ECONOMIC - CEMENT INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600140174-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 174
• Publication Date: June 23, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY
SUBJECT
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REPORT
CO NO.
DATE DIST.3 Jun 1951
NO. OF PAGES 7
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
The shorta?e of cement is continunna in the USSR. and the consumtion of
cement uas been strictly controlled by the State Planning Committee. To ob-
tain an extra carload or cement, plant directors often violate rules by ex-
changing for it products of their plants or other critical materia;.a of which
they happen to have a surplus. Kolkhozes are almost completely deprived of
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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by a mixture of clay, lime, and stray. The construction of small, primitive
ray materials from different localities, including the Donbass, Moscow, and
fora cement plant of a 250,004-barrel capacity and of manufacturing the
As the extensive construction in the USSR required more and more mate-
risAe, the government decided to create a separate All-Union People'u C4x mis-
sariat of Construction Materials Industry and L. A. Sosnin was appointed
head of the new commissariat. One of the main administrations of this l3omnis-
sariat, the "GJ.avtsement" (Main Administration of Cement Industry), became the
top authority for the entire cement industry of the USSR, with the exception
of sme.il cement plants which remained u;.ider the jurisdiction of the People's
Commissariats of Construction Materials in various republics. The new com-
missariat was extended every possible assistance by the government, as the
shortage of construction materials was seriously delaying the completion of
numerous construction projects. To increase cement production, an extensive
plan was put into force for the reconstruction of existing plants and con-
struction of new ones. The following plants verer.econstructed and consi&
erably enlarged: two Novorossiysk plants, "Krasnyy Oktyabr "' Plant in Moscow
Oblast, "Gigant" Plant, Georgian plant, near Tbiiiei, two Donbass plants,
Po9a.'ssk plant, and Leningrad plant. Neely built plants were the Dneprodzer-
zhinsk plant, Far Eastern plant, and Karaganda plant.
Construction and expansion of cement plants depended on the proximity of
large-scale construction areas: the Moscow industrial region, Donbass region,
Ukrainian region (including Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Dneproatroy), Lenin-
grad, and the Par Eastern region. Not all of'these locations provided good
raw materials for the cement industry, but the location of new cement plants
near main construction areas relieved the railroads of excessive cement trans-
port.
Reorganization and expansion of existing plants, as well as construction
of new plants, were carried out partly by equipping the plants with machinery
manufactured by the "Uralmash" and Kramatorsk plants. These two plants sup-
plied. gears arri rips for the kilns and grinders, screens, small redactors, and
ki1K.71 of smaller capacity. Larger machines, i.e., large redactors, large
grlvders, and kilns, were purchased in Germany and partly in Japan. As a re-
sult of these efforts; the USSR cement industry produced in 1939 about 7 millieu
tons of cement, as COmp4I'eQ M1LU 4 L14L'.11V11 i.Ulitf in 1j2j. $Uwevc, vi- .i=r%: of-.v?+
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d#~'
of cement plants was considerably delayed owing to an
cavators and of locomotives and care for '[Barrow-gauge railroads serving the
quarries, and the shortage of measuring instruments, including pyrometers,
thermocouples, and electrical measuring instruments.
The war and the German occupation of the western USSR seriously affected
cement production. It was quite impossible to evacuate the bulky equipment
of the existing cement plants, especially the kilns. On the other hand, it was
impossible to build new plants for lack of equipment. Many plants were de"
sitre;rye8 by the retreating Soviet Army and the country lost a large number of
important cement plants: Dneprodzerzhinsk pla:.tt, Donbass plants, Belorussian
plant, Leningrad plant, and Podol'ak plant. The largest plants in Novoros-
siysk were badly damaged during the battles of 1942-43. As a result,'the
postwar production of cement dropped to 2.5 million tons a year, whereas
enormous quantities of cement were required to repair the extensive damage
and to begin new construction in areas which had been occupied by the Germans.
Consequently, it was decided to begin the restoration of damaged cement plants
immediately and to equip them with machinery dismantled in Germany. The
fighting was still going on near Berlin when dismantling of cement machinery
and exporting-it to USSR had begun in Breslau and other cities of Silesia.
P. F. Lopukhov, director of "Glavtsement," more than half of all the
directors of cement plants, and engineers specializing in cement were sent to
Germany to supervise the dismantling and shipping of the equipment to the USSR.
In addition, Director 'jur'ye of the Institute of Cement Industry and almost
all of the institute's personnel were sent to Germany to assist in the task.
To ensure effective technical supervision, a concession was made to the
Ministry of Construction Materials Industry to send more persons to Germany
than was permissible under existing regulations. For instance, the largest
ministries were allowed to send only five to eight persona as their represent-
Atives to the Administration of Reparations and Deliveries, whereas the Min
istry of Construction Materials Industry was permitted to send 30 persons by
special decree of the Council of Ministers USSR.
It was a known fact that Germany produced about 18 million tons of ce-
ment a year and that the main cement plants were located in Eastern Germany.
To expedite dismantling of the badly needed equipment, teas of thousands
of specially mobilized Germans, repatriates, German prisoners of war, and
s>tembers of the Soviet Army construction battalions were used, and high pri-
ority was given to transportation of dismantled equipment to the USSR. By
1946, a nusc.ir of plants with a total productive capacity of 2 million tops
had been dismantled. Among the dismantled plants was the "Tissen" Plant,
the largest in Germany, and two "Preiseg" plants in Rudersdorf (east of Ber-
lin). Construction of these three plants with a total output of one million
tons per year had been completed by the Germans in 1942 and the cement produced
war, used mainly :or building automobile highimys. Hundreds of steam locomo-
tives, thousands of railroad cars, ma'.hiihe tools, and other needed equipment
were brought over from Germany for 'the reconstructed cement plants. Bovever,
there was a shortage of excavators, which were the basic equipment for work 3..
the quarries. Representatives of several ministries, including the Ministries
of Coal Industry, Ferrous Metallurgy, Norterroua Metallurgy, etc., were hunting,
for excavators in Germany. However, very few excavators (especially 1.5-3 cubic
meter) were avnilaable in the Soviet Zone of Germany, as they had been trans-
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A curious thing happened when the underground ammunition plants F-1 and
F-2, near Wordbausen, were being dismantled. About 90 excavators and a num?
ber of stem 1ocoexstives and-cara were found around these plants. Dismantling
vas done by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the dismantled equipment was
earmarked for use by the First Administration under the Council of Ministers
(Adsal.nistra'ion of Secret Armaments). In 1946, Lopukhov, director of "Glavtse-
menta n wars able to ship to the (Ministry of Construction Materials Industry 30
eaavators and about 2,000 railroad cars and steam locomotives, by using his
connections with railroad officials and keeping the MVD ana-~or in charge of
operations in a state of intoxication. This resulted in an- argument in Moscow
between lieriya and Kaganovich (the latter was head of the Ministry of Construc-
tion Materials Industry at that time). Finally, the excavators had to be
returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs `for more important uses," as
Beriya stated.
When the USSR adopted the postwar Five-Year Plan, extensive plans were
made for restoring destroyed industrial enterprises and cities and for new
construction. Three new construction ministries were created for this pur-
pose; however, the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan for construction was
doubtful because of the shortage of cement?
According to the same Five-Year Plan, cement production was to be increased
to 10.5 million tons per year by the end of 1950. However, according to Min-
ister Soanin, Stalin actually demanded that the output be increased to 13.5
million tons.,, In spring 1916, the Soviet government elevated the Ministry of
Construction Materials Industry to the level of the most important ministries
having top priority for supplies of materials, equipment, and personnel. L.
M. Kagt rift., member of the Politburo, vas appointed head of the ministry
and was given special powers to enable him to carry out the plan. All these
measures produced results: by using the equipment and materials received from
Germany, the total output of the USSR cement industry was raised to 5 million
tons a year by the end of 1946. However, to produce this quantity of cement
it was necessary to overtax plant facilities to the utmost with the result that
the equipment was worn colt. It was estimated that the equipment could not last
longer than 6 months and there were no spare parts, as the domestic industry was
unable to manufacture them. Consequently, it was decided to enlarge existing
plants by adding equipment received from Germany (?ovorossiysk plants, Podol'sk
plant, Leningrad plant, and others). To relieve the catastrophic situation
caused by the lack of spare parts for cement-manufacturing equipment, 500,000
tons of spare parts and 5 million marks' worth of machines and control and
measuring instruments were included in the list of reparations to be obtained
from Germany in 1947.
Furthermore, to solve the problem of increasing cement production to meet
the requirements of the postwer Five-Year Plan, the Soviet governmentdeeided
to manufacture in Germany from 1946 to 1948 complete equipment for 24 cement
plants with a total productivity of 6.5 million tons. These were also to be
included in the reparations by Germany.
Theref*re, the plan specifying a cement output Of 10.5-1"3.5 million tons
was divided as follows: existing plants, 5 million tors; dismantled plants,
2 ni,1ion'tons; and new plants, 6.5 million tons. I.:cidentally, several of
the dismantled plants were located in Wanchuria; they had been dismantled
immediately after the end of the war with Japan.
To carry out the plan for manufacturing equipment for ?Ia new cement
plants, it ens necessary to revise the previous d:?cision to di r ntle several
machine-building plants in Germany, and dismantling of the following plants
was ,suspended: Krupp-Grusnn, Wolfe-Buckau in Magdeburg, and "Polyslus" in
Tkoaanu.
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following persons were made responsible in Germany for prompt and successful
Administration of Germany, and Kaganovich'u deputy, G. S. Ivanov, who arrived
Buckau, "Polysius," and Riesa plants, as well as a plant manufacturing reduc-
headed an association of more than 200 plants of the Soviet Zone and 30 plants
ua-, nnrsnaj. c,nuxov, neat or the Soviet Military Administration of Germany,
Soviet Zone give every kind of assistance for the completion of the-order."
Trade was ordered to give top priority to the delivery of metals and parts
for cement plants. Since gears and rivs for cement kilns, large reductors,
fittings, chains, and shaped castings could not be manufactured by the indus-
try remaining in the Soviet Zone of Germany after the plants had been dis-
mantled, the orders for these items were placed in the Western Occupation
Zones, mainly in Westphalia. The Western Zones also supplied metal for manu-
facturing 300-meter cement kilns. However, it was feared that the fulfill-
ment of these orders might be delayed, thus hampering the entire plan.
The completed kilns and other equipment were shipped to a transshipment
base in Stettin, where they awaited arrival of other parts ordered from the
Western Zones. Kagenovich strictly prohibited partial shipments of equip-
ment to the USSR, calling the practice "Pyatakovshchina," i.e., sabotage, after
Pyatakov, the former Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry USSR, who
was shot in 1937? Urgent steps were taken to cope with the difficult situ-
ation created by the delay in deti.veriee from the Western Zones. Special
agents of German nationality were secretly cent to the Western Zones to ex-
pedite completion of the orders. The ?gents were supplied with large amounts
of money and large quantities of sugar, cigarettes, and alcohol. At the same
time, negotiations were in progress, through Kaganovich, to allot the suns of
200,000 dollars in foreign currency for placing orders in Czechoslovakia or
Belgium, if necessary. Incidentally, Czechoslovakia refused to accept the
order in 191+7.
The entire order for the equipment of 24 plants was to be .filled by mid-
1948, -co enable the installation of machl:nery in the plants by the end of
1950, an planned. The dependency on the Western Zones for the supply of
metals (they could have been supplied by the Soviet Union) and parts, and
the delay in negotiations with Sweden and Switzerland for placing orders for
electric motors and other electrical equipment (they were satisfactorily con-
cluded only in March 1947) made the Soviet authorities ver? nervous. However,
despite the fact that the new cement plants were in a blueprint stgg4 of con-
struction,nine of them were assigned locations and code numbers. For in-
si.ance, the plants ror wielch equipment was being manufactured by the Krupp.
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Grneon Plant (15 Plants of 300,000-tom capacity each) were designated "K" --
K-l, K-2, K-3, etc. -- while ?t se'recetvt achinery -from "Polystu s" were
,designated "P." The loaatinn~awst ntswere am-follovs Plant K-1 was
planned-for Wovorossfysk, K-2 for the Donbass, K-3 and X-4 for Magnitogorsk;
K-5 for Georgia, P-1 and P-2 for Podol'ak, P-3 for Leningrad, and P-4 for
Dneprodzerzhinsk.
Construction of buildings for the new plants 4.g., in Podol'sl)had began
as early as 1946, in accordance with plans submitted by the "Polysius" and
Kra-Gruson plants. It was also proposed to build the plants in Georgia,
in the Donbass, and in the Urals (two or three plants).
Until 1947, the progress of the manufacture of equipment in Germany was
exeeedingly slow. As a result of this delay, Polysius, owner of the Dessau
Plant, was the first to be arrested, several other arrests followed. The
plants were turned over to the Soviet corporation, and its head, Mityukov,
received a special order from the TaK VKP'(b) to expedite fulfillment of the
orders.
During 1947, it became evident that the equipment for the 24 plants would
not be ready on schedule. So far, the equipment had been manufactured only
for eight or nine plants instead of the planned 16 plants. This disrupted the
plans for the completion of new cement plants.
To study German methods of cement production and to adjust the plans for
new plants to be equipped with German machinery to the future plant locations,
local raw materials, etc., a special Department of Science and Technology of
the Ministry of Construction Materials Industry was formed within the admini-
stration of Science and Technology of the Soviet Military Administration of
Germany. The department, headed by Professor Vetukhov, consisted of a group
of cement specialists sent over from the USSR; it was located in the town of
Welten, northwest of Berlin.
A German professor Meyer and some other German specialists were invited'
to cooperate. Among other types of scientific research, the group studied
problems of prolonging the life of cement-kiln linings, devices for automatic
control of kiln operations, etc. To encourage the German specialists in their
efforts, they were given, in addition to their normal rations, a special
monthly ration and a salary. It is interesting to note that these Germans were
living in the US and British sectors of Berlin and did not want to move into
the Soviet Sector, despite persistent invitations to do so from the Soviet
Military Administration of Germany.
Toward the end of 1946, in correction with extensive constructions in
the Par East, Minister Kaganovich gave special consideration to the operation
of the liar Eastern cement plant. To improve plant operations, Lopukhov, the
director of "Glavtsewent," was sent there. After introducing some improve-
ments at the plant, Lopnkbov left for Moscow. However, he was taken off the
train by an MB officer somewhere near Lake Baykal, by telegraphic order of
Kaganovich, and returned to the plant. There were rumors that this was done
because it was considered very important to increase the For East's cement
output, ea cement was essential for the construction of atomic boob plants.
In connection with the recent political situation in China, which is favor-
able for the USSR, it may be expected that the 30 cement plants built in
Manchuria by the Japanese have already been included in the economic system
of the USSR. Deliveries of cement from these 30 plants have undoubtedly im-
proved the supply of this important material in the Soviet Par East.
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an S ? il' jowet level razr~iaa? t Germany.
am-woctr Vewter- t n nrte 'vutiea ar-Mt* s WA coal.
i4r, OwKet- Vwwoment eaites this !"11, &ad oift gnroblaw of
incre"Ug the p odtitettou of construction i teTi&ls, e*Wt*Uy of cement,
a anttear of great 1uportanee.
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