are "reactionary." The VOA shows a stronC similaritendency
(describing Mao, for instance, as a mere puppet of Stalin), but it probably does not carry
the tendency as far as Moscow.
f. Blurrinp., distinctions within one's own camp. To claim unity on matters of
foreign policy is'lone thing; to give an impression of homogeneity in other respects is
another. Moscow,lfor instance, blurs the distinction between its own socialism and the
"people's democracy" in its satellites, and between the socialism which it haslnow and
the'; communism toward which it is "marching." Cultural differences between the Ukrainians
and'theGreat Russians, or between the Russians and the Chinese, might almost be non-
existen1t as far as Soviet propaganda is concerned. The picture of the West which the VOA
paints is a good deal more heterogeneous,
g. Non-adaptation to the psychology of specific audiences. Moscow, unlike the
VOA, shows an amazing lack of interest in the specific national traditions, national
susceptibilities, etc, of its various audiences. They are all treated as being alike in
that they are battlegrounds between "the people" and Wall Street or its lackeys.
h. Zpnolring issues other than the main one. Soviet propaganda ignores to al
extreme degree cleavages such as that between India and Pakistan, or betwee:_ Jews and
Arabi, or between! Catholics and Protestants. The VOA appears less extreme in this
respect. Moscow also concentrates its own propaganda on a smaller number of subthemes than
tiresed by the VOA.
I6. Soviet Claee-Mindedness
Although,class thinking is far less
prominent in present-day Soviet propaganda
thantin the classics of Marxism, it is nevertheless still somewhat more prominent than in
VOajb'oadcasts. The word "people's" as applied to "democracy" has some class connotations,'
for iastance, and ,the enemy is often identified as Wall' Street, monopolists, reaction--
aries,! etc.
7. American Religion and Tradition
a. Religion and ethics. While Soviet propagandists take pains not toantagoInize
religious people by attacking religion as such, they have only ve: rarely attempted to
enlist religious sentiments actively on their side. In VOA broad--sts also religion as
such Is not a major, theme, but it does occur. There is'an appreciable frequency of words
such as God, Jesus, Christian, holy, spiritual, faith, and prayer. There is also in VpA
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broadcasts a group of very broad ethical terms which may be psychologically associated with
religion: ideals, ethical, moral strength, inner strength, purity of soul.
b. Tradition. Another cluster of terms used by the VOA which is difficult to
interpret includes tradition, cultural heritage,~way of life, and, on the neglative side,
"alien." It is possible that these represent th ethnocentric or nationalistic attitudes
which in the 1lst have been associated with political conservatism, or it is possible
that they represent an anthropological appreciation of the organic unity of any given
culture-.others, as well as our own. !
8. The Western Defensive Role
There isi still another cluster of terms which cannot he grouped with 1 those
discussed up to this point because it seems to reflect not a cultural difference but a
difference in thelpresent political roles of East and West. In spite of the ligor of the
Soviet "peace" campa;.gn and of the Soviet attempt to pin the guilt of war and aggression on
the ruling 'ircles of the West, the Western defensive posture is reflected in the fact that,
the VOA has a much more differentiated set of terms associated with the defensive role
than Mosco- does: common peril, collective security, joint defense, integration of
defense, resisting aggression, sad necessity, nolappeasement, invading hordes, refugees,
etc. The absence of the word "appeasement" in Soviet broadcasts is especially striking;
Moscow does not say "we in the democratic camp cannot appease the imperialists;" Perhaps,
as in the rather crude attempts of the Soviet propagandists to appropriate the, Western
ideolog, of democracy and individual freedom, this is a case of taking over mechanically
a few key words without taking over the complete lcluster of ideas associated with the
experience of being actually in a defensive position.
D. RE, S .m
Similarities
a. Same 'values invoked:
1) Peace, friendship
19 Little or no means-end analysis
20~ Conforming to policy of own government
211 Few, if any, facts without clear propaganda implications
225 Little on the atom bomb
23) Little specific material on military strength
18 Never or almost never) criticizing self or allies
11 Distinguishing between rulers and "eople in enemy nations
12 Including audience with self in a larger unity
13) Not criticizing audience
14) Not grossly flattering audience
N Pyramida]. structure; a i'ew broad themes and many subthenies
Blurring distinctions within enemy camp
Never or almost never) giving credit to enemy
2 Democracy
3 National independence
4 Class justice
5 Economic welfare
6 Truthfulness
7 Anti-Nazism"
8 Individual freedom (not
Same propaganda, principles:
1 Clearness
2 Simplicity
3 Factualness
4 Selection
l
stressed, but approved by Moscow)
S
anting
6 Impression of objectivity (e.g.,jin tone of voice)
7 Avoiding obvious lying on tangible facts
8) Distortion primarily in the intangibles (motivation, etc.)
9) Not attacking entrenched prejudices
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 Soviet conflict-mindedness:
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c. Similarities attributable to limitations of intelligence:
1) Not very much adaptltion
2) Not very muchi,talking in
Differences
2) Other references to individuals
3) More varied terms fofi democracy and tyranny
1 More termsforiinadequate knowledge
2 More feats
3 Less spelling out of interpretations
4 Less denunciation; fewer epithets (same as a 1)
5 More historical material
6 More direct discussion of opponents' ideology
7 More specific military, and economic comparisons
e. Soviet dichotomizing:
No self-disapproval
No approval of the enemy
No disapproval of allies
5 Blurring distinctions within the enemy camp
II
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6 Blurring distinctions within one's own camp
7 Non-adaptationito the psychology of specific audiences
8 Ignoring issues other than the main one
f. Soviet class-mindedness.
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to specific audiences
terms of listener's personal life
Greater;, frequency o -'denunciation
More military !,metaphors and words
More words' connoting suspicion
Fewer words representing the gentler virtues
Fewer words for moderation
Less reference to civilian life: home,
More terms for determination
More terms for strength
More terms, for unity (?)
entertainment-mindedness:
1 More human interest
2 ? More humor
3 More variety
4 Evaluations in terms
American individualism:
1) Individual, freedom
American religion.and tradition:
.1) Religion and ethics '
2) Tradition (andiethnoientrism?)
h. The Western ', defensive role.'