ORGANIZATION OF ZAVOD #1 PODBERESJE, USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500770002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 3, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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0r.l1lir1'1-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT . Organization of Zavod #1,
PodberesJe, USSR
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
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INFORMATION REPORTI II
General
1. In October 1946; German engineers and technicians formerly
employed by Junkers, Sie'cel, and Heinkel were taken to Podberesje
to set up and operate an aircraft development plant. The personnel
at this plant (Zavod #1) were divided into two groups - Junkers
and Soviet personnel in one group (0][M--1), and Siebel, Heinkel,
and Soviet technicians in the other group (OIL-2). The total
labor force was about 3000-3500. In addition to the 365 Junkers
and 192 Siebel and Heinkel technicians, the total figure includes
plant maintenanr.e groups, security police, party organizations, and
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Soviet Administration
2. Both Siebel and Halle groups were under the supervision of a
Soviet Plant Director- who was responsible to the Deputy Minister
for Aircraft Industry in Moscow. /ee Enclosure (A), a chart which
chows how the plant and the Air Ministry are connected] It is to
be noted that the Plant Director reported directly to the Air
Ministry and not through the Central Institute of Aerodynamics and
f.USII f ~I !)RMATI ON
FORM NO. 5l-4F
OCT 1951
,Z(RF- 'T ZZ l3 -JAJ~ OI STRI9UT ION
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Lin I DATE DISTR. '5 rnX~ 2
NO. OF ENCLS. 2 ,. I
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO I
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION I
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SECUR1n" I C;i'i`1li,A ,.'1111
,-
0
Tiyt[n;';yna ' (%.AnI). There three p1tai1t clireotore thwi
my stay at 7;zvod #J.: Abramow (f.ront Octaber 1946 to Jul'; 1947,
Reben1-o (July 1947 to e'or~.aar'y' I",50), arid : )Iriirncw*(F,bruary
1.950 to September 1950). Jiar:3+'st;1n, air 1ViV7) v,as in charge
of plant sect-rity and was chief of Dey artes__ 1;7, The Director's
Admi.nistrat?ive Staff, under Bir''ukovr, directe puz'c:hasing, pay-
roll, a.c' r', nt{ ng, and other plant administrative matters.
W:?' and ? =nsk.i, the Chief Engineer, advised the Plant Director on
He was the superior of both Junkers and
Siebel Ch'_ Designers, but did not actually direct the design
work in et)Y`.er OKB-1. or OKB-2.
Junkers (OKB-1) and Siebel (OKB-2) Develo meet Groups
3. It iE (~:+trcmely difficult to present an organization chart
that would be completely accurate at any given time. Personnel
at Zavod #1 were continually transferred as dictated by the
work load in different departments. Furthermore, when the Soviets
felt that Soviet workers had acquired sufficient experience, they
began to combine departments and to take over jobs formerly
occupied by Germans. In September 1948, Soviets were made
nominal chiefs of the Tool Design Secti::)ra and all of the shops.
Thgralso completely took over certain other departments, notably
Flight Test. /Yn general, this report describes the organization
of the plant as it existed in
September 1.950. An exception iz made, however, in trie case of
the Germans who were chiefs of the various deparrtments. To call
attention to these key personnel, they are shown in their most
important capacity - one which they may or may not have been
holding as late as September 1950. Transferral of German chiefs
is ao at.ated in this report, under the appropriate department.7
The Junkers and Siebel Groups each worked independently on their
design projects, but they shared most of the facilities for shops
and laboratories. Design and production methods and procedures
were the same for both groups, but since the Siebel (OKB-2)
operations were less extensive, some of their design sections
were combined. The authority of both the German and Soviet
management of the de artments viied from complete to only admini-
strative control. LDeviation$ from the direct chain of compand
are described in the text of this report and indicated b broken
lines on the organization chart Enclosure (m).
I -7-
These department numbers are purely arbitrary. The English names
are those vthich may be used for comparable departments in US air-
craft factories. Estimates of the number of people employed are
given for the 0KB-1 Group; this was not attempted for OKB-2
except, that where the departments were combined, the estimate is
given for the entire shop. In most of 1.:rie OICB-2 design sections,
the status of Soviet personnel was u.,nkncwn
Department 1: Chief Designer?'s_ Office Chefkon:atrukteur)
Responsible for the entire design and c.onatruction of new
aircraft which included all research, design, testing and building
of prototypes. Airplane design and tooling drawings were made for
series production aircraft but there was no mass production of air-
craft at Podberesje. 0I0-1 and OICB-2 were completely separate in
this office.
zff-See 'ootnote on Enclosure (Ay
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iaad-, Bruno7.1' -? Dipl Eng (Chief)
Obru.bos,* (Soviet Deputy)
Bc,hjm Miss Helga (Secretary)
Schoenma.nn, Miss Inge (Secretary)
Hans-Heinz - Eng (Chief)
13er~^r ~ ak (Soviet Deputy)
Becker, Mrs Herta (Secretary)
Department 2: Deputy Chief Designer's Office (Stellvertretender
ChefkonBtruicteur)
Assisted the Chief Designer and, in his absence, was the
the Acting Chief. These OKB-1 and OKB-2 offices were separated.
OIcB-1 Personnel:
Freytag, Fritz - Eng
OKB-2 Personnel:
Hel.nsohn -- Eng (Also Chief of Department 15, OKB-2)
Department 3: Special Assistant to the Chief Designer (Assistent
des Chefkonstrukteurs)
Uhl, Heinz - Eng
(no other personnel)
Wil.msen?, Paul - Eng (Also directed work of Department 6
of the Siebel Group, through its chief,
Koehn)
(no other personnel)
Department 4: Technical Liaison Office (Technisches,
VerbindungsbueroF
This office was responsible for coordinating the work of the
design offices and the various shops and laboratories. It
assisted the shop personnel by explaining ideas of the designers
and helped in the interpretation of drawings. This office expedited
design changes and helped in setting up means whereby damaged
parts could be salvaged. The Chief Liaison Engineer was present
at the preliminary design discussions, but the real work of the
office did not begin until the first detail design drawingp of a
plane were completed and the shop started work on the parts. The
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liai-+on engineers worked on any problem of all airplanas. One
exception was Goretski, who usually was the liaison man assigned
to Flight Test ')ecause of his fluency in Ruse.an, In addition
to his technical capabilities.
Uhl, Heinz - Eng (Chief)
Goretski, Heinz - Eng
Cot-tin, Karl . Eng . (My successor)
Lange, Karl Eng
Lueneburg, Werner - Eng
Winkler, Fritz - Eng
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
No comparable department.
Department 5. Translation Office (Dolmetsoherbuero)
This group supplied interpreters az :reqq'uizred, . and was.
responsible for all Soviet and German translations including
reports, correspondence, and notes on drawings, if neoessez'.
Obrubow, Soviet Deputy Chief Designer, proofread trans~F;ted
reports. Bereeniak probably proofread Slebel.reports, but! this,
is not definitely known.
Uhl, Heinz (Chief) - Eng
Marks., Bruno - 'Eng
von ochl Rpe, Xenia
He tiler, Nally
Thiel, Erika
Schiller, Inge (Secretary for Departments 3', 4, and-5)
Hartz, Bruno (Temporary)
von Schlippe, Georg (Temporary)
von Schlippe, Wladimir '(Temporary)
No'Soviets
Siebel did not have a special department for. this, kind of
work. Translation was done by the OKB-2 Chief Designer's
Secretary, Mrs Becker, and by a design engineer, Waldemar
Peltzer.
Department 6: Planning Office (Planung)
Supervised Departments 7, 8, 9 and 43 until the:Sovj.ets
took over Department 43. In the Siebel Group, these offiooa?were
combined, but were separated from the AKB-i Groups,.
Mi_ndach, Boris - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
KQQebach, Miss Edith (Secretary)
One Soviet, name unknown
Koehn, Gerhard - Eng (Chief, but under_Alreot supervision' of..,
Wilmsen,. Department 3)
Hauber - Eng
Total Number unknown,
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Department ?: Engineering Schedule (Plannungsbuero)
This office was responsible fo*1 scheduling and following
up design and drafting work to meet a specified Completion. dd.te.
They also had the authority and responsibility ?f or *transferririg
engineering personnel from one department to another, to !meet
schedules.
Bonin., Peter - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Huth, Otto - Eng
Riedel, Miss Irmgard (Clerk)
2 Soviets - Names unknown
See Department 6
Department 8s Er.olneering Administration (Verwalttng
This office was responsible for general administration, '
such as payment of salaries and procurement of drafting equipment,
office supplies, furniture, etc. Although this Igroup: paid, the
salaries, timekeeping was under the control of the Soviet' Admini-
strative Staff.
Schumacher - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Reusz, Mrs Anna (Paymaster)
2 Soviets - Names unknown
ORB-2 Personnel:
See Department 6
Department,: Mater! ::.I ^. _ a.:~,agn6 Office (Material' Planufig
This office was respona~X:le for ordei-ing All raw materials
and parts; actual procurement was handled by the -9oviets.' This
office had more troubles than any. other due to the numerous. !..
material substitutions.
Beyer, Paul - Eng (Chief)
Nefflln, Miss Hildegard (Secretary)
Barnewald - Eng
Koelling
Voelker, Bruno
No Soviets
See Department 6
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Department 10: Pr-eliminaDesign Office (Ez twurfsbuero)
This office was responsible for preliminary .design of new
aircraft and the preparation of the handbooks (Pro.j ekt Mappe)
which included pre'iminary design drawings and'pprformance~
requirements. This office, with Department. 22,. was. jointly,
responsible for the preparation of aircraft maintenance. handbooks.
The Preliminary Design Office also supervised. Departments 11 and
12.1 whether. Departments 10,-_11 and 12. in. the
ORB-1 Personnel:
Wocke, Haas - Dip]. Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Stechert, Miss Inge (Secretary)
Mix - Dip]. Eng
Backhaus - Dr Eng
Lehmann - Dip]. Eng
Wacht - Eng
2 Soviets - Names unknown
ORB-2 Personnel:
Guenther, Siegfried - Dip]. Eng (Chief)`
Benz - Dipl Eng
Scherer, Fritz - Dipl Eng
Motzfeld - Dr Eng
Schmitz - Dr Eng
Becker, Werner - Dip]. Eng
Eulitz - Eng
Fuchs - Dipl Eng
Thiedemann - Dr Eng
Sander - Dr Eng
Dietze, Fritz - Dip]. Eng
Butter, Karl - Eng
Total Number Unknown
Department 11: New Aircraft Design (Entwurfszeiohnuhgsbuero)
This office worked on the design of n6w. aircraft .until the
$oviets approved the plans for detail design. Tl*eX were alpQ
Jointly responsible with Stress (Department .14) for air load
calculations.
ORE-l Personnel:
Grolle, Herbert - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Schmidt-Stiebitz, Hermann - Eng
Schrecker, Martin - Eng
Kornmueller - Dipl Eng
3 Soviets - Names Unknown
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Department 2.2: Aerodynamics Unit (Aerodynamik)
Responsible for the aerodynamic design of new aircraft and
jointly responsible with Flight Test (Department 29) for flight
test, analysis and reporting.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Schumann, Hans-Georg - Dr Eng (Chief)
Schreiber, Walter - Eng
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 10
Department 13: Project Engineering Office (Typenleitung)
After a new project had been approved by the Soviets and
the detail design started, a project engineer was assigned by
the Chief Designer, Baade, after consultation with Erich Wolf.
The Project Engineer was then responsible for the procedures in
design and production although he did not give direct orders to
the men doing the work.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Wolf, Erich - Eng (Chief) (Also Project Engineer on
EF-131 and 140)
Wolff, Fritz - Eng EF-131 and EF.-140
Wessel, Eric:: - Eng EF-126
Theobald, Jakob - Eng EF -132; EF-150 (Had been in Dept 20
as Chief Designer on the, $N'r15O Servo
Mechanism)
Rentel, Rudi - Eng (Former ME 162 Design Chief with
Messer.schmidt)
Schreiber, Heinz (Former Test Pilot)
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
No comparable department
Department 14: Stress Analysis and Weight Control Statik and
Gewic to
Two groups worked in this section under the direction of
one chief. One group was responsible for the calculation and
reporting of stress analysis and the other handled weight ealcu-
tions There was considerable argument between the two groups;
l
a
the chief tried to be impartial. If there was . wide
. however
,
difference of opinion, a structural test was run. The Stress
s
ti
on
,
engineers also worked with Department 13 on air load calcula
and with Sections 23, 24, 29 and 40 on static and vibration
ineers than any
n
G
g
erman e
problems in OKB-1. This group had more
due to coincidence and poor
el
r
l
h
y
g
a
is was
other section but t
. planning on the part of the Soviets at the time of the "transfer"
from Dessau. All those listed for OKB-1 were stress specialists
unless otherwise indicated. The jobs which the OKB-2 personnel
held are not known to me.
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Guenther, Waldemar - Eng (Chief)
Feofanow (Soviet Deputy)
Eltz, Miss Rita (Secretary)
Aickele, Karl - Dipl Eng
Walzel - Dip]. Eng
Paasch, Fritz (Fredrich?) - Eng
Besinger, Jose_ - Eng
Mattern, Otto - Eng
Gottschalk, Siegfried - Eng
Lammas! - Eng
Kuregger - Eng
Bordihn - Eng
Schreyer Eng
Heineck - Eng (Died April 1951)
Emmer - Eng
Hildebrandt - Eng (Weights)
Bergmann - Eng
Wulf - Dipl Eng
Weygand - Dipl Eng
Koscielny, Guenther - En;;
Steinhardt, Johannes - Dipl Eng
2 Germans - Names Unknown
5 Sovieta - Names Unknown
Heinze - Eng (Chief )
Scholz, Rudolph - Eng
Machill, Hans - Dipl Eng
Neumann - Eng
Weber - Eng
Neumann - Eng (Different engineer; not duplicat4on of name
above)
Walter - Eng
Michalek - Eng
Sparrer - Eng
Total number unknown
Department 15: Fuselage Design (Rumpfkortstruktiioo_n)
This office, in 0KB-1, waR responsible for all d the
'ueelage, dell gr?and supervised Departments 15 a, b, an4 co. in
OKB-2, fuselage (15), wing (16), armament (19) an4 'servo
mechaniE~ms (20) were under He: nsohn, but what,
if any, subdivisions existed.
Haseelloff, Johannes - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Bather, Hermann - Eng
OKB-2 Personnel
Heinsohn - Eng (Chief) (Also Deputy Chief Designer,, Dept 2)
Luksch, Miss Dora (Secretary)
Noetzold, Martin - Eng
Peltzer, Waldemar - Dipl Eng
Christien - Brig
Luksch - Eng
Balluft - Eng
Jacob - Eng
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Borchert - Eng
.Mehl - Eng
Hellrlegel - Eng
;Kap el , August - Eng
'fold - Hug
Schurz, Edwin -- Eng
Knoll - Eng
Rheinlaender - Eng
Schroeer - Brig
Haul - Eng
Total Number Unknown
Department 15a: Fuselage Forward Section (Fuehrerraum)
This group was responsible for the equipment in the cock-
pit as well as the design of the forward fuselage structure.
Stiller, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Scheller - Bug
Markwardt - Eng
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department l5b: Fuselage Center Section (Riunpfiatitteletueck)
This group was responsible for the structural design of
the center fuselage section of the airplane. They worked with
Section 19 on bomb bay doors. RATO installations were also
handled by this department.
Wolf, Kurt - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Stechert, Hans - Eng
Kraemen - Eng
Schurz - Eng
Woehrle, Wilhelm - Eng
Mueller, Paul - Eng
Blumel - Eng
Freckmann, Josef - Eng
- Schloszer, Max - Eng
Hadamczek - Eng
Sattler - Eng
Wild, Manfred - Draftsman
Tuchel, Miss Marga - Draftsman
Gerngross, Miss Elfriede - Draftsman
1.. German - Name Unknown
6 Soviets - Names Unknown
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SECURITY 11;1.':1'?ri!ATIC)N
Department 15c; Fuselage Art Sectk':n (Rlz ufende)
These people were responsible fog the sti~uctuzal d.^ sign of
the aft fuselage section except for the e:aq.-era_aga, wi 1eh ..as
designed by Department 16b.
Riedel - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Stebel - Eng
Scholz - Eng
Wieners - Eng
Nebel - Eng
1 German - Name Unknown
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16: Wing Design (Fluegelkonstruktion)
Supervised and was responsible for the work of Departments
16 a, b, c, and also d1until the Soviets took over Lofting in
September 1948.
OIL -1 Personnel:
Freundel, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
No other Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16a: Wing Structure (Fluegel)
This group designed wing structure but' no flaps and aileronp.
They also worked on the main gear attachments in conjunction'with
Dept 16 c and tank support structure with Department 17 b.
Strobel, Franz - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Krause - Eng
Wingerter, Oskar - Eng
Kober - Eng
Richter - Eng
Wreth - Eng
Glaser, Kurt - Eng
Mueller, Miss Ursel - Draftsman
Nickell, Miss E-lith - Draftsman
1 German - Name Unknown
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
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artment 16b: Empennage Strw tixce (Leitwerk)
designed the complete empennage, ailerons,
rou
This
p
g
and landing flaps. They coordinated closely with pepartments
16a and 15 c.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Hartmann - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Kletsch, Max - Eng
Zerressen, Paul - Eng
Bernhard - Eng
Rabbold, Ernst - Eng
2 Germans - Names Unknown
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB--2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16c: Landing Gear (Fahrwerk)
Wheels, tires, bearings, and forgings were purchased;
landing gear design was done by this department.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Reusz, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Zecyska, Paul - Eng
2 Germans - Names Unknown
Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16d: Lofting (Strakabteilung)
This group made accurate wing and fuselage profile lay-
outs on metal and on a World War 11-developed German plast a
known as ?Astralon". Zimmermann was Chief unti.L ine Sovie s
took over the section in September 1948; he was then transferred
to Department 16a of OKB-1. By the time Zimmermann was
transferred, the Soviets had had sufficient experience to enable
them to do very accurate lofting work. This department did work
for both OKB-1 and OKB-2.
0KB-i Personnel:
Zimmermann, Paul (Chief) - Eng
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
8-10 Soviets - Names unknown (all women}
Department 17: Power Plant and Hydraulics (Triebwerkskonstruktion)
The department organization in 0KB-i (Junkers) was unusual
in'that there were two department chiefs, jointly responsible to
the Chief Designer. By mutual agreement, DuBois supervised fuel
Stud hydraulic systems and Hoch followed power plant installations
and engine control design. Each was considered to be equally well
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qualified to dLrer.t any work in Departments 17a, b, or c. In
OKB-2, these departments were combined under one chief and
worked on the design and testing of liquid rocket engines.
Hydraulics for OKB-2 may have been organized lake ORB-1,or may
have been handled by the people listed under Department 15.
OKB-a Personnel:
Hoch, Hans - Eng (Chiefs)
DuBois, Georg - Eng
Soviet Deputy -? Name Unknown; no other Soviets
Kappe - Eng
OKB-2 Personnel:
Schell - Eng (Chief)
Stahl, Mrs Lore (Secretary)
Ufer - Eng
Stahl, Richard - Eng
Michel - Eng
Reek - Dipi Eng
Michaelis - Dipl Eng
Mueller - Eng
Kuenzel - Eng
Kaul, Werner - Eng
Winter, Kurt - Eng
Schenk, Werner - Eng
Total Number Unknown .
Department 17x: Hydraulic Systems' (F#ydraulik)
With the exception of servo mechanisms, this group designed
the entire hydraulic system on the airplane, including pampa,
valves, and actuating cylinders. In nKB-l servo mechanisms werre
designed by Department 20. In 0hts-CZ, servo mechanism design
handled by some or the people listed under Department 15.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Antoni - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Haas, Walter - Eng
Pansegrau - Eng
Hainich - Eng
Busse - Eng
Horn, Miss Elizabeth - Draftsman
Busse, Miss Elfriede - Draftsman
Ulrich, Miss Anneliese - Draftsman
3 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 17
Department 17b: Fuel Systems (KKraftatoffanla6e)
This group was responsible for the er}tire- a'oraft fuel
system, including fuel tanks, pumps, lines, and gauges.'
OKB-1 Personnel:
Goericch, Werner - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Bonse, Ludwig - Eng
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Krieger, Otte -? Eng
Schlosser, Rud'~ - Eng
Koenig, Miss Waltraut - Draftsman
3 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 17
Department 17c: Engine Installations. (Bedienaill.age)
This group designed the engine installation, Gowling,'and
controls. Engine design .work was done by OMB.-2 but not by OMB-1.
The Junkers preliminary designers (Department 10) would request
an engine of a certain rating from the Soviets and Ir it was not
available, would inquire as to what could be furnlshe4. The
engine manufacturer would furnish information necgssry for
installation design work.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Kuehne, Richard - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
1 German - Name Unknown
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
ORB-2 Personnel:
See Department 17
Department 18: Electrical Installations (Elt-Abtei1
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Responsible for all electrical installations and components,
Including radar, electronic computers, interoo3mnuniRatione,
electrical instruments., and electrical actuators. In OKB-1, a
branch under Rinke's direction worked with electrical 1.istrumen-
tation and control devices for laboratory and Pi,ight testing. In
OKB-2, in addition to working on aircraft designs, part of the
ou was working on some kind of electronic rp
I this work was in a field similar to radar, 0
further details. Very strict security was observe n otion
with this work.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Nagel, Otto - Eng (Chief)
SimkIn - Soviet Deputy
Lehmann, Bruno - Dipl Eng
Rinke, Fr idolin - Eng
Keck, Alfred - Eng
Heiman, Rudi - Eng
Zindel, Wendolin - Eng (Former Heinkel employee)
Busse, Wolfgang - Technician
Goersch, Paul - Eng
Kill1 an - Brig
Kraemer - Technician
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
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0
OKB-2 Personnel,
Wehde (or Whe iLe) Dr Eng (Chief)
Horn, Miss Annerese (Secretary)
Schell - Eng
Szappat - Ens
Brandel - Eng
Stegk - Eng
May, Ernst -? Eng
Zuehlke - Technician
Stegk, Ede! - Technician
9 Germans - Names Unknown
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
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Department 19: Armament (Bewaffnung)
In OKB-1, this group did all gun installation and turret
design work~but no work on the guns themselves. The guns were
supplied. by the Soviets. Department 19 was responsible for all
adjustments and tests either on the airplane or in the laboratory,
but no tests were conducted in which the gun installations were
tented by actual firing of the guns. Bomb racks and bomb release
mechanisms were also this group?s responsibility. No rocket
armament installations were planned for any airplane built'at
Podberesje. There was no armament on the one $i bel plane?built
at Zavod #1
~,...~~ I have no information on e e es
nom built-at Pod.beresje.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Steuerlein, Gustav - Eng (Chief)
Kuljawzew - Soviet Deputy; handled procurement of guns
Gremser - Eng
Book, Max - Eng (Died July 1951)
Koenig - Eng
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 20: Hydraulic Servo Mechanisms (Sonderaufgaben)
Part of the ORB-1 Section was responsible for the design
of hydraulic servo mechanisms used on flight surface controls
and on the FA-15 gun turret system. Another section under Handke
worked on optical bomb and gun sighting systems, The worked very
glosely with the Hydraulics Laboratory (Department 28) and with
the Armament Department. In the Siebel Group, this work was
don( by some of the personnel listed for Department i5..
0KB-1 Persdhriel:
Heisig, Josef - Dipl Eng (Chief)
Handke, Erwin - Eng (Former Zeiss employee; an opticEs expert)
Rockatron, Rudi - Eng
Bruske, Erwin - Eng
Weiche - Eng
liiek - Eng
10 Soviets - Names Unknown
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SECURIT': II:TFORMATION
.~ 5-
Department 21: Fire Extinguisher Systems (Feuerloesohanlagen)
This section concerned itself with the design and testing
of aircraft fire extinguishing systems. Stegbeek and von Schlippe
were the inventors of the system used on the aunkers airplanes.
In the latest design, extinguishing agent (carbon to 'aohlor1.de)
could be discharged repeatedly from the same bottle, The method
of pressurizing the bottles is unknown. There was no comparable
section in 0KB-2,
ORB-1 Personnel:
von Schlippe, Boris - Dipl Eng (Chief)
Stegbeck, Helmut - Dipl Eng
Bergold, Alfred - Eng
Ballerstedt - Dip]. Eng
Naumann - Foremen (Obermeister)
Herling, Paul - (Former Flight Testing Msahania)
No Soviets
No comparable department
Department 22: Handbooks (Drucksch_riftenstelle),
This group, in collaboration with Preliminary Design
(Department 10), wrote, illustrated and published handbooks for
pilot Instruction, maintenance, etc.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Kindler, Lothar - Dip]. Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Steib - Eng
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
No comparable section
Department 23: Static Test Engineering Bruohversuphe)
Due to the complexity and large number of engineering
problems involved in static testing, a speo:,al group of engineers
van set up in the Junkers Group to design the toot 0105, to
oupervise the tests, and to write reports on ttoato rOgueoted by
papartment 14 (Stress).
OKB-1 Personnel:
Kahofor, Richard - Dipl nng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Gromes, Friedrich - Eng
Steidle, Anton - Eng
Wittkemper - Eng
Jasper - Eng
2 Germans - Names unknown
2 Soviets - Names unknown
ORB-2 Personnel:
This work was performed by the Stress paroonnel..in Dept 14.
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aaa
D ep' timent 21 Vibration Test Engineering hw m sabteilunt3)
This group in OKB-1 was responsible_ Por. run= .n& shake tests
on the' complete airplane and analyzing ?;th re9 ultls la, on etiOn
with 'Section 14. They assisted the.?flight'te$t? p{~p 'in J=
vibration analyses and also worked with, the -8tqt. VVeat 1'.ab on.
vibration tests, e g, the test of the flight- cc tr0'1 19,rWage
in. OKB~-2, this work was performed by Dr. Th10Q~mannj 'Dr.. Sauder.. and
Fritz` Dietze of Department .10.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Schmidt, Theo - Eng (Chief)
Koeppen - Dipl Eng
Wild - Eng
Raff, Richard
Schilling, Siegfried
Thiehle, Miss Gisela (Calculator),
No Soviets
No comparable department.
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TYee saL tment 25: Wind Tunnel (Windkanal ),
This was a self contained. unit and, oven tCltftai a shop
iihieh made models both for use in the ti nQx` at gcadb~ravja.-qnd
jt~ the tunnels operated by ZAGI in Moscow, oi!!e4, to
tk'~ve eight tunnels. This group conduetbd
iel tests on all airplanes designed by Jut*dra.,and:$i 3'
b gineers. They maintained ver close
d _dmics con aC~i W3.t re Section (Department 12).
Strauss, Kuno - Dr Eng (Chief)
Dominik, Hans - Eng
Wenzlau, Alfred - Eng
Hempel - Eng
'Kleinschmager
Matzke
Tuchel, Horst
No Soviets
- Jae rtinent 26: Production Engineering, Ferti e? W1cklun
t7.'heae people worked on production pFocessea and designed templates
tools, dies, form blocks, and dbaembJ.y Jig8 'U.Dad' the plant at
Podberes je. They also made complete tcoltng'dpawifgq for. series
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;alil~t~ing the phyaiesl properties or .mazer."eR e:anu wzW+as WIVa
a31m etign cf
9 r
production which the Soviets took along with the final
drawings of the airplane. Although t) ere were two gx-ovpe,
G'iebsch was in charge of both. He aapprove4 a drawings
from both groups.
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OKB-1 Personnel:
Griebsch, Franz - Eng (Chief)
Lasarew- Soviet Deputy
Risk, Ernst - Lug-
Warnck - Eng
Walkenbach, Theo - Eng
Fischer - Eng.
Westerhelweg - Eng
Blank - Eng
OKB-2 personnel:
Stolberg, Gerhard - Lug (Chief of OpoOo but der the
supervj.a~on Of fw$ev o).
Thomsen - Eng
Qearasch, Karl Eng
Zuhlke, Paul - Bug
Foelibach _ Eng
11 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked fc' b*Mi ups)
?d2 rtraent 27: Naterinl.e Teetin
PruefuriB e -z~aa~r~ata~ '
l;l
?X5-l Personnel:
Eitner, Heinz,- Dipl Bug (Chief'
No Soviet Deputy
3oa:roeder, Rolf -- Eng
Ra,ebarlew Brig
T ,eh L e - Fang
edebaoh Lug
Qeortz, Arno - Dr Bug
lloin, Oelcar - Eng
Dizukowva, biro (3oa'viet in Chs'ge $ tM In +'6 R1ti 80t1on).
Knoll, Biisn Anaelioee - ftahnialiM,
7 ?Soviete - Ntames Unknown
OK13-2 Personnel:
SEQRBT
roOion ra oietanoe tests, and for the retn4s A
"pnte roused in the ahope. This labci'$ta CO t4O tQOtO
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Department 28: I-Iydr. aulics Laboratory (Hydraulik-Laboratorium)
This laboratory also operated for the point benefit-&t'
OKB-1 and OIB-2. They worked with Departments 17a and 20 to'
conduct tests on hydraulic systems and components.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Keller, Paul - Dipl Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Horn, Fritz - Eng
Goernicke, Kurt - Master Mechanic (Meister)
Eltz
Moses, Walter
Tuchel
Boettger, Ernst - Eng
Kunze, Josef
Ulrich, Rudolf - Eng
Stottmeister - Eng
Koenig, Siegfried - Eng
Kube - Eng
Misalla - Eng
Sauerborn
Kramer - Dipl Eng
Mansf eld
14 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
None
DeRartment 29: Flight Test Engineering(Flugv.orsuchagruppe)
This group was responsible for scheduling and conducting
flight tests and jointly responsible with Aerodynamics,?Department
12, for the evaluation of flight test data. After the SF;14%'wl
flight tests were completed by the Germans,. the functions' of the
Junkers flight teat group were taken over by the Soviets: ? ' ( ?
? 4chroeter' was the only German scheduled to participate ' 1n' the
plane. 4ad not.. flown.
$P'-150:fl .g
x}der' power and the OM-2 Group '
IL
was still intact,
OKB-1 Personnel:
Bormann, Alfred - Eng (Chief)
Slutzky (Soviet Deputy; succeeded Klimowitzlci in February
1948) ,.. '?
Juelge, Paul - Chief Test Pilot
Sohroeter, Guenther - Eng (Flight Teat Engineer)
Lehmann, Walter - Eng (Flight Test Angineer .r'
Feodorow (Soviet Colonel and Teat Pilot)-
5 Germans - Names Unknown
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
Ziese - Dipl Eng (Section Chief and Chief Test Pilot)
Treuter, Karl (Test Pilot)
Motach (Test Pilot)
Rauschen - Eng
Glocke - Mechanic
Total Number Unknown
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Department 30 Ch ;n_-=~~ ~abora.t_c,r1V (Ch~nl: c :J~abc>raT`~rium)
This group was c concerned with the development of
liquid rocket fuels, cut also d-1.- ct.l;er? uhem1oal research and
analysis for both. ?cnlcora aril S'.:" el (ri cups
Dunker - Dr Eng (Chief)
Hahn, Walter D-e Chen
Daniel, Wilhelm - Dr Chem
Janke - Dr Chem
Ruppelt - Dr Chesi (Died 1948)
Burmeister - Dr C1-iem
Emmerich - Chemist
Rudat - Chemist
Keil - Chemist
Steffen - Cheair?t':
17. Soviet Women ?- idames 1Jn hnov:n
Department 31: Production Chief.'''s Office (Ilauptbetreibsleitung)
Responsible for all matters pertaining to Departments 32
through 38. The Production Chief Office was also concerned
with supplying workmen and facllitiec for Departments 27 through
29 and 40 through 42; but the planning and supervision of the
work in these laboratories and the Mockup Shop was done by the
design sections directly or by working through the liaison engi-
neers. Quality control (Department 39) was responsible only to
the Soviet Air Ministry,. German personnel in Quality Control
were responsible to the Production Chief on personnel administra-
ti,ve matters.
Dreuse, Otto - Eng (Chic;.')
Isotow (Soviet Deputy; no other Soviets were in this group)
Ternka, Mrs Hildegard (Sec:retary)
Schumann, Herbert - Eng (Chief of OI03-2 but under the super-
vi.sion of Dreuse) (Killed in May 1949)
Department 32: Prod'ictIon P.lannin_Office (Betriebsbtxero)
This office was responsible for the scheduling and follow-
up of work in the production departments to meet a specified
completion date. i4ork load of both groups were considered in
planning, but Hans Schumann had final authority.
Schumann, Hans -- Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Ternka, Walter - Bng
Horn, Otto - Eng
Naumann, lserner? ?- :rii (Chic: ')
2 Germans - Nanmme ; iinkcnotin
8 Soviets - Name- Unknown (t,hey worked for both groups)
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P.Da tmont 33: Machine Shop (Meohaniaahe o ? t~-~1t~ ( ..~pb T)
This group did the machine work n?oesaz.tog? production of
airplane parts?; All of the machine tooln were GOMWO and had
boon brought from the plants in Dessau and To Machine
Shop did work for both Junkers and Siebal Q Q_
O]?-1 Personnel:
Heinrich, Max - Eng (Chief)
Papiasohwilll --< Soviet Deputy
Koerner, Karl - Foreman ?(Obermea.ater)
Hahn, Otto - Hob Operator (Zahnra4frg*qjV)
Sontag, Martin. - Lathe Operator (I)roher
Gerngroiss - Plaster Mechanic (P!e.oter)
Gerngrose - Lathe Operator (Dreher)
Schulz - Layout Man (Anreiaeer
Voelker - Foreman (Obermeister3
Sonntag - Jig Borer Operator (BohrwerkajSt,'eZ:er)
Skribeek - Layout Man (Anreisser)
Eckler - Lathe Operator (Dreher)
10 Germans - Names Unknown
125 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for bocg group)
p
A
,enclosures (except for the glass), seats, ete o:? both groups,
O1 B-l Personnel:
ORB-2 Personnel;
Ruffert - Eng (Chief)
D artment h: Equipment Assembly Shop (,W kp;oe 2)
M.
This shop built up such things as lands BIn
r oo1t
2t
Zang, Robert - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
thlmann, Anton - Sing
Dennert
Qollniok
Hills f- Foreman (Obermeister)
Schmidt
Oeterland (Died 24 Dec 49)
Nickel
Halter, Erich - Foreman in charge of We141ng (Obermeiater)
Iiokel (Not a duplication of names)
Plansfeld, Manfred
19 Germans - Names Unknown
01-2 Personnel:
4 Germane - Names Unknown
95 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked fob' both 4Wqups)
D&2aVtment 35: Sheet Metal Shop (Klamp ra~,~~ a~lacr n11
No assembly or riveting work was done haze Formed shoot
metal parte were made for both groups
ORS-l Personnel:
Kuhnert,.Karl - Eng (Chief)
Suvxet Deputy - Name Unknown
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55 Germans - Names Unknown :,
41 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked 't'oil both J'6s s)
bbpk~tznent 36: Assembly Shop (End on d6d bts :1iu6ammen-
2,l
Raebe - Master Meahanie (Meiotor)
Helokenberg
lanai or
Friedrich
Graeberm
12 Germans - Names Unknown
O1B-2 Personnel:
Rudolph, Hans - Foreman (Obet^miAster)
In addition to sub-assembly and f inat assembly, 'this shop
also had electrical, plumbing, spot welding, rivet fabrication,
and .plastics sections. Final inspection, t,nglud~n6 functional
testing, and final painting was also done here. The ongizre
taan?ifacturer sent engineers to supervise engine Installation.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Roehr, Paul - Eng (Chief)
Amaltsehemko - Soviet Deputy
Rusoek, Werner
Hruschka, Paul
Bertel, Albert
Sohroeter, Heinz
Pelzer, Josef
Nagel
Kellermann - Quality Control for electrical system
Ungowiss
Martin
Lehmaazn
Reimann
Zoibig
Sohlesiger, Ernst - Foreman (Obermej.ster)
Schoenemann, Walter - Foreman, electpla4
Seidel, Walter - Foreman
Dueben
Moosbach - Quality Control for electricaa system
Booker
Hildebrandt - Foreman (Died November 1952)
Rudolf
Neff in - Engineer for Plastics Seotign
Rust, Karl
Richter, Arthur
Albreoht
saeper (Master Mechanic) (Meister)
Riohter, Horst
16 Germans - Names Unknown
OHB-2 Personnel:
Froehlich - Eng (Chief of OKB-2 Final Aserofimlya finder the
supervision of Roehr).
araeff, Phillip - Eng
11 Germans - Names Unknown
215 Soviets - Names Unknown (Worked for both &r'QURe)
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Department 37: Tool and Jig Building (Vorrioatungiba) (Zeche 21)
This shop made the templates, jigs, form blocks and other
tools designed by Production Engineering (Department 26) for both
;Tankers and Siebel Groups. The~.?e was no foundry in the plant and
not many duplicate parts were made, so that f*orr4 blocks were usually
h .-made of compressed laminated wood, btt a, fipw metal form blocks
Pfitzke - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
65 Soviets - Names Unknown
Only Soviet personnel were etnploypd in thope shgpo Anodizing,
as Well as plating could be done. Any kind of heat treating
equlred in aircraft work could be aoeompllahe4, but there were no
facilities for foundry or forge work.
bopn'tment 38: Painting, Plating and Heat eatin Shops
Lac - erere und ere un eo a
art' and also witnessed tests in the ioborgto'ies.
ar
n
s
.
B op Q w pons o "n y A t1e pY WV A r
kl, t . Ins ectors made all detail And ti,natx inopeationa on the
No Germans
45 Soviets - Names Unknown
ar ment : ualit Control Ferti uefun or Fe rue
hi d
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1 t t la a i
&. wars wa
tm
Herzog, Otto - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy.,- Name Unknown
Werner, Erioh - Eng
2 Germans - Names Unknown
2 Germans - Names Unknown
25 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for both @Groups)
M rtment 40: Static Test Laboratory (Bruchversu ham- boratorium)
r x~ o w-ru eriw~wrrar w~
This laboratory was responsible for making the test net-up
And running the tests in conjunction with Depertmcnts 14 and 23.
Teats were run for both OKS-l and ORB.-2?
Mattray, Justus - Dipl Ting (Chief )
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
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Hoffmann, Ludwig - In September 1950, Hoffmann ewasMtransferred
from Department 29,'to
Gaub at z
Johnen, Cassius - Foreman (Obermeistpr)
2 Germans - Names Unknown
3 Germans - Names Unknown
18 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for both groups)
Department 41: Mocku
Zeche 20)
Mockups, mostly of wood, were made by this shop with the
aid of the design sections. Workmen were transferred when
necessary, but otherwise, the OKB-1 and the OKB-2 Groups were
separate in this shop.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Kempe, Albeit Eng
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Koch, Harry - Foreman (Obermeister)
Wenzel
Ediger
5 Germans - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel
Griesahaber - Eng (Chief)
Cornelius - Foreman (Obermeister)
3 Germans - Names Unknown
30 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for
both grotPa)
Department 42: Flight Testing Ground Crew Flu versuohs u e
Bo enor an sa ion
0KB-1 and OIC-2 each had a group responsible for the
maintenance of their flight test airplanes end the Installation
of instrumentation, except that engine changes for the Junkers
D$rplanes were made by crews sent out by the engine manufacturer.
-Since the Siebel Group designed and built their own engines, they
did all of their own maintenance work. After the Soviets began
their tests on the E?-140, all 0KB-1 Germans were transferred out
of this section. Richter was transferred to the Technical Liaison
5X1 orrice, l D tment 4. the information flowni
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and the OKB-2 Flig z group was still intact.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Richter, Erich - Eng (Chief)
OKB-2 Personnel:
Sczuka - Eng
Total number unknown
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SECURITY T: 'N)1I1ALION
Department 43: Drawing Archives and Reproduction (Zeichnungs-
ausgabe, Archie, unc. Pauserei)
This section controlled all non-secret drawings and prints
of both groups that had to be locked up at night. It, also
handled all reproduction except photographic work. In September
1948, Lofting (Department 16d), the Photographic Laboratory
(Department 44), and this section were combined under the
Soviets who had been in charge of the photographic laboratory.
Dan-mann was then transferred to the Aft Fuselage Design Section
(Department 15c)_ When Dammann was in charge, he was responsible
to Mindach, Department 6. He was responsible for drawing, storage,
and filing; but the actual work was done by personnel 11 from the
two groups and OKB-1 and OKB-2 drawings were handled independently
of each other. When the Soviets took over, the chain.'of command
was through Isotow, Department 31, and then to the Chief Engineer,
Wosnizenski.
Dammann, Paul - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Heydrich, Mrs Ida:
Zer?essen, Mrs
Zeressen, Ann - Miss
Melber - Mrs
Horn, Mrs
10 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for both groups)
Department 44: Photographic Laboratory Photo-Laboratorium)
No Germans were ever permitted to work in this department.
The Soviets were very careful about the security of photographs
and photographic equipment. This group was responsible only to
the Soviets through Isotow to Wosnizenaki..
Personnel:
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
Department 45: Flight Testing Procurement Liaison Im Werk
a on er e
(Verbindungsgruppe zur Flugversuchsgruppe) (LIC)
This Soviet group expedited the flow of parts and materials
between the factory and the flight test fields. They were only
responsible to Isotow and Wosnizenski.
Saburdajew (Soviet Chief)
5 Soviets -? Names Unknown
Department 46: Garag(
This group maintained and operated the vehicles and
mechanized equipment used in connection with the plant's operation,
and was responsible to Isotow and BirukoTi.
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Personnel;
Zappe, Wilhelm - Foreman (Obermeister); the only German in
the garage
75 Soviets - Names Unknown (35 drivers)
Department 47: Secret Drawing Vault (Geheim Abteilung)
This group (only Soviets were employed here), looked and
secret drawings and nrinto when not in use
ardael Fill This office rec. ve all
a ass e mall; ed through this and
the Plant Director's Office before he received it. Jursahin was
an.MVD man; hence, not even the Soviet management at Zavod #1 had
any authority over this department.
Personnel:
Jurechin - Soviet Chief
4 Soviets - Names Unknown.
Department 48: Power Plant Construction (Triebwerksbau 0KB-2)
This section of O_! -2 built and tested the Wa' t -0 en
liquid rocket engines used in the Siebel airplane.
0203-2 Personnel:
Werner, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
Kossiiic - Obermeister
Kilian, Ernst
Janice, Willi
Jahnke, Paul
Naumann, Heinz
Werner, Klaus
4 Germans - Names Unknown
Design Procedures
4. Preliminary Design:
All new designs were originated by the Germans. They told the
Soviets what was being planned and asked if,they were interested.
On all technical matters, Baade made direct contact with the
Ministry for Aircraft Industries in Moseow. (This, of course,
was done with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet Plant
Director.) When the preliminary design drawings 'and main features
of the mockup of a new airplane were completed, Junkers personnel
went to Moscow to discuss the plans. Following this conference,
a committee of about. 20-25 Soviet technicians came to Podberesje
to go over the details of the design and to inspect the mockup
This mockup board sometimes ii_.luded general officers (identified
by their striped trousers). All of the members were qualified
technical men and not merely politicians. Changes would be
suggested and discussed at this meeting. If such changes involved
oonaiderable time, the above procedures would be repeated. When
the design had been agreed on and approval received from Moscow,
the design details were carried out by the Pro4eet Engineers, the
design sections, and the mockup group. The preliminary design
drawings were not made with sufficient detail to be used for
detail~lstructural design. However, the basic ".mensions were
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determined here for the detail design to b~- done later. The
configurations of the landing gear, cockpit, armament, bomb
bay, engines, and fuel tanks were also determined when
necessary. Detail design engineers assisted the preliminary
`mdesign section. Mockup construction paralleled the design
work.
5. 13etail Design:
Air load calculations (Luftkraft Verlauft) were based on wind
tunnel data by Dr Strauss (Dept 25). The calculations were made
by Preliminary Design (Department 11) working with the Stress
Department. Aerodynamics, Department 12, was not concerned with
air load calculations. German desk-type electric calculating
machines were available in adequate numbers here, as in every
department of the plant. The Soviets used the abacus for
calculations and were even faster than the Germans with their
electrical calculators.
(E) Description
.Using the above information, the design engineers
would first make an overall layout drawing of their particular
section. Other layouts were made for the pertinent sub-
sections. From the layouts, detail drawings' were made for all
parts except standard parts. No dimensions for malting individual
parts were put on assembly drawings. Assembly drawings were made
for all major and sub-assembly sections. Isometrics wnr.e not
used for production drawings. The -layout drawings were available
In case the others were not sufficiently clear, but were not issued
to the workmen. Wiring and schematic system drawings were also
made. Before a project was completed, all drawings were changed
so that they were suitable for series production. The engi-
neering sections worked very closely with the mockup' section,
particularly during the early stages of the design, Although
the mockup was not made with sufficient accuracy for tooling
purposes, it could be used to work out many design Installation
problems. With the detail designers% assistance, the mockup was
continually reworked to add details as the design progressed.
Due to the complexity of plumbing and electrical installations,
the first airplane as well as the mockup was used to assist the
designers in making up those drawings. In addition to tooling
design work, complete tooling drawings which were designed for
series production were also made at the plant. The original
tooling drawings and twelve sets of prints were transmitted to
the Soviets along with the final airplane design drawings. After
these drawings had been given to the Soviets and the Germans were
occupied with other tasks, the Soviet deputy, Lasarew, would ask
questions of Griebsch and Stollberg (Chiefs of Tool Design,
Department 26), relative to the tooling drawings. He would
pose these questions as if they had just occurred to him, but I
believe that someone else may have asked these questions, through
Lasarew.
(b) Scale
The scale of a drawing depended upon the size of the
part. Full scale and double size drawings were made only for
small parts. Standard scales used were: 1:2.51 l;5; 1:10; 1:25;
1150; 1:100; and 1:250 for preliminary design drawings.
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(c) Accuracy
Production and layout; drawings were made accurate
enough to permit scaling. If scaling of a print was necessary,
the work was usually done by a liaison man. the missing
dimension, initials and date were put on the Dr$nt with India
i.=ak and the designer notified of the action, so that he could
correct the original. If the shop so requestedr, the draftsman
might have to put the dimension on the print and initial it.
(d) Dimensions
All dimensions were in the metric system. Parts were
located by the drawing numbering system. There was no system
for locating a part by airplane stations or Rw4 er lines .
(e) Numbering System
Example: EF140-052-0071-001
Type of airplane
(2) Section of airplane (corresponds to the design
section, such as the fuselage canter section,
fuselage aft section, etch
() Sub-assembly number
( ) Detail part number
If there was a change made, the Vetter "au would
precede the section affected. If a change as oS` such magni-
tude that it affected the block of numberp socon 'rem the
left,' the work would be stopped until the dcaign Wand straightened
out, but no ?ZU would ever be placed In front of this block.
When the airplane was completed, serial 'oduation drawings were
made taking care of all changes. The "Z would not appear on
aerial production drawings; otherwise, this same numbering system
was used on production drawings as well as for marking parts and
ausemblies. (Part numbers were put on parts with metal stamps in
spite of German recommendations against this), A first the
Germans used their own system of indicat ,ng part numbers on an
assembly drawing. The part would be ir>dieated on the drawing by
an arbitrary number which referenced the part number and
description in the material block. After. abc ut July 1949, the
Soviets changed to their own system of Indlor-tong the part --
the part number was enclosed in a circles and an arrow pointed
to the part coneerned.Some power plant draws which I saw at
Podberes3e but which had ue.en made elaawhlorec -used the latter
es7etem. In early 1948, I saw German signatures in Latin script
on the title block on some of these dra$ingbo but 7 caanot
remember whether they were on Mil:ulin or Lulbro rints. The
signatures were not those of former Junkers empjoyees. Drawings
excited eonsidera6Te interest and many Germano looked at the
drawings but did not recognize any names,, . ?adim:Lnary design
drawings carried a number which indicated the type and main
section (such as fuselage or wing) to which t:ho dravzing pertained.
Except for the type designation, there drawing numbers bore no
relation to the other numbers described above.
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(f) Amount of detail
As regards detail presentation, the German practices
were similar to those in the US, except that sectional views were
always cross-hatched and drawings were made for each part.
Dimensions to be used for part fabrication were not designated
on assembly drawings. Rivets were designated by specifying the
kind and spacing, but were not drawn individually. Rivets were
coded per DIN (Deutsche Industrie Normen) and surface finish was
designed according to DIN. On later drawings, information
previously covered by DIN was taken from three volumes of Soviet
handbooks - Russian Aircraft Materials and Parts (Russische
Luftfahrtmater alien and Zube oertei a he same se oT books
'that contained procurement information. The Soviet method of
designating surface finish was the same as DIN. Rivet coding
symbols were specified, but were different from those in DIN. The
bill of material contained the part number, description, quantity,
material, weight, and a column for remarks. Under "Remarks",
finish or plating would be specified in addition to being
designated on the view of the part. At first, only German was
used on the drawing designations, then both Russian and German,
and finally only Russian for the EF-150. By the time Russian
was used exclusively, the Germans were sufficiently familiar
with Rtiwssian terms to understand and use them in their work.
(g) Equipment
Pencil drawings were made by the designer. Engineering
aids, usually women, would finish the drawing in ink; semi-
transparent paper was used. Pencils and paper were scarce.
Designers frequently had friends in Germany send them pencils.
.Drafting tables, machines, and other drawing equipment were taken
from Germany; the Soviets did not have any of their own equipment.
6. Handling of Drawings:
(a) Scheduling
The Planning Section (Department 6) assigned and
transmitted in writing, completion dates to the design sections
and subsections. The design section worked out the sequence of
the individual drawings. Bar charts were kept by Planning to show
the dates on which assignments were due and the progress which had
been made. In actual practice, planning was a great problem. It
was complicated by Soviet demands, by the Chief Designer's desire
to surpass the Soviet designers, and by the personalities of the
people doing the planning. The Soviets would set a date for the
completion of an airplane when they gave their approval of the
preliminary design. The Scheduling Department, working with the
chop production representative and the designers, estimated the
amount of time required. Bonin, who directed scheduling, had a
good knowledge of plant capabilities. He discussed his calcu-
lations with his supervisor, Mindach, (Department 6), who
reduced the estimate. Baade, and then the Soviet Plant Director,
Baade's superior, each cut the estimate still further before
approving it. The approved schedule was then given to the
department chiefs by Mindach. As soon as the various departments
received the schedules, they protested the inadequate time
allotments. The schedule was then discussed by those concerned
and finally revised and a more reasonable estimate was made.
(b) Checking and Approval
In Dessau tii.ere was a separate seotior} for checking
drawings, but due to the lack of personnel in Fodberesje, the
following system was used: When a drawing was completed, it was
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signed in the title block by the draftsman. It was then (srieeked
and signed by his immediate supervisor, the group Ieeader, and
signed by the section leader. When the thawing call outs were
changed from German to Russian, the Germans signed their names
in Russian script at the request of the Soviets. A routing slip
was also used for routing and approving one or more drawings.
The following people signed the routing slip in the order given:
2
3
Draftsman
Group Leader (Draftman's immediate superior)
Chief Section Leader (this would correspond to
9
Hasselloff in the Fuselage Section)
Soviet Deputy to the Chief Section Leader
Stress Analysis (Department 14)
Weight Control (Department 14)
Materials Planning (Department 9)
Production Engineering (Department 26)
Planning Office (Department 6)
(10
Project Engineering (Department 13)
(11
Chief Designer or his Deputy (Department 1)
12
Soviet Deputy to the Chief Designer (Department 1)
When those indicated above had approved a drawingg, it was sent
to Reproduction and then filed. There was no other paper work
required to release a drawing. Each day all secret drawings,
finished or not, were filed in steel boxes, cne for each
section. The boxes were put into a vault (Department 47); this
vault had three locked doors and was guarded, Non-secret
drawings that were not finished or that were needed for reference-,
were locked up in steel cabinets in each design section. Non-
secret drawings that were completed were stored in the drawing
archives, Department 43.
(c) Reproduction and Distribution of Prints
Three copies were made of each print by the "Rotpar:se't
(red tracing) process for use in Zavod #1. (The prints had red
lines on white and smelled oi' ammonia.) The routing slip (same
as above) was then sent to t}F r.>,?uuuctaon Office (Department 31)
to notify them of the availability of the prints and finally sent
to the Planning Office (Department 6), where it was filed. One
drawing print was sent to the Design Section and two were kept in
the print files. Sometimes extra copies could be made upon
request, but the number was kept to a minimum due to the severe
shortage of paper for printing. shop foremen sent clerks to the
files to get whatever prints were necessary. All print.,
except those for individual pax?u>3, had to be returned to tn~
Piles each day for security reasons. Secret prints got the same
treatment as that described for secret drawings. Prints on
individual parts stayed in the shop with the parts.
7. Design Changes:
The method of handling changes depended upon their magnitude and
where the required changes were discovered. Handling these
changes was, of course, one of the major functions of the Liaison
Engineering Office, but this whole idea appeared to be new to the
Soviets. They believed that one man could effectively coordinate
design and production operations and saw no reason for a larger
staff.
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(a) Minor changes, found in the Shop
(1) Minor changes were those that could be worked
out between the shop and the liaison engineer without consulting
the design section, eg, moving a valve or switch a little to
clear a structural member, or replacement of poorly installed
rivets, In a change of this type, the liaison engineer would
make a sketch of the changes - thereby authorizing the change
on the airplane. These changes were recorded in each shop.
When the serial production drawings were made, these records
were consulted and those changes involving design information.
were incorporated.
(2) Greater changes were handled by means of a
standard change notice form. On the form (or attached to it)
was a sketch or description of the proposed change. The change
a_otiee was sent from the shop to the Liaison Engineer Office
and was then routed in the same manner as were new drawings.
Change notices were reproducible and each section on the routing
list received a copy. Each department that initiated change
notices had a record book and a numbering system to keep a record
of the changes that had been made and thereby prevent duplication.
There was no limit on the number of changes that could be made
before the drawings had to be revised, but there was a date set
In the production schedule, after which no changes could be
made without Baade's approval. There were four categories of
priority for these change notices. vo 1 had to be completed
in two hours. It was hand-carried by each person. Lower
priorities required longer completion times,
(b) Minor changes, found by the Design Section
Changes falling in this category were handled in
exactly the name manner as those found in the Shop, except that
notices initiated by the designers were routed from the drafts-
man to the Liaison Engineering Office.
(o) Changes that necessitated drawing revision
The requests for changes requiring drawing revision
could originate either from the Shop or Design personnel. If all
sections concerned agreed that a new drawing or a revision of the
original was necessary, the drafting was dpr;e and routed as
-described for new drawings. The changed drawing would have a "Z"
in its number; a change notice form was not used. If very large
and time consuming changes were planned, they were usually left
for inclusion in thr third airplane (V-3). IV such changes
affected the structural integrity, the static test airplane (V-2)
was also modified. Therefore,,the V-1 and V-3 airplanes usually
differed because of these changes. Part interchangeability was
not required at Podberesje.
8. Training:
The German girls who worked as tracers were taught their work
in the drafting room by the designers with whom they worked. Soviet;
girls were taught by the same process; in addition, Soviet engi-
neers instructed these girls three evenings a week. Some political
Indoctrination was included in these meetings.
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Procurement Procedures
9. This section should have been titled "Ordering Procedures"
since, for security reasons, that is all the Soviets permitted
the Germans to do. All information pertaining to to sources
of raw material and parts was carefully kept by the Soviet
Purchasing Agent, Orlow.. Both German and Soviet materials were
used; almost all of the material for the EF-159 and about half
that for the EF-140 was Soviet. German material specifications,
designations, coding, etc, were handled in accordance with German
standards (Deutsche Industrie Normen). Soviet standards were
presented in the three volumes, Russian Aircraft Materials and
Parts. The copies available to the Germ a a the factory name
a1d3ocations marked out. Although it was customary to refer
to a material by number,
except one steel, s
Lz~
ore a Russian number - CA A3? (HGSA30) o any
specific tensile strength figures, but in general,
the Soviet materials were inferior in strength to
Soviet materials were less uniform in their dimensions and physical
properties.
10. Materials could not be ordered in less then standard sizes but
were sometimes available in larger sizes. Stee', rods were normally
six to eight meters long, but could be ordered up to 14 meters in
length. Dural tubing was usually available in lengths up to 10
meters, the standard lengths being four to six meters. (Steel and
aluminum are still very scarce in the East Zone of Germany; stain-
less steel is practically non-existent.) Tu'ing sizes were in
both English and metric systems. Metric-sized tubing was used
when high stresses were involved because the couplings were
better machined, had finer pitch threads, and could withstand
more vibration. German ball bearings were use4 in most appli-
cations. As many as possible were salvaged from unused parts
made in Germany during World War II. These parts were shippeA
From Dessau and disassembled in Podberesje. Soviet bearings were
very scarce and of poor quality. (The same situation exists today
in the East Zone.) Springs were unavailable and had to be made
in the Machine Shop. On an average -- about 20-25% of the rivets
used were made in the assembly shop. Forgings were very difficult
to obtain and were usually of poor quality. Two forgings for the
EV-140 V-3 main landin gear bearing pivot were obtained from
a plant near Kimsy These
two forgings were well made. Standard extruded shapes could
usually be obtained but special shapes had to be machined. Standard
extrusions included
(a) Angles: 900 only. A limited number of angles with
unequal legs were available, as were some
angles with reinforced edges (similar to bulb
angles).
(b) Channels: 90? only.
(c) "T" Sections: 900 only.
(d) "Z" Sections: 90? only.
(e) "I" Sections: 90? only.
(f) Hat Sections.
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11, Actual procurement was initiated by Materials Planning
(Department 9) which made up a list from the "materials, block
on each drawing and sent the list to the Soviet Purchasing
Agent. The Soviets ordered material without any assistance
from the Germans. Additional material, not listed on the
drawing, could be requisitioned in writing from Materials
Planning. All material arrived in trucks and was received by
the Soviets;
5X1 en a SnIpmezit, ,
Pl in of the kind and amount or
ann
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material which had been received. Quality Control (Department
39) stationed a Soviet at Receiving to inspect the material.
Samples were sent to the Materials Testing Laboratory for
evaluation of physical properties. Laboratory test reports
were sent back to the inspector. If the material was as specified,
the inspector saw to it that each item had the proper color
coding before sending it to the storeroom. what
system of Soviet coding was used after the middle of 1949; prior
to that time, coding was done per DIN. If the material was not
according to specification, Materials Planning was notified and
they took the matter up with the Soviet Purchasing Agent. When
the material was received, it bore tags which showed material
specifications and the name of the factory where it had been
zroduced. Since the materials warehouse was closely guarded,
21ave no knowledge of any sources of
material. All material was stored in one guarded warehouse and
was not tagged f or any particular plane or drawing. In c,3h
shop, there was a group which originated requisitions from the
drawings, obtained the material and delivered it to the work
bench or machine. The material was cut to the desired length by
the storeroom.
;2. The plant at Podberesje was on a telephone exohenge not directly cone.
nected with the flight ? testing fields of Ramenskoye, Tepli-
ptan, or Sor.ti. (These three flight testing fields were located in
the vicinity of Moscow.) Since telephonic communication was
difficult, due to poor service, the following procedure was
established to expedite liaison with the plant: If spare parts or
material were needed at one of the fields, the flight test crew
would send a courier plane to Podberes e. The plane would eirole
25X1 the garage and one other building
and then fly to a nearby meadow which was use as a an ng .
This "other building" housed a special li:. on group known as
LIC (Lottnia Espitanja Stanzia or Im Werk Stationierte Verbindungs-
gruppe zur Flugversuchsgruppe). LIC was " mposed entirely of
Soviet personnel under the direction of Saburdajew. On the
arrival of the courier plane, LTC would dispatch one of its men
with a truck to the field to find out what was required. Any
requests for spare parts or repairs were then brought to the
Technical Liaison Office (Department 4) which acted upon the
request. After t}" shop had completed the repair or the warehouse-
had filled the order, the material was given to LIC, which forwarded
it either by truck or plane. During important flight testing, one
of the Technical Liaison engineers from Department A. stayed at the
airfield with the flight testing group. If repairs were urgently
needed, Goretzki (Department 4) would go with the plane and
personally expedite the work through the plant and back to the
field.
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Laboratory Procedures
13. Materials Laboratory: (Department 27)
Tests were requested by a design section or by Quality Control
(Department 39). Setting up and running of the teats were
supervised by a test engineer in the laboratory. Quality Control
personnel were in the laboratory at all times and witnessed all
tests; occasionally, the design engineer also witnessed his tests.
The test engineer in the laboratory wrote up the report and sent
it to the section which requested the test. Copies were also
made for the Chief Designer and for the laboratory files. There
were three sections in the Materials Laboratory.
(a) Chemical Testing
Actually, the function of this section was testing
and determining by chemical means, the corrosion resistance of
parts. The item to b? tested was immersed in an acid or salt
bath for a certain length of time. The results of these tests
were used to predict durability of a part. This prediction was
based on factors takeii from t.uies in German handbooks. This group
also worked with the Hydraulics Laboratory (Department 28) to
develop a method of sealing integral fuel tanks. No chemical
analysts was done here;. whenever it was desirable to have items
chemically analyzed, they were sent to the Chemical Laboratory of
the Siebel Group (Department 30).
(b) Physical Testing
Routine tests were run for Quality Control to measure
hardness, tensile strength, fatigue factors, specific gravity,
and spring rate. (Springs could not be purchased but had to be
made in the shop..) Tests were made to determine the effect of
scratches and notches on the performance and durability of parts
and to efficiently save damaged parts. Experimental work was
also done to establish new and better processing methods for
welding, riveting, or other means of joining materials. Micro-
soopic analysis of materials could also be made, but any photo
(-
fraphy had to be done by the Soviet' Photographic -Section
Department 44).
(c) Instrument Calibration and Repair
Since this group was under Soviet control, (Mrs
Birukowa, wife of the Administrative Director, was in charge), I
was never permitted to enter the area and therefore have little
5X1 k-owledge of It. they only worked on instruments
used in the shop and no on nose used for aircraft. There was
no shortage of gauges except master gauge blocks (Johannsen
type) and this was largely due to their "disappearance" from the
storage place while being unpacked after shipment from Germany.
14. Hydraulics Laboratory: (Department 28)
Test requests were Initiated by Quality Control (Department 39),
by the Hydraulics Section of the Power Plant Group (Department
17a), or by the Hydraulic Servo Mechanism Group (Department 20).
A research engineer in the laboratory supervised the set-up and
testing, and also wrote the report for each test. (Report distri-
bution was the same as described for the Materials Laboratory.)
Two Quality Control men were permanently stationed in this lab.
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Individual parts could be tested on a hydraulic test bench. For
most of the testing, however, a co.plete and exact mockup of the
airplane system was made. Test data were obtained for such
things as pressure, temperature, flow rates, pump speed, etc
Equipment and instruments were available in sufficient quantity
to control and measure these various factors. Recording equipment
included pen and ink recorders and three four-channel 20-cm
oseillograph The frequency response of the oscillographs is not
known to me. two kinds of hydraulic fluids - one colored
green and the o eriteremained fluid at fluid minus 55~t C commonly kinds
of fluId wane -rj=eiyAd In barrels and did V -4,
miring; ands of t e
These by a c u
personnel working with them; those working with the fluids had
to wear rubber boots and loves and in time, the boots and
gloves were affected .II not recall any trouble with air-
craft parts due to using these fluids. (Packings were made of
special compounds of synthetic rubber or metal including lead in
some eases.) Tests were also run to test the effectiveness of
the fuel tank sealing compounds developed by the M:teriala
Laboratory. Tanks were tested by rocking them, while filled
with water and under pressure. Slosh tests were also run with
the tanks half and three-fourths full, but not pressurized.
15. Static Test Laboratory; (Departments 23 and 40)
I this was the only factory in the USSR
that had its own static test laboratory. Other plants sent
parts and complete airplanes to ZAGI in Moscow for testing.
Facilities at Zavod #1 were not adequate for testing a
completely assembled airplane, but tests were made on all mayor
sections.
(a) Static test requests originated in the Stress Group
(Department 14). The requests were sent to Static Test Design
(Department 23) where the jigs and test setups were designed
and drawn up. The research engineer from Department 23 also
approved the completed setup, supervised testing, and wrote
the report. The fabrication anc. actual setting up for the tests
was done by the Static Test Laboratory (Department 110).
(b) To facilitate the mounting of the test specimen and
the hydraulic loading cylinders, there was a grill work of
I-beams, approximately 8 x 16 meters, imbedded in the concrete
floor of the laboratory. The test specimen was mounted on a
vertical steel structure built up from the grill in the floor.
All loads were applied by means of hydraulic cylinders. No
shot bags or weights of. any kind were used to apply loads. Load
attachment points on flight surfaces consisted of contoured metal
made up to rubber connect cemented
the n attachment points with f the r loadingagee
were plates
cylinders bolted to the grill in the floor. If upward loads had
to be ap-'Ued to the top surface of the test specimen, pulley and
cable systems were made up to carry the forces from the cylinders
to the points of application. The setup was operated from a
central control panel, with one man required for each loading
cylinder valve. Loads were applied in increments of 10% of the
"design loading". Tests would usuall7 be continued to failure,
, "Design
which was required to be 125% of the Design loading".
loading" was 120% of the expected flight loads.
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was 80 aft for those that were fired upward and 8 forward for
those ejected downward. Stiller expressed his personal belief
that the seats in the EF-150 wouldntt clear the tail at the
higher speeds obtainable by that airplane. Canopies were also
jettisoned by means of powder charges and were. designed to clear
the tail when ejected. Two operations were required in firing
the seat. One to unlock the trigger and the other to actually
fire the seat. The trigger was a lever with a scissors-type
grip located on the side of the right-hand arm rest. The
occupant had to squeeze the grip to unlock the lever and then
pulled the lever to fire the charge. The lever had to be pulled
with sufficient force to break a piece of wire installed and
scaled with lead as an added safety feature.
(e) Cabin pressurization tests were also made by this
laboratory. Structural proof tests were run on the V-2 air-
planes. Leakage tests were also made on the V-1 and V-3 air-
planes. For safety reasons, water was generally used to test
the V-2 structures. Air pressure was used on the F.F-150, V-2,
however, since they could tolerate more leakage when using air
than when water was used and thereby save much of the time
visually required to plug up holes.
16. Vibration and Flutter Testing: (Department 24)
Test requests were originated by Section 14, Stress and
Weight Control. Analysis of data was made by both laboratory
and stress men working together. The report was written by the
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(c) The Soviets specified certain parts which they wanted
to test at ZAGI just before static tests were to be run. The
Gernans tested these parts by loading them only to the "Design
load". They were then completely inspected by Quality Control
and, if satisfactory, were sent to ZAGI for testing to failure.
The test setup at ZAGI was made by Junkers personnel. The
tests were run by ZAGI personnel in the presence of Junkers
engineers. Since the EF-131 tests had been practically
completed in Dessau, a new wing was made and sent to ZAGI. On
the EF-140, one wing and the complete fuselage- was tested by
ZAGI. all of the Er-150 tests were to be run
to failure at Zavo
Bending fatigue tests on
wixig spars and torsional fatigue tests on the flight surface
control linkage were also run. By using. a standard drop hammer
machine, simulated drop tests were made on landing gear; but the
entire airplane could not be picked up and dropped.
(d) The Static Test Laboratory also worked with Stiller
(of Department 15a), in conducting tests on upward firing crew
ejection seats. Tests were not run on the dot;nward ejection
seat used in the F7--150. Teats were made from a stand built for
this purpose. No tests were made from an airplane or simulated
aircraft structure. The seats used in the airplanes. built at
Podberesje were the same as those built by Junkers and all other
German aircraft companies during World War II. All seats were
adjustable by mechanical means, both up and ;down and fore and
aft. Ejection was accomplished by four powder charges simultane-
ounly fired by means of electrical primers. There was also an
emergency hydraulic ejection system. Maximum "go loading for the
upward-firing seats war, 8 ga;for the downward
firing ' seats. it was 3.5. i uz?in v'ue tests on the test stand
he upward-firing seats went 16m above their
starting point. The angle of ejection for all aircraft seats
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SECURITY IN'~;.ORIVIATION
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test engineer and approved by the Stress Section. All airplanes
to be flown received a thorough vibration and flutter test (shake
test) that lasted three or four days. The airplane undergoing
tests rested on its landing gear and was vibrated by means of
electrically-driven mechanical shakers. Frequency and amplitude
were recorded on strips of paper moving at known speeds. The
recorder and pickup were in one small unit called a
"Schwingungstastschreiber". The pickup consisted of a sliding
probe extending out of the box of the recorder. When taking
data, the unit was held by hand with the probe against the air-
plane structure. After testing, the airplane was thoroughly
inspected by Quality Control. This group also worked with the
Static Test Laboratory on various life tests such as on the
flight control linkages. In this test, the complete control
system was duplicated in the laboratory. When necessary, they
also worked with Flight Test on vibration studies.
17, Siebel Chemical Laboratory: (Department 30)
This group was primarily concerned with the development of
liquid rocket fuels. They experimented with various mixtures of
the "T and C Stoff" used in the Walter Ofens for the Siebel air-
planes. Although they did much chemical research and analysis
for both Siebel and Junkers, the only other program which I knew
about dealt with corrosion resistance tests on fuel tanks for
liquid rocket engines.
Shop Procedures
18. The factory worked three eight-hour shifts daily. All of the
shops did work for both Junkers and Siebel Groups. Siebel had
only one sho and that was for building liquid rocket engines
(Walter-Ofen). The Siebel plane was assembled in a section of
the final assembly shop, Department 36. The machine tools were
all of German make and had been taken from Junkers/bessau, and
Siebel/Halle. There were no special training courses for
machinists; Soviet workers received on-the-job training and
were considered "specialists" after six-eight weeks.
19. Planning was handled in much the same way as it was in the
design section. The Production Planning Office (Department 32)
scheduled the time when an assembly was to be completed and it
was up to each shop to work out the details. Since both ORB-1
(Junkers) and OI{B-2 (Siebel) used the same shop and laboratory
facilities, planning was a joint operation. Shop planning.
personnel coordinated with the engineering planners in working
out an overall schedule. The question of priorities between the
two groups was not serious; it was nearly always settled in the
shop where parts were being made. A process routing card was
made by every department for each part. This card had the part
number, name, machining or other operations required, the standard
time allowed for each step (except inspection), a space for the
actual time used, and another space for the Quality Control stamp.
When the routing card had been prepared, the card, print, and the
? material were placed in a room where they could be obtained by
the workman. on completion, the part, drawing, and the card were
put in another room for inspection. After the part left the shop,
the card was routed back to the Production Planning Office
(Department 32), where it was used for inventory control records.
The card remained in this office. The method of handling payroll
cards is not known, but it was done by a Soviet in the Production
Planning Office. There were timekeepers in each shop; there were
also timeclocks - four in the shop, one for Junkers engineers and
one for Siebel engineers. The only other records used were the
books that were kept in each shop to record changes made on parts
for the airplane.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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20. Since Zavod #1 was a development plant, there was no series
production and consequently no assembly line.te.chniques were used.
The description that follows does not indicate any sequence of
operation, but is simply given shop by shop:
(a) Machine Shop: (Department 33)
Each section of the machine shop had one or two men
.(Anreisser) who did part layout work. The machines were set up
by the German machine operators themselves. The Soviet operators
set up their machines under the supervision of the foreman
(Obermeister) or the lead-man (Vorarbeiter). Special extruded
shapes usually had to be machined. Forgings were also hard to
get and, where possible, welded assemblies or machined parts
were used. Coil springs had to be made on lathes. Tungsten
carbide tools were used until the supply taken from Dessau was
exhausted; they were not available in the USSR.
(b) Equipment Assembly: (Department 3b)
This shop used the same system of laying out parts as
described above for the machine shop. Welding fixtures were made
up and used to hold assemblies while welding them together. These
fixtures were designed by the Tool Design Section (Department 26)
atidl built in the Tool and Jig Building Section (Department 3T)-
Welded assemblies were heat-treated to relieve stresses set up by
welding, When necessary, welded assemblies were also heat-treated
to increase their strength.
(o) Sheet Metal Shop: (Department 35)
Layout work was accomplished as described above. Lay-
out men, with the help of the foremen, computed the set-back
allowances. Suhnert, the Department Chief, was never able to take
more than three days vacation at a time because the Soviet workers
did not understand the work and he alwayo'had to plan their
assignments prior to his leaving. Some parts were formed out
of full hard aluminum alloys and others sere made of annealed
aluminum and later heat-treated, depending an the degree of
forming involved. Sheet metal forming was practically all done
by hand. This was largely due to the fact that only one to three
pieces of each part were made. The tool designers (Department 26)
however, did make up complete tooling drawings for series
production. The dies and form blocks that were used at Podberesje
ware hand-made of laminated compressed wood and occasionally of
metal. Metal form blocks were also hand made of steel since there
was no foundry, The laminated wood came from Dessau and could
not be obtained in the USSR. Rubber pillows were used in forming
parts on hydraulic presses. No stretch presses were available in
Podberesje. Stretch presses had been taken from Dessau by the
Soviets but their present whereabouts is not known to me.
(d) Assembly Shop: (Department 36)
Wing, empennage, and fuselage jigs more made to hold
ribs, formers, and other structural members during cub-assembly.
Rivet holes were located by measuring and marking of the part
Itself. Hole patterns were laid out by lead men or group leaders.
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(1) Most of the assembly work was accomplished by
means of dural rivets, including age-hardening ( "ice-boxT1)
rivets. Mild steel rivets were also used. The only blind rivets
used were the explosive type, and these very infrequently. Bolts
and nuts were not used for permanent assembly of structure. Small
screws were used temporarily to hold parts together while riveting.
Spot-welding was used extensively for tank construction and for
engine cowling and air intake ducts. Spot welding was of good
quality and no unusual amount of trouble was encountered. Rubber
was attached to steel by cementing, but no metal-to-metal
cementing processes were used.
(2) For final assembly, jigs were permanently attached
-U-o the floor and used to locate the various sub-assemblies with
respect to each other. Electrical, hydraulic, and other
equipment was installed during final assembly. Electrical,
hydraulic, and fuel systems were installed with the aid of
schematic drawings. Detailed drawings were not made up for
plumbing and wiring until after they were installed in the first
airplane. Power plants were installed under the supervision of
engineers from the engine plants. All engine adjustments were
accomplished by these engineers alone. Engine-changes made during
the flight test program of the EF-140 were done by a Mi.kulin crew.
A Mikulin engineer also went along on test flights.
(3) Control surfaces, landing gear, armament, fuel,
and hydraulic systems were given a functional check by means of
various test stands in final assembly and approved by final
inspection (Endkontrolle). Weight and balance, with the air-
plane empty, was also determined here. No gun firing tests were
conducted. Wing and fuselage surfaces were inspected by means
of a device which recorded the variations between the desired
contour and the actual contour on a strip of papers if the contour
was too uneven, the roughness was filled in with a material
similar to a paint primer and hand-smoothed. This was a procedure
which had been done in Dessau and was continued In Fodberesje.
Junkers engineers were in favor of discarding painting, but the
Soviets wanted to continue it. I have no knowledge as to whether
the EF-150 was to be painted or not. ( some MIG-15s
in Dessau which were not painted. They arr ve n Dessau in
December 1950 and were still there in October 3.951.) Airplanes
were painted light blue with red star insignia in eight places.
Wings were taken
e rp ane in or er to ge ough the shop
doors. After the airplane was rolled outside, the wings were
again attached. Engine tests were run ary.the electrical, fuel,
landing gear, armament, and hydraulic systems were again tested'
using the plane's own power instead. of the test stands.
(4) The airplane was again disassembled for shipment
to the flight testing field. Wings, power plants, landing gear,
and horizontal stabilizer were removed. Landing flaps and
ailerons were shipped separate from the wings. They were then
brought to Ramenskoye and Teplistan by truck, except for EF-11+0-B
(V-3) which was transported by ship to Sorki. The airplanes were
dispatched to Ramenskoye or Teplistan, arrived In Moscow by
nightfall, and were transported through the city. We were told
this was done so as not to interfere with traffic. The airplane
was then reassembled at the airfield under the supervision of
Paul Roehr, Chief of Department 36.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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(e)
Y01
Painting, Plating and Heat Treating:
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(Department 38)
Only Soviet personnel regularly worked in these shops;
oocaoionally, when an especially difficult job of heat treating
had to be done, German engineers were called upon to do it. All
painting and plating was done without paint booths or facilities
for getting rid of the fumes; the Soviet painters did not even
wear masks. All of the necessary equipment was available and the
Germans offered to set it up but the Soviets said it was un-
necessary. Smoking was forbidden in the paint shop, but a real
fire hazard existed in that the doors in the shop which led to
the plating room were kept open where electrical equipment was
used. Because of the fumes, final painting of the airplane was
done at night in the Assembly Shop, Department 36.
,(f) Siebel Power Plant Construction
an. Testing: TVFp-artment 48)
OKB-2 built six liquid rocket engines (Walther-Ofen).
Three were built with one burrir and three with two burners. Two
of each were to be used in the Siebel experiment fighter and one
of eadh was for testing on a stand. These en ints built in
a section of the assembl shop (Department 36) and
very few details concerning e
n, harp-cornered steel boxes with
aLe
ex
About 100 x 70 X 70 am-1
The exhaust tubes were about 30 em in awe er an lung. The
one-burner engine had one of these tubes extending out of the
100 x 70 em face of the box. The two-burner thewo ofrials
theme tubes in the same location.
used were. all taken from the former S e e Plant n alle.
t tubes extending boxes measturPr
h
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FiWCLOSURE (A) Soviet#Supervision of
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Y~~1~ MCI 1~?Il~ll~eo~ ~~+~6o~e?~
NOW"
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SECRET
3!CURITY INFORMATION
DEPUTY MINISTER FOR
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
General Lukin
Viassoff, Civilian Aid-
Abramow
1. eb enko
Smirnow, V.V
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
I Birukow (Chief)
Orlow (Purchasing Agent
MVD
Smirnow
Jursohin
OKB-1 (J'UNKERS )
Baade Chief
Qbrubow Soviet
ZAQI
Prof Shiskin
CHIEF ENGINEER
Woonizenski
OKB-2 (SIEBEL)
Roessing chief Designer)
Beresniak (Soviet Deput
Designer)
Deputy)
ENCLOSURE W: : 25X1
Chart Showing Soviet Supervision of
Zavod #1
LW V V Smirnow has, in error, occasionally been referred to as
P P Smirnow in previously disseminated lI reports.
You will note that these are two individuals
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