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SOVIET PROPAGANDA VULNERBILITIES AND SECURITY FORCES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 2, 2011
Sequence Number: 
303
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 22, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2.pdf140.02 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2 - PLACE ACQUIRED DATE ACQUIRED CLASSIFICATION L?RITY T2)r,CPivGksE~4~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT INFORMATION REPORT CD Soviet Propaganda Vulnerabilities and Security Forces DATE DISTR. c'i.D Dec 1952 NO. OF PAGES ,3 NO. OF ENCLS. )LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 4 THIS !S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 50X1-HUM Ihe biggest thews is land reform. .Alth,~u4h tho aclleotivea sbould be liquidated, there should be cooperatives or art'le for apcola:ised purposes, including the operation of maohiaa-tractor stations. he people wcrild not favor any return to the prerevolutionary eystem of landlordism. Workers should be given their fantQ:i.e, as well as peawants their land. The ex- perlenoea of the Sovitts in Qerman- ocu~ied territory served to confirm Soviet toptrustsaBlikesKrvpappiandiFarben viet were driver as hardias before. A mixed soonoq should be auvocated, with small industry and trade in a private sector, urban utilities unher city man4dessert and large industry atste.owned, Perhaps AAtional tra:;s unioua could be permitted to owz plants. Propaganda ?1' :d avoid abstraction; be nraetiaal. Ca:tnut ahrnilA ba kiuvlea to psrsaaa: fraedom (evoboda). Co:ma.niim csiu..' be supported, but Ate original aims tainshoulthesed be WWoorkkersii~ Pea"nts' Goverment,tad as s fraAh effort to ob- dhronologioally, the first thing to do would be to inform the Armed Foroes of the existence of an Army or population publicity ou and for its missions or goals. Po1 allyre the Russia. objective Then would bd e faRu.eianPedeat.. tion, with minority nationalities accorded a wie measure of sutunosar. Propaganda should :te `greuiive. It should strike at the falsehood of Soviet pre- tensions such ai happiness on the collective farm. it should unm*ak every Soviet propaganda trick ac it appears. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2 Sl:~i+R i?/.SECUn IT.Y ii; l?:!~"' - / n,J{1 mite - 2 - The people should be told how to meet ariv :n liberation forces, and what they can expert from them. Individuals should be infiltrated into the country. Then leaflets 50X1-HUM could be sent into them at agreed drop points. Some live without passports in the villages now. In the chaos of wartime, it would be easy. A stranger would be well received, if he came with friendly intentions, It is important that such propaganda emissaries bo supplied with pieces of paper. The simple Russian or Ukrainian places credence in what he sees in print, rather than in what he hears. Further, it will be well for the propagandist to obtain signatures from supporters and send them out of the country. This will go far to ensure loyalty. Other media should not be neg~ected. wrizie ~nere is placements come in all the time, and men accompany supplies reachingltheefront. Tactical propaganda would be useful if the Soviet forces were being beaten. In addition to delivering leaflets by artillery and mortar fire, it may be desirable to withdraw slightly over ground well strewn with propaganda. In general, it takes about two hours for a fLrst-clais rumor to co rrnm nnu &"A50X1-HUM to the other .,f a ~..: , ..,- ? . _ .-- - - Women at by the troops at the from, through "gifts to the Front" taok- B r y * ,he local Voyenhomats. These were not censored in World War IT, for fear of theft by the censors, and could contain leaflets. The position of women in Soviet society is not such to to preclude their baying political influence. Any normal man is influenced by some woman. In spreading propaganda to the arme es, nurses could play an im- portnnt part. They enjoy high prestige and wide freedom, but the use of camp followers would be bad for the influence of the movement. For a city of 20,000 there might be 50 MVD for police duty. Kirovogr d, with 100,000, bad 400, plus some reserves in civilian jobs. In addition, Comminist Party members are authorised to carry area, and do so. The MVD has been reduced to the level of ordfi y pol,i;,s, a xsrge units, with military organisation and heavy arms, are now 10B. These units run up to a regiment in eise. This is the strength of the li1B at Ktev a pity of over 500 000. The headquarters of this re n+ is at No 8, Kirov Street, MOB Convoy Units and prison guards add to this total. There are usually 40 guards on a prison train. Ir, an oblast' there migh t be a reserve 00' siaurity forces of 500-600 awn, or sad as a battalian sa normally statiot>?d i:s or sear the obia^t~ oente~ SECRET/BECURITX INFORMATION Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2 sJf Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08 CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2 SECRET/SECURITY IN14FORMAT_ ION 50X1-HUM -3- Scattered around to -l ft 'U. V1biuA V70UIU oe 'Im guard separate points , there would be a cen- 50X1-HUM tral reserve of any considerable size; the Government would not keep many troops idle. a recent Army manual on guard duty, and it srrcifies that a guard re iment50X1-HUM g may e n several places. Companies will he responsible for the guard of certain points for 24 hours. Each man stands guard eight hours in 24, in shifts of two hours on and two hours off. Following a 24-hour period of guard duty, a company has 24 hours of rest. The third day of the cycle is devoted to training. There are four companies in an kGB battalion. The fourth battalion is often incomplete and serves as a training battalion. - end - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030303-2