POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050342-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 25, 2011
Sequence Number: 
342
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 17, 1954
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050342-7.pdf98.31 KB
Body: 
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050342-7 COUNTRY Rungary GENTRAL 1NTECLIGENCE AGENCY IIdEORMATION REI'QRT CLASSIFICATION? CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT Possible Soviet Military Strategy PLACE ACQUIRED DAl E ACQUIRED NO. OF ENGLS. tUSTED'9ELOW1 25X1 25X1 THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 3. During World star iI ~rhen Soviet,forces defended the Tranacarpathi~'n Oblast, they learned that German armies had difficulty in penetrating the larger eaterahed areas of the Podkarpataka Rus sector: Soviet artillery was heavily concentrated in the Podkarpatska Rue passes. Tne majority of the gun emplacements and heavy gone xere trained toTanrds the Hest, prom leteona gained in xarfare during Korld liar II, Soviet strategists decided in 1951 that very few large guns were needed to defend this ;area from Bcstera invasion. They recalled that during Borid Bar II, ffere~aa forces en?aged in the Podkarpatska Sus region had to bypus these passes (thsz is, penetrate the TJkraine proper by going, to tlu right and the Left of that region). ~? ~ '-951, Soviet engineers (according to Hungarian escapees) or>ilered the removal of soe~e artillery, but by and late instructed the Soviet ailitary eo~tadera to turn the gun ee~pLcements srouad and ea+umt the gone facing t>be southeast and northwest. Gl.ASSIFICl1T10N ~~~' 1 ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050342-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050342-7 According to ,the Hungarian soldiers who escaped from the area, the remounting of penetration by Western ground forces. ~ ? 25X1 ac r f possible significance xas xhat general Soviet s'trate mi it be is the -event another war developed in Europe. Several Hunga-riaas by virtue of hasociatioa and conversation xith?Soviet infantry o cers a e isted ~ e3 th..,r, oo~sibility of wm~ld Wnr TiT; On the hams of such coa- versaynumber of the Hungarian soldiers were of the same opinion. Some of these opinions are:. The Soviet armed fences have very little regard for the military capabilities, of?such Satellites ns Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. The Soviets will not try. to defend their Satellitss in central Europe, according to these people. The Soviets state that they don't xsat to make the same mistake Hitler did by extending his supply lines for extensive distances. , gr , xoul D. Eorapeyoalyeif euchset~a?eteats xerefdefinitely profitab d fight in central le. The escapees.: add flat the. Soviets' real line of defense against Western forces 1a.Europe xould include a liae.set up from:Riga to Odessa. The USSR official personnel referred to it as.the Riga-Odessa line.. 252 37M 223.2 N(MC) 25X1. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000600050342-7