TRANSPORT - MILITARY RAILWAYS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00809A000600210292-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 24, 2011
Sequence Number: 
292
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 4, 1949
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00809A000600210292-5.pdf181.13 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/24: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600210292-5 CLASSIFICATION C TAL GL.ITRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CD N. INFORMATION FROM FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT HOW PUBLISHED WHERE PUBLISHED DATE PUBLISHED LANGUAGE Transport - IR.ilitars xai1wa u liont il,y' psriodioa1 Moscow rebruarg 1948 INFORMATION 19118 DATE DIST.* rch 19119 NO. OF PAGES 2 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. in T O 001100 01tnn0; 7{1011, iwt 0w4WM..a Un0Ufl0 c. .. 0. 0. 0.. 11 0110 . N ?001000. /n 1041190100109 91179.90111101100 4V in C"r&II" 0900 01 647. 11101000*0[100 Omit ,00011 /00111 100.11 Cq0? SOURCE Zholos R!g!Z rt, We 2, 1948. (lnforestion regueeted.) on SOY=T 0910 AND RAZZ11AT TBAIIIBPO$T .A..Ylassv urn-ms7or of Teob Troops Eailwsy transport opsratsa saesssnfu14 in world war n, became like otbsr bra,shsa of the maticsal eoomaq it had bsq praparsd daring the Five-Year Plea, foc active defense of the hansland. khroight taiff1e in 1940 a 36 tine. an great as in 1920, and tbs tot>al traskag`s had grown to 103,300 kilanstsgs as oaspatat vlth !'8,00 k lmoters in prwwolutiamsa7 Russia. The awrsge 24-km freight Toed hat risen from 2^,W- care in 1913 to 97 tare in 1910. Enaaq air attacks oniwr rail transport failed to asvar our ccmnseticas with the rear at arp tins drift the far, and the sgppl,P of ailitsrp freight ocatiassd despite the hsaq burisn of evaonatilona fray thrsatomad arses. Apprasiaats],p 1.3 million railroad oar,, or 30,000 trains, oarrl.t svaovation sbipsonts eat pillions of Soviet citicems out of thasatsmsd are" during the first 6 months of the war. 21-9 work of the Oor'Mp', Boson?-assn, Yaroslavl' sat Iaatorn Railroad t etsas during the battle of Ibsoow is fawn. ikral, gibrirtan, sad Par lastsru divisions wore brought in train- loafs at a spat of 800-900 kilc stcrs sva7 24 ,hours. The raiiroats, in fulfilling these taska, contributed uterialky to thy coat of Oarnan Pores arosad Moscow. Daring the battle of Stalingrad, 1.3 tinsc as aarp train,, wont over the single-track. Povorino-llovlya ,sator as wore tiro war. Dariag Novabor the Southeastern Railroad Systs1's freight handling avoragsd 16 full train. per 24-hoar day in support of the sacirolosn* of the 300,000-0010 Dsrrain esq. ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/24: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600210292-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/24: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600210292-5 In the vicinity of Leningrad, new lines were built to effect the supply and liberation of the blockaded city. This single-track Kestornaya-Marmyzhi-Kursk line Carried tremendous amounts of freight during the Kursk operation. Railroads brought up the reserves that stopped the German thrust toward Zhitomir and Korosten' in November 1943. Among other railways of decisive importance during the war were the Sonkovo-Medvedevo, Bologoye-9alday, and YTrbal A.etrakhan'. In 1944, arms, ammunition and-materiel constituted 60 percent of freight handling for transport to the front line, and food and forage 23 percent. In December 1916 munitions were only 4 percent and food and forage 75 Qercent of total freight. Between 1942 and 1944, the transport of .rake and self- propelled artillery increased 4.5 time, trucks 2.2 times, an unition more then twice, and fuel 2.5 times. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Rsngary, Germany, ) nohur"ia and $' , railroad units maintained transport for our field forces. Large- anale transfer of Russian rolling stock to western lurb$een railways was organized, ant changing of 'wheel couples to European gauges without un- loading the ogre was widely practiced. In following our advances, railway restoration proceeded at an average rate of 10-15 kilometers per day in tome sect6rs. Reconstruction of the ?moleaok-Minsk-Warsaw line averagddl6.5 kilometers every 24 hours, while the rate on the Pbko- Dvinek line was 15 kilcwtsre over; 24 hours. In certain periods the opeed of reconstruction reached 21 kilometers per 24-hour day. Despite eanear raids, railroad forces and special units kept such vital terminals as )uz msk, Volkhovstroy, Bologoye, Kursk, Darnitsa, Kupranak, Likhaya and others in operation. In the concluding *tape of the Berlin operation, railway transport did a brilliant fob, reconstructing all necessary front line rails, equipping loa&lkg and unloading installations and preparing for large-scale novamsnt of troops and sapplias. Railroad troop units shoved high combat morale, and nilItary trains advano.C to the front in an organized manner and with- out delays, despite eunp ai,r and artillery bambard^asnts. After the victory the railways rendered great aervice in the return rY. demobilised soldiers in 1945-1946. Throughout the history of the Soviet Arsly~ den have cooperated closely with units of ]mlitary Ccesscloations of Oa Area. Forces in the rear, center and front. the tasks of the postwar live-Year Plan for Soviet railroad den form an inpartant conatrilntioa to the strengthening of U'B0 eoonasnia-military night. As Stella hee yointed out, "While developing peaoefal, cr'cialist oomstrustion we nest not forget for a niwate the intrigues of international reaction which plot a new war. Va mast, as Lenin exhorted, be constantly on the alert, give attention to our amid forces and strengthen the country's_defenaive capacity.' ' C'ID$ITIi+L Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/24: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600210292-5