INNER ANTAGONISMS IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND STALIN'S NEW GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500830068-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: August 18, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

V10. 1447 111.4 IAT161 Hl os MD. l:CE4sv!F!^h~i0~7 .~~T~C TIS"~~
INFO ATI N REPORT
COUNm r
DATE DISTR. 18 August 1947
SUBJECT' Inner Antagonisms in. the LeradorO11 p of the ,911-RusellsmKJ. OF PAGES 15
Comm unist Parlay and Stalin'o Eew Oo eat.
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During the last fete. ,.oaths, Stalin has effected a number of fundament9:. changes
both iL:- the structure and in the personal, composition of the most iw95.-:.ant gov-
ernmental institutions of the USER. The meaning of these clines is w%., yet;
clear in detail, but there can no longer be any doubt as to the general line
they have tskent an ever greater concentration of power in the hands of Stalin`
himself is talon,'~ }`.ec~e_~. 15uz~ing? i he war no was already, o a en a an pur-
pose3, a c a. or,, unlimited powers, but at that time this was conrd4er d
as a temporary state of affairs. It has now been made permanent. The l:Wi. has
no:: enter--, upon a period of personal dictatorship in form as well as
practice.
WAR
The most it.-portant of the recant innovations are:
(a) Measures which legally affirm Stalin's position as to the top pleasure,
(this title, borrowed from the Italo-Cerman Fascist terminology, ie now in
universal use in official Soviet literature), who stands high above all other
state functionaries, and in whose hands are concentrated the main threads of
state, party, and military government..
(b) The transformation of almost all the members of the hig"-ist orgeni.,otion
of the ruling party, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of I;: a All-
Russian Communist Party, men whose status was previously, formally at :+ . ast,
equal to Stulin[s, into the 3sitter:s "substitutes" in various governmo al
functions, in other words, into Stalin's inferiors in the state hierar:inj.
(c) The creation of a special boc~r which has charge of all the country+!l mili-
tary affairs - The Ministry of the Armed Forces of the US&V" - which r t.itducts
all work connected with preparing the country for armed conflict with outside
enemies. This ministry is headed by 'Generalissimos Stalin himself, w'' has
chosen as hie assistants the most brilliant military commanders of the ;.ar.
The, word "Defense" has bean omitted from the name of the 1inist7y, and comments
in the Soviet press snake it clear that this omission is a -deliberate oT~la, and
political in character: tha tasks of the new ministry are not confined '.c pre-
paring the country merely for defense.
(d) The complete altercation of the structure of the Organizational Burr^u of
the Colznunist Party, that most important body *7hich directs all the In ,)r work
of the party and distributes the party forces (.,adres)3 both in form and in
fact Stalin is the head of this bureau.
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3. All those changes are the result of the complex processes of the country's
development. and of thA inner. -_ -.- ..
To understand present conditions in the U$SR it is necessary first. to see
clearly the role played in the courtly by the Communist Party.
(a) The whole population of the count i di
i
umky an with
will..crmit one to understand correctly then full meaningeofrthe ch ngeseres
re-
cently made by S'-al1 angel
v
-,y %Aeu V1140 to unequ members- of the Commmunist Party on the ne9hand,. and non-memberss on the other
hand. The first group at the moment numbers about six million in other
words,--approcfr tely six percent of the adult population of the country,. All
power in the USSR is concentrated in the hands of this six percent: thus alone
have the right to nominate candidates for election; they have the monopoly of
all po..itical and generally ideological propaganda; they alone may occul-w-
leading positions in the govurnment, the courts and the amps, may direct Indus
trial enterprises, and so on.
(b) Non-.party members, which means about 94% of the population, have no .right
and may occupy only subordinate positions. Men occasionally a non-party member
is elected to some post, this is done by the Covwmnists themselves, who find it
eoq',ecd,cnt to pretend that non-party members take part in run. ing the country,
Ne.tural.ly, in such cases the Communists are careful to select persons who are
vsiolly subs..rvient to them. Non-party members who hold views different from those
,if the Cor..munists have no chance whatever of influencing the government in ar,6r
legal manner. They are not the subjects but the objects of power politics.
(c) An power in the USSR belongs to the Communist Party; -the structure of that
party however liar, nothing in common with political parties as they exist in
the democratic countries of the best. During the decades of its dictatorial
rule in tPie US>S'R, the All-Russian Communist Party has been transformed from a
free assoeiati'an of men who held the same views into a complex hierarchical
organization of men who hold leading positions and of candidates for such posi-
tions. Uniting as it does only an insignificant minority of the population of
the country over vhich it holds plenipotentiary pourers, the All-Russian Communist
Party hasbanished every vestige of democracy from its organia.;.tion in order to
preserve its dictstatorship. At the present time its structure is guilt up from
above, on purely totalitarian principles: severe centralization, iron diauipline,
and scrupulously observed hierarchical7:gradation.
(d) All party policies are determined at the top, by a small group of leaders,
and in actual fact by Stalin himself, with all the others acting in the capacity
of advisers, The party tolerates no opposition to the decisions made by its
heads. imll its active numbers without exception swear by Stalin's every word.
Yet an inner struggle within the party still goes on, but it uses channels other
than those: of political opposition.
Most important in the inner life of the party is the struggle wI:ich may be
termed as the struggle between various social layers and strata within the
aountry -a now overnin g._ e. the ra=w of the - sa an Communist
Party are uni a all hose who occupy leading positions in the state govern-
ing,mechanism. This mechanism is riot only composed of a great many people,
but is exceedingly complex as well, since all the branches of industry, culture,
science, and public affa;.rs in the USSR are governed by the state. Bach of these
branches has its own peculiarities and its special interests, which are inevitably
reflected in the attitude of. each separate group of "responsible workers" towards
matters of general state policy. For this reason, during the very first years
of its dictatorship, there appeared within the All-Russian Communist Party
groupings built along occupational lines: "professionaliats," or the leaders of
the trade unions; "industrinlists'I, or the men who stood at the head of various
industrial enterprises; "military workers", or Communists who had specialized
in the science of warfare, and so forth.
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6, The struggle between these groups was one of the pivots of the internecine
party struggle within the last few decades Stalin settled it at lest by his
own methods: in the bloody purges of 1936.38 he liquidated all those who
had taken a leading part in it, and established a party dictatorship within
the party itself. All the members of the All Russian Communist party may be
divided into two basic grouper those who occupy important positions in some
branch of the government on. the one hand, and those who are engaged in or-
ganizing the proper functioning of the party itself on the other. At first
the role of the latter had been merely auxiliary, but it gradually increased
in importance, and after the trials of 1936-38 has overshadowed the other
group. If the Communist Party as a whole is the master of the Russian State,
the party machine has now become the master of the Communist Party. It is a
dictatorship within a dictatorship.
The total result of these various processes of development was that, on the
eve of the war, the mechanism o;: power in the USSR was built on the following
scheme: goverr,enta1 posts of any importance, in all branches, were packed
by Communists, who were, however, merely carrying., out the will of others; the
real master of the State by now wao the inner leadership of the L'ommunist
Party, which not only appointed all important government workers, but con-
trolled them and gave them all necessary instructions.
8. The war produced material changes in this set-up. The country was-fighting
for its vex/1 existence, and events inevitably broui;ht the arey into the fore-
ground. The specific gravity of the whole army staff increased correspondingly,
together with the growth of its influence in the life both of the country and
of the party.
On the eve of the war, the party machine had perhaps held more power over the
ors r than over any other single group. The smashing of the staff collected by
Tukhachevsky and his assistants had -only recently taken place. The victims
had been Communists versed in military science who, in order to render the
araV a more efficient instrument,; had demanded for the Red Arnpr a. certain mini-
mum of independence and freecbm from political and police intorference in its
affairs on the part of party lenders. Sono 50% to 70% of the upper army staff
perished in that havoc, including all. the best-trained younger men groomed for
top positions. Only the "political marshals" of the type of Voroshilov, Budenny
and Kulik escaped. These were men who knew relatively little of military mat-
ters, but who were wholly subservient to party leadership. From 1937,on it
was these men who bacame full masters of the Red ArnQ', which they altered to
suit themselves, with the aid of a special group of party officials, the so-
called "political commissars", who wore the direct representatives of the party
machine. It was they who were in charge of preparing the country for .wax dur-
ing the crucial years of 1937-40; it was they who held top command in the array
during the first stages of the war, and they who were responsible for the de-
feats of 1941-42.
10. The situation was saved by officers of the middle ranks. They were all Go==-
iota, and many had done years of party work (at that time non-Communists were
permitted only in the lowest officer ranks). Hoer these men felt became clear
by the fall of l 41: they were all unanimously in favor both of replacing the
useless "political marshals" and of abolishing the office of political commis-
sars. These demands were dictated by the war situation itself. These men did
not constitute a political opposition to the government in goneral, though
there was undoubtedly a certain e--unt of opposition to the party machine,
which, in order to preserve its dominant position within the country, attempted
to limit the init{ative of officers in the field by placing them under the con-
trol of political commissars. t~
1l This opposition had no clear-cut form and no leaders; but it represented the
attitude of the greatmass of officers. The outstanding representatives of the latter
had a few sharp personal brush-ups with the "political marshals" (as for example,
the conflict between Zhukov and Voroshilov in September-October of 1911 on the
problem of organizing the defense of Leningrad, or the even severer conflict
e'F~ of o of political commissar was created in April 1918, during the Civil
War, and abolished in 19a. It was reinstituted in 1937, after the execution
of Tukhaohevskyr. During the Finnish War it showed its worst side, and was there-
fore, abolished once more in August 19.440. On_ July 16, 1941, it~'Ras revived for
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of the same period between commanding officers in the(Crimea and 1,1,ekhlis, a
special emissary of the Political Bureau). Rumor spread the tales of such
conflicts, and the general opinion in the army was that the "political mar-
shals" and the commissars were responsible for the defeats which the army
had suffered.
1.2. The Communist Party was finding itself in "a really dangerous situation, singe
dislike of political commissars was wide-spread among the Red Army soldiers
asviell. Here the struggle took other forms: the number of.political commis-
sars killed by-their own men in time of battle increased. The non-party men,
which the great majority of the rank-and-file soldiers were, found their dis-
like of the commissars intensified by their hatred of Communists in general.
13. In spite of the danger of the situation, the party machine did not give in
without a struggle. The compromises which were :gradually adopted follow a
distinct pattern. The first sop wawa riven to the younger candidates for the
office of marshal: dismissals of the "political commissars" began as early as
September 1911. Then cane a general amelioration of the position of officers,
the creaticn of new medals, and the restitution of other privileges of the of-
ficer class. The office of political commissar was abolished only after. the
second series of severe defeats (on October 10, 1942).As f:.e' the rank and file
soldiers, the government met their demands only by altering the content of its
political propaganda: it abandoned all mention of "world revolution", and be-
gan to appeal exclusively to national and patriotic sentiments. Political and
police control over the soldiers remained in force as before, tivhile the officers'
powers over them were even increased; thus, all officers from battalion comman-
ders up had the right to transfer any soldier to a penal regiment without trial.
24. Clearly, the administration was willing to make compromises in order to reach
an agreement with the azu "ommanders, in other words, with the iightimg- offl
cars, the overwhelming majority of whom were members of the Communist Party,
but it granted nothing to the voiceless soldier masses. On the contrary, the
administration expected active aid on the part of the officers in watchin the
arrV more closely than before.
15. The second line along rhich the struggle within the Communist Party developed,
was''ihat of personal antagonism between various representatives of the Party+a
leading or ans,, History Shows that such antagonism increase in po ages Ti
n3 worse ratio to the amount of democracy in any given government. In absolute
monarchies, for example, in which the policy of a country is detenained by a
single person, the hidden struggle for influence upon that person frequently
decides the fate of the country as a whole. The USSR has come very close to
being ruled by one mau., which is why the pxarsonal antagonism between Stalin's
closest assistants is of such great importance.
16. It should be noted that, far from trying to wipe out such antagonisms, Stalin
cleverly, furthers and fosters them, and the various groupings which arise on
such personal grounds. He has been systematically introducing into the leading
positions in the party and government apparatus people whom he knees to be op-
posed and even hostile to each other. This is one of the peculiarities of his
,system of government, .ich he has borrowed from the ancient practice or the
Oriental despots: personal enemies, like spiders placed in the same jar, watch
each other jealously and report evervthi to their chief. True, the practical
work of their departments may suffer because of this Struggle, but on the other
hand such a department can never become a center of opposition to the hetid
ruler: as.long as '.here is a personal conflict between heads of departnnents,
they will need that ruler to arbitrate between them. Ve know from Stalin's
Biography that he is extraordinarily clever in using this method, and that
he frequently deliberately creates conflicts between his assistants.
171. During the r3cent period (since the purges of 1936-38), the central figure in
all such personal antagonisms which affect the fundamental institutions of the
USSR has been (and still iR) G. F. !alenkov, who at the present moment is one of
the most influential men i!Stan 'no's mrediate entourage.
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direct the vast and complex machine which is ins charge of theta orgmille and
trained men destined to hold responsible positions in the Communist Par
lion ty and -
in the state. His staff in the Department of Cadres is organized 1n precise
corrospondenoe to the government itself; to each commissariat (now ministry)
of the latter corresponds a section or subsection of Malenkov'a own organiza-
tion. Such a section not only carries out all the appointments in its particu-
ler ministry, but also collects all possible information regardirg the personnel's
private and public life. This information is concentrated in the hands of
Walenkov, whose organization keeps a running file of`personal dossiers of all
the responsible employees of the state and the party. Here repose all their
secrets, which Mlenkov often uses to keep the people concerned under his
thumb. He is the real "boss"" of this organization,..
19. Malenkov is neither a statesman nor a theoretician. He never writes, and
seldom makes speeches. His strength 14 as 4
hi 1
g
" work in the Red
time when such work was indivisible from that of the hC tithe Civil War, at
joined Stalin's private corps of. secretaries, who were alreacbr 1925 n
in great secrecy the collection of various materials which wereconducting
to aid in
Stalin's struggle for supreme power. Malenkov-soon became one of the lead-
ing workers in this secretariat, and played an important back-stage role in
organizing the purges of 193&-38. He remained officially merely a technical
worker for the Central Committee of the Communist Party until 1939, but his
hidden role had been of such importance that at the 18th Party Congress of
March 1939 he was elected at once not only to the membership of the.Perty's
Central Committee but also to that of its Organizational Bureau, cone of
hose secretaries he became, while in March 19111 he was a candidate to the
Political Bureau,,the highest political organ of the Communist Party.
the war he was Stalin's substitute both in.the People's Commissariat and in
the Committee for Defense. From 1939 he has held under the Central Committee
the position of head of the Department of Cadres, in other words, he is the
man who appoints members of the Coraminist Party to the highest positions
open both in the government and in the party itself. At the present moment
he is the real head of that party machine which,, as has been pointed out above,
is the actual master both of the party and of the state as a whole.
3.8. Still comparatively Young (he was born in 1902 or 1902), lAslenkov first won
c~ist4ac~~ion t- doin
1441
20. Politically, of course, Malenkov always follows Stalin's lead, and takes pains
to show himself to be one of his most ardent disciples. But inhere running his
machine is concerned he has long ago manifested a tendency to go further than
Stalin, even in following the latter's own policies. Foremost among the prob-
lemstrhich have arisen lately in that field is the problem of the so-called
"Old Bolsheviks",
21. It must be noted that, then he was training the men who were to assist him in
his rise to power, Stalin instilled in them a contemptuous attitude torards
the ""old men" (i.e.., those members of the Communist Party who had belonged to
it in its underground days), presenting them as people who were good enough for
the destruction of the old r egime, but were too "sofbn for constructive work,
for the, administration of the state once the revolution had conquered, because
they were frightened by the extent of the terror necessary for the purpose.
Such work could be carried out successfully only by men wbo attained paychologi-
cal maturity already under,the dictatorship, and were ;rained in the state and
part
m
h e
y
ac
.. ?
22. It was these considerations which formed a basis for the annihilation of the
"Old Dolshet-lk9' during the purges of 1936-38. However, Stalin not only did
not destroy at that time a certain number of these "Old Bolsheviks", some of
rilomware among his closest collaborators, but did not even remove them from
loading positions in the state and party government (it is enough to mention
that even now over two-thirds of the members of the Political Bureau are
"old.mcn"). ttalenkov considers this a mistake, sees it as unforgivable weakness,
and does not conceal the fact that he is in favor of "rejuvenating" party lead-
ership still further,
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23. Stalin has been restraining Iftlenlcov in this matter, but restraining him
with the smile which comes to his Zips when he listens to proposals which
seem to hrm essentially right, but premature. To people who know him well-
and lerkov is of their number - the smile signifies encouragement: "wait
a while,-the time will come".
214. During the war years Stalin, occupied by matters of state, was forced to re-
linquish the actual guidance of the organizational work of the party secre-
tariat to Ualenkov, although of course hessceived regular reports from the
latter and consequently approved of it in the main. Nalenkov received great
freedom, which he immediately put to use in pushing out the hateful hold menu.
The ones who engaged his foremost interest were those members of the Organiza-
tional and Political Bureaus of the Central Committee of the All-Tussian'Com-
mu ist Party who played -in important part in running the party machine and who
consequently were tdalez r. v's immediate competitors. These were members of
the Central Committee's secretariat Zhdanov and Andreev, members of the Poli-
tioal?Bureau Voroshilov and Kaganovich, and Vekhliss, who was a member of
the Organizational Bureau. The last-named. was not actuall,,, an ?Old Bolshevik,"
but was closely connected with Kaganovich and played a tremendous role in the
Central Committee in his capacity as director of party work in the Rod Arne.
25. Thus the struggle which developed during the war in and about the central.in-
stitutions of the All-Russian Communist Party has been following two linos:
on the one hand, the struggle of communist officers against the party machine,
on the other, the struggle-in the core of the party itself between its younger
leaders and the ':Old Bolsheviks" who still remained on their posts. Ml.enkov
became a central figure in this struggle because he stood at the point 'inhere
the trio lines crossed. A3 the head of the party machine, he not merely de-
fended the latter from the pressure of the "military", but did his best to
utilize the conditions created by this pressure to oust his enemies i7 the
party machine.
26. This was all the easier since the main attacks of the officers were directed
against the very men who were bialerk,v's opponents. For this there is a very
simple explanation. Men the war began, the Pol-14ioal Bureau wanted to con-
duct it according to the old recipes for revolutionary wars. In a ecordanao
with this intention, not only were the "political marshals", Voroshilov, Budenrr
and Timoshenko, placed in charge of various fronts, but special commissars
of the Political Bureau with extraordinary plenipotentiary powers were'sent to
all the armies. The more responsible of these assignments, were given to those
members of the Political and Organizational Bureaus whose work in the state
and party machines was not considered. indispensable. IJal.enkov was not among
them: he was needed in the central organization more than ever, for the train-
ing and guidance of replacements. The "Old ten", being persona of greatest
experience, were naturally ippointed to the most dangerous sectors. At best,
this took them away from leadership in the party machine, which was getting out
of their control. But almost inevitably they had to bear the brunt of the
conflict with the communist officers: it was psychologically easier for the
latter to shift the whole blame for the activity of the political commissars
on those concrete people with whom they came in immediate contact, than on the
system as a whole. The young communist officers who were lighting against the
interference of the political commissars in army matters were inclined to re-
gard the creators of the system, who sat in Moscow, not as those who were most
at fauli; for having brought about the situation, but rather as supreme arbitore,
who alone could 'eoide in their quarrel with the political cormnissara.
27. This was so advantageous to Stalin personally that there can hardly Le.,aiwj
doubt that r;alenkov'a game had Stalin's complete approval behind it. The re-
sult was that towards the and of the war all of the five above-named men were
almost completely removed from the positions of poser which they had held in
the core of the party machine. Of the five secretaries of the Central Committee
who were active in May, 1941, Iwo, Zhdanov and Andreev, had dropped out by the
end of the war. Actually all the work of the Comm*,ittee fell upon WYalenkov
and his closest collaborator and adherent, Shcnurbakov; the fifth secretary was
Stalin himself.
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28. Of great significant was the c2iamissal of Nekhliss from the post of head
of the Political Guidance of the Arny (a department of the Cettral Committee
which has charge of all political cork in the array, all appointments of
political commissars, etc.) Mekhliss ruined his war career in the Crimea,
where his activities as commissar extraordinary of the political Bureau wore
evaluated by all the vrarcexperts as unconscious sabotage. But his appoint-
ment to the Crimea in the late fall of.1941 was already subsequent to his
dismissal from his post as head of Political Guidance.. He was removed from
that position at the demand of Shcherbakov and Malenkov, who insisted that a
Jew must not be in charge of political work in the arn7, lest that should
provide a basis for increased anti-semitical propaganda. In general, the
removal of Jews from important political positions under this pretext was
carried.-out systemrtically during the war. This practice was begun by .
Shcherbakov, who held the position both of secretary of the Central Commit-
tee and of chief secretary of the Moscow Committee: ? as early as 19414}2 he
engineered the dismissal of Jews from all positions of responsibility .'..the
I1!oscow section of the Communist Party. Later, when he was appointed } ,ad
of Political Guidance in the place of Lekhliss, Dhaherbakov pursued his policy
of ousting the Jews in the Red Army as well.
29. To replace the "old men" who he had elbowed aside, Lialenla,v gathered about him
a close-knit group of young men whom he had trained himself and who were de-
voted to him. Outstanding among these, apart from erbal v,-who has already
been mentioned, were G. F. Aleksagdrov,--vrho in l94]. was appointed head of the
Department of Propaganda and` Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-
Russian Communist Party, and Nikolai Shatalin,_Lialenkov+s substitute number
one in the Department of Cadres. Also closely connected with Malenkov is
N. A. Voznesenalcr., .candidate for membership in the Political Bureau and clsair--
man of t o State Planning Commission. Towards the end of the war it was these
five men who were practically in charge of the whole work of the party machine.
(Shcherbakov died in April, 1945, shortly before the war ended).
30. It must be noted that to Lalenkov's group belonged three out of the five
"young" members of the Political Bureau (those who, according to Stalin's defin-
ition cited above, attained maturity, already under dictatorship and therefore
do not hesitate to use mass terroristic measures): Malenkov himself, Shcherbakov,
and Voznesensky. Of the younger members, only Khrushchev and Berya ware outside
it.
31. However, Khrushchev, who is the general secretary of the Communist Party of
the Ukraine, was practically in disgrace all through the war, not only because
a general-anti-Soviet attitude became apparent throughout the Ukraine (such
a reaction took place practically wherever the Germans went), but because a
similar attitude became very noticeable within the Communist Party of the
Ukraine itself. Thus, for example, Khrushchevrs substitute in the party
secretariat, Burmistrenko, quite deliberately went over to the side of the
Germans, and played an important part in organiz.:ng a pro-Iiitlerite movement
araon;; the Ukrainians. It was largely for this reason that Khrushchev -and his
staff were not allowed to come to Loscow, but were settled in Saratov, where
ILhrushchev %as obliged to carry out a ruthless check-up on the loyalty of all
the Ukrainian Communists, a work Wiich naturally had to be done under the
control of halenkov's special emissaries. All the publications of the Central
Cc;nmittee of the .Ukrainian Communist Party came under similar control, and dur-
ing the war the "Pravdarr, ttwo or three times published bitter criticism of the
editors of the newspaper, "Radianslca Ukrainarr, the chief publication of the
Central Committee of the Ukraine;. Under these conditions it will be neon that
although Khrushchev never formally lost his rights as a member of the 'olitical
Bureau, he was in no position to t ake an active part in the struggle which was
going on inLloscorr.
32. Quite different is the case of Berya, whose influence increased tremendously
during the years of the war,* The story- was current in Moscow that Malenkov
used considerable effort to establish closer relations with Derya. It is
The news of his having fallen into?diaf1vor, which appeared in the American
press, is altogether fake: true, he gave, up the post of Minister, of the Interior,
but only in order to take over, as Stalin's substitute, the direction of all
problems of domestic policy (the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of State,
Security, the Ministry of JusticQ; and others.) At the present time Berya is one
of Stalin's most trusted assistants, and belongs moreover to the narrow circle
of Stalin's personal friends, along with 11 3 k :aa,.aud Voroshilou .--
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25
known, for instance, that he committed several infractions of his own war-
time rule of spending holidays at work in his office (the remark, Mere
are no holidays at the front" is ascribed to him), in order to make trips
to Pushkin to see Berya,.whose summer cottage is next to that of Stalin.
The cautious Berya was very cordial, but refused to commit himself. lie
has shown no inclination to join Malenkov's camp.
33? Malenkov has had no greater success in his relations with Bulganin, who
since the spring of 1944 has been spoken of in Moscow as.a rising star.
It is known that after having worked on HokanacvalW's Staff, during the
preparation and execution of the spring offensive of 1944, Bulganin, at
Stalin's order, prepared a long memorandum on the defects in the organiza-
tion of the armed forces, and that Stalin liked the memorandum so much that
he imm-ediateiy carried out a series of suggestions contained in it, and had
Bulganin transferred to his own Committee for Defense, entrusting to him
at first the preparation of all measures which directly concerned the organ-
ization of the armed forces. Several months later, when I-Ranin was fi-
ointed Stalin's srbsbitute in the Committee o efense, Stalin
also gave him the power to sign some of the Comrdttee's orders, thus showing
him a degree of confidence which previously Malenkov alone had enjoyed
(Malenkov had been empowered to scribble Stalin's initials.on documents
which concerned appointments of party mem>,ors in the arxp'). From that time
on, Malenkov began, with his usual somewhat rude clumsiness, to. court Bulganin,
but the latter has shown himself even more restrained than Berya had been.
34. Thus Lfalenkora attempt to establish close relations with all the younger
members of the ruling, clique has failed. Only those of them who had worked
together with him in the central party organizations have come firmly into
his orbit.
35. Such were the inner relationships within the leading institutions of the
All Russian Communist Party when the war ended.* The balance was a precarious'
one. It was clear that it was only temporary, especially where the two basic
problems of the war years were concerned, namely, the relations between the
party machine and the Communist officers, and the role played by the
Malenkovites within the party machine itself. The changes made by Stalin in
recent months represent an attempt to attain a new and more stable equilibrium.
To understand fully their significance, they must be seen not only against the
wartime conditions, but also the conditions which existed in the Kremlin high
command immediately before the war, or, more precisely, before Stalin took
over the chairmanship of the Council of the People's Commissars.
36. In examining these changes one feature should be noted, which becomes apparent
as soon as one attempts to follow the personal destinies of the members of
the high staff of the Communist Party whom Stalin assembled immediately after
the purges of 1936-38. No matter how Stalin has shifted them about since
1939, not a single member of this a a'f !"thich includes all the membera of
and candidates for membership to the Political and Organizational Bureaus)
has been dropped since that date. There were a great many personal conflicts
during the war, in some of which Stalin himself was actively involved - for
example, his skirmishes with Voroshilov in 1941-43; yet no matter how bitter
such conflicts become, thcrr did not lead to the ostracism of any one of the
members of the top staff. Even L:ekhliss, who was so violntly attacked in 1941-
1942, whose court-martial was demanded by the arry officers, has now been
fully restored to his former pre-tninent position within thq party, and is
a member of the Organizational Bur^au. Flo is no longer, however, head of
Political Guidance, since the latter post involves activity not within the
party but in the field of relations between the party-machine and the armor.
37. Of course, only Stalin personally could have so definitely put an end to all
the frictions of wartime, and even he could only have donna so by means. of
great. perseverance. For the first time in his history he had assumed the
role of an arbiter whose aim it is topreserve the unity of the ruling group.
There is only one possible interpretation of his conduct: Stalin is seriously
concerned in keeping and unifying the leading party workers who remain grouped
c er sov's death in April, 1945, made no change in the balance of power,
since he was r:n-.)Laced as secretary of the Moscow and Central Committees by
Georgia Pow one of Malenkov's most loyal meal. 1
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about him, and wishes to :Inatf.f. both in them and in all responsible party
38.
40.
gild: by party action, in other words, by Malenkovl* orders, he was removed
from his position Supreme Council, deprived of his title of President of the
Russian Soviet Republic, and appointed director of he beer trust. This was,
of course, done not only without a trial, but oven without the permission of
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workers in general the assurance that inter-party relations have been stabil-
ized, and that purges of the old type are no longer a possibility.
He has, of course, not given up his right to shift or even dismiss people at
will, but his recent conduct is a proui.se that such reprisals could be caused
by administrative considerations alone, and rmuld not exceed certain definite
limits. Very indicative from this point of view is the se of Alexei E.
Badayev, former deputy of the Fourth State Douma. A devoted Stalinist - they
have been personally acquainted since 1913 - Badayev after the trials of
1936-38 was appointee chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet
RepuL?l,ic and member oi'.the presidium of the Supreme Council of the USE, was
member of the Central Committee of the All huesian Communist. Party, and oc-
cupied a number of other honorary positions. In 1942 Badayev committed a
grievous fault: sent to outer Mongolia totake part in some sort of festivities,
Badayev not only acquired there a number of valuable "gifts", not only wen, in
for drunken bouts and debauches (they don't pay attention to such everyday
trifles" in the USSR any more), but permitted himself to speak disparagingly
in public of Stalin's diplomatic talents because of the latter's'pact with
Hitler. Such conduct on?aadayev's part was characteristic of the man; he
does not belong to the number of original thinkers, and if he pronounced
such opinions (even wt~-'n drunk) the inference must be that such opinions were
commonplace among the ruling clique.
That, of course, could hardly serve Badeyev as an excuse. lie was at 'once
recalled to Moscow, where the news of his adventures had been forwarded,
to answer for his crimes. But the punishment meted out to him was amaz:,u ].y
the Supreme Council, but what impressed the general public was not the infrac-
tion or the elementary laws of the constitution (advertised as "the most demo-
cratic in the world"), but the unusual mildness of the punishments for such
a crime a concentration camp, at the very least, was indicated, while here the
party did not even bother to take away the valuable presents from outer
tongolia... Yet even this penalty was soon softened; recently Badayev was
once more elected deputy of the Supreme Council of the tTSSIL, which is clearly
a step towards complete amnesty.
Such mildness can be properly interpreted only as an indication of the desire,
referred-to above, to create the impression that relationstetween the leaders
of the party have been stabilized, and that the days of ruthless reprisals
towards guilty party leaders are over. This policy is all the more character-
istic because it is being pursued against the background of unusually cruel
and unusually vide-Spread mass reprisals directed against the non-coenun..st
population literally millions of whom are being sent to Siberia and to the
north in general. These are actually the two sides of the same policy:
within the ruling elite of the country, in the ranks of the Communist pa~i:y
and especially at its top, the administration is trying to create unity by
means of a sort of amnesty, while merciless t error is being employed against
the popular masses.
41. The highest exponent of supreme power in the USSR before the war was the
political Bureau of the Central Con?.ittee of the 'All-kussian Communist Party.
Officially, according" to the Party's statutes, the Political IR reau is in
charge of the political work of the Communist Party. But since the latter,
as has been pointed out above, is the master of the whole USSR, in actual
practice the Political Bureau has not only been determining the country's general
policies, but has served as the highest court for the decision of all practical
questions of any importance as we The official government - the Council of
the People's Commissars - was composed of men appointed by the Political i3ureau
and Ties in fact only the executive organ vihich carried out the decisions of the
Political Bureau. The relation between the Political Bureau and the Council
may quite properly be compared to that between the owner of a private ontsrprise,
and the man whom he appoints as manager of tnat enterpr''e, with the only dif-
ference that this manager, liable to be cruelly punished for the least error,
has no contract which :sight guarantee t:im a minimum of r..ghts.
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42. Side by side with the Council of the People's Comndsnars, the executive unit
of the Political Bureau in the government of the state, existed the Organiza-
tiou,al Bureau of the Central Committee of the A11-Russian Communist party
which in practice was also an executive organ of the Political Bureau, but
this time in the party machine. Formally the Organizational Bureau was not
dependent on the Political Bureau, since it was elected at plenary sittings
of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party for the purpose
of "general guidance of she organizational werkr of the party, but In actual
practice it was completely subservient to the Political Bureau and directed
its work along channels prescribed by the latter.
43. Thus the political Bureau was the highest body in the country's go,6.3rnment,
but a body which was not recognized in the country's official constitution, and
Which therefore had to act as a power behind the throne. This was character-
istic of a basic contradiction in Soviet life: in actuality, all pcnier was
based on the r ecognition of the party's superiority over the state, but the
party was not willing to give this principle official recognition. The result-
ing ambiguity r,ay be illustrated by Stalin's perso:al position: until May 5,
1941s he occupied-no post whatever in the government of the state, held no
official ranks or titles, and was nonlyr Secretary General of the ruling party -
yet actually he was the real "boss" of the country (at that time that was what
the Russian communists called him among themselves), and one move of his finger
sufficed not only to remove any given People's Commissar, but to send him to
his death. In one way or another; this contradiction had to be resolved.
114. Shortly before Hitler's invasion of hussia, the situation underwent a change:
Stalin emerged from the wings to the center of the stage and, on May 5, 1941s
became chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars. -Luring the war he
was recognized as the sole dictator, but the war situation was a temporary .ono,
and the government machine was not altered in accordance with Stalin's new
role. This alteration is now taking place.
45. The present composition of the Political Bureau, confirmed by a plenum of the
Central Committee in March 1946, is interesting primarily because it emphasizds
Stalin's desire to stabilize the personal composition of the party's ruling
clique: all the members of the Political Bureau who had been in office between
1939-45 Have been re-elected, with the exception, of course, of the late
Shcherbakov. The changes made within the Bureau are insignificant ones: two
of the candidates Berya and 11alenkov - have been made active members; to
replace them, two new candidates, L'uloanin and Kosigin, have been elected.
Since the death of another member of the Political Bureau, M. A. Kalinin, the
Bureau is now composed of ten members: Stalin, .tolotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan,
Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdenov, Khrushcnov, ;soya and t.alenkov, and four candi-
dates for membership: Shvurnik, Voznesensky, Bulganir. and Kosiain. But the
distribution of work among these members of the Political Bureau is so differ-
ent from what it was before the war that the question arises what the functions
of the Political bureau are going to be in the nearest future.
46. The most notable change has taken place in the state government, more precisely
in the Council of the People's Com:iissars, now transformed into 'a Couna'l of
Ministers. The number of the latter has been materially increased: the cun-
stitution which was ratified in 1937 lists only 39 connissariats, while the
list presented by Stalin to the Supreme Council on March 19, 1946 named 53,
and several new ministries have been added since. Yet what this rapid increase
in the number of ministries shows is precisely that the men who head ,them will
play nopolitical role. At the moment, there is a special minister not only
for each branch of industry of any importance, but frequently for one industry
branch in one specific section only. The ministers are becoming more and
more similar to directors of large industrial trustp, except that they are
backed by, and may call upon, the state's powers of roppression.
47. Side by side with those technician-ministers,.Stalin has created a new category
of ministers: substitutes of the chairman. These are eight in all, fur of whom
are entrusted with special functions - Molotov, L.tikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovi.oh,
and four others, Berya, hridreev, KosiLin and Voroshilov, who have no definite
assignment. These eight men have only one thing in common: whey are all members
of or candidates for membership In, the Political Bureau. Under these c um-
ances, a fact at t ey have n, een appointed substitutes can mean only
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to pool_i_taca.. loadership, appears to have no des' ^e to restore them to leader..
shippn the arm. That is all over and done WW''n. It is interest ing to note
that a M .,:c Press, when it mcntiorw Voroshilov, does not refer to him as
"mare)hr~1n.
one things side by side with his technician-ministers. Stalin is creating
the office of politician- inietera. He is actually going to have two
councils of ministers: the multiple general cabinet (which includes up to
70. ministers alone) in which no questions of political importance will ever
be decided - and a smell political cabinet, which. will consist of ministers
who are also members of the Political Bureau.'
LB. There can be no doubt that this small cabinet will take over both part of
the questions which were previously referred to the Political Bureau, and
political surveillance over the work of the technician-ministers. Such
surveillance existed before as well; it was carried out in the past by mem-
bers of the Political Bureau, almost every one o.' whom was entrusted with
watching, a number of commissariats, whose ','cads had to submit reports to
them. Formerly, however, such surveillance was carried out extra-constitu-
tionally, behind the wings of the state+s legal procedure; now, while still
carried out by members of the Political B.ireau, it would be quite legal,
since they now would be substitutes of the chairman of the Council of Min-
isters and would be carrying out his instructions.
49. Thus relations will be normalized to a far greater degree than before.
Stalin is quite deliberately choosing this precise moment for alterations
in nomenclature, abolishing the Soviet of People's Commissars. around
which have formed associations with the frequent shifts of the revolutionary
epoch, and returning to the old term,. Council of Ministers, which is associated
in the public mind with ideas of stability. Stalin not only realizes himself
that he is making fundamental changes, he wants the whole world to realize it.
But one of the results of this normalization must be an appreciable curtail-
ment of the role of the Political Bureau. First of all there can be no doubt
that a considerable number of the problems which formerly were . decided by the Pol.Bu.
will now be settled in the Council of Ministers, either by Stalin personally,
or in a conference between him and his "substitutes".
50. Still more important is another point: Whereas before the members of the
Political Bureau who were entrusted with the surveillance of the activity of
various ministers previously held the status of equals, they will now be
acting as Stalin's assistants, at his instructions and within the limits of
the powers he may con er upon them. Stalin's extraordinary position has
now received legal shape within the Political Bureau as well.
51. Of even greater importance is the second group of changes, which concern rela-
tions between the government and the on the one hand, and between the
Party and the arrgyr on the other. has-been pointed out above that dug
the war was iese relations which presented the greatest danger to the
destinies of the "governing elite" of the Soviet state. During the war, the
specific gravity of the officers increased in every respect. They now include
dozens of marshals and several hundred generals, all of whom have rendered
great service in battle and are covered with military glory. All of them
are members of the Communist Party, but they are all rather backward in their
knowledge of Communist doctrine; there was good reason for the order, issued
to array organizations of the. ,ommunist Party as far back as 1943, not to in-
sist upon acquaintance with the foundations of the party program when accept-
ing now members or screening old ones.' Whatever data is obtainable of the
mental. attitude of this particular class leads one to believe that there is
no conscious opposition to the Soviet regime in their ranks, far less any or-
gan zed opposition. But there is among them a great deal both of dinzatisfac-
tion with the general state of things and dislike of the party machine,,
52. Those difficulties, so sharply defined at the beginning of the war, were not
resolved during its course. Their solution was one of thetusic taskb which
faced Stalin when he began to carry out his "reforms".
,.53.return to the past, to those days when the party ruled the army through
"political marshals" of the type of Voroshilov, is impossible. These marshals
failed in the role of generals, and the arm, with the experiences of the war
behind it, will never recognize their authority, even should Stalin make every
effort to bring them back into awry affaars. But it is clear that Stalin in-
tends to make no such attempt, and, having rest-red both Voroshilov and Budenr
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511. There is apparently no chance at least in the nearest future) of another
mass purge, of the type of 1936-38: the purges referred to were possible
only because Stalin than felt that he was safe, for the time being, from a
"great war", whereas right now, as all Soviet newspapers may testify, he is
preparing for just such awar. ' Under these circumstances he may, of course,
settle the hash of any given group of army officers, but will never under-
take a widespread purge.
55. Such being the case, Stalin was forced to seek a solution to his problem. in
? the only direction which remained open, that of an agreement with the new men-
ben of the argr officer staff. The available information regarding the new
ministry of the Armed Forces of USSR and its first measures permits one to
see along what lines Stalin expects,eucn an agreement to develop.
56. This new ministry, at the head of which, with the title of Minister of the
Armed For es of the USSR and at the same time that of commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, is Stalin himself, has been constructed by him as a most
powerful governmental center which is virtually isolated from the rest of the
administrative mechanism. Formerly there Seers two military comrrisei.riats,
that of Defense and that of the #'avy, whose heads were members of the Soviet
of People's Commissars and held the same status as all its other members.
Like the rest, they were subject to the general control. At the present time
the only link between the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the officers on the
one hand, and the government or. the other, is Stalin himself. Naturally,
under these circumstances there is no possibility of any outside interference
in military affairs.
57. This isolation will naturally increase, rather than decrease, the importance of
the armed forces and of their new ministry in the general life of the country.
As his substitutes, Stalin has named some of the best commanders produced ty-
the war (as, for example, the Marshals Vasilevs1gr and Zhukov). The powers of
the ministry are extraordinarily great. The.* act that Stalin personally takes
part in all its projects is sufficient guarantee that it will have unlimited
credit at its disposal. In his speech of February 23, 1946, Stalin emphasized
that the Red Azrry must ""ceaslessly and owiftly" develop military affairs and
improve the theoretical training of the officers. Of this one may be sure:
though the country as a mole should starve, the new ministry will have
enough means to form new armies containing millions of men. Under the cir-
cumstances there can be no doubt that the new ministris about to become a
now and important. center of executive power .mantlcountry If the l Bureau is sue a center in the p y machine, and the Council of Minis-
ters in the state mechanism, the Commander--in-Chief and the Minister of the
Armed Forces of the USSR in conference with his substitutes mill certainly
form another such center in the mechanism of the army.
58. The unlimited possibilities of military construction, which would enable the
army officers to satisfy their professional ambitions by providing tine oppor-
tunity for a swift and brilliant military career, are the bait with which
Stalin hopes to lure over to his side the more ambitious amongthe officers.
59. Stalin is willing to go quite far to meet these awry groups halfrwayp the new
military code, recently published in the Soviet Press (and expounded in the
New York Times on June 20, 1946) shows that Stalin intends to assist certain
groups of Soviet officers in their. desire to attain a stable and of.Ucialized
privileged position. Thus, the code introduces officers' honor courts an
Institution once highly developed in the armies of monarc l esZwhere it used
to be one of the most important factors for breeding an anti-popular, narrow
caste attitude among the officer class. This measure is quite in ki ping with
others (the re-Introduction of orderlies, the prohibition to officers to carry
large packages in the street, etc.) ti4iich Stalin introduced in 1942?h3. Lr.
Stalin is consciously tryinS to build up the "red officers" into a specially
privileged group within the new Soviet elite. This side of Stalin's "reformingn
activities in the azir is all the more important because it fits in with his
general policy of stabilizing the new Soviet elite. ;,kilo affirming the Son -
oral privileged position in the country of the ruling class as a whole, Stalin
is also marking out within this class a specially privileged order of persons
and groups who are of particular importance to him in governing the country.
SECrn .r
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 rs? substitute In a inistry of the Armed Forces, Stalin has chosen Bulganin,
who'has been entrusted with "'g neral business", which means primarily party
political work in the array. Sitaultaneously Bulganin, who is a candidate for
membership in the Political Bureau, has been also elected to the Gc{;anizational
Bureau, where he has been placed at the head of that department of the central
party machine which will direct party work in the an V (this departmentnsas
previously known as Political Guidance of the Red Anir; it is not known exactly
ithat it is called today). Thus Bulganin possesses full powers for the work
he is doing, both along governmental and party lines. The extraordinary ap-
proval which Stalin has shown to Bulgani.n is guarantee enough that the latter
will be completely independent of any other influence; no matter what policy
he should pursue it will, essentially, be Stalin's policy, and will therefore
necessarily be coordinated with Stalin's general effort to create a sharply
delineated privileged caste of "red officers'".
63. Stalin has carried out especially complex measures in reorganizing the Organiza-
tional Bureau of the Central Comrittee of the All-Russian Communist Jearty -
that dep.rtmcnt which directs the whole activity of the party machine. In
Warch 194E the Organizational Bureau was rebuilt completely, which involved
not only zadicnl changes in its staff, but an alteration of the very principles
of its organization. It would be possible to bring out the full significance
of these measures only by means of a detailed comparison of the biographical
data of the new members of the Bureau and of their previous functions in the
party machine. This would require a considerable digression. Hovevnr, a basic
outline of the meaning of these innovauions may be indicated without. such de-
tailed analysis.
60. Reports of the new military code contain an indication of what Stalin ex-
poets to get from the new privileged officer class in return for its privi.-
legea: the code introduces far severer, discipline in the army, and fixes
increased penalties for the loss or damage to aims and military equipment
?.. for which single persons or detachments are responsible. The officers are
expected to assist the government more effectively than before in holding
the armed forces of the country in complete subjection.
61. The materials available at the present moment are insufficient to allow one
to judge just how Stalin is going to resolve the second half of the army
problem, namely, the relationship between the argr.and the party. All his
recent statements, without exception, indicate that no is not in the least
inclined to limit the role of the party as a gigantic mechanism for influenc-
ing the hinds of the population. But there can already be no doubt that for
the officers, who are being formed into a special privileged caste, some sort
of adjustment will be made within the party, which will permit them both to
remain party members axi.to hold courts of honor.
62. :`easures which are now being carried out seem to indicate that party organza-
e general party machine. is is attested to by the o ng acs: -as -hie
64.
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13-
The Organizational L-ixeau, as prescribed by the last conference befo.'c the wgr
(Larch, 1941) was actually a.sub-section of the Political Bureau, to which
organizational work was assigned: of its nine members, seven, in other words
77.8, were members of and candidates for membership in the Political Bureau.
Now the picture is quite- different: vdhile the total number of its members has
been increased to 15, the numb::r of members of the Political Bureau on its
staff has been cut down to four, which represents only 26.7,%' of the total.
Of equal. importance is another point: in 1941 t!,;: ,aaority (five) of its mers-
bers were "old Bolsheviks", who had joined the Con.,,uist movement dur:Lng its
underground period; moreover, all five wore members of the Political Uureau,
in other words men of considerable importance. Of the fifteen members of the
present-day Organizational Bureau only 2 (13.3%)belong to the category of
',Old lien". . All the rest are yoiu er men, who joined the party durin,; the
period of revolution; moreover, the overwhelming majority of those - in fact,
all but two: Bulganin and L;ekhliss, both of whom have already been mentioned-
belong to the category of party workers, and have been maneuvered into their
present positions by iAalenkov.
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65. The present-day composition of the Organizational bureau would seem to indicate
complete victory on the part of Izalenkov, who has staffed it for the most part
with his own candidates. Moreover, 1:Ialenkov himself has risen in party ranks.
in the list of the members both of the Organizational Bureau and of the Secre-
tariat of the Central CConnittee his name follows immediately upon Stalin's,
which means that he 3.n in fact the first secretary of the party. Yet it is
certain that IAlenkov is not pleased by his victory: at the same time he has
been relieved of all his duties in the government of the state. During the
war he was Stalin's substitute both in the Council of the People's Commissars
and in the Committee for Defense, he was almost a dictator in the field or
production of military aircraft, and so on. Now he has bean removed from all
those positions, and transferred exclusively to work within the party. There
canoe no doubt that this was done under the pretext that there was a need
on the part of all available forces to specialize and concentrate on party
work;. but neither can there be ar r doubt that- this marks the end of Stalin's
remarkable favoritism of Malenkov which began just before the war and lasted
during its early years. Now Malenkov is no longer the man closest to Stalin,
but merely one of his four or five closest collaborators.
66. tesides, coven in the Organizational Bureau Llalenkov'a victory is not as far-
reaching as might appear at first glance. One of the members both of the
Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat is Zhdanov, that same Zhdanov
whom IGalenkov had worked so hard during the rar to oust from the Central Com-
mittee. True, Zhdanov has not been restored to his former position of head
of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, which he had occupied until
late in 19i41 or early in 1942 (that most important post is firmly held by
Georgii F. Aleksandrov, one of Lialenkov's closest assistants.) True, Zhdanov
is only the second secretary of the Central Committee, which for him, who has
r-served in the Secretariat since 1934, is a direct demotion. Nevertheless, he
will be the second fully-empowered member of the Political Bureau to servo on
the Organizational Bureau, another man who will be constantly taking part in
the current work of the very center of the party, machine, who will be informed
of all its details and will have the right to know all its innermost secrets.
From his experience of former years, Malenkov understands clearly the signifi-
cance of Zhdanov's appointment: he will have at his side an onemy who is going
to watch him, collect materialcbout him, and report to Stalin on his activi-
ties. The function which in the past '.;Ealenkov himself has so often exercised
in regard to ethers will not be exercised by Zhdanov in regard to Ealenkov
himsela?.
67. Another circumstance must be noted in this connection: Mekhliss, who seemed
to have been ousted from the center of the party machine for good, has once
again been made a member of the Organizational Bureau. This not only repre-
sents Stalin's departure from the campaign of ''current anti-semiti.sm" which
was carried on in recent years by Malenkov and Shcherbakov, but means also
that among Llalenkov's closest collaborators there will be one more watchful
enemy.
68. It will be seen that Ilalenkov's 'victory" even r:ithin the party machine is
not without important reservations. Actually, the chief, if not the only,
victor in the struggle for power in the party machine which ialenkov has been
waking all through the tar is Stalin himself. It is his position whir.;, has
been strengthened: in the ,ow Organizational Bureau he is oven more cnmplotaly
"boss'r than he used to be in the old.
69. It is possible now to formulate conclusions. The two main lines of antagonism
which were formed during the war in the government and party mechanisms have
been utilized by Stalin to ^ive shape and stability to his pcrscnal dictator-
ship. Instead of two organs of executive power, he now has three, each of
which appears to have extensive powers. All contradictions between them, all
frictions are now resolved by Stalin' s,, personal authority. He alone correlates
the activities of these three organizations.
SECRET
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70. The political Bureau must certainly, both in form and in fact, lose a great
part of its former importance. Of the fourteen men (members and candidates
for membership) who now compose it, eight are Stalin's official assistants
in the government of the state, one is his assistant in the Ministry of the
Armed Forces, and two in the party machine. Cnl,,y two of the members of
the Political Bureau do not hold officially the, position of Stalin's assist-
ants, ?11"hitr are Shvernik, the new npresidentu of the U; SR, and Iihrushchev,
the "viceroy" of the Political Bureau in the Ukraine.
?1. The Political Bureau will not, of course, go out of existence, and in all
probability there will be no formal- changes made in its activities in the
nearaut future (Stalin is always extremely cautious in such matters.) But
there can hardly be any doubt of the fact that its influence has entered
upon a period of'decline. It may be expected to: progress further along that
line, degenerating gradually into a conference between Stalin and his closost
assistants in all the basic branches of the state goveznent.
72. Un&r these conditions, an increasingly important role will undoubtedly be
played by Stalin's personal secretariat which will have to collect material
relating both to the coordination o e three organs of executive power
mentioned above, and to the preparation of central changes, both of a struc-
tural and personal charactdr. There are already signs of such a growth. At
the head of Stalin's personal secretariat at the present moment is Aleksandr
Nikolaievich Poskrebishev (b. 1891) 'rho is a member-of the Central Coiw ittee
of the A11-4tussian Comm mist Party. It is characteristic of Stalin to have
engaged for this position not a representative of 'Ithe young", like Mnlenkov,
but an "old man" and former underground worker, though with a rather brief
record of such work. Stalin is insistently pushing him to. the foregrounds
he has not only been elected to the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet
Republic, but has been placed at the head of the Council's Legislative Com-
mission and made a member of the constitutional Editing Committee.
73. It is clear that the new state of development upon which the USSR entered
in the moment when Stalin officially took the reins of government in his
hands, is far from having reached its completion. It is i tossibl& o far
to predict the concrete forms which it may take i*i the future. But the
direction of this nei development is now clears it. is progressing towa:rus
the ever-greater strengthening of Stalin' a'peraonal regime. The preparation
for war as a concrete possibility (and that this is being done may be seen
from the highly instructive theoretical articles which determine the whole
character of party rxor::uanda),must further and hurry development in that
very directions in Stalin's opinion, in order to win a rar, the country needs,
first and foremost, complete unity of power which nothing and no one can
disturb.
S.,=M.
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