ECONOMIC - WAR PRODUCTION, URANIUM MINING SCIENTIFIC - URANIUM DEPOSITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600150031-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 26, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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COOL/
'is OFfICIALg ONLY
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
CLASSIFICATION Sw! -C-R-E-T
5ECURT"Y INFOMTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A&ENCY
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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.. m?ap-
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
WAR MATERIAL PRODUCTION 1R QM.' GERMANY AS OF
THE EAU OF ipjo
In the Roust note of 5 February 1951 to the US, Prance and England con-
cerning a new meeting of the foreign ministers, it was stressed that "the ful-
fillment of tte provlaions of the Potsdam agreement on the demilitarisation of
Germlny would unquestionably contribute a great deal to the improvement of re-
lations between the US, France. Great Britain, and the !M."
Chapter III of the Pctodam agreement provides for "the co@Wlste disarmament
and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination of all German industry which
is convertible to arms proiuction."
The Soviet note goes on to state that "not only is the daed:.:itaritation of
Germany not being cwrrie,? out, but, on the contrary, steps are being taken to
set t regular German army again and to revitalize the war Industry of Nest
To the statement in the earlier note of 22 December 19500 free the Western
Powers to Lhe UOM that only in the set goes of Geraaaay is there say rearing
to be Investigated, the Soviets in their iwply of 30 v?.......... 1950 prote3ted"
crteb1e -r the -tt pia stn
all the nose tnen a
.vr_--- ..r~yuw WE w+w www craw Powers to justify
- *VY ,oi
CO/MM/ ilr! O lCALB ONLY
L-A
REPORT
CD NO.
DATE OF
MFORMATION Dec 1950
DATE DIST. ;4 Sep 1952
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the remilitarization of West Germay by reference to a supposed rearming in
East Germany. Everything adduced in the nave (of the Western Powers) on this
matter is pure invention and in no sense corresponds to the truth.
practically all official notes and reports of the Soviets have for years
now followed this formula, frequently with a special reference to the fact that
the Soviets have, throughout the Soviet Zone, scrupulously observed and carried
0
out the provisions of the Potsdam agreement in the matter of demilitarization,
disarmament, and the elimination of every industry even remotely connected with
the German Federal Republic. On the other hand, the Alert Police in the Soviet
Zone are beyond all doubt, in training and equipment, a military group under
Soviet command.
As far as industrial demobilization is concerned, it must be definitely
stated that the Vest German steel production is still restricted. In accord
with the Potsdam agreement, many limitations on industrial production are still
in effect; for exe ple, on synthetic rubber and synthetic fuel production. Re-
cently, with certain limitations, aluminum production has been permitted. There
Soviet Zone howei?, the situation is quite different, as will be shown below
60
The general statements which came into acceptance in 1945 have declared
practically every product to be a war product. However, the concept of 'war
goods'; is not going to be taken in so wide a sense in this study.
The manufacture of ammunition and weapons, tanks or tank parts, or any
kind of specifically military equipment comes without question under the hcaa-
ing "war production", no matter how the term is defined.
Also, uniforms, aiming devices, or signaling apparatus, insofar as they
con,'orm to military specifications, can be regarded as v--r goods. The ,name
is true of military boots, sword belts, ammunition pouches, and slings for
small arms and automatic weapons.
If the food-processing industry in a given area, as in East Germany, is
obliged to turn over a large proportion of its capacity to canniLg food accord-
ing to army regulations, then that can be regarded as war production.
If the steel capacity of an area is abnormally expanded, if the produc-
tion of synthetic rubber &u1 synthetic fuels is constantly and tremendously
increased, and if these products are delivered predominantly to the army,
then these goods can be regarded as war goods.
We shall show in detail. for how long and to what extent such war pro-
duction has been going on in Bast Germany. And specifically we shall show
how this production has been carried out at the express cosmaad of the Soviet
occupation authorities or the Soviet Amy, to a large extent in plants which
are formally order the direction of and are responsible to the Soviet authorities,
namely the SAG (Soviet Corporation),
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Up to 1945, the greatest concentration of specific war production in
The hydrogenation plants in Zeitx, Roehien, and Launa promptly began
were turn d over to the Soviets. One of the first acts of the Soviets was to
start war production again in plants which had been shut down by the Americans.
pits ou V-weapons. At the iieptuu Shipyard in Rostock, Soviet n+.val vessels were
repaired and outfitted. Thehtesting of 11-2 weapons went on at Peenemuende. In
Leipzig, bolt assemblies for small arms and machi:.e guns were made. Small arms
were again produced at Buhl. Railroad car manufacturers mrde special broad-gauge
undercarriages for guns and tanks. The great textile plants in the Soviet Zone
manufactured uniforms for the Red Army and the big shoe factories made military
boots and other leather goods. The foodstuffs industry put up canned goods for
the Red Army.
Aviation Plant in Halle/Basle continued to make jet aircraft. Siemens in
Arnstedt produced telescopic and signaling apparatustor tine Red Army. B W
(Bavarian Motor Works) in Eisenach delivered passenger vehl.cles to the Red
Army. The Polte firm in Magdeburg and Arastadt continued to make small arms
Plant in sahkkopau im ediately began the production of synthetic rubber. The
Zeiss Plant in Jena produced optical apparatus for the Soviets. The Siebel.
This is a small sample of the war production which began again in the Soviet
Z o in e e 1c,19- The plants tinted a -re to a la_ro extent thus vhich hmff_ been
declared to be Soviet Army plants, whose direction and control :.ay in the hands
of Soviet Army officers; most of these plants became SAG.
Typical of the U3SR'a manner of operation in war industries in the Soviet
Zone nab the reopening of he Siebel Aviition Plant in Rsalie/8eaie. Us troops,
as the first occupying power in this area, had taken along some of the plans,
models, and sundry items when they withdrew to the West. On the first day of
their occupation of Halle they shut down the plant, dismissed the personnel, and
moved prisoners from concentration camps into the workers' settlements near the
plant. The first thing the Soviets did was to remove these unfortunates from
the dwellings and to reinstall the key personnel in the settlements. They made
no distinction Ac to whether the test pilots, designers, or engineers were
v!cmbers of the 12DAP [Mazi PartZ7 or senior SS officers; anyone regarded by the
Soviets as a 'specialist" in the manufacture end testing of art planes was auto-
matically considered politically sound.
Through agents, the Soviets mad& e-mry effort to win back to the Siebel
plant those engineers and designers who had in the meantime moved to the West.
As soon as enough "specialists" were assembled, the plant was again set in
operation. The workers, office employees, designers, and engineers were given
very high salaries and large increases in food rstions.
War production ran at full speed until fall. 1946. Only when the demands
of the West to allow an Allied commission to inspect the abutting down and
dismantling of the war plants in the Soviet Zone could no longer be put off
(the Soviets were influenced, too, by the result of the elections of September -
October 1946, which, in spite of terror, showed an anti-Conzaalat majority),
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equipment and canned food for t1ze bov"Ie I Army vcre bcru6bucmu 1?. ~.,
and designers, moved off to the USSR. Only the production of per
-_-, , -_,. a,,,.+%-+4 P N-1 maul rubber.. orrtical and signaling devices, and war
wee-', .+ .. .-- k---- -_
a few days the plants were stripped and, together with the specciaalists,e neers,
t
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It became clear very early that the destruction of the industrial potential
in the Soviet Zone and the removal of the dismantled lants (which to a large
extent were plants engaged in normal peace production) to th%- Soviet. Union meant
no increase in th.^ latter's potential. For one thing, much of the equipment was
dam ge_d en r_emte and much of it reached the USSR with parts missinie and vas thus
of no use. Further-more, the USSR lacked the necessary trained personnel for
erecting and operating the dismantled plants.
These experiences were the cause of the second Thane of Soviet economic policy
in the Soviet Zonc, beginning in spring 1946. The large industrial plants still
in existence, if they were modern and reasonably whole, were simply transformed
into SAG. In this way the majority of the key plants in East Germay (particularly
in the iron and steel, heavy machine-building, and. heavy chemical industries)
coutinued to produce as they had prior to 1945, without ever coming under the
'!imitations imposed by tLa Potsdam agreement.
During this second phase, which lasted from spring 1946 to spring 1948, all
industrial and hand trade plants in the Soviet Zone were obliged to devote 30 .
90 percent of their production capacity to the manufacture of reparations goods.
The burden fell just as bard on the SAG as it did on those plants which were still
in private hands or on the so-called "people-owned enterprises."
Without regard for the needs of the zone itself, the total economy of East
Germany was harnessed to economic reconstruction and to st!rengthrning the economic
potential. It was a period of ruthless economic exploitation.
When, as & vesult of Soviet measures, the separation of the eastern and
western occupation zones became more sharply emphasized, and the USSR could no
longer hope to bring West Ceraany under itt. authority by means of ideological
warfare or pressure, the third phase in the economic development of the Soviet
Zone began, In spring 1948. Its goal was to regain the production level of
1936, while still retaining the reparations policy.
waves of dismantling. Rather, they keptright on producing what they had been
turning out during the war: tanks, V-rockets, jet aircraft, etc. (until fall
1946).
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them up again in the devastated arees of the uabac.
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Second Eaif-Tear Plan of 1948, had, primarily, the task of building up those
branches of Soviet Zone industry which were of particular importance to the
Soviet potential. For this purpose the BAG were expanded and those partially
l dismmntlaid lacy industrial plants which had become people-owne4 were
t
t
a
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o
rc eojuipped and expanded in great haste. In some cases the USBl1 l,tself f'urnishad
. - . __...__- If- at.,- - - A4r-.-.e+1 ..A
goods), and, to a large extent, it famished sale pans,
Among these hurriedly expanded capacitios were, first and most imapoeAut,
the whole metallurgy comselex, imcltniing heavy machine building end heavy ehesistry;
coal and power; vehicle construction; end t1e optical industry.
The trend becomes clearer in the fourth phase, that of planning for the
- The ERSt Germs Five-Year Plan, 1951 - 1955, which is designed down
f
u
t
x
;
ai
. to the smallest detail to fit in with the Soviet Five-fear Plan mad the analogous
plans of the ether People,* DeaDcraciss, has (according to official statements)
the task of supporting and strengthening the Soviet economic potential in general
and the Soviet war potential in particular.
pletely incorporated into the Eastern bloc as a Satellite state. A few material
e+ra-
rced iacor
this f
k
p
o
e
improvements in the living standard are supposed to ma
tion more palatable.
ivo distinctions have to be made in an evaluation of the armament potential
of the Soviet Zone in terns of its importance for the USSR.,
1. A direct strengthening of Soviet war potential takes place trough the
BAG. The SAG deliver their products directly to the USSR or to the Soviet Army.
Manpower, raw materials, pother, sad semifinished products for the SAG are
furnished primarily, and preferably, by it Germany. At least 50 percent of
the total potential of the Soviet Zone economy is required to supply the SAGS
The wain emphasis is on heavy machine building and on all kinds of steel and
chemical products. In addition, the Soviet war potential is further strengthened
as a result of the delivery orders j5le-ced with Bast German firm? and the
military equipment of all sorts (optical and signal equipment, leather goods,
textiles, vehicles, food, etc.) which is demanded from the last German economy
by the Soviet occupying forces.
2. The Soviet war potential is constantly strengthc7.ed indirectly by
reparations deliveries and by export trade with the t$23. Here, too, it is
lsrga?,y r ofitter of steel and heavy sa+chines, copper, fuels, buns, and other
ch.miccl products. In order to strengthen these strategic sectors of the war
potential, there has been a forced expar4lon since 1948 of the following
branches of industry in the Soviet Zone:
a. Iron and Steel
Crate steel production can illtatrate to what extent production is
to be expanded within the framesork of the rive-Year Plan. A comparison with the
production figures of the years 1946 end 1948 sakes clear that this is not a
normal grarth.
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Laude Steel Production in the Soviet Zo
(tons)
Actual. Production
'936
1946,
107
Plans quota,
191&9
1950
1951
1,198,000
157,000
177,000
270,000 (plan? quota was
1,250,000.
1,670,00
5,000)
times Lame iywa vuu- _~_-_ _
will be necessary, for industrial and geographical reasons, to erect new metallurg-
One of the most importans projects is the reconstruction of the
Brandenburg Steel t.nd Rolling Mill, which was dismantled in 1945. It is to be
equipped for a yearly capacity of 500,000 tcas of crude steel. Four open-
hearth furnaces of 100 tons capacity each have already been set up; six additional
furnaces are to be put into operation in 1951. ?)r the rolling mill it is
planned to have a 2-tigh ingot-rolling mill, a billet-rolling mill, a blooming
mill, and a sheet-rolling mill. Furthermore, a roller foundry and a cast-i:on
foundry are planned; the latter is supposed to be the largest in the GDR.
A very large project is the "East Metallurgi.al Combine at Fuersten-
berg Oder, whose planning was begun in mid-September 1950. With 12,000 workers,
the plant in to have a pig iron production of 500,000 tons and a steel produc-
tion of 550,000 tone.
The blast-furnace plant is to have three modern blast furnaces, each
with a daily capacity of 500 tons. The steel plant is to be equipped with ten
open-hearth furnaces of 50 tons capacity each, a large Talbot furnace, and a
gigantic mixer heated by waste gas. The rolling mill is to have a 2-high revers-
ing mill of the largest site, a plate-rolling mill for heavy sections and coarse
material, and a wide strip mill for medium and thin sheet, with a capacity of
150,000 tons per year.
Furthbzaore, Fuerstsnberg is to have a steel-casting foundry itll-
a capacity of 10,000 tons per year, a cast-iron foundry, a roll foundry, a turning shop, a eh_et-metal-working plant, an electric power plant, a g swork^,
and a cement factory.
As for raw materials, Fuerstenberg expects to receive one million
tons yearly of high-grade iron ore from tae Donets basin of the USSR; Poland
will deliver 800,000 tone of blast-furnace coke from Gorny Slask; the Soviet
Zone will furnish the nlsnt, labor, and p-wer.
Another large-scale project fa the metallurgical plant in Calbe-
Bas1.e, erection of Mslch has alre* Y begun. It is to be put into operation in
1951. Altogether the plant will have 20 low-shaft furnaces. In the firbt
:.onstruction pe.iod, two batteries of five furnaces each are to be erected; there
are to produce 100,000 tons of pig iron yearly.
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pyrites obtained from sulfuric acid manufacture. Its low-shaft furnaces will
dill-receive the fine ore mined in list Germany. It will also smelt the roasted
(Maxhuette in LTntervellenbora, Riesa, Rennigsdorf, etc.) is processed almost
of the various SAO (woif-Buckau,, Otto Gruson, etc.), is about 30,000 tons per
increased. Up to now the bottleneck has been the supply of cast steel. Cast
Soviet control the supply of the civilian sector always plays a vary subordiaeLte
Commission with the trumped-up excuse that crude steel production in the USSR
in 1950 wed only aboc:. 30 million tons, whereas the capacity of the USA was
100 million tons in the sane year.
All official statements on the Five-Year Plan speak emphatically
of the key position of iron and steel and heavy machine building, upon which,
in turn, all armament depends. The forced construction and expansion of the
iron and steel capacity in the Soviet Zone is carried on by the Soviet Control
Zone indicates clearly a strengthening of the Soviet war potenwial.
T"e following figures indicate very cicariy t tat v.. clan tha
iron and steel industry in East Germaiiy is to expand under Soviet rule.
Production of Iron and Steel in the Soviet Zone
A^tual Output Plan Quota Percent of Increase
Product 1948 _ 1955 Over 1948
Iron ore
Pig iron
Crude steel
Rolled steel
(in tons)
248,000
1,800,000
about
725
181,000
1,250,000
700
195,000s
3,000,000
1540
151,000+'
2,200;000
1450
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About 80 percent of the to',al German production of copper,
stratmgically the second most important metal, occurs in the Soviet Zone in
the Mansfeld-Rettstedt-Eisleben area. In 1949 the VVB, (Federation of People-
Owned Saterprises) Manafeld, in Eisleben, produced 8,000 tons of pure copper
from about 650,000 tons of smelting ore. The quota for 1950 was 11,000 tons
of pure copper frog 850,000 tons of ore.
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Since the pits in the Manifeld area are constantly becoming less
productive and will probably be exhausted within 10 years, the Five-Year Plan .4:,t*
aims to shift the emphasis to fiangerhausen-Riessstedt. According to plan, a
yearly output of 900,000 tons of smelting ore is to be attained here. In 1952,
10,000 miners are to be settled in the new district.
Assuming that it viii still be possible to mine 850,000 tons in
approximately double the copper production of the Soviet Zone.
The Man.sfeld copper shale mining has for decades required state
subventions; it will continue to require them because of the geological con-
ditions and the technological methods used in the mining operations. In addi-
tion, tremendous sums are required as subventions for the new openings. All
this forcing of the copper production in the Soviet Zone makes sense only from
the point of view of war economy.
The supply of aluminum and aluminum alloys in the Soviet Zone is at
present very poor. Therefore, th* production of aircraft and aircraft parts has
not spin been resumed since being abut down in 19146.
magnesium, and electron at the former IO Farben plants in Bitterfeld, Stadefu t,
and Aken and at the largest aluminum-producing plant of the Soviet Zone, the
Lauta plant in Lauta (Lausitz), rere dismantled in 1946.
The rebuilditg of aluminum capacity began in the SAG Bitterfeld
Electrochemical Combine, where, at first, a rather amnll instal.ation was set
up that turned out 1,000 tons of pure aluminum in 1949. In 1950 it produced
about 3,000 tons. in 1951, the plant is tobe expanded to a capacity of 15,!100
toils.
According to present plane an aluminum electrolysis unit is to be
:its tailed at ti.n Laaat.-a - rmn , ;iii.-.h 15 nov a part of VVB A! u (Federat?cn of
People-Owned Fnte:prisesvfcr the Production and Processing of Aluminum). The
expansion of the partially dismantled Lsuta power plant has already been started
and was supposed to be completed in 1950.
Since bauxite is not found in the GDR
must be imported, net of it from Hungary.
Because pure aluminum is scarce in the GDR, secondary aluminum is
obtained from light metal scrap supplies left from the last war. The Bitter-
feld SAG Combine and some 30 smaller people-ovned plants are doing the re-
covery work; the total reeelting capacity is about 20,000 tons.
In spring 1.947, under the name Wismuth A3, the Soviets began the
reaich for uranium ore. Since then, the uranium-mining areas have constantly
been increased and expanded. Now, in the Erzgebirge alone, from the Czech
border (3ohanngeorgenstadt-Annaberg-Schvarseaberg) to Zwickau (Aue-Schneeberg-
Oberschlema) about 150,000 persons are occupied in uranium pining.
Pro, an econoiaic point of view this rndertaking Ss stupid, since
the opdrating costs exceed many times the value of the ere. However, the Soviets
apparently are concerned only with obtaining every possible Wt of uranium for
their atimic production, regardless of cost..
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S E C R E T
over extensive areas shaft after shaft is sunk. The size of the
there are some with drifts running far under the earth
atl
i
y;
es gre
shafts var
in which thousands of men work; there are dozens of others that are shallow with
few or no crosscuts. Again there are cuts running straight into a hillside where
fregneffitly only two dozen men work. If one shaft becomes unproductive, another
t
ns that d s~carded
ft ha
__ ~- -- ----__
ppe
i
o
AS?,.- +b, minota are is washed. it is packed into special tubs or
uoszzxs fdiu ..,
Every one of theme ore shipments passes under the eyes of special Soviet troops.
uranium ore production. From a comparison of reports or miners in vwriuum a ,moo
Rialeben (Mansfeld copper-mining awes), but the number of persons employed
there is considerably less than in the Erzgebirge region; comparatively, how
ever, the yield there is higher. In spring 1950 uranium mining was started
From Eisenach all along the ridges of the Thueringen forest
i
'
huer
in 7
ngen. as far as Kahia, prospectors of Wisanth are on the trail of uranium. In the
nau-Meuebach the first shafts were sunk just a few months ego.
Y Il
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vicini
Also o the south of Unterwellenborn there are some drilling preparations; the
number of persons employed in these operations is still small. Further mining
operations are going on in Bernburg (Sachzen-Anbalt) and in the Freiberg area
to the sc.rth and vest of Dresden.
Altogether about 250,000 persons are employed in the uranium-
mining operations of Wismuth. These vorlers are generally forced labor; their
working conditions are at times medieval. The number of deaths and serious
Is hIgh; th ....wl.,.?. whose health is permanently impaired runs into the
tens of thousands.
The uranium in the Soviet Zone are very similar to the Soviet
forced labor camps, except that Wismuth still pays regular salaries. Of course,
these salaries, and all the other tremendous coatis, "et be paid from the taxes
of the Eas'4 German population.
The uranium mining areas are Soviet reserves which err hermetically
sealed off from the outside world and in which the secret police swing their
scourges over slave labor, male and female. To an ever greater extent, political
prisoners, as in the USSR, are being put into the uranium mines, where they work
without wages.
d. Heavy Machine Building
The importance of heavy machinery as the basis of all war production
was underscored in the production prohibitions set up in .London by the Allies.
In t':.L Soviet Zone, great attention was paid to the rehsLilitat.on of heavy
machine building in the Two-Year plan (1949 - 1950); now, in the Five-Year Plan
(1951 - 1955), it has become one of the key efforts.
The principal concern id the construction of heavy machine tools.
For the last 2 years the VV, Machine Tools sad Tools) has been busy design-
ing and drawing. As early ae 1950, the Meuselvits'WMW Machine Factory turned
out 20-ton lathes, which csr. handle jobs up to 10 tons in utight.
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Niles Works, Berlin
Plant (formerly Billeter
& Klunz)
(formerly Wetzel)
this may definitely be considered as war preparation, since the Soviets constantly
support the plans and projects With advice and designs.
What great emphasis the Soviets place on the chemical industry, in-
cluding coal products. within the total economy, particularly in terms of their
own war potential, is seeu in the fart that almost all the large chemical plants
in Central Germany have become Soviet property. The large plants of the former
IG Fa.-ben Industry (Leuna, Schkopau, Bitterfeld, Bochl.en, etc.) have been operat-
ing at full capacity for the Soviets since 1935 as oitu.
The Five-Year Plan names the following WHW plantb particularly
for the manufacture of heavy machine tools:
Moreover, the production increases specified in the Five-Year Plan
(1951 - 1955) for the chemical industry leave nr room for doubt that war pro-
duction io the compelling factor in the efforts to expand this branch of in-
dustry. It has been this same interest in war production that has caused the
Soviets to disregard completely, from the first day of their occupation, the
very clear prohibitions of the Potsdam agreement against the production of
synthetic rubber and synthetic fuels.
The output value for the year 1955 is set at 6.6 billion r rk.s,
or 162 percent of the 1950 output and 304 percent of the 1936 output. `Here,
and throughout this document, there is no ind+_cation Whether values are in
West marks or East marks.] The Fire-tear Plan sets the following production
figures for the most important chemicals:
1955 Plan Figures for the Chemical Industry
Planned Production
(tons
Gasoline
790,000
Diesel feel
475,0M
Synthetic rubber
6o,00a
Motcr vehicle tires
900,000
Sulfuric acid (So-1)
4co,Gr)o
Textile cellulose
162,000
in (%) of 1950
175
119
159
2,00
156
163
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32,000 314
126,000 154
250,000, 170
Synthetic fuels (gasoline and diesel oil) are produced in Ea4t,.
and doled out only very small amounts to the Germans for their needs. Even diesel
fuel, which was available to the civilian population in adequate juantitiea up
to mid-1950, is now hard to get.
Although the Five-Year Plan sets large production increases in the
fuel industry, the civilian sector will not profit at all from these increases;
they serve only to increase the fuel supply of the Soviets. The high octane
aviation gasoline produced since 1945 at SAG Foehlen (and, to a limited extent,
at %auna) goes exclusively to the Soviets.
Synthetic rubber has been produced without interruption since 1945
at SAG Buna In Schkopau. In 1946 and 1947 come parts of Buna were dismantled,
thus eliminating certain by-products, such as Perbunan. However, simultaneotsly
vita the dismantling order came an order from the Soviet authorities that the
dismantled parts be rebuilt. According to the Five-Year Plan, Bunn production
is to be increased from 40,000 to 60,000 tons.
The procedsi.ng of buns into tires did not begin until 1947 - 1948.
The Soviet Zone tire industry had been almost totally dismantled. In 1950, the
planned quota of tires for the people-owred tire plants in Biesa and Xetschen-
dorf was 450,000 units; twice that number, 900,U00 units, are to be produced in
1955. Just as formerly most of the synthetic rubber went to the Soviets, now
most of the tires go to them.. Tires for the Soviet Zone itself are in very
short supply.
Sulfuric acid production in East Germany was declared to be a
part of the key industry program in the Two-Year Plan (1949 - 1950). Sufficient
supplies of sulfuric acid are indiepensable to the extensive plane of the Soviet
Zone; it I. needed yarticularly in the manufacture of synthetic fibers and phos-
phate fertilizers.
Sulfuric acid production (in terms of SO) in East Germany was
302,000 tons in 1936, 90,000 tons in 1947, and 150,00 tons in 1949,
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5-E-0-R-g-T
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as 1936. This figure had to be revised downward to about 255,000 tons, be-
cause it was impossible to set up the necessary installations In tisie. An in-
ing plants; it is also produced from gypsum. Since the only source of pyrites ,...
the Soviet Zone (at Elbingerode) is insufficient, pyrites are to be imported
reat
s
l
'
g
ay
Plan
from Eastern Bloc states and from Scandinavia. The Five-Year
anned
e increase
is
-
ki
p
-h
- --
ng
Particularly stri
50 000 +nns of soda a to be produced, a 372-percent increase _/sic
I 1955 3
000 on
00
- 6 -
,
over the 1
Germany produced about 550,000 tons of soda. After the dtsmantling of the largest
ple
t in
a
h
p
n
e pl
a mock "'vial" some legal basis was sought To convert
owned property." As a VEB, the Solvay plant in Dernburg is scheduled, within
adequate supply of caustic soda, since it must to a large. extent be. used in
place of soda.. The increased production of sulfuric acid makes possible the
planned increase in synthetic fiber production, but the need for caustic soda
t the fibers increases in the same proportion. This fact is takeh into
t
rea
to
account in the Five-Year Plan, -which sets as its goal a production increase in
caustic soda to 170 percent of 1950 production. Of course, it is hoped that
increased soda production will release larger and larger quantities of caustic
soda for synthetic fiber production.
According to the Five-Year Plan, a considerable utisnber of new in-
_tnllat one v ill be aet up for cellulose production, particularly in Wittenberg,
Saalfeld, end Land Sachsen. Ostensibly, this is being done to improve the lot
of the Soviet Zone population, for whom the supply of textiles is still'roefully
inadequate. Actually, the real reason for the planned increases in synthetic
fiber production is he constantly growing demand of the Soviet Zone's People's
Police for textiles; rore and more the People's Police are emerging as the main
consumers after the enoromous demands of the occupying farceo (uaiferms, over-
coats, uuuerwear for the Soviet Army) have been met.
VI. INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPI4ENT FOR ARMAMENT PRODUCTION
From the point of view of raw materials, armament production in the Soviet
Zone for the USSR has been prepared for long in edvenee. It has also long been
apparent that the capacities of the metal-processing industry were being ex-
panded and readied for rapid conversion to extensive armament pro't'ction. Rare
are two examples:
1. Machine Rental Stations
A far-reaching, and, from a strategic point of viw, completely new pro
,oct is the setting up of the large people-owned NAB (1Ych.ne Rental S-
in the years 1949 - 1950, 63 HAS were set up throughout the Soviet Lone, In
structure, as well as in type of machinery and personnel, they are so constituted
that they can be treerforeed overnight into assembly or repair etztions for tanks.
Mw planned -- and actual -- labor force in each of these stations is 145 men and
B-s-C,R-I-?
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 Tractor Plants
Besides the preparation for armament production from the point of view of
raw materials and installations, actual production has been going on for a long
while. The following survey is necessarily incomplete; it is intended to give
only an approximate picture. Hence, only a few examples are taken from the
various sectors of armament aroduction.
1. Heavy Weapons and Accessories
A number of people-ovned and SAG plants make tracks, track links, pins,
-,. Ilan ;.. ~*I s p?Mnrtl nn
Offi. ~L-~.,, -??-? r- -- -
and guide rollers for the Soviet T-34 tack. goes
by the cover name "caterpillar and tractor parts." However, in the wbole Soviet
-B-C-xi-E-T
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weld equi.pxea vita rcpois ,y~..?:.a__. - _
equipment than could ever be used for the normal repair requirements of, agri-
vehicles can leave w='u1euO an-,,e
anti tnals. the ;WAS wre extraordinarily
c
tions are so big that up to 3v large ve
of these stations hass~u:,o*-..~ eight repair pits
The workshops are So arranged that
p
e
I
Eastern Germany, are equipped e i specie eng
for the repair of diesel and gasoline engines. The workshops in all these sta
les can be repairel at once. Each
hi
60-80 apprentices. Forty of these 83 stations, strategically scattered through
s with all, modern facilities
sho
n
i
tor Plant is turning out 30, 5, an
Soviet design. Ninety-horscpower tractors are useful. only if they are hitched
in front of heavy guns. lkvreover, since 1949 Soviet Army tanks have beer. re-
paired at the Brandenburg tractor plant.
Other tractor plants also produce caterpillar tractors, but on a
smaller scale than the Schoenbeck plant, whose quota runs to several thousands
of tractors per year. All tractor pl*.nts are constantly being expanded, as
are those plants which produce engines for these tractors. Moreover, one
must take into account that to a large extent these tractors are built on
Soviet models and that the Soviet command in Karlshorst keeps a very careful
eye .... tractor prnd--?rtion in the Soviet Zone, The tractor parts and the
tractor :---
tractor engines are, for the most part, made according to Soviet aea?.gns Enid
Soviet norms. The model for tractor construction is the well-known "Krasnyy
Oktyabr'" Tractor Plant in Stalingrad, which, during the last war, was one of
the principal suppliers of Soviet T-34 tanks.
The urgency with which the tractor plants in East Germany are being
expanded, the fact that workers for these plants are drawn from the numerous
metal-processing factories, and furthermore, the absolute secrecy which is
rigorously maintained around each tractor plan. at express Soviet command,
suggest that. the assembly-line production of tractors has aspects which the
Soviet Zone authorities and the Soviets want to keep from the view of any
"unauthorized person,"
v
burg builds the 30-horsepower,_Akti
11 A 90 horsepower caterpillar tractors of
power "Pionier" tractor. The ifs (Vehicles an cce
i t" tracto, The Schoenebeck/Elbe Trac-`
11
Zwickau, formerly Tne aorcu psc.ui va ~..~ ?--___._ .___ -.
last war turned out armored reconnaissance cars, is now producing the 4O-horse-
d svories) Plant in Branden-
VIII, AIU-AMERT PRODUCTION IN EAST GERMANY
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Zone thee* are uuti as-j ~... ~.. _ ~- ,
vast number of track links, pins, or guide rollers that are turned out. At least
450 tons of sprocket
t
o
12 large plants in the Soviet Zone produce monthly up
--L- ..-A4- tom, !4nVlot drslxa? and
v eeele, Cogwnee.La, ounce ..vKya. -
specifications. The 3AG Schaeffer and Budenberg, in Magdeburg, is the most im-
portant of these plants.
The SAG Marten (formerly Kunsch Steelworks) in Siibitz and Fassberg
bogie wheels for tanks since 1945. At present,
akin
g
near Zeitz has been m
production is running about 40 tons monthly. In 1949, the Silbitz plant be-
gan the manufacture: of track links; up to now, more than 2,000 have been made.
and production capacity is being
cast daily
b
,
een
Since August 1950, 30 have
a ...4 n 4 t i a t ?.nn RAG Sehaeffer and Budenberg which shows the greatest
production, 700 tone monthly.
(;ompietm teau&
Zwickau/Geale; the monthly output is 40 units, each 12 meters long and 40 Cenci
VEB Grossenhain Steam-genuner Plant makes almost 100,000 tank track
lats producing these pins are the Rosawein Axle, Spring,
._- Other
p
o
a
p....,. t
- .
and 4rop-84.7.: gge rlann..,
for Cast and Forged Products), formerly Dr Carl Wolf, and the Ccerlitz Machine
Factory, a part of ViB Gesko (Apparatus and Shaft Equipment for the Coal In-
d-"try) .
The VEB Thueringer Propeller-Shaft Plant, Stadtilm, formerly Bcrsig,
with a capacity of 25,000-30,000 Cardan shafts ` o time period given pro-
ducep 25 different types of propeller shafts th30 e tom2 20emillimeters
diameters in didiameter.
All these. types are used by the Soviet Army,
Studebaker, ZIS, and GAZ army trucks, the larger diameters in tanks.
The former Aakania Plant. now part of VVB Mechanik, in Teltow, pro-
duced in 1950 about 65,000 pumps for use in the central lubrication or tanks;
an additional 16,000 were produced in the VBB Measuring Apparatus Plant in
Treuenbrlezen.
The SAG Bleichert Piant, Leipzig, had by May 1950 produced a great
number of trench diggers with caterpillar treads. Since May, numerous cater-
pillar chassis without the diggers have been turned out.
In the newly erected VEB Kirchmoeser/Brandenburg Rolling Mill, a
special shop has taken uu the assenbly of diesel engines fe.N tanks. At pre-
sent, the parts come from the USSR; :G0 engines were assembles in October 1950.
The SAG Wetzel Gear Plait, Leipzig, produces 60 hear, gear sets for
tanks each month.
The SAG Marten in Silbitz near Grossen/Elste~7 has been producing tank
armor plate 5-8 centimeters thick oinee mid-1950. At the end of I4ovember 1950;
six such plates were produced daily, but since then the capacity has been con-
stantly expanded. Since May 1950, the plant has .een converted more and more
to the exclusive manufacture of tank parts. Five new work wings are under cou-
structicn; the number of workers Increased from 2,000 at the beginning of Nov-
ember 1950 to 4,000 in the first quarter of 1951.
At present, the most important plant for the production of tack armor
plate is the VEB Kircbmoeser Rolling Mill. This plant turns out daily 45 tons
of plate 5-9 centimeters in thickness, 100 centimeters long, and 60 centimeters
wide. The SAG Rolling Mill for Nonferrous Metals in Eettstadt, and the KWU
in Y....iebt g wry
(Communal Economic Enterprise), rormeriy ULM cJFi=iu ilo.'+`.., r.-u----n,
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npring 17,-Y
Manufacturing), Weimar, welded sheets of tank armor plate }#O centimeters thick
CAA m.enk eben Ste&lvor'ks. near Merseburg, produces 250 tank
The
ktaggonofu, a pasr%, Ub .- - %----- ----- task turrets and turret
Locomotive and Railroad Car Manufacture), also make
is to e ?~---
the BAG XrLr?aip-tl?wons heavy machinery, tank parts, heavy steel mill and rolling
e is
s listed
oduc
increasi The output opantstarepbei gtexpanded andvnew onessaretbeing drawn into
Former manufacturing pl
this armament production. Thousands of workers are being transferred from other
plants to these war industries.
2. Weapons and Ammunition
The production of arms and ammunition for small arms and guns is just
beginnln? in the Soviet Zone. Cartridges for carbines are being produced^atRthe-T-
Septe-
VEB Grotteadorf Metal Goods Factory, Grottendorr/arsgcbirgn. At the and of
ber 1950 the manufacture of grenades was begun in the former army arsenal at
been i that
drawn in
ara Zeithain, intact, and vor'men, particularly lathe ncninstalled in eratore, have the
from VEB plants. The Radebeul Casting and Metal-Enameling Plant (formerly the
Gabler Plant), a part of VVB tagema (Federation of People-Owned Enterprises for
Machinery for the Food-Processing, Refrigeration, and Chemical yndustries), is
making "pineapple" hand grenades such &a were formerly used by the German B;ahr-
macht.
mill equipment.
pistols, carbines, and machine guns are produced at Buhl/Thueringen by
the following plants of the NB !dean (Feders tiara of People-0vndy Enterprises of
the Metal Goods Industry): VEB S?,orting Rifles and Gauge
(formerlying
WEB Bauer Ernst and Plant Xerkel
eC (formerly MeerkelBrothers); (formerly
Rifle Factory Wilhelm Gustloff Factory).
3. Sigma gquipasnt
The people-owned and SAG plants of the electrical industry of the
Soviet Zone contribute a part of their capacity to the Soviet war machine. A
large nusbek of tbe1mal1 electrical plants, as subcontractors for VVB `!u-
trixturee, Cable, and Rquipment) en1VYB RFT (Radin and Telecommunications),
produce individual party for am signal equipment, which frequently is merely
aeseabled by the largerelante, Th9 producers tbesuelves often do not know that
they are ~gng parts for military signal devices. Zighty percent of the total
production of the 36,VVB 10-T plants, which employ 2',000 man, Goes to the Soviets;
?tr-.melt' ?nr re?arattnS. 60 percent as supplies
20 pereett of T=m :.alai sue. ,...... --, -__ _-s-- -
to the SAG and other armament industries, particularly the shipbuilding industry.
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--rile D u A.~.u~cu...?...
Army per month. These are 3-ton Studebakers, equipped with so-called "Guerxburg
~_._" (de imeter_Va a transmitters with an output of 8 watts). Theses special
>aee,e Railrc Car Plant (formerly Schumann Works), a part'
~ _ W
d
er
au
adio
a
--
or VVB Lava, produces railroad flatcars equippeavi M u lescopic r
--- tte
". e from the USSR.
.4...; Transportation Equipment
t
o
Ninety percen
USSR. This is true of railroad cars. as well as of trucks, trailers, passengers
recei es most of the road
t A
m
i
S
r
y
e
ov
The
cars, motorcycles, and bicycles.
ordinary railroad passenger and freight cars (including
th
d
e
es
asi
vehicles. flatcars, refrigerator cars, and other epecial types), the Soviet Zone makes
IMM v.,.. U4 ?i ne and Rsav r In.
dus tr lei diqu pmenx,;
Mannesmann Plant, produces five depressed-center cars monthly, 16 meters long,
r?an or Russien
G
t
e
e on
equipped with a mechanism which allows them to opera
and mine-
the SAG Dessau Railroad Car Factory has been turning',
49
4
7 -
Since 19
,out flatcars of very heavy construction falsely designated as "crane cars."
I r long with a wheel diameter of almost 2
5 e
,
These are eight-axle cars,
meters. Probably 3,400 such "crane cars" have been made since production started;
in September 1950, the weekly output was 15.18. Theseecare
l suited foor
elare veil
thenSovietng tanks and heavy guns. Practically orl the use of the Soviet war industry;
the Soviet Zone produce narrow-gauge
the SAG Lindner Plant, Ammendorf, is the heaviest producer of these cars.
Narrow-gauge locomotives are produced at the VEB Xarl Marx Plant, formerly Oren-
- n. and at the LEST (Locomotive Construction
stein and Koppel, B-erl-i-
and Electrical Equipment), formerly AEG (German General Electric Company 3en-
nigsdorf. Practically 100 percent of ae production goes to the USSR.
Trucks for the Soviet Army are made by the following VVB Ifa. plants:
Horch in Zwickau/Sc,aeen, ghaenomen in ?itttau/Sacheen, and Framo in Hainicher/
Sachsen. At Zwickau, 80 3-ton diesel trucks are produced monthly, while at
Zittau 150 2k-ton gasoline trucks and 15 ambulances are turned out in the same
period; all these vehicles go to the Sc.iete.
:ruck trailers are produced principnlly by the BAG Lindner Plant, Halle/
Saale, and by the VRA Railroad Car Factory,
go to the USSR.
Most of the motorcycles built by the SAG Avtowelo, formerly BMW, in Eieen-
ach, are also turned over to the Soviets. These machines have 350 cubic centi-
meters displacement, rear wheel spring suspension, and a speed of 120 kilometers
per hours they are perfectly suited for motorcycle messengers. The plant pro-
duces 200 such machines monthly. The BAG Sisson in Buhl makes heavy motorcycles
of over 500 cubic centimeters displacement.
The lion's share of the AM passenger care produced by the BAG Awtovelo
also goes to the USSR.
The following VE.1s produce bicycles for the USSZ: Wanderer Plant in
Chetznits, Mifa Plant in Ungerhausen, National Plant in Ha'naberg near Dresden,
Urania Plant in Cottbus, Mom Plant in kueh?hausen/Thusringen,BAG Simeon in
9sst,l/4ruarinaen and the Elite Diamond Plant in Biegmar-Schoenen near Chemnita.
8-E-Calf-E-T
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5, Caesicals
in quantities far beyond:-the needs of the Soviet Zone, Only a very small part
of this production is used in mining or in the SAO Wismuth enterprises; by far
the greater part is delivered to the USSR. The VEB Explosives Plant at Gneech-
witz n4.ar Bautzen makes dynamite, with.50-60 percent nitroglycerine content;
bl.astinq gelatine, with 21 percent nitroglycerine content; ark' pulverized
Donarit, with 14 percent nitroglycerine content.. Altogether, the plant
produces about 1,000 tons a month. A new people owned explosives plait was built
monthly. The former Fertilia AG in Coswig near Dresden, today a people-owned
plant in the VVB Sapotex (Soap and Cleansing Agents) and the largest produce:
of sulfuric acid in the Soviet Zone, has begun the manufacture of dynamite. The
SAG Buse plant in Schkopau near Baile/Saale has begun to produce nitroglycerine.
This plant is also producing poison gases, such as mustard gas, phosphorus, fe-ic_
phosgene?7 and potassium cyanide. The latest figures obtainable indicate the
following daily production (in kilograms). mustard gaf, 900 phosphoruso 500.600;
Sugar Refinery; the raw material for its manufacture is the molasses residue
from the va;rR-ous Soviet Zone sugar factories.
Fuel for jet aircraft is produced from a gasoline base by the SAG Boeh-
- th_ car
Leura. The monthly Output of jet fuel amounts at present to about 12,0G0 tons.
Antiknock gasoline for aircraft Is produced at the SAG Boehlen Gasoline
Plant. All of the monthly output of about 6,000 tons goes to the Soviet Army;
efforts are being made constantly to increase this output.
6. Shipbuilding
As early as string 1946, shipbuilding sus revived in the Mecklenburg
shipyards. The small yards were occupied principally with tLe construction of
w'oden or mega. iifeboats -u oc-s, nlCOpc, oe ?- rid ?fnra The larz
yards, such as the SAG NeptunyinRostock, the VWW (Federation of People-Owned
Shipyards) Ship Repair Yard in Wismar, the VVW Shipyard in Rostock and the
former Kroeger Yard in Stralsund, repaired ar3 equipped seagoing ZLrchant?7
vessels, tankers, and worships. P11 the construction, repair, and equipment
contracts were chnrgeu to reparations. In 1.947, Land Mecklenburg had to pay
out over 200 million marks to the Baltic shipyards for the contracts made by
the Soviet occ:.pation f-rces. Of this amount, about 180 million went for re-
pairing and equipping 178 seagoing vessels, tankers, and warships. The magni-
tude of the r'pair end equipment operations can be gauged from the fact that
for the work done on four Soviet vessels of Class SA is, 5, 6, and 8, Land
Mecicienhurg had to pay about 36 :sill!.on marks to the Neptun Shipyard. in Rcstt'ck,
and. the costs had to he calculated at 1944 ceiling prices.
Since the end of 1949, at the insistence of the Soviet authorities,
new ship construction has been pushed with great energy at all East German yards.
Tht Two-Yar Plan (1949 - 1950) and the Fire-Year Plan (1.951 - 1955), have drawn
into the new shipbuilding program not only the shipyards of the Baltic seaport
cities of Rostock, Stralsund, Wismar, and 'Warnemnende, but even the Elbe ship-
yards (particularly Magdeburg-Rothensee and Dessau-Roaslau), the people-owned
shipyard in Brandenburg, and others.
In the main, this new ship program is concerned with luggers of 450
tons and seiners of 100-350 tons. Durin 1950, about 200 1 era and 50 seiners
were completed. In the preceding years Lnumber not indicated about 150 luggers,
70 seiners, and several hundred cutters and other small craft were built. As
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a consequence of the extraordinary expansion of the shipyards and the increase
in their capacities, the output in 1951 may well exceed that of 1950. The 12
people-owned shipyards of the Soviet Zone have also begun the construction of
seagoing vessels. Of course, ship repair for the USSR goes on as before.
The seiners are 4quipped with a 300-360 horsepower diesel engine; they
also have a 12C-horseporer- auxiliary engine. Their average speed is 12 knots,
their maximum sped lB knots. Since they have automatic pilots, they can be
steered by remote control. They seem far better suited for use as outpost patrol
planned-as war vessels. The forward part of the hull is reinforced and the decks
are fitted for the mounting of radar apparatus and guns. They have modern radio
equipment. Their holds are so arranged that it would be impossible for them to
take on board profitable amounts of fish; only when heavily laden with such items
as guns, ammunition, and mines are the vessels properly ballasted, It is claimed
that these luggere have 750-horsepower diesel engines; actually, they have 1,000-
horsepower diesels. Their construction shows that these vessels are meant to be
coastal defense vessels, patrol boats, or mine layers; they have crews of 26-32
men.
The diesel engines for the luggers and seiners are made at the SAG Wolf-
Buckau in P6ageburg, VEB Diesel. Engine Plant in Rostock, and also, more recently,
at the Goerlits Machine Facto,-y, a part of VVB Gesko. Uutil a short while ago,
the larger engines (750 and 1,000 horsepower) were obtained from West 'Germany
or the USSR.
The SAG Neptun Shipyard in Rostock has, for several years, been over-
hauling and recendi':ioning former German warships. Up to the present, the
following have been, overhauled (all of them sailed out of the harbor toward the
east): 30 mine sweepers, one mine layer, 6 cruisers, and 3 destroyers.
At the people-owned Hansa Shipyard in Wismar, by mid-October 1950, five
1V 111C1 VCi t4O my...... hit-,' ....... ... been r -~-_------ ondlttoned or us. by the newly-established
~3? uii.c arm, - -~ by
Soviet Zone Sea Police.
7. Equipment
Military boots for the Soviet Army art grade principally in the numerous
shoe factories in Weissenfels belonging to the VVB SLV (Shoes avid Leather Pro-
cessing) Weissenfels/Saale. Every month 25,000 pairs of boots are produced here;
only the very best leather obtainable in the Soviet Zone may be used for this
f.,otwear.
Many plante of the 'NB Konfektion !Reedy-Made Clothing) I and II in
Auerbach/Vogtland and Halle/Scale are occupied exclusively with the manufacture
of uniforms for the Soviet Army. The VEB Halle Clothing Factory, Halle/Saale,
alone produced about
150,000 uniforms
in
1949;
the total produced by all fac-
tories that year was
over a million.
The
1950
output was con*iaerably higher.
A number of the plants of the VVn SLV Elbe-Dresden produce teltn and
German Army model leather ammunition pouches for the Soviet Army. The VEB Leather
and Drive Belt Factory in Dresden makes carrying straps for -mall arms and ma-
chine guns, besides belts and ammunition pouches.
The VEB Zeiss/Jena produces for the Soviet Army all kinds or optical
apparatus, from field glasses to radar equipment; this material is used in the
infantry and the artillery, in tanks, submarines, and aircraft. The v211-known
camera f_cturier: in Dre edeu, now part of VVB Cptlk, deliver photographic
equipment; SAG Agfa.Wolfen (formerly Agfa of IG Farben) furnishes films; and
the VVB Kodak and Mimosa supply photographic papers to the Soviet Army.
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P'
war ? o loviag percentages of its total production of
foodstuffs to the occupying forces:
unn
s
flour and , .
grain products, 600,000; lirye cattle, 200,000; foots, nest, and canned
fruits, 250,000; and sugar, 150,000. Also great quantities of potetoes,leg=sc, amd
vegetables must be sent to the 1888 after each harvest. In 1950, Land Sachsen-
1nha1t had to +irli th f 1
Y
e Soviet Zone government. In addition, vast quantities of fog from the
Soviet Zone suit be delivered to the USSR. In 1948, the monthly ships-entr t--
the USSR by rail alone averaged (in hun&?edvaights i e 50-kilo
it
)
?
-E
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Still other X and some private plants, e.g., Otto Yfsether in Dresden, are
occupied largely in supplying the Soviets-with othei equipeent such as underwear,
socks, gloves, and cooking utensils.
8. Army Rations
All provisions for the Soviet Army units stationed in the Soviet Zone
bare taken from the Soviet Zone, and the cost of this provisioning most be borne
th
Percent
Rest
20-25
Lard end bacon
15
Butter
25-30
Fish
35
Flour
30
Legumes
10
Cereal products
10
sugar
30-35
Confectionery goods
20
Vegetables and canned
vegetables
40-61
Fruit and canned
fruit, jams
30
In terms of quantity that means, for ezaarle, 30,000 tons of seet; 7,200 tons
of bacon, 1,800 tons of lard; 18,000 ton! of butter; 81.,000 tc-;.s of flour;
30,000 tons of sugar; and 10,000 tons of fruits, canned fruits, and dams.
In general, all grade I and II cattle are set "Ids for the acvieto.
In the case of flour, cereal products, confectionary goods, canned `eatables,
fresh vegetables, fruits, jam, canned fruits, and fish, the soviets deaand that
their share be exclusively of top quality. The Soviet sharp of the food pro-
duction in the.other Laerder of the Soviet Zone is probably about the some on
the average as in Sachien,Awalt.
9. Other Armament Material
I`. IN !apossible to list all the other armncent production that Jose
on in the Soviet Zone. The following are a fey random o)tamples:
The V? Calorimeter and Radiator Plant (VV8 Aechanik), formerly Junkers,
in Dessau, sakes light fixtures for airports and se4rchlights. The light fix-
tures are produced in units 100 centi.ters long; the searchlights are 500
millimeters in diawseter.
Your plants in the Soviet Zone make Oerman Army model cable vinebes for
c'ap;f'ax balZs:ann. In 1950 each plant turned ant 1,500 units, or 6,000 in all.
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S .?-G -R-E-.T
The Stamping and Wire-Mesh Plant (VVB TEWA - Industrial Iron Products
mesh for jet aircraft since 194+8. This plant, which also msksos cooking utensils
contract for 20 cartridge-making machines (Patronen-Walzmaschinen). Advance
payment for the contract was made by the Soviets.
the SAG Thaie Ironworks make field-kitchen boilers.
In fall 1950, the VEB Spezima, in Dresden, received its firet secret
The SAG "Podyemnik," formerly the Mako plant, in Rudisleben, Kreis
Arnstadt, makes airfield storage tanks for jet fuel. These tanks have a capacity
of 10,000 liters and are mounted on an undercarriage. By the end of October 1950,
40 such tanks had been produced. This SAG also makes shell cases for amor-pierc-
ing shells. The SAG "Podyet ik," tAin VEB Malthouse Equipment and Heating-Plant
marines. The designs for these engines, vhich are packed in special boxes and
dispatched from the Soviet Zone via the port of Wismar, came from the USSR.
Oberschoeneveide, produces about 100 special tank and aircraft batteries monthly.
The SAG Wolf-Buckau, In Magdeburg, makes large diesel engines for sub-
The SAG Buns, Schkopau, makes aircraft tires; several freight cars
leave the plant daily for the USSR.
The SAG Oberachoeneweide Battery Factory, formerly Varta, in Berlin-
At the beg nn1n .. of the nrr""pntinn regime in the Sow Soviet Zone. thp_ USSR
requisitioned over 90 percent of all output in all fields of production.
Many methods were used to get these products. Delivery of reparations was
one "ray; requisitioning by the Soviet Army was another; priority delivery to
state-owned Soviet export firms a third; and selling thtcsugh a black market
organized by the oc:upying forces a fourth. In addition, there were numerous
variations of these techniques.
For instance, Land Sachsen was obliged to deliver as reparations 30 million
marks" worth of its industrial products within one month. Included in this
aao t weretools and steels, 2.8 million; m.chine tools, 1.6 million; optical
equipment, 1.3 million; and electrical equipment, 1.1 million.
Within one month the Soviet Army demanded from Land Sachsen products valued
at about 20 million marks; 4 million of this was for canteens and belt buckles.
The commerical Lcanch (Handelsnetz) of the Soviet Army demanded within one
month 8 million marks" worth of industrial products from Land Sachsen; this
amount included mattrees.s, .4 million; seeing machines, .2 million; office
furniture, neckties, men's hats, and washing machines, .15 million each.
The commercial branch of the Soviet Military Administration received from
Land Sachsen within one month 4-5 million marks" worth of industrial products,
including, for exs.mple, 150,000 marls! wort:t of each of the fella ing: writing
tabl-;s, bedroom furniture, club furniture, and ladies" suitLases.
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The !soviet Administrations for foreign 3'rsde took from limed Sachsen vitbin
one south about 5 million sstrtia, worth of industrial products, laaalmtin, for
crimple, 1.6 million in scan lumber; .9 ec.llion in cutting mechiaes; .3 million
in cameras; mad .2 million each in seeing seerhines, pecking oadd rss, ty its,
ttabsiaes v,,, required for o1i the goods delivered to the various $ovie4
recipients. Insofar as the value of these deliveries ezesedei thereperation
account, the SBA credited Una at 1944 prices. The iixesss costs occasioned by
the ?rm_* 'a in cost of xe MAWrials by to t t.aaa in U "M'; alLmd - t? 4e-
cline in pr*duotica resulting from the dtsroatling of machinery and setuipment
were all charded'to the Soviet fie.
The volwms of goods deliveries to the bas declined, aomasiaat in the
pest 2 rear" Loveveer, it is still necessary to tib$idise all Isoducts which
Use as a general rue, elsile the people-own" and private, enterprisoo ehs*.
products are delivered to the UM are subsidised in individual cases only.-
no UM credits a fishing lugger at 430,000 marks, but Us cost of pro
A standard wooden house, thousands of.vhich have been delivsred to the.
!/mil, costs 27,E marks to produce, but only 12,000 marts may be charged
of production and the delivery price to the UM is seen more unfavorable (8:1);
2:1; for textiles and leather goals it is 1.5:1.
considerably below. the cost of production. The SAG aloes, even todsj, eccouat
factors'reprerent"a considerable strengthening of the Soviet economic end armament
The armament man facture Which is tarried out for the : in the bgviet
Zone must be dvalueted from several points of view: ? -
1. The area ant products mods in the Soviet Zone relieve the strain an the
am armieslant industry.
2. The arsawnt production of the Soviet Zone bolatars the potential of
the MM, particularly in regard to iron, steel, heavy machinery, and heavy
cheeaiptrr, which are still bottlenecks in the ill.
3. The td>U saves- a great deal of money by placing brmsmsst contracts in
the Soviet zone, aince, as an dcctning power, it insists using paying only 1914
j.rics$.
b. Since the UM proc*ss list German armsmsat goods throwO -angular"
expoft very cheaply, it con gradually loosen the *crows on separations; any
lowering of reparstic J demands mass gc2d propaganda.
3. St UM, by increasing its contrasts to the Soviet Use, is aiding th!
eoonoep CZ the soar. Tin standard of living in the Soviet. Zane Is gradually Is-
" 'a a result. Thus the Soviets are furnished with another propaganda ves-
S-s-a-B?s-2
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6. bec*se of the continuing integkntion of the Soviet Zope econoo with
the Moscow-df ,ct.d p1agned economy at the lattern Mae,, the absoaption of the
Soviet Zone into the 8axiet sphere of inflnatcr is baccaibg acre .and scare con-
plate and, as a oobsequance,,the sane'. dependence on the OM is becoming?con-
stsotly greater.
Haw great is acs: is V04 attested, for exrftle, by Welter Ulbricht,
general secretary of tM 8 ) and Deputy Minister-president of the Soviet Zone
Vva t, m sn, in 814-19 h8' in encouacing the Two Year Ilan of 199 a 1930,
be said Heat the plan deaapded greater industrial activity on the part of Heat
Germany so that "the will not have to fall behind the UOA in econoaic paver."
8irce then, the Ooxawtiist leaders of the Soviet Zone have taken the final
step. ?residaut Wilhelm Pieck and other high officials recently announced, "We
shall fight enthuteiaatinall$ by the side of the 88SR against the West."
only from this point of view is it %Mderetsndable that the Soviet one
leaders have slavishly taken over the exploitation asthoda of the UM and fsetenerd
than on-the Soviet Zone.
The so-called activist novemaats, abicb,entail constantly increasing norms,
intensify the anwamt efforts and simultancoutsly-reduce a cost of these efforts.
Howevsr, the uqusa#oned increase in the tempo of production in the Soviet e
achieved =y these aethods in no may reflects the standard of living, which is
still quite low.
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