CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV - COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: THIRD REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730216-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 216
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION SECR}rT',
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COUNTRY yugaslav-tea &j I3eighbc3r3ng Soviet Sat',1lites
SUBJECT CRITICAL INDIC?.TORS IN "UGOSLAV-~
CQ4LTNFURM PROPAGANDA: THIRD REPORT,,
i
PUBLISHED ~+.onitored Radio Broadcasts
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
TIIIf DOCYN[NT CO NTAI Nf INfON L1 ATIDN A/IICTIN? TNt NATIONAL O[f[N L[
0/ TM[ UNIT[D [TAT[3 ^ITNIN TMl' ^[ANINL 0- [LHONAL[ ACT 10
Y. i C.. ]1 ANO Lt, AL A![NOI.I. ITL iNANLrIL310N ON TN[ N[T [LATION
0/ ITf CO NiINTi IN AN7 ^AI.NYN TO AN YNAYTNONIlID f[NLON IL fND?
NI LIT[D L1 lAw. llf N000CT10N 0/ TNIL fONY I3 fNONI.IT[D.
DATE 01ST. i D ~r 1951
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATI
M~
+~
~[p9771saY
~S~j,t~~~l1RY AND CONCLUSIOAI~
A ~:~,ntinuing quantitative analysis of military oharges against Yugoslavia
broadcast by the Cominform radios to their own peoples and to Yugoslavia
rE/-,~als no indication o? intensified psyc4:olo~i.cal preparation for 3.mminent
hdb^~,:ilities. At no time in 1951 have Satellite military charges broadcast tAo
dom~l+stic audieneos and to Yugoslavia reached the high peak recorded in late)
Ilovenber-early December 1950., The median level of such charges has remaine
fair],y eonatant.
Thr~ only peak appz~oach-~.ng that of last fall was occasioned by the consides~
able attention devoted to two Albanian trials of Titoite espionage agentcl
held in Jas'uary at Pashk~p3 and ICorce~ Since that time Satellite charges
~~f aggressive Yugoslav military preparations have berm relatively level.
G~'~].itatively, there a~eare to have been; no general movement towards stress
ern the more threatening types of charges,' Intensity of denunciation does I'
nwrt s ~ to have ~lncreased.
k.':,cl .fit for these spy trials, Ti-to's request for arms from the West occasioned
~~ direct response than aa`y otY:er single event during 1951. Charges baa~ci
on thid event were predominant in the home services during the first w?ak; j
but since then have bP~~ made prunarily ~!n broadcasts to the Yugoslav audiameeD
During the last week in April the frequency of armed forces charges 3n the
hcamis services returns to its no~wsl level'.
'1'he clandestine Greek radio's charges of,a planx~d "operation Lightning"
against Albania have net been giver sufficient prominence on Satellite ra,dio8
t_. build up pop+iLsrly a pretext for military action.
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SLCRI;T s~`jR~~
C1tI~'ICAL INDICATOItS~N YUGOSLAV-CC,~.4INFONI! Pi?O~AC` .DA: THIRD RLPOR
This report, considers only Satellite
charges of a mi i ;,sy na urc, c arges which most directly and most convincingly
aim at creating psychological tension. T1-ie use of military charges against Tito
:i.s in a sense a last weapon; Satellite condemnation of ?Pito in the ideological,
economic, and political ranges had been largely completed by the late summer of
1~l,9 following the USSR's denunciation of the regime as "fascist." Military
charges were a minor element in the total range of accusations, most of which
discussed frontier vio'laticns a.*td occasional espionage trials. The present
report makes a detailed quantitative study of current military charges, based
on counting and analyais at sentence level.
The material is drawn from the following broadcasts:
The six Satellite home services: tbout ~5 of all broadcasts
normally dealing with political
subjects.
Satellite broadcasts to Yugoslavia: About? 2 ~ of the total output
(abou?t 36;~ oi' broadcasts in
Serbocroat, little Macedonian
and no Slovene).
1. The Total Voltune of 2~tiilitary Ch r ~s
The volume of all charges during April has shotm no significant increase when
compared to the first three months of 1951. Its fluctuations have remained
within -the range of normal variation. (See Chart ;~`l. )
a. As Broadcast in Satellite Hnme Service^: Beginning the last week in
14iarch -?here was an increase in the number of charges beamed to hams audiences.
The ttvo principal pears during ?tltis period reflect discussion of the Bulgarian
trial of Yugoslav espionage agents and the announcement on 6 April that Tito
had requested arms from the 19est. (See Chart /t`2. )
b. Tito's Request fo A s: This event received the considerable
attention which might be expected. An tuiusttally large proportion of the
discuss?~on was broadcas?I; in the Satellite home services during the first week
(,10-16 April). l;arly indications that Satellite propagandists might intend
tc-~ u?tilize the event as a possible pretext for ae?tic.-r against Tito were no?t
sustained, however. Although attention to the request continues, the denuncia-
tions carried in home services have declined both absolutely and in ratio to
those beamed to Yugoslavia.
Military charges made in the context of the Tito request for arms
ecnaiderably ^xceed previous event-related charges. The only event rivaling
the arms request in this respect has been the American food aid grant to Tito
last fall.?~ (See Chart ~r`3.)
c. Da Satellite x?adies on the whole ignored the opportunity
presented by May Day to play up Titoist?aggressiveness, and relatively few
military accusations against Tito were made during the week preceding and
f'ollovting 1 May. Those vrhich did appear were quite general in character.
2. the Substance of ?the CharaP^
a, Inca Thy ag?.nniF22 Char;--sst There have been no shifts greater -than the
normal range of fluctuation in the following types of charges: (1) economic
preparatiorus for war (building ?~rar factories, etr... ); (2) Yugoslav intentions t~
violate the sovereignty of its Satellite neighbors; (3) general aggressive
intentions or action; and (!,) para-military activities (trnether within Yugoslavia
?~ Radio Moscow gave much more attention tc last fall's U.S. aid grant to
Yugoslavia t:~*t it did to the arms request, which moreover it waited even
longer than usu:~1 (6 days) to piclt up, while the Satellite radios started
connnent tivit)tin two days. l;xcept for incidental mention, the Soviet radio
stopped di. cussing the arms request within a week aft^?^ its first reference.
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or in espionage ngainsi Y>>goslavia's neighbors).+~,
b. Horder Violation Charges; Excluding broadcasts of protest notes,
there have been no increases in border violation~'charges Suring the past three
weeks. Of protest notes there have been a few mare broadcast since early
b~arch than in the prece3ing two months. However,i, unlike protest notes
broadcast in late November and early December 1950, recent notes have not
been 1Qngthy and have not beer. broadcast in the honne serc-ices of other
Satellites. A Rumanian protest note of 8 April vas apparently not broadcast
but transmitted only by AGEN.y3~SS. (See Chart //4.i,)
c. Dhaz?aes of Warmon~erinc: No increases Have been recorded in charges
that the Yugoslavs are stirring up their own andi then people by warlike
propaganda.
d. Aa~-ed Forces Charges; These charges conlsist'of descriptions of
(1) the construction of military installations grid the supplying of arms and
equipment, (2) the recruiting, training and strength of the e.~^med forces, and
(3) the disposition and .operation of those forces'. This group of charges,
particularly the last, the operational type, are 'considered to be the most
threatening group of the total range of military 'charges, Operational charges
constitute only a small segment of the armed forces charges--about 12 percent-
s ratio which indicates Satellite reserve in the use of their most effective
instruments of alarm.
The last three weeks in bpril showed an increase in the total n~mmber
of charges made concerning the Yugoslav armed forces; during the period prior
to this, the level of these charges had remained Fairly constant. As
previously stated, the increase is accounted for almost. entirely by the
exploitation of Tito's request for arms. When the armed forces charges made
in the context of this Event are subtracted from the total number of armed
forces charges, the result avproximates the previous average.
With respect to psychological preparation of the Satellite home
au~.iences, armed iorces charges in the hone services return to their normal
level during the last week in April, and use of the request for arms is
minimal compared to the pre rious two weeks. (Seel Chart //5.)
j. ,~l.bar-ia as the Ob.iE~et of Yugoslav Attack II
Yugoslav plane to attacL a specific Satellite, for example Albania, might be
given sufficient prom3.nence to provide propagandal~ustification for under-
taking action against Yugoslav=a. Although Satel~ite radios continue to
cite Albania as the target of attack much more often than other individually-
named Satellite neighbors, the ratio of such charges continues to be small
to the total, of military charges. Two circumstances are notable in regard
to the charges ci?:ing Albania: j
a. A]most four-fifths of them involve. the more routine charges
of border violations and espionage activities directed against Albania.
Froth types of charges have been since the Tito-Cominform split the most
common type of military charges made; they constituted the bul'~ of military
charges up to the advent of the Korean war, when ?the more threatening
armed forces charges were considerably expanded.
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b., Uf the other fifth, armed forces charges 'with Albania the
recipient of the action, only 6 (out of t~5) were broadcast in all Satellite
home services and none in the A.banian home service.
,~'~.?ee Greece's "Operation Li1rhtn~nR~' Charges: I'I The charge that
s combined Yugoslar?-Greek invasion of Albania, "Operation
Lightning," was planned fore the spring was origii-al~,y made by
the clandestine free Greece radio on 11 rebruary, The
clandestine atrttion habitually uses more inflammatory language
and indulges 7.n more specific and threatening-sounding charges
tTu~ the Sate]?i.tes do. The "disclosure" of ,Operation Lightning
~ A single exception is the recent broadcast of a Bulgarian protest note over
alleged espionage against that country.
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Satellite acct:sations that Tito has requested arms from the West occasion's
sharp increase in collaboration charges during the last three weeks in
April. Satellite propagandists, who during the first of the three weeks ~,
did not single out Ameriea as the primery~,'collaborator in plans to supply',
Tito with arms (especially i,n breadcasts',to the Satellite hone audiences);
have s2wwn an increased tendency to do eon dir. subsequent weeks, Hos4etrer, '
explicit charges that the 'Jolted States i? helping Tito~in his aggressive '',plans
still constitute only abo~~it ',15q~ of all military charges.
Charges that the countries of We:.tern F;1.i:rope are abetting Tito, after a
noticeable increase San early, April coinc?d'ent with Tito's request for arms,
have subsided to their normal level of about !,~ of all military charges. I,
lce+.isations that Tito is receiving ~rupport~~from the Mediterranean states--
Greece, Turkey, and Ttaiy--~r,'a~re increased! somewhat du_Ting the past month, '
but that increase is within ',the normal limits of fluctuation and in part is
due to "Operation Zightnirg" charges confined to Serbocroat broadcasts. ',
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5. ~atel,lite Aenials or,~,gressivs Intent ',
1Q51 has seen an increase in',tlie number oflSatellite denials of military ~,
prepa'^ations against Tito, as compered with. the fall of 1950, when they sirere
slrmost nil. In part this he's been a reaction to an increase in Yugoslavians
more detailed armed forces charges against', the Satellites. Averaging about
10% of all military charges 'during 1951;!~denials maintained ere~even volume
snztil the last two weeLs of April, when they dropped noticeably. The same-
what more defensive cha_TeoteT of Satsllitelpropaganda evident in the first'
months of 1851 war apparently altered by ',Tito~s request for arms, which he's
allowed it to resume the offensive. Most,of the denials are of general
aggressive intent. Satellite propagandists do not give currency to enemy!
charges by denying the more detailed az~sed,iforces charges made by Yugoslavia.
6. ~harees Avoided I, '~li'
Charges that are i.nf`requent include assertions that Yugoslavia is trying to
frighten the Satellites and explicit stateixitents that .Yugoslavia is a "threat"
to the Satellites. The first of these charges has been made only in one
commentary. wince )raid-~J'annary atatementa~~,that Yugoslavia is a "threat" have
appeared every wreak, but the quantity remains small, seven being the largest
number in one weeko (In contrast, Xugosl'av charges that the Satellites era a
t:ireat loom very 7.arge, reaehin.g a total 'cif 163 during ane v~teek in February.
T'iiis vohune has receded, but, relat~'.ve to Satellite broadcasts ie still
]sigh.)
Consistent with -the Satelllites? relativelyl!slight attention to their own
strength is an almost complete avoidance cif explicit warnings to Yugoslavia of
the consequences of attacking them. (,Here again the Yugoslav picture is
different, There hAVe bean as mar~,y as 28,',statementa warning t;he Satellites
of the consequences of attack in Delgradel~ibroadcasts during a single week.)
Among the armed forces charges that have Been completely avoided durin; 1951 are
charges of operations or cpeTational plans !beyond the Yugoslav borders. Izi
the fal'! of 1950 it ~aras charged that plane %saere under way for a blitzkrieg ~i a la
Hitler and abreak-through to the Plack Sea via Rumania.
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reached a new high in concrete a_nd detailed charges, even for
Free Greece. Satellite tz?ansmissiono is Greek promptly picked
up the charge {slthoug2i without many'iof the details regarding
time, place and numbers used by Free',Greece), and on 5 March
a Budapest Serbocroat transmission briefly mentioned the Free
Greece "discovery," ', '' ~'
At no time, however, has a Sate111t'~home service broadcast
referred to Operation Lightnings anaialthough Satellite broad-
casts to Yugoslavia increased somewhat during April their
references to the operation and other'Free Greece charges,
their use of svch material remains ins~gnificsnt in relation
to its potential for intensified agitation.
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4. iHestern Military Collaboration With I!,~'ito
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Charges that U.S. or (other Western troops are in Yugoslavia or'that plansl~are
underway for their entry hage been largely avoided, with a total of only)
].!* such charges dur3.ng 1951, and none since the first week in April. Charges
that Western officers''lare directing Yugoslav Operations are very infrequent,,
sad in only one case was it charged that such officers were directing maneuvers.
Charges regarding foreign troops sad officers have been beamed primarily to
Yugoslav audienses~
Ia the paaamilitary category,, guerrilla and bandit activity and explicit claims
of revolt have been totally ignored.
7. flied D4ilitary~ YVgakness Char~esr
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Descriptions o_ resistsace'to Tito s efforts to militarize the'couatry-r
sistaace of officers and soldiers, of youths refusing to undergo militaryl~
training, and of workers sabotaging the ~roductioa sad transportation of ~
armaments--have shown'I'no net in~~ease during 1951. They increased somewhat
during March, but were reduced in April. There has been no marked increase
in either the number o! the proportion of these charges in the ,home services,
a development to be expected if Satellite propagandists desired to convince
the home audiences that Tita~Q Ai~ny vcas so rent by disaffection that it
could easily be beaten. 'I
8. 'Satellite Statements of 'Their Own Military Strenrrth ~
Satellite transmitters' coL;,~:aue their practice of avoiding completely anyji
explicit discussion of, their own military strength in connection with the 'Tito
issue' Statements o?~their opn strength are for the most part implicit,
and are usually occasioned by',local anniversaries, These strength claims,
normally confined to the respec?Give home services, have been broadcast in two
instances to Yugoslavia., one a speech by Hungarian Defense Minister rarkas
on 26 February and thelother a speech b5 the Czechoslovak Minister of Defense
on 9 March.
~ There was an increase in similar charges in Moscow broadcasts during March.
Moscow, unlike the Sate113te?radios, tends'. to a+sese such charges in non-
Yugoslav language broadcasts, j
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''TOTALS YL* IT~1RY '~ CHARGES
(A11 Satellite Charges Beamed to Home'iAudiences sad Yugoslavia)
~ Two categories are omitted fratn this and subsequent totals':.
~1) strength claims (they do not exp13'citly refer to Ti?to), 'and
2 border violation protest notes (see Chart ~~`~).
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15 22 29 ~ 5 12 19 26 5 12 19 26 2~9 6 23 3~
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Bare represent ?inalcumulative'
total of military charges rela-',
tive to respective events,
except in case of th~iArms Re-I!
quest, which continu~s to re-
ce{.ve attention.
Number of Charges
r-z---
50
U.S.
food
Aid
Djilas Perkins
Tito ~ s Vi~~its Visi'~e
Budget Landon Helgrede
~..ee,,,. --- ~ n f-I', ' '' Istanbul
Observers
Invited
Ito Maneuvers ',Pijade
Manen- Held ~Viaits Frankfort
SEC~E?
Eisen- I~London Meeting
hover US Dip_ Malta
Tour 1o~ts ~~ ?
ldov Dec January February
Rvents 311ustrated are those which have appeared to offer the best
opportunity for propaganda explo3~tation-~-possibly as pretests for
action--in the light~of standard Satellite charges of Tito's
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Tito ~ s
Re-
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3CGitC i
8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 5 12
?an Feb Mar
E1FiMED FORCES QiARGES BEAMED TO HOME AUDIENCES
Line: Total Military Charged
Bars: Armed Forces Charges
350} t 350
Bulgarian
Spy Trial'
Peshkopi
Spy Trial
at
19 z6 z 9 16 z3
Apr
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