RADIO MOSCOW'S COMMENT ON ATOMIC ISSUES *

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500730250-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 250
• Publication Date: November 11, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL vI LLLIU =!vue Ac,cvui
INFORMATION FROM
COUNTRY iTSSR
SUBJECT RADIO MOSCOW'S CCV NT ON ATOMIC
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF TIIE URITCD STATES WITHIN THE MEANING Of ESPIONAGE ACT 60
I. S C.. 41 AND 71. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION ON TNS REYRLAYION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ART .ANNER TO AN UNAUTUONI7[D PERSON IS
'RO-DT LAW. R[P1ODUCTIOR OF TNIS FORM IS PROIIIDITCD
Radio Moscow's continuing and prevail.Zr.g concern in references to atomic i.r.
to present the USSR as the chanpion of peace; the sk--i- e to have atomic wen,?a~w 1.,?I-rcrt
is one, aspect of this presentation. The U.S. position, which allegedly di ti a~t1ess t' Lc!
position of all the bourgeois nation, is said to be exactl;; the eppo v1 te.
white black dichotomy is characteristic of all Soviet radio propagenda; but, -Itt a1Yx:u_?1:1
with particular clarity in propaganda ?'.oncerning atomic weapons. Again and. agora
Moscow baldly reiterates that the Soviet Union Is for banning the bomb, the T.initc.3
States in not.
There w ?e several indications of marked sensitivit-.r abnut the entire ator.!i.c i.sw.v
The deliberate avoidance of detailed discussion Is one: the low volume of n1;1 > zi,i:r. 3s
:te?-
another. (There has been appreciable Ftte i tion to atonic issues 0:11,y
bates and in the two Reeks following Stalin's 6 Oc',oher interview in .i1RA'T).)
indicator is the relative absence of scaremonger. ing over th dreadf'ul
n
atomic warfare. I.yuch scaremongering occurs rarely and only in broadcasto to
restricted group of audiences.
It as;- be that this sensitivity reflects concern over a Soviet-estimated
in current East-Viest atomic potentials. if this is the case, Mosco?w's pro ;arra-,Ja r s,,?
change as the Soviet? potential is enlarged.
Although a departure from previous propaganda in salve minor ways, Stalin's i.atex^.~4 ,
in P-,UVD.k was generally consistent with Soviet propaganda on -.'airs and other ?1.r,rnzes.
The interview added luster to the USSR'a facade of paste, it initiated a ncvv pt .c'
East-West propaganda relations (in itself of intrinsic value in a propagen(l:a Y,inr),
it gave the superficial appearance of reopening the via,) to East -.,!eat ne3*otiatior::s. i'
the U. S? were to have accepted Stalin's implicit offer, r.?hiah involved little
from previously-stated (Soviet terms, the resulting negotiations would pre::na.!so1;7? lYav~
tended to reduce popular Western anxieties, at leant for t1he moment. 'Il is i. 'L..rn.
might have resulted in a temporary relaxation of W stern efforts to build up rl.li;,ata:.
strength, hence in effect obstructing thin '?estern proqrsm. If the negot.i.aticris p_~rJc
fruitless, the Soviets would be in a position to mare propafgyanda capital of the fact
by pointing out that the Soviet terms, on which the nefotiationa3 were baue:.l, hr.4L1 cutilui::
been rejected by the United States. And even if no Tlegotiations were antirsi.pat;d 11;;
Stalin, it might have been his expectation that the apparent offer to negotiate and
the U.S. refusal to accept would tend to create Western doubt:: and confusic.l:: nbout
American motivations. In other words, it is probable that obstruction of the Arieric.&c-
led drive for Western military strength and unit,-- In IC one of the ob Je;ctives o ti:.:
interview-just as it is of much of hiosootv's current effort.
* This report incorporates rsome material which has been presented in previous D1131"S
publications.
CLASSIFICATION
r/sRB
STATE NAYY
ARMY AIR FBI
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Soviet radio propaganda ccrcerning atomic weapons, whether related to Stalin's PRAVDA
interview; the Hiroshima anniversary, or the several U.N. discussions of this issue,
reveals certain basic character:.stics. Thesa are:
1. Lcw volume of connner.t.
2. The absence of any specific or concrete discussion of atomic weapons,
of the direct eonsegiLca?~.3a of atomic warfare, or of the detailed
problems of Lnternat .onai control.
3. Insi sic nt. empha_ is on tdi(i slogan-like axiom that the bomb must be
banned. riot merely rF: ,Flared.
4. Limited efforts to scaremonger. (This is a natural consequence of
the failure to elaborate on the effects of atomic warfare; but this
in turn: appears to reflect a decision to avoid this type of ropa-
garida except on special occasions and for limited audiences.)
5. Thorough-goi :g concentrst.iar. on establish Ing the Soviet Union as the
sponsor of world peace. Tr.is concentration prevails in much of
1,'.oscow's radio propaganda) but appears to !be especially marked in
noruncnt on the atomic wea_'OnS
1. LLmite Vo1ur2e
Moscow's references to atomic wed; ons have been limited in volume ever since the
issue was brought to prominence with the dropping of the bomb or. Hiroshima. At that
time Soviet, propagandists confined themselves to occasional broadcasts minimizing
the military s i.trificarlce of the tort and touching, on the need for international
control of atomic energy.
In the cix years since ll'irosh ma, total attention to atomic issues has been but a
small part of Mos :.. w's total uomrien!. on foreign or domestic affairs. The question
has received marked attention lur ing LTr iced Nations deliberations on atomic
questions (Moscow consti~!tently ca,ritalLces on world news events), and after Stalin's
recent PR.AVL?A interview.-A- But i : the months when rp such event is being publicized,
references to atomic in^ues are few and far between. President Truman's 1949
announcement about a-n a'tomi.c ~~a:'c1osior. in the USSP as reported in a TASS statement
that was broadcast only 40 time--or oppro:sirnately once in each of Moscow's foreign--
language t.ransmis -:ior. The Enl-;re.tok and Nevada tests have been pointedly igziored.X
Reports of a third at-omin explon.o:i in the USSR have never been acknowledged.
This low volume of attention is irparked contrast to A1occow'3 treatment of other
issues involvcd in 'Iwo-:'.amnp relttlonc, For example, the militarization of Western
Germany bar ccr. is'tecrtly reef i-red vc 1: minus attention: the organization of NATO and
the establir:tirent of Nrcer icon bane: in Western Europe litve been publicized through-
out most of 1951; and the allege. re:rnili.t?ari.zation of Japan has been denounced in
appreciable vol,_Lne. This con t._?ast suggec *? that the atomic bomb has a special place
on Moscow's propaganda agenda---namely, it is exploited when world developments bring
it to the forefront, or when So'v'iet initiati?re can be clainced.
* Even in this instance, howevrer, the high volume of attention was not sustained.
The peak of attention to the 6 October FPu1VDA interview was reached in the period
9 to 15 Oc'Lober when exploitation of the 'interviewIamounted to 239 of the total
comment on foreign affairs, in the two weeks following, attention to atomic issues
dropped to 12 and 2 percent; respectively. This pattern of attention closely re-
sembles tha'L for Stalin's February intcnri.ew in PRAVDA; and this similarity suggests
that much of the attention to the atom interview was related to the basic requirement
of publicizing the words of the Great Leader."
The only reference to date to the current Nevada tests occurred in Ilya
Ehrenburg's 15 November PRAVDA article on the COLLIER'S issue, "The War We Do Not
Want." Ehrenburg asserted that American diplomats ignore these Nevada testa when
they talk of peace in Paris. But. true to the general pattern, he gave no details
of the tests. Furthermore he acknowledges the COLLIER'S references to destruction
of Soviet facilities but does not explain, in the broadcast version of the PRAVDA
article, how that destruction was brought about. It appears that Ehrenburg is allowed
certain liberties not given other Soviet commentators for he alone has mentioned
such things as atomic submarines-a subject on which Moscow has been completely
silent otherwise.
O~FIC/~,qq~~
CONFIbM,A ONL
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2. voidance of Detail
Moscow's comment on atomic issues has also been characterized by a marked absence of
details--whether on the use of atomic weapons or on the plans for regulation. The
destructiveness of the bombs dropped in Japan was not touched upon until Molotov, in
the October Revolution anniversary speech of 1945, mentioned "the tremendous
destructive power" of the atomic bomb; previous broadcasts had tended to minimize
its military significance. In general Soviet broadcasters have not elaborated on
Molotov's simple statement. There have been occasional remarks concerning the
destruction of civilians (these are most often broadcast to Japan, and even then they
constitute a very small segment of the total comment) and the first comment on the
COLLILd'S issue of 27 October made such an allusion. Otheiwrise, however, there has
been a strict avoidance of any details concerning the effectiveness or consequences of
atomic warfare.
This avoidance of detail also applies to the question of developments in atomic tactics
and strategy; a recent PRAVDA article spoke of atomic artillery but did not define or
illustrate the term, or discuss the tactical problems involved. There has never been
a reference to radiation or to defenses against the unique impact of atomic warfare.
(The raid tests in American schools have been scorned as hysterical, but have not
been described in any identifiable detail).
Reports of U.N. deliberations on atomic issues have also been lacking in specific
detail. Comment on the 1948 deliberations of the U.H. commission on atomic energy
control echoed Gromyko's somewhat confusing statements, gave only a hazy idea of the
American position, and generally adhered to the practice of leading unwary listeners
to conclude that only the USSR sincerely fought for peace and true control. A
similar pattern prevailed during subsequent General Assembly discussions. Andrei
Vishinsl;/'s remarks were publicized--but not always in the detail in which he spoke,
especially on the question of inspection. As was true before these debates, and as
has been true since, '.4oscow did not give any detailed information on the various con-
trol proposals. the Baruch plan is rejected, without analysis or examination,
because it furthers the profits of Ainerican monopolists.
In seeming compensation for the lack of detail noted above, 1.1oscow is vociferous in
its demands -that the bomb be banned. Mere regulation is held insufficient and un-
acceptable-because it serves the monopolists' warmongering p.nrposes. (T1,e shift in
Soviet policy from demands that all bombs be destroyed to Stalin's demand that
existing bombs be used for peaceful purposes-which may reflect the charigL in the
Soviet potential-has never been ac1c owledged per se. it has not been discussed in
post--~;tali:i comment.)
Thus Moscow, substituting generalized harangues for detailed argument, insists that
the bomb crust be banned if peace is to be secured. As in much of Moscow's propaganda,
no shadings of viewpoint are acknowledged. The ban is held to be axiomatic for peace;
and -the peace lovers are ranged behind it while the warmongers are lined up in
opposition.
3. Scaremongering
In general, Moscow avoids explicit scaremongering concerning atomic weapc:ns. Although
such scaremongering may be considered implicit in any reference to atomic weapons,
Moscow rarely engages in deliberate formulations which would 'tend to panic its
listeners. Such explicit scaremongering as does occur is usually related -to specific
events, e.g. the Hiroshima anniversary which Moscow commemorates by remind'inj, the
Japarese of the suffering they have endured. The recent COLLIER'S issue on "The War
We Do Not lant" has been exploited in a commentary pointing out that the editors
relis)n the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. This has been broadcast only -to
limited audiences; and it did not appear in Home Service transmissions. Stalin's
announcement that other bombs would be exploded is also implicit scaremongering; but
to the extent that it prepares the Soviet home audience and the Conununist world for
future tests it could also have the effect of reducing Soviet-Orbit fear.
There have been general charges of atomic diplomacy and of American efforts to threaten
or blackmail via its atomic weapons. These charges have been more frequent since
Stalin's interview; but they are often surrounded by compensatory generalities
regarding peace-camp strength, i.e., ability to resist such threats.
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There have also been occasional attempts to warn that the Americans plan to use
atomic bombs in the Korean war or against Chinese cities, but these have been rare,
unelaborate, and limited in volume. vurthermore, President Truman's 30 November
1950 announcement that he alone would decide whether to use such bombs in Korea-
which could conceivably have been exploited for scaremongering propaganda of the
most overt sort-was almost ignored.
The general pattern of Sooviet conr?nent.--low volume, avoidance of details, relative
failure to exploit scare~nongerLng possibilities--suggests Soviet sensitivity to the
whole issrae. Moscow may fear. that discussions of atomic warfare would panic the
Soviet audience. The pastern also suggests concern over the disproportion in East-
West supplies and potentials. For this reason it might be expected that the propa-
ganda patterns will change when the Soviet supply is enlarged. This possible change
is also suggested by the shift from the demands that all bombs be destroyed to the
demand, expressed by Stain, that existing bombs be used for peaceful purposes.
5. mateStalin Interview
Radio Moscow's comment o' the Stalin interview of 6 October highlighted the strength
of the Couninmist camp an the possibility of negotiations leading to the prohibition
of atomic weapons. To aLlesscr degree, both in terms of volume and distribution of
comment, Moscow engaged n qualified _scaremongering concerning atomic weapons by
charging that America is[engaging in atomic scaremongering. The PRAVDA reference to
"atomic artillery," note1 above, was the major departure from the previous avoidance
of any sort of detail in reference2 to atomic weapons. Otherwise Soviet broadcasters
generalized on Stalin's yvords and did not spell out any of the implications.
Exploitation of the inter view followed familiar patterns; first the interview itself
was rehashed, then world speculation on the significance of the interview was re-
viewed; in these reviews emphasis was placed on tre peace elements and on the
implicit hint at negotiations. Then Moscow rebuked the Viestern press for distorting
or ignoring the intervie After this, the interrview was allowed to disappear except
for almost formalistic r1ferences in consent on other issues.
The interview and the sutlsegr.ient propaganda seemed to serve a number of propaganda
purposes; they answered President Truman's statement that the Soviets are talking
peace while preparing foi'iwar, they rationalized Soviet atomic experiments and the
Soviet-led "peace campaign," and they boll-,tired Communist confidence in Communist
strength. The incident as giver. spec-?.al publicity in broadcasts to North America--
as part of the continuin?effort to evoke popular dissatisfaction with official
policies. Py raising theipossii'il.ity of reopened negotiations it challenged the
unity of the Western nations, especially in quarters where that unity appears to be
based primarily on anti-SlIovietism.
The strength implications lof the interview and the subsequent propaganda are, of
course, tantamount to scar' emongering insofar as they constitute flexing of the
atomic muscles. However,'Ithese implications have political as well as military
significance; ldoscow may e seeking to persuade listeners that it is leading from a
position of strength and, in fact, is forcing the V;'estern powers to negotiate.
Finally, the interview appeared partially designed to offset recent Western moves to
seize the peace-propagandfa initiative.
The fact that the Stalin interview brought no substantive change in Soviet references
to the atom bomb is clearly shown in Beriya's address on the 6 November anniversary
of the October Revolution;' in that address the word atom appeared only once.--in a
recapitulation of Soviet proposals before the United Nations. Beriya made passing
reference to "fantastic pojectil.es" but did not otherwise allude to the subject of
atomic weapons or atomic warfare.
IAI.
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