TRANSPORTATION, SUPPLY AND REPAIR ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET ARMY UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600060044-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: May 27, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT
CLASSIFICATION GONFE t}ENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE
1. The "Til" (rear Grea or communications zone) was the weakest part of the
Soviet Army. The Soviet Government would not inform the Army General
Staff exactly whether the "Til" organization should be based on the use
of horses or of trucks. Naturally the "zveno" (supply circle) varies
in length depending upon the means of transportation and also differs
in number of supply points. For exataple, if horses were utilized, shorter
distances would be covered and the tray might have to employ army, divisional,
and regimental points. On the other hand, if trucks were employed, the
distance would, of course, be greater and perhaps there would be only army
and regimental points. The Government claimed, of coarse, that sufficient
trucks would be available. The Army General Staff when it xae under Marshal
Tukhaohevsky prior to his execution in 198? was superior to t..a staff aioh
followed later and the earlier staff know that the above question was a
major problem. The most recent manual which had been published on supply
transportation (Nastavlenie po Ustroistvu i Sluzhbe Tile) was published
in 1929. It was, therefore, out of date, as in that year the Soviet Army
consisted basically only of infantry, artillery, and cavalry azi moreover
had no trucks. Major (fnu) Va anov was a senior instructor on "Til"
matters at the Frunze Nilitarv Academy in Moscow. In 1935 or 1936 the
major wrote a good compromise textbook (uohebnik). It was utilised in
the military academies and the military schools. This textbook gave sesaral
possible solutions to "Til" problems. Incidentally. Vaganov was arrested
in 1937 but was released in January 1940, returned to Frunze, and was
promoted to the rank of colonel.
..Si Fin. T.ON CONFIDPENTL'.
Transportation, Supply and Repair
Activities of the Soviet Army under
Combat Conditions
NO. OF ENCLS.
MISIED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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2. The rough sketch below indicates one method of organising supply
circles as tar as distance was concerned. This presupposes that
horses are utilized.
Regiment ,,-- Division Army
t------ 12-15 ka -------y 4---7-305kn--------i k----3o km----------i
(one round (one trip one way (one trip one
trip per day) per day) way per day)
3. The following rough sketch indicates organization of supply circles if
trucks are utilized.
"Zveni" - using trucks
-------------------i
(one round trip per day - (one round trip per day)
distance is lest if
regimental transport is
based on horses)
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4. The
esfoll moat ughhisketch indicates the of supply circles by the and s use
of both trucks and horses. This system takes intodaccunt thhe poor
Soviet roads and the lack of trucks, which was certainly true in
the early 1940's at least.
If the railroads are near, then one might not use the army "zveno".
If troops advance PirCher from the railroad, one can then begin to
use the army supply circle and expand its length up to 60 km. If,
during the advance. horses had been used to such an extenttbeosuse
of poor roads that they were very tired and then the units reached
an area of be1ter roads, one could move the trucks up to the divisional
"zveno" and rest the horses. However, the Soviet Government said
"no" to such a solution because it assumed as a certainty that the
USSR would have trucks at its disposal and would be fighting on enemy
territory where the roads were better.
6. The following nay give an example of the problems faced in regard to
the "Tit". In July 1941, three new Soviet armies were formed in Moscow.
One of these was given 300 trucks for each of the six infantry divisions
which were included in the army. One hundred of each 300 trucks were
21 ton vehicles. The other 200 were 1j ton truck., which were the
basin Soviet army trucks. Out of the 300 trucks, only about 30 or 35
were three axle vehicles, (similar to the OS 2* ton 6 x 6 truck). The
three axle trucks were utilized only for the purpose of pulling
artillery pieces. Mien the army moved forward to Smolensk, it still
had to obtain its supplies from Moscow, which was 320 km away, one way.
Is s r c.,;;lt, thoro ware not enough 0r-auai. e.eu Lhuuejt the army was not
in combat at that time and the divisions initially numbered only 7,6000
men each. On 1 Sep 41 the divisions became lOj thousand men each and
the number of trucks became even less adequate. Staff ears were normal
passenger vehicles, which had been rubbed with dirt to make then less
oonspicious. There were 30 staff cars per division and this was quite
adquate. Each division had 150 or 200 bicycles to be used for
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reoonnalaanoe and by messengers. Initially, no horses were provided.
However, in September 1941, all the required hence were obtained.
At this time the regimental "zveno" became based on horses and the
army "zveno" on trucks. 1'hie was a prrotioal organization. However,
it should be pointed out that although the army had 100% of the horses
it needed, it had only 50% of the required wagons (pavoski), only 25%
of the needed harness, and 0% saddles. Obviously, only 25% of the
horses could be used. The army was suffering from these disadvantages
when in October 1941 the Germanc attacked. The attack destroyed the
army, and only one half of a division and the army staff escaped. All
the rest were encircled and captured. The army was later reformed
from new personnel.
6. It should be remembered that supply system characteristics of the
Soviet Army will differ greatly for operations on Soviet and polish
soil, or for operations in Western Europe. In the USSR. the supply
system would use railroads to a great extent and would utilize them
as close to the front as possible. It would have to use horses
because of lank of roads. Regimental supply must be hcrse drawn
in that country if mobility is desired at all times of the year.
Otherwise. snow and rain would stall military units. It should be
recalled that there are roughly 15 good motor roads, with the
ncoessary bridges, in a country like West Germany for one road in
the USSR. If one attempted to use trucks for regimental supply then
one should use the lightest possible trucks (one ten) and ones
''aving good passability characteristics. Trucks larger than 2 tons
should not be used.
7. In regard to the question of repair facilities, only artillery repair
shops were fairly well organized it the Soviet Army. These were
located near army artillery dumps.
8. As become apparent from my acoount,above,~about the experiences of
one of the Soviet armies formed in Moscow, the period June 1941
June 1942 was one of improvisation. Horses were utilized more
extensively in the south than near Moscow. Nowhere were there to
be found more than the two "zveni", one for army and one for regiment.
Military operations in the Ukraine utilized horses for both "evens".
Therefore, troops could not very well operate further than from
37 to 40 km away from a railway lines 25 ka would be the length
of an slay :apply circle and 12 ka for the regimental. As can be
seen, therefore, the 430 thousand trucks provided by the US as
Lend-Lease material were absolutely vital to Soviet military
operations.
9. There were no supply dumps (skladi) in division. There were only
supply dumps in army and regiment. Duving most of World War II
there wore no corpc in the Soviet Arr. A regiment received only
what it would consume during one or two days or what it would need
in combat.
10. Basically then, all supply operations in the Soviet Army during
World War II were improvised in an attempt to adjust to early
defeats, lack of equipment, lack of planning, and the course of
the war. For example, the Germans had air superiority in 1941 and
1942. Therefore, each army had several dumps located at various
railway stations instead or just one army dunW. Sack service also
had its own dumps, for dispersal purposes. There was some consolida-
tion of supply dumps toward the and of.World War II because the
German Air Force was less feared. Usually an a would deliver
mip lies direct to a regiment. Later, hcmerer, "MP" was
quite often used. ? "DD!" (Divisiomi Obmsmi runts) was a
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divisional .upply esubaage point. It was located in a rear arr
of a division *ere army would deliver supplies cad the various
regiments wo:nld pick up the supplies. earlier In World War II
an asap did not have its awn trucks and merely delivered supplies
.to the nearest railway station, where divisional trucks would pick
.up the material and deliver it to rogiaenttal supply pointsf as
the division did not have its awn supply dumps. Lster amp took
over the trucks from divisions. This was, a bettir distribution'
of vskiAes.Otherwise, if it were necessary to transfer a division
from one amp to another, it would require the use of too large a
naber of railway oars. In the U 8R, operations depend very ankh
on the use of railways. The Soviet Amy depends extensively an
quick repair of demaied railway lines and is experienced in this
type of woik.
242 N
.
243, N
246 N
247 N
249 N
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