RELATIONS BETWEEN MALENKOV, NOLOTOV, BERIA, AND KAGANOVICH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040275-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 275
• Publication Date: July 21, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/21: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600040275-3
ICATION SECRET/SECURITY m p---T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
a dFORMATION RE["ORT F
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SUBJECT Reletii-ns betwarn Malenkov, kolotov,
Berta, and Kaganovich
ATL DISTR. Jul a
NO. OF PAGES 2
DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE
DATE OF INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
1. Aft?ej Ilie end of World War II, Malenkov was personally entrusted by Stalin rritb re pcus1.?
bility for the complete obliteration of Ge::man industry, war centers, and the like.
Malenlrov ajxcified what was to be dismantled, What was to bq blown up, what was to be i?e-
paired_ what was to be sent to time USSR; in the case of reparations shipments, he decided
inchi .tistr:.t.at~?n in the USSR down to individual factories and rayon centers.
2. During the same period, Kaganovich was made responsible for rehabilitating the deetroyed
economy of the USSR and for the construction of new plants, factories, barracks, min a,
dwellings, etc. Kaganovich, in addition, had charge of all the construction materials of
the USSR. For this huge construction program, Kagenovich needed special equipment,
machinery, etc, in particular, excavators. To obtain them, Kagenovich commandeered
dozens of Srvie.. _ivil engineers and technicians in Germany. .The equipment and necessary
e;,,..'vators were found by the technicians and asseubled for shipment to the USSR.
3. Beiia, as chief of the large econ is empire operated by the MVD, was in great need of
construction equipment. He ordered his subordinates in Germany to expropriate all the
equipment from Kage4noviches technicians and to dispatch it to certain addresses which
dzc.ar d, He gave orders to arrest immediately She technicians and transport workers
under ICaganovich s control if they attempted to offer resistance.
4. The conflict between Berta and Kaganovich was passed on to MalenI.-v for his investigation
and decision. lenkov eunporteii Perl to the -rc t.es =Ttent
y,:.ncv1ch was unable to fulfill the construction plans established. by the Govern ant,
in spite of hundreds of thousands of rubles spent on the dismantling operation in Germany.
I had an insight into these developments because the regiment of Colonel Ilorosov, which
was part of s unit, vas engaged in the dismantlement and shipment of a pmcnt on the
instructicnaa of an agent of K*ganovich.
5. In 1947, after Molotov's return frog Paris following the fruitless conference concerning
the Marshall Plan, Molotov urged countermea,srwes against the Allies Rnd proposed the
establishment of a Berlin blockade. 'L'is was ve,'-nt=._ ie?.o._
a.v isiwe wit enLTUfFOG to
1falenkov for consideration. Upon the initiative of Molotov and aith the 64,po t of !leleraov,
CLASSIFICATIONS RsrfS TJRI r IMMOV3 IO!
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Mm//SBCUR ,?hq INTO.
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the blockade was established.
6. As evident from these two exmpleo, the relations between lialenkov, Molotov, and Beria
during 1945 to 1948 were distinguished by mutual friendship and support. I an inclined
to believe that the current successors of Stalin not only Will not carry on a struggle
among themselves for. power and that not only should a ps;Lace revolution in the Kremlin
not be expected, but just the opposite.
putting their boase in the- full They we shadb]y consolidating their power and
order necessary to them.
7. As for the disappearance from the horizon of po v or the
oth asev,
the former minis+.r of the MM, this is a vie o~ for who cider of
Beria, p
idered both as
Beria, ersonal uses. *Llakaav, in the nom of friee and b a consa certain of
save in to the latter. This attack upon certain personalities should be ccon-
d nothing more than A slight peck. The triumv.sats is gently
out Of ]3er#,a. Opponents, who, during the lifetime of Ste-l,in ~~ the teeth
out of certain Thus, the situation has nothing ' night have rev, l
or a struggle in the KjaNj. . cosmon w with h a palace ace revolut
ution
8. We know from experience that Stalin in his tide destroyed a
who bad influence upon the goat and nation and nonaloteperm do cc red. Ts
present actions with respect to Posialob trivial. occurred. The
point of view, it is at present worthlesto soucuul Peate about an others are
m
n es of opinion
betwee'.i the h ].in leaders, and especially about a speculate
struggle e o or palAcaL~cif a differences of
a
revolution.
.
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the blockade was established.
6. As evident frost these two examples, the relations between B(alenkov, b6olotov, and Beria
during 1945 to 1948 were diet Wxtwa to believe that the current succcceos of Stalin not w support. I a inclined
among themselves for. power and that not o should only u no
nly tarry in a strem14n
not be expected, but just the apposite. '1' are ai mbace-revnlution in the Power
ng power and
Putting their house in the full order necessary consolldat their
them.
to tlae7. As for the disappearance Prod the horizon of pos ebyahev or the demotion of thrsonale of , this is a vic ry`for Berta, who considered botthasev,
in the rte's of friendship and because of a certain we of
Beria, gave in to the latter. This attack upon certutn personalities should be con-
sidered nothing more than a slight pack. The triumvirate is
outtt of o certain opnts, who, ding the lifetime of Stalin, mgmrtly knocking the t9eth
ight ha ~~
te Out
Barls- Thus, the or a struggle in the Ijadin.
situation has nothing in coon with a palace revolution
8. we know from experience that Stalin in his tiab destro d a p
who had influence upon the, Snit and nation and no e palacerirevol. group of rred. Th
Present actions with respect Of view at to poskrebyshev, Ignatiev and others are trivial.' Fran mW
bointen the ' present woa'thles8 to speculate_ about differences of Rraeatin leaders, and especially about a e utio
toggle or palace revolution.
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