POLITICAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 295
• Publication Date: July 20, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8
CLASSiFICA I
CENTRAL INTELLi Wu REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
COUNTRY Worth Korea
SUBJECT Pollt.i.ca;
HOW
PUBLISHED Monthly pub] i^al.i
WHERE
PUBLISHED Pyongyanv
DATE
PUBLISHED ~o lvov 191+7
LANGUAGE Korean
AIA TOCII//T COITYOI IUTOuIATIM 51011Th/ TIP ^L:IOUM OISTlll
I7 T ! IIMO ITATTI Oulu TIP OWI11 O! 111101411 ACT II
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or In CIMTIIRS Il LIT UYlltl TO Y sIUTIIOTTfll 511000 is 110'
1"71TTC 0T 1.051. QST03000TIOI OT' TIIII Till I0 TTSIlIIITOI.
SOURCE H,aa Kera ch'onFtyon:
DATE DIST. n'OJut .a
NO. OF PAGES 3
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS, UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
HISTOBT AI. AIMLTSI:i ( T THE. ,Xflr.,or: To171'i{ MOV. r
Korea's March First. independence hbvement of 191:1 endr"l t:, failure, notwith-
standing the fact that there were m re than i0 mil].ioa peopie mobilized in the
movement. Historically analyzed, we find both direct !rx) icdlrect causes for this
failure.
i'icf t1r'suc2 rau.es Included (l t the modest ant co; . -,ate., v pc:: icy of the
bourgeoisie who led the movement, (2) the r?umsrioai wen_1cnc-,a, of -.sae progressive
parties, (3) the absence of hesic demal:ai~ which would spur i.r:e pec:uhi to aatien
and keep them united, and (L) the absence of lmperatjvr % ,,'e,;:t? se related to
daily living that would drive the masses in strugplc i:,ceswtr:tly and untiringly.
In other words, the movement was init.irtr' primarily r p:;l. tlca reasons, and
since it had little to do with matters such as land pr-bl?ma, it failed to appeal
to the farmers. Y'Lis was important, sines- the frnnsra c?.n,r?,r.]t.urtuc snore than two-
thirds of the Korean population.
In addition, there were suer Indic act 'actors a~. (1) Js'yo:?,, ? vietox hu s
nation,enJoyed the advantage of Into nett,,nai. rolatione at ti m), t iris; (2)
although'iunobed in Coordination with a:,i und,.r the euppor. _r-al Tel
movements abroad, the Kor?ar. movement received no :r lterial r_t, p r, -?r am abroad.
Although a failur 'ho mjvonr,?nt ir.?atillF.i In ]:e Korea,- pe.,ple a. strong
raalgl sand. class - _.... yT.,+..
-- - ui ~iaviw~i`!T ..:1'1: tad Pel'C..': That Yi>110peQ
s
young Korean hots::,.>. m' sr2aga:I to be tar, :..+ i?.t 4,.c;lb:Li9d4. After
the March First M._n -xx, numerous youth :r,:na:azc+t-?, ,s spra:,._ all over Korea,
and on 1 February _92" tLn Federation of i;oreu Tou.t.'i ..3eocia. i :_s vas established,
consisting of 133 orgr:nizaticns and over 30,1+C0 meaL re.
The purpose of tie iloderatian of Korean. t.i t. promote,
develop, and. conaolida'.. al ' --,iJ.h organizat i :a. 7h! a via aao;,mpl-eked by
frequent meotings to or. c tote activities amt 'mpr;,vo more.-, p,;b:ieations
and lmopeganda, by eponaori I- pnbllc addresses .sad t :.i - ,r h:1o1a. :.v,pportln.g
public educe tior for the yrl,th. sponeorir,:, at i , to _. ot',, it in 'rdustrial
organizations, conducting industrial research, a' 1, tmrr-^.'.g ho 1,'log conditions
of the poo:.
CLASSIFICATION'
DISTRIBUTION
50X1-HUM
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8
tb
e argy of the bourgeois elements who ruled the Federation,
the cooperative movement declined, and by 192?, enthusiam for it had disappeared..
the Federation gava c oneiooruble V - y . ~i 'ion sly.. nL r'irst
to theconsumercocperative .movement, How-
ever because isf th 1
i
epreeen ng over 100 organizations. Kamen affairs,.
religion, education, labor, economics, racial, and social problems were discussed
and the convention was scheduled to pass its resolutions on 29 March. However,
3 days after the opening, the convention was ordered to close by the Japanese
police who feared a tnm,rs.n+ n?+a., -
the Federation, sponsored , rs.,.y HOblvu cul.caatiea with
pa ration' ;,nth onvention at Seoul. Sy ,ral hundred
delegates partioipatod r t
1
can eration movement. Strong
pressure from the Japanese police ant the prohibition cf Koreans from assembling,
however, restrictedtha Tnasnofn e..:..aa .. -.- . __~.-
convention in Seoul, with 176 delegates -.t znal-sural
g participating. Later, more than 220
organisation Joined the League. The objectives of the league of Korean Youth
Associations were (1) to establish a new society based on the welfare of the
masses, and (2) to became the spearhead of the Icon I
During the same month, the Korean 1orkers League Was organized.
r.orean ,sours AJeooiaticnB,
the league of Korean Youth Associations, and the Korean Workers League, not only
centralized all youth activities in Korea but also succeeded in uniting the
farmers and workers who were effectively Influenced by the organizations and
be nn to tak t
i
g
4 asp ization impressed the public unfavorably. As a result,
the masses began to desert the bourgeoisie leaders and respond to the Communist
annRai
During this period there was another national organizatdon, the Nov Youth
League, separate from others. his organization, founded in August 1922, was
first called Proletarian Youth Aseclation, but was renamed the Saturday Club,
in June 1923. The naps was changed again, in February 1924, to the Now Youth
League, This organization was notoriously subversive. Its policies provided for
(1) social reform through military training and the indoctrination cf youths, and,
(2) that the League should be an eselusive organization of proletarian youths. The
plane of the Now Youth League to sponoor the Far lani Youth Convention were interrupted
by the Japanese authorities.
The establishment of the Korean Commmniet Youth Party, 18 April 1925, was
an epochal event in the history of the Korean youth movement. After its first
failure, the, ultimate success of the Korean independence movement seemed to
depend upon the Korean Cos~uniste, It became apparent that only the Communists,
with their orgendting ability, could bravely continue the struggle under the strong
Pressure and interference of the Japanese authorities. Moreover, unlike the other
social ref camera who concentrated on the political front; and were more or lose
utovian dreamers, the Communists were guided by the economic front and offered
practical solutions for the daily living problems of the suffering masses. The
political'oluzdere of the bourgeoisie who previously had led the movement to failure
and their subs rent d ,.1
e
a so
ve part in their activities.
.
The year 1925 through 1927 marked the turning point in the history of the
Korean independence movement.. This period was characterized by the drastic
change from a relatively mild rivsm>nt nurtured by the more or lose instinctive
huran desire for freedom, and as such limited to a feu intellectuals and the
bourgeoisie, to an aggressive movement strongly motivated by the new economic
front that appealed to the hearts of the masses and encompassed the whole
social strata with deifinite and precise objectives.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8
This trend developed into the Jwte TeatL Desnnstration in 1926. The
significant fact about this demonstration was that it was led l,F students,
which indicated the new direction of the movement towards enbraef* all anti-
Japanese elements -- students and workers, intellectuals amt nonintellectuals.
The moat notable acccmgpliebmant of the youth movement of this period was
the unification of the various proletdri.an organizations which frequently
lacked unity because of religious conflicts.
The famous Svangju Sttdent Incident which occurred in Kwangju Railway
Station in November 1929 between Japanese Police and Korean atudente ushered
in the period of continuous struggle byetudonta which lasted until perch
1930. Daring this period, 194 schools end over. 5k,000 students were susponded.
In January 1930, when the movement was at ita climax, .2,000 employees of the
Pusan Spinning Coate, 300 workers of the Kato Rice Refinery, in.Tnohon, aid
the workers of the `rasohang Textile Company in Seoul, launched a general
sympathy strike.
After 1931 the movement reverted to iu erg nrs4 activity beceuss of the
increased jmossax of the government in and around Hamgyonjg Province. Students
instigated farmers riots.
We conclude by saying that the anti-Japanese sentiment,itich earvad
etreotively in unifying the youths for Communistic purposes,tea2-i to slienata
the public Erma the.novagsflt' when it was turned to radical actions. The public
shunned both pe?rivtise< an& Cc?nM sin, when too large a dose was given at once.
The lack of public ecceptsnoe end support, so important in the perpetuation of
an organization, forced most at the organizations to disintegrate.
The foregoing historical analysis of the Korean South Novessnt is based
on the assRsr info4 otiou available due to the circumstances prior to the
li1oratio ,f Zorea which did not permit the free recording of data. It is
hoped tint is'will eerie as a valuable lesson to the the North Korean
Ccomonist oagenizera of today.
IAL
50X1-HUM
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240295-8