SINO-SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730217-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 217
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/03 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730217-7
CLASSIFICATION SECRET ~EC~ET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROAdCASTS
SUBJECT
NOW
PUBLISHED
1~JHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
SINO-SO{1IET PROPAGANDA
ON SOUTHEAST ASLA
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATIOPt~~
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S~y~arsr and Conclusions
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Both Moscox and PeMng devote eery little tame to Southeast Asian affairs. Total
attention to Indochina in 1950'was only .8 of one percent of e11 MoecoR's comment
on foreign affairs, and Peking's level of attention Ras not much higher. There
Rare no lbsoow comu~ntaries on Burma at all in 1950.
? Both radios discuss Southeast Asian affairs sa merely one facet of the struggle
between Rorld iatperislism led by the iTnited States and the "Peace Camp" under
the leadership oil the Soviet IInion. Generally there is no atteapt to heroine
local resistance leaders, and conversely there are .few denunciations ad iaen
_ of the .sesca~.ed pup~eta. The essential CommuniQ'C character of tone resistance
i~siu+"'~ a~i-cased. _ .. _
While Peling and Moscow coiacide to a great degree in their trea't+nent of South-
east Asia, there are same indications that spheres of interest have been
delineated, Kith the Chinese Communists taking responsibility for contiguous areas.
7!~'appears also to be the policy for Pe]cing to maiatain an atmosphere of
e~ccitation in those border areas. .
Them has been no large-scale ehif~t in the pattern of propaganda to either
Iadoch3~la~or Burma in the past year. The formation of the Lien Viet IInited Front
aa~l the Laodong Party acs, e-ccorded more attention by Pe]risg than by lioscaw, abut
neither of the tRO mafor Communist transmitters devoted a great deal of gastained
attention to the development. Moscow has recently reported more militant resistance
to the Buranese Govertraent, but has not given any indication of intention to form a
united resistance front against the Thah~n Nu regime.
Z'he Sivso-~Sovi_et propaganda pose of as interested but reaaote observer need not be
construed as indicating local Communist quiescence in Southeast Aeie; there Ras
no Korean ripple on the surface of Moscow and k?eldng propaganda patterns in dune
1950. That overt participation could probably be preceded by peychol?gical
preparation,_hoRever, is indicated by the PekrSng propaganda ca>wpaign preceding the
appearance of Chinese volunteers in Korea.
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Approved For Release 2008/03/03 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730217-7
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730217-7
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o ror.~~rtionril Attez~tior:: Soviet radio attention to Southeast Asian countries has
during the print 18 months been an almcst negligible fraction of So?riet
cona~entaay material; the fire for Pebzng discussion of Southeast Asian
affairs is larger, but st:il]. of relative insignificance in comparison with the
tre.tntent accorded ot,'.ter areas and s~:b~jects. Poring all of 1950 Indochina vgas
the subject of only eight-tenths of one percent of the total number of Mescow
cimunentaries d~vo?ted to foreign affairs; not one single commentary ryas broadasst
during all of 1950 which specifically concerned Burma. Attention *?o Indonesia
and Tra,iland, respe:.tively, ran one ai:e-hundredth rnd six one-hundredths of one
per..ent. ;See apperdcd chart /{l.) The ?xact, figures for Pek-ing's concentration
ors ru.t available but a-t best would no more than tri.pie these figures. Attention
to Vietnam, mall as it was,i~wruld I,&ve been considerably smaller but for the
Soviet IIrj..iou's diplomatic recogr_itior. o.f the Ho regime in January 1950. That
one event received almost as'Imuch attention in January and I'ebruary 1950 as all
other comment on Indochinz for tie entire year.
Tt is estunated tiiat 65>?0 of l~duscc~rr':s meager total of attention to Southeast
Asian areas i s directed to A~iari audiences in Asiatic lar,.gttages, Even ?with this
hea?ry :Localization, hardly toar percent of all Moscow commentaries to Southeast
Asian audiences are cancer*_iad with Indochina, and the percentages for Thailand
and Indcnesia~~?are only a fep~ hundredths of one percent. There is virtually no
attezi?,ion (i.n commentaries) Burma.
~enaral Characteristics: The basic pattern of Moscow-Peking treatment of the
? 5outht~~:~t. Asian countries contains certain specific features which indicate a
coordinated effort. Ther? also appear 'to be divergencies of varying degree.
{see Table I.) Both Moscow and Peking show a tendency to de-emphasize specific
local eventH in tnn areas while concentrating on the larger aspects of the East-
YJzst conflict. ?This car.Sorm,~ lvitl?r. their basic propaganda practice in relation
to events a.li o~~er the world: While bot].i Peking and Moscow praise the Ho
regime, it is almost alvrays ire 'the context of the larger struggle to consolidate
the peUfilP.t3 of the world i.il 'the great Soviet peace camp.
l~Io Heroiziatr of Leaders: AltYtough ;w?th i,he major Communist powers vary in the
degree of their atteuti.on to~,irdividual native resistance leaders in these
cc~lntries, t3iere is a general teu3ency to refrain from aggrandizing tuu~y one
person and from singling outit3uy "puppet" leader for special censure. While
the leaders of the Ylhite Flab Conenunists In Burma have almost never been
mentioned, and Luis Taruc hats riot within meptory been identified as the leader
of the Huks, neither hoe 5ukri~?~-ra, Tran Van Huu, or Songgram been especially
c:asi;igated. 'flee latter is sotuetiwes qualified as an American puppet, but he is
almost never condemned for his wartime collaboration with the Japanese, nor is
Pridi Phanomyong, his pro-Communist predecessor who has a much better resistance
record, mentioned. SuLarn~:.,'iFresider_t of Indonesia, has never been subjected to
criticisgt, even when hi.t~ movers were definitely calculated to increase the
'Nestern orientation of hie regime.
Stress o:t i:xt=:rnas_Pressu;~es: l~ttr-che:c t,o keep the focus an ?the larger single
battl.c, both Moscow and Peking put a great Seal more emphasis ort the evidences
of extet?rtal px?esstrrc- i;han updn loco.;. affairs. 'Phey talk about American attempts
to coerce boo J)ai ar,d to supplsint the trench in Tndarthizsa, and tYte Thakin Nu
C~-rr:zzm;e?n?t is described rncsi; jof'ten as a pavm i.n the endless battle for control
bet.t~eeti the Bri .ish arld the Amcriaa.ns; the Quirino Government merely executes
American dictates. Resistau?:ie in TndGneS:ta is against the Dutch and American
econou~i.c acrd poli?ti.::al exploiters.
Tio Taistir~atior, .ilmoug ReststaYice Groung: Neither Moscow nor Peh-ing makes any
greet distireti~n among the ?various resistance groups in any Southeast Asian
country fro long as that resistance is against {a.) the establish9d goverment or
regime, or (b) against the orientatiot. of that regime towards -the Western camp.
Moscow ~ re?uer really distinguished between ~t~e Red anti White Flag Conmaunists
i.n B~.icma, and'P'G'U` qutR Karen ]'orces. This is, of enures, consistent with the
gencr:~.7. practice of not Aui:b'k;ling over allies as long as the coalition serves
t_~ e~avar,ce the prin-ary goal.. I As an example, the insurgents who defied the
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~ Iiudcmerai.r:u; !~:,c,e-'zzvnr:'-t. i.;1 t1?~ la,~:i.ucc a a._d t.n:: Ge l.?.bes iollowil,g the formation
u~ the uL _ ,ar i aI:., : vtF.t?r: :,C , ? :i i i e:-?2'_lt.. _'t _ d i_I ?tr ~^ ..tment from those who
sparked t1.e pst,ently Corarr~,ist??in:'.ti.r49 ?,!s3i!III uprL:';I.t,
'i ;i
~. ~esveeti,"~r~?_ S ~l,eree af' Prcl,a~ar,da Ac Livi tv : Feking ra:f apparently accepted
' respon..ibility fo* m~intaillin,; ;rnsf:or_= iIt areas cantiguou:s 'to China, while
~-the Soviet IInion i:-~ pr-imrtrl :. j ^oli-:e.rnc:d vr:i1~': those cnunt,riea bordering on the
~:Tfi~.SR. a:ai the Europe:~?I S3tel:lites. ;:hlrge:~ that T"hailar!d, ir_dochina, and Burma
~~Yuive (al enr:roacTled uF,or. Gh:.na..i, t.e~ritoty, {L?) provided bases and men to prepare
~ ~ .
Eln Ar12rican inva~iG2: el Chills; ~, t ,.ire :!:a'tera of e:,pioJ!age against the
.People's RGpl1b1.L_. CI' ,China ::ra pr!:~,s~,~ wigcr~~u:~ly as a ~t.apl.e inr,;redient of
Peking's r.~ztrui.. aril cl:ax?c;e:s e.re soz!et~~es mcnt Toned by D4oe>cow, but with not
ilcarly t~ sustai?r:~?d. 'i.JitensA+,?;: j +hc. im,I:i:t- 'T r? r;...r? a'
1. _: E^r~.-~F_ri:.~1:a,_.. Ea1:.__~t: '.1'h~re i.s in:>r.os~ and k'eking propaganda on Southeast
&.sia. T~ar_- foll?~lvirg rtiacl":s~; ~n ref r,1;1,a~?~Irt. r''if f'erences ,ir_ approach adds
~.pressio*,isti; concau,ion:; to .:acts. >t,n-l,st:icral dsta as is av>:Iilable.
I .i
II
].. FE?king wii;hout qu~~ti?~n ~r?,~~:,t..:s a. gI'eat deal. gore attention to the
@'.!Cj,leR9i0II C)f Y1.18~,i.aILCG, G:!'C: LF:i'..'i!7?7 91' LI"1tC?Y?G:'..^ nrIl~ general activities of the
i6yer:;ens Chinp3e corranlu:._tii.::, C:::nea?al. di.:~:?ur.?si.or.I of Ills cverseas Chinese alone
~ ecmmrises more th~~, half of ~lJ. Fe6I.n~T'.~ ro~ar,ent; dhout Scr~Ithr-.ast A.-~ian affairs.
~T2ais concelltration: (a;2 pc-:,gin:'*.;; ~'~~k~.n,7 to pir.tu:re the Chillese Communist regime
~g!g the one to whirl. the ctxiue~r: .:'a8.tiollril^ ,Duce ullepiar~ce, (bl provides a
pz?etex-t L'or. mailltair.?irg u:d expr. `scions of s1lpFort from over-
; seas religious F,rrcn.ll::: n