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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE CY INFORMA.ION FROM COUNTRY USSR SUBJECT Transportation HOW PUBLISHED Pamphlet WHERE PUBLISHED Duesseldorf, Germany DATE PUBLISHED 31 Dec 1941 LANUAGE German Tilt DOCI02RT CONTAINS INFORMATION strl:Taa US NATIONAL tins,. ON US Ru=t STATSS iintS US MISSING OF SAMOSA SS ACT IS I. R. C.. 11 Fes x1, Ar AMtt,.Y. I7t TRANxM?1D1 tlt 1Nl RtrxLF/lo1 01 Ita CO1TRNit It AMT RAtnu TO AN SNASTNOS1t1S 111101 it nn- nONIt1T1o. 'J M,.a RT Yn. 111,11O8l0"On or "is roan is SOURCE CD NO DATE OF INFORMATION 1941 DATE DIST. 7 Aug 1949 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION SowletruesischaVerkohrexirtschaft, 'Tore nigte Staha.werke Aktieagesellachaft, Volkewirtechaftllohe Abte lung. United Steel Works Corporation, Politico-Econtmio Department, 1941. (FDB Doc 519238 1. PAIIECIAD8 A. Present USSR Railroad Network, 1. General Traffic Density Although the present operating length of USSR railroads is almost two-thirds lsrg.:r than that of 1913, the number of railroads is still very limited, considering the size of the country and its population. In 1937 the total railroad operating length in the USSR amounted to 86,500 kilometers, compared with 50,500 kilometere (without Poland) in 1913. In 1939 Germany, including Austria, Sudetenland, and the Incorporated Eastern regions, had approxLdately 74,000 kilometers, not counting private railroads. The ratio of the population density per square kilomiter in Germany to that of Russia is 1,000 to 53, the dencit7 of the railroad network in kilometers per 100 square kilometers in Germany to that of Russia is 1,000 to 38; and the density of the railroad network in kilometera_per 10,000 inhabitants in Germany to that of Russia Is 1,000 tc 610. These figures reveal that in Germany there are 19 times as many inhabitants per square kilometer as in the Soviet Union, 132 as compared with 7 inhabitants per square kilometer; that the German railroad network is 27 times as dense as the Soviet, 10.9 ab compared with 0.4 kilometers per square kilometer, end that to every two German there is slightly more railroad length than to every three Russians, 8.2 as compared with 5 kilometers per 10,000 Inhabitants. In comparing the LdSR with other countries, It ohould, however, be borne in mind that it is composed, of vast lands of which the steppes and tundras and partly desert land are of no Importance whatsoever with respect co railroad freight traffic sinrto they ere without Inhabitants or are only sparsely populated. These areas, however, are not clearly definable and therefore cannot be omitted for purposes of ocmparison. But even in the Ukx%ine, where the railroad length eaounted to 14,400 kilometers in 1937, in the Moscow Region, and the Central Black Earth Region (area between Tula and Kharkov), which rank among the most STATE Anwr o~u~rr'~- 1 , pp 411MMML Neae DISTRIBUTION El Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 eg i der loredareea from the Atandroint of rmmun.icatione, vbe density cf the rail- road network reaches only o'? fourth that rz rie a -'re. ' in the Rai [?t.. IL. ration of the density of the rai.ircad r, t In r umetera ter 100 square kilo, meters of area in Germany to that in the Ukraine is approximately :.,000 305 in the Moscow Region is approximat'ly 1,000 272 in the Central Black Earth Region 1,000 226 2. Principal Features of Railroad Network In Eltropean USSR At the beginning of the Second Fire-Year P'a.u,the railroad network in European USSR was still 5 to 1.0 times as dense as in Aatatic USSR. Whereao in Siberia the railroad density varies between 0.9 and 11 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometers, in the western part of the Soviet Union It reaches approxi- mately 24 kilometers, and in the Ukraine 32 kilometers per 1,000 square kilo` meter. In 1933, the figure was 29.6 kilometers in the Moscow region and only 14.5 kilometers in the Leningrad region. As a result of the creation of new industrial centers east and southeast of the Ural Mountains, the Western Siberian regions gained increased prominence. No significant shift in the regional distribution of the railroad network, however, in noticeable even today'in spite of the fact that the expansion, by approximately 60 percent, which the Soviet railroad network experienced between 191.3 and the present was confined largely to the formerly unopened areas of Central Agin and Siberia. The areal hub ~f the railrnnn network of European USSR is Moscow, . the starting point of most important railroad lines. For through freight traffic from the socth to the north, and to relieve the Moscowbeltt lline, to tin recent years construction was begun on a semicircular ty pass a east about 100 kilometers from the capital. Leningrad and Kharkov are next in importance as railroad junctions. In the Ukraine, the main lines emanate from Kiev. The r-dial system of the Czarist period is still recognizable even today. Lines :lead from the main junction to the border, setting up the connection with the western and southwestern countries. Formerly tr ffiicci.. abroad was impeded due to the fact that the USSR railroad gauge Is app and mately 9 centimebsim wider than the standard gauge customary if, Western Europe. It is 1.524 centimeters compared with the 1.435 centimeters of the standard gauge. This necessitated reloading at the border Pointe. In the_1920e, however, a voeparatively simple method was invented by which the majority of the ordinary freight oars were transferred without reloading to the wheel asse%blies of the standard gauge, which provided 'relief for the froight `raffio. 3. The Main Lines In view of the great width of the country the long through lines j6giatral?, hereinafter referred to as main line are of particularly great importance in the Soviet Union. Primarily they link the economi: areas east and west of the Urals. In the European tart the three main liner, connecting the TAni:,gi'ad-Moscow industrial region with the Donbass and which handle the mass transport of the raw materials from the Donets Basin tc the north, should be stressed. In Rostov the lines connect with the Transcauoastar railroad leading to Baku. The last section to Rostov cf the onn6ral one, the so-called Donbass Main Line, has not yet been completed. It has assumed a large part of the tasks of the Enrek-Eharkov Main Line. The Bryanek-Vyazma->7hev line is to relieve the Moscow railroad net, routing the Donets coal direotly to Lenin grad. In addition ther3 is a through connection via Vitebsk-Gomal? between Leningrad and Odessa, likevise between M.-?acov and Sevastopol? CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CQN IBEK IAL CONFLDENTIAI The burden of the "lateral ecnnecti;?,e between the Dnepr and the Donets Regions, which accomplish the exchange of the iron ore of Kri.voy Rog and the coal from the Donets,is extremely heavy. The Krivoy Rog-Nikopol, Zaporozh'ye and Pyatikhatki-Dnepropetruosk lines have been electrified. The best known of the main lines nowadays is the coo" letely double-- tracked Trans-Siberian Railroad which connects Moe ow Frith the Far last via & ybyshev (Samara)-Chelyabinsk, or Yaroslavl'-Perm, and Omsk-Irkutek - Khabarovsk. From Zeningrad,this main tine can be rea'ohed dirartly in Omsk, via Perm- Sverdlovsk. The Trans-Siberian Railroad is the main traffic artery of Asiatic. USSR. The former through line has developed into an entire system of railroads. It is, the starting point for those railroad lines that opened up the Siberian raw material resources and industrial centera in Karaganda, Bertys (Kounrad), Kuznetsk andMinusinek. Only since the outset of the Third FircYour Plan ha^e efforts been made to avoid the detour via;tbe Trans-Siberian in transport to the west,'and to'--set up direct links between the individual industrial centers. This refers principally to sections of the South Siberian Main line mentioned later. The new industrial: center of Komsoaol'ek, in the Far East, is connected to the Trans-Siberian in Khabarovsk. Since the Amur railroad, so close to the border, to subject 'to ser?,us threats in emergencies, the Soviets revived an old plan from Czarist times, namely, that of a Baykal-Amur Main Lin, ('RAM). The BAM starts In Teyshet, by-passes lake Baykal in the north and is to end, for the time being, in Somsomml?ek. It to not known to what extent t;i) con- struotion of this railroad was completed by the beginning of the war. It is planned to have its terminal at the Tatarskiy Proliv near Nikolayevek. The Turkelb (Novosibirsk-Alma Ata-Taehken+-) was opener In 1931. It links Siberia with Central Asia and supplies the Turkestan population with grain, which made possible the development of cotton cultivation in this region. The first large branch line, linked to it in 1939, was from Rubtsov via Seminogorek into the zing:, lead, and copper region of Kidder. The following large lines are under construction or planned: Direct Tbilisi-Moscow connection, Stalingrad-Orsk, with Connection to the South Siberian Main I'ne South Siberian Main Line, Satan??-Ufa-Magnitogorsk-Orsk-Akmolinek- Kaznetsk-Minusinsk-Tayshet. Together with the BAM the latter Is to form a second Trans-Siberian line designed to rel=evo the present one. At the end of January 1940 the first test run took place on the Karaganda-Akmolinek-Kartaly-Magnitogorsk line, effecting for the first time a direct connection between the coal region of Karaganda and the ore deposits of Magnitogorsk. It vrntld lead too far to enumerate all pica for the conntruotion of nee railroad aoaneetions. Basically, their purpces is to knit together more closely the Donets Basin with Krivoy Rog; the Murmansk and Ural regions vit4 Central European USSR; and Western Siberia with Central Asia, and to ehurten the existing transport roates. 4. Proportion of Double to Single Track Lines Apart from the comparatively limited track length, the USSR railroad network suffers from a very unfavorable proportion of the double-tfa2k t: the single-track lines. Of a total length of 86,500 kilometers in the Soviet Union 1n 1937, only 26,500 kilometers (1913' 18,000 'k.Llometere) were double track lines. According to the Third Five?Yea- Plan, a total of 34,000 kilo- meters of double-track linos were to be completed by 1942. with a total. track length of 97,000 kilometers. Even if this could be accomplished, the pro- COHF OENT11L Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CONFIDENTIAL portion would still be unfavorable, considering the fact that in Germany the reverse is true. The double-track finer, ar of particular strategic importance for which reason they are located mostly In the western part of the USSR. Eaunomio interests received little consideration in the development of traffic routes. One of the greatest achievements in railroad construction was the doubling of the Trans-Siberian, carried out within 3 years and completed shortly before the war. This was not merely'a matter of laying a sedond track on an, existing roadbed; for due to terrain difficulties, routes far off,the main line had to be chosen for considerable distances The line now leads to the vest doable-tracked via Kuybyshev-Penza-Valuyki into the Donets Basta. In addition, the double tracking on the connection of the Trans-Siberian to - the'capital, via the detour Sverdlovsk-Perm-Yaroslavl', was completed. (at the Manchurian border) junctions of the Trans-Siberian are equipped with to have been close to oompletior by the outbreak of the war. The Baku-Batumi railroad was likewise in the process of being , converted, to a double-track line. Also the three main lines from Moscow to the Donbass and the Mcecow. Yaroslavl'-Kenosha;line hare double tracks. The Leningrad-Moscow lino is even The portion of electrified lines within the USSR railroad network lu very small, oonstr,'otion h-ving been started energetically only since the Second Five-Sear Plan. Nevertheless, electrified lines increased from 0.2 per- cent in 1932 to 1.4 percent in 1937. Essentially electrification is limited ') the surban traffic of the four traffic centers of Moscow, leningrad, Kiev, and lmarkov. In addition to the mentioned connections in the Krivoy :tog region, among others the Tranacaucasus rat]rrd has been partially electrified, also the last section of the Murmansk railroad from Kandalakeha on. B. Yffioiency of U39B Railroads 1. Freight Traffic a. Transport Performance and Rolling Stock A comparison with Germany shows how great the transport loads are that the Russian railroads must handle. Not only did the absolute quantity of the goods shipped increase, but also the average shipping distance. Fo, example, daring the Second Five-Year Plan, the latter increased from 632 to 666 kilometem. Con- sequently, as compared with 1913, the ton-kilometer performance Increased acre than fourfold while the quantity of the freight shipped barely tripled. CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 50X1-HUM' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 COL TUSz~'R Freight Traffic Cooinared V: th That of Germany Frei it Shipped AveraQe Shipping Distance in Mullion tone) in 1928 481 156.2 1932 280 267.9 1942 (plan) 750 including Austria and Sudetenland Year 152 158. 496 67 65.7 598 73 93,4 632 4,4 169.3 669 71 323.4 696 8o* 355,0 718 93* 370.5 1928 1932 1937 1942 (plan) F5?si An cars 15,100 472,000 17,900 51; 5,8oo 23,700 750,000 (approximate) 31,700 1,200,000 For oomparativi purposes it should be stated that in 1938 Germany (including Austria and Sudet:,nlan3) possessed a stock of 25,200 locomotives and 650,200 freight oars. The USSR stock of freight cars, therefore. increased from 1932 to 1937 by approximately k0 percent and that of locomotives, approximately, by only 32 percent whereas the ton-kilometer volume expanded by approximately 1.15 percent. Zt is natural that, with this rolling stock, such outputs as those shown above could be attained through continuous, extraordinary straining of the traffic apparatus. Already in 1932 the traveling performance of the rolling stock vastly axceodeb. the German scale: Germany USSR 7.oeomotive-kilometera per locomotive 36,653 34,947 Car axle-kilometers per freight car 20,074 61,239 During the Second Five-Year Plar. an even more extensive utili- zation of the r-lling stick is expeotod to have been attained. By cutting tkt hauling time of freight oars from 9 to 7 days (Germany in 1938, epproxi- wately 3.5) and increasing the average traveling speed from 14.3 to 19.6 kilometers per hour, the average day's run of the freight oars was increased from 99 kilometers In 1933 to 140 kilometers in 1937. The number of care made available each day rose from 51,400 to 89,700 and was to reach 110,000 in 1942. In Germany, including Austria and Sudetenland, in 1938 the number of oars was 154,500. The rollit.g stock is insufficient not only in view of the extraordinarily great shipping distances but also with regard to the operating length of the railroad netvork, The stock of locomotives and freight cars, per 1,000 kilometers of operating length, lagged far behind the density of German rolling stock. COSFIDENTIAL . CONFIDENTIAL 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CONFIDNNTlAL Equipment of Line Network With Rolling Stock 1913 1928 193P 1937 037 was below 1.5 million ton-kilometers per kilometer of operating length. mately 5.3 million ton-kilometers in 1942 as compared with 4.2 millinu tea- kilometers in 1937. In Germany, in comparison, the average traffic density in length. In spite of this improvement the load of the Russian railroads would still be a huge one since the network, even with a length of 97,000 kilo- meters,; would still not match thedimensions of the area to be supplied. The number of ton-kilometers per kilometer of operating length is to reach approxi 52.0 286 11,422 459 196 12.550 407 2:19 11,976 4oe 274 10,910 6,784 6,139 6;691 8,834 After completion of the Third Five-Year Plan there was to be 31.6 locomotives and 12,371 freight cars to each 1,000 kilometere of operating the demands upon the railroads increased en steadily, by 400 percent over the figure of 1913 according to the Soviet press of 1940, that the o'itl:ut per vehiole had to be increased at the expense of safety. This is responsible for the high repair requirements of the rolling stock: 6 percent for freight cars, and 20 percent for locomotives. b. Operating Instability As is known, the frequency of accidents on the USSP railroads is unproportionately high. It can be attributed to insufficient training of personnel and to the poor condition of installations end rolling stock. Already structural defects have become apparent in the foundation. The construction pattern followed is chiefly that of field rai?.roads, as they are used in wartime. Perfect roadbeds and auxiliary installations hardly exist. The great distances, the unfavoreole terrain eonLitions, and the complete wilderness of scale"of the regions through which tracks must be laid, make the prooureoieut of the construction material ec difficult that the track dust ccn- etructed is used to lay the subsequent track. The top of the roadbed is in even worse oonditio:, than the .oandation. As a rule, sand is used as ballast. Gravel is found rarely, broken stones hardly ever. Generally, untreated wood is need as ties. The number of ties, (1,440 per kilometer), is very low-in comparison with Germany, 1,600; and the United States, 2,000. Furthermore, the track material is too light. Whereas in Germany a track weighting approxi- mately 45 kilograms per meter was used before World War I, more than 80 per- cent of the Russian main tracks have a weight of less than 38 per meter. The intrrduction of new heav, steam locomotives necessitated the strengthening of the trackvork, which has been effected already on some lines in the Ural region and on the railroads in the interior of the Donets region. I ?CONFIDCMTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 trains, receive special premiums for each freight train routed through on schedule. Such premiums are not paid for pacsenger traffic. Cdnsequently, the passenger trains and the for fast trains each day experience delays of many houz'b. personnel, locomotives, and repair shops, intentionally, passenger traffic was curtailed heavily. In 1937, the Soviet freight traffic load was 355 billion ton-kilometers; passenger traffic, however, only 91 billion passenger- kilometers, i.e., hardly twice the amount of German passenger traffic, whereas the freight traffic, load was 41 times that of the German. Many passenger connections were dispensed with and the lines made available to freight traffic. Special supervisory ,officials, whose task is the prompt routing of the freight Passenger traffic in the USSR lags far behind freight traffic. Because of the .limited extent of the railroad network, the lark of trained b. Passenger Train Performance In contrast to the prewar period, suburban traffic is gaining increasing importance, over long-distance traffic, due to the rapid growth of cities in. the process of industrialization. Of the 1.2 billion persons transported in 1938,0.9 billion fell to suburban traffic. The main share is handled by Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and Kiev. The following table war period: Year Posen ms Transported Average Traveling Distame in millions in km .~ 1913 185 136 1928 291 84 1932 967 87 1937 1,143 80 shows the development of the USSR passenger traffic as compared with the pre- The rolling stock for passenger traffic is extraordinarily small. Whereas the loads, expreeeed in passenger-kilometers, increased by 261 percent between 1913 and 1937, the etoc of passenger cars expanded only by 13 percent. for the same period. A passenger-kilometer load almost twice as great as than of Onrmany was attained in 1937 with a rolling stock estimated to be 60 per.- cent smaller. In 1937, Germany posseeued 60,000 passenger care, the USSR, ho- .4-ever, only An estimated 25,000. The average traveling dpaed of passenger trains is likewise low. In 1937 it amoanted to 2h.6 kilometers per hour. The fastest train, the "Red Arrow," rune between leningred end Moscow. On this comparatively faror- able straight line it attains a speed of barely 71 kilometers pcr hour. In general, hoverer, the traveling speed of the fast trains is between 40 and 60 kilometers per hour. The speed of the "Siberian Express" operating between Moscow and Vladivostok is 40 kilometers per hour. CONNIBE T!AL Passenger Traffic a. Neglect of Passenger Traffic 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Basis of USSR Inland Naviiration 1. Favorable Geographical Conditions radiate in all directions, and empty into the seas surrounding the country, Essentially, there are two head-water regions; the Valday Mountains north west of Moscow, and the northern part of the Urals;. As in the case of the railroad network, a radial orientation of the waterways is evldont. It Is worth noticing that Mosco- is located in the traffic focal point also with respect to the waterways network. .In 1937 it was linked through the Volga Moskva Canal to the waterways basin of the Central-European USSR, the Volga- Oka Ring. and the Bug-Dnepr Canals form the connection between the Dnepr and the rivers flowing into the Baltic Sea, and an eastern depression with the Neva-Volga System which includes the Mariinsk Canal System between Moscow and Leningrad. Both traffic channels, which connect the Baltic Sea with the Blank Sea and Caspian Sea, respectively, have to overcome only very slight differences in elevation, thus allowing both downstream and upstream navigation. Natural lateral connections, as acll as canals which could facilitate an exchange of commodities between the various river basins, are lacking. As rule, the canals coaseructad so far, serve to complete the continuous north-south con- nection (Mariinek Canal, Stalin Canal). .The favorable geographical orientation cL the waterways is adversely a cempa.~etireiy shot navigation period. In winter, shipping 13 interrupted for me.,the by a heavy cover of ice, and in summer the water level frequently sinks so low as a result of the drought that wandering sand banks impede navigation. Regulated water channels, which are really indis- pensable for the wide, mostly shallow, USSR rivers, do not anat. The riv?,e in the south of European USSR are frozon approximately 100 days per year; in the north, approximately 200 days; In the south of Asiatic 'TSSR, approximately 235 days; and in the Asiati3 North, approximately 275 days. The navigation period varies at the upper and lower courses of the Volga between 6 and 9 months. Conditions are more favorable in the cases of the Dnepr and Don Rivers. The period open to traffic is generally limited from 2 to 4 months on the re?- raining rivers. The poor maintenance of the waterways during World War I, and their deterioration In the postwar period, rendered many of the waterways completely unusable. When the Soviet regime finally came to recognize the importance of inland shipping for the mass transports so characteristic of USSR communications, it first had to center its attention on the improvement and increase in efficieuoy of the waterways. However, it could devote only limited effort to new construction projects. Except for the brief navigation period, the poor structural condition of the waterways does not permit any extensive utilization of inland shipping for freight traffic. The numerous USSR waterrays, there- fore, constitute traffic routes of only subordinate importance in the country's communication system. CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CONFIDENTIAL Only -jr, USSR rivers are described as navigable. At the beginning of 1940, 94,800 kitouieterr, .1 weterw8 y5 were actuax.y ra gated, of which 3,000 kilometers were se.uals. Tne length C the inland water ways network thus is longer than the USSR railroad network whereas !n Germany the inland waterways account for approximately only one bixth of the length cf the railroad network. B. The Artificial Waterwase . Of the canals built under the Czar the old Mariinek Canal. System (1,050 meters long) LProbably 1,050 kilometer is the most important one. It linaa the Baltic Sea via the Neva, Svir, Vytegra, and Shekena Rivere with the Volga, and through the latter, with the Caspian Sea. The canal installations are out- moded. Traffic to nut very extensive. Until now only ships with a maximum loan capacity of 800 tons could navigate this canal system. According to the most recent plane it was to be dredged to a depth of 5 meters and pro- vided with modern lock's for ships with a maximum load capacity of 20,000 tons.: A connection between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, Via the Dvina and Dnepr wad established through the Berezina Canal upon completion of the Dneprostroy;Looks. The efficiency of the canal, however, does not come up to present dnydemands and therefore is of little importance to traffic. Besides, the estuaries of these rivers, at the Baltic Sea, are located in foreign countries. For this reason several plans were considered acct-ding to which the Dnepr wab'to be employed as a useful connection. The ohorteet route would be via the Lovat and a protected Lovat-Dnepr Canal. Furthermore, c canal bo- tween the. Desna and Oka is planned which would establish the connection with the Volga-Oka Ring and the Mariinek System. This waterwep would fulfill an old desire for a link between the Upper Volga and the Blank Sea, which would gi*e the Usraine, so rich in natural resources, a link with all USSR economic areas, over the navigation ring of Central-u:opean USSR. The construction of canals under the Soviet regime was carried out principally from a viewpoint of defense. Two large new works should be men- tioned here: the Stalin Canal, as connection between the Baltic and the Mate Sena, and the. Vc'_ga-Moskva Canal.The Salin Cartl was to oprelieve the Murmansk railroad; among other things, to assist foreign war materials, and to facilitate the exchange of light naval forces, In 1933 it was opened to traffic. Contrary to some allegations, it is defi- nitely not altogether free of ice. its depth is 3.6 meters. Of great economic importance it the already mentioned Volga-Moskva Canal which was opened to traffic in 1937. It can be navigate?. by sea-going vessels and a small naval force will oe able to cast anchor at the naval port planned for the vicinity of-Moscow. it is 128 kilometers long, approximately 60 ma.,ero wide and 4.5 meters deep. Finally in European USSR, the frontier canals in Belorussia should be mentioned which, after ::sing take: over by the Soviets, probably were to directed agvinsteGebrmmaany.inAbovepall, thetBug-DnprrCanalc(builtnina1780, 100 kilo- ma meters long) may gain importance for transport of Ukrainian raw materials to Germany via the Viola River and the Baltic Sea. Until 1939 it was in com- uythe paratively poor repair. The the Dnepr had ben madeanavigeblecthrough depth of the canal. Only after construction of the reservoir (Dneprostroy) near Zaporozh?ye, did the canal gain importance. Fovever, navigation conditions on the Dnepr must be im- prnved still further if the canals connected with it are to be used to a large extent for the traffic between Germany and the Ukreine. Its depth versos between 0.9 meters at the upper course and 1.7 meters at the lover course. The Soviets Intend to ensure a continuous depth of 5 meters by means of ten reservoirs. Freight traffic of the Ukraine with Northern Europe could at a future time, if necessary, develop aia Daniig a Koenigsberg. A navigation period of 7 to 8 months may be expected. German Institute for Economic Research (Deutechea lnstitut fuei CONFI?IE NTL ONN~INEE~T~A Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 The Oginekly Canal, built in 1770, for the present is of importance only in local traffic. It is 12 meters wide and its mean navigation depth is __ n I,n ...e+o..s shipping period. shipping space of approximately 14,000 tone, up to 600,000 tons 01 irelght g o In op.,* o go of H?rope at present serves only internal USSR eooaomy, due to the unfavorable location of its mouth. Sea-going vessels cannot reach it. Although the land at the mouth is very fei`~.Lio, the climate is much too dry. In spite of the huge volume of water which the Volga carries to the Cawptan 3et, t'_ latter's eater level continues to sink and is already 26 meters oelow th^t of the Black Sea. Prerequisite to the eo'Ivinq of the Volga Project, in the fram9vork of which 4 to 14 million hectares of steppe land are to to irrigated vtth the waters of the Volga, is the tapping of the water-rich rivers of northern USSR. A large reservoir of approximately 18,000 square kilometers, roughly the area of lake Iadega, at the upper course if the Kama near Solikaask where Soma, Vyohegla and Pechora Rivers approach snob other, is to collect the waters of the rivers mentioned and feed them. into the 7nlga. Along the Volga, Kama, and Ota Rivers a total of 16 reservoirs are to be built, eight of which are allocated to the Volga. They will cake possible the production of 12 million kilowatts of electric energy and an annual supply of 60 billion kilowatt hours. The past Soviet production varied from )0 to 145 billion kilowatt hours. The largest reservoir is under construction at Kuybyshev. Upon completion it will occupy an area of 740,000 hectares and will be up to 20 kilometers in width. By means of a 2 kilometer break through the divide of ?erevoloksk, the Volga loop at Kuybyshev is to be cut off. This will shorten the Volga route by 173 kilometers. The Uglich and Rybinsk locks were opened to traffic in part this summer and were ',o be completed by 1942. The reservoir below Kalinin was put into operation in 1937. 1 is to be,closed by, means of a canal. in , e m.n also be tied to the Great Volga System and obtain a water route to the Black Sea. Beyond this, the plane provide for a continuation of this waterway from the Ob= via the Ket through a canal to the Yenisey and farther via the Upper Tunguska and i,he Angara to lake Baykal. 0. The Great Volga Pro act The most revolutionary of the projects for USSR inland navigation is concerned with the improvement of the Volga and its junction with the water- rich rivers of the north. Its completion will be of great importance not only to USSR economic life but also for 0,9 ewehange of commodities between USSRt and Central and Western Shrope. ability and abundance of water the largest stream d navi f region o e r the Ch'isovayaare to be improved and the gap between the, Iset and the Chusovaya hi z nor Western Siberia would It is intended to transport Kuznetsk coal by water to the industrial f L_ IT I. Navigation on3itions or, the Tom, Ob', Tobol, Inset, and an increasing measure. The Siberian rivers serve as approach roads to both the Trans-Siberian railroad and to the Arctic Ocean Route which the Soviet Union intends to use in s gable 19;500 kilometers; and the Yenisey for , om In Siberia, navigation has gained relatively greater importance than in European USSR since hardly any other means of communication exist there and the rivers are navigable far into their upper courses. The Ob-Irtyeh is nevi- tars 8 4C0 kil The Augustovo Canal is used only to float lumber. CONFIDE T AL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 and the industrial region of Moscow. Such a .route would be only 2,?50 ki1- ateters long whereas the one leading over the Volga-Don Cana will be 3,420 kilometers long. This proposed route, however, would first have to be regu- lated along its entire length. By 1960 the entire Volga was to have a cant,iiiauua u--kth )i 'mats .. Tne plan to attain a depth of the Volga, chanr91 cf 2.6 meters by 1942, was, how- ever, only partially accomplished. The task of the Great Volga Project, from a standpoint of communications, is to provide the shortest possible connection between Moscow and the Black Sea. To this end a Volga-Don Canal is being built near Stalingrad which for traffic purposes shifts the mouth of the Volga to the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea. Iteoons~ruction is said to have begun this, year. Am0 nimum depth of 6.4 meters is planned. It will also be utilized as a traffic route between the Caspian and Black Seas, particularly for the transport of petroleum. Tc be sure, a shorter connection between these two seas via the Manych and Kuma Rivers has been planned and completed impart. In addition to the project of the, Volga-Don Canal another very old plan is under consideration, according to whicn the Oka would be linked with the Upper Don, and thus a'direct waterway connection set up between the Donbass N Freight Transport Freight Traffic on Inland ed Frei t Trn ort Ouhput in million tone (in billion ton-km) 1913 48.2 37.2 1928 18.3 15.9 1938 66.6 32.9 1939 72.6 35.0 36.0 1942 (plan) 58.0 The ton-kilometer output did not increase in the same meusurp as the freight tonnage transported. Thus the average transport dtetanoe, in contrast to thb railroad, has decreased. In 1913 it wee 772 kilometers; in 1928, 86'; kilometers; ip 1938, 481 kilometers; and in 1939, 526 kilometers. This decrease of the transport distbnoa may be attributed in part to the increased shipment of goods which requires relatively short shipping distances, such as building materials. On the whrle, the average shipping distance decreased for almost all types of goods. This is particularly true of petrjleurr, which has to travel the longest distance. 1,650 kilcnetnre in 19,28, 1,140 kilometers 4a 1937. For short hauls, inland shipping was used; long-distance hauls were left to the railroads. Distribution of nand-Shipping Traffic Over Vemioue waterways in 1937 Quantity of Goods in Million Tons Percentage of Total Quantity Volga; Be-, Oka 31.4 46.9 Northwestern waterways io.5 15.7 Rivers of Northern USSR 11.0 16.7 Dnepr, Don, Kura 6.8 10.1 Others JR 103 9 100.0 CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 USSR 85.5 Germany (without Austria) 7.7 in view of the waterways network at its d1 al ,~si, are shown by the following comparison of the shipping loads of Germany and Russia in 1937; Waterways Traveled Goode Transported amtPut inland shipping more extensively for freight traffic. The combined transport Is being effectively subsidized by reduced feeder tariffs. By 1942 the traffic load of inland. shipping was to be increased by 76 percent as compared with 1937, whereas the load carried by the railroads was to be raised by only 44 percent for the same period. Decades of neglect of the waterways, however, could not be overcome so rapidly. Moreover, the amount of availrble tonnage is Insufficient. Thus is brought about the fact that th'e economy, even in the case of typical bulk goods,'is making increasing use of the railroads which are more reliable in. spite of their inherent defio! ncies. Transport Diatributiou of Most Important Bulk Goods Over Inland Waterways and Railroads (in rt:11:1ion tons) . Building Materials Grain Petroleum Lumber Coal 1913 -- 5.9 5.4. 11.7 0.8 1928 1.2 1.2 4.8 8.3 0.1 1932 5.4 2.6 7.4 26.3 0.6 1937 9.8 4.3 7.9 35.5 2.1 1938 -- 4.8 8.3 34.8 2.1 Building Mat.eriala Grain Petroleum Lumber Coal 1913 7.3 18.3 5.8 20.8 26.3 1928 13.7 15.5 8.7 20.1 30.4 1932 43.4 23.8 17.0 46.3 56.7 1937 102.4 ?38.9 24.7 66.2 116.6 1938 -- 40.4 28.2 63.5 120.9 I Figures on the transport of ore, iron, and steel in inland shipping were not available. According to the above figures thv total amount of building materials, grain, petroleum, lumber and coal, transported over the inland shipping system in 1937 was approximately 60 million tone. In addition, over one million tore of salt were transported over inland water- vayg. This leaves about 6 million tone for miscellaneous goods shipped. An approximate amount is shown for miscellaneous gods in 1938. Even if the remaining quantities were to be ascribed in fell to the transport of ore, iron, and steel, the share of inland shipping in the transport of bulk goods would still be unproportionately email. In contrast, the railroads transported In 1937 a total of app.oxisatel,^ 57 million tona of ore, irc,n, and steel. CONFIDENTIAL - 12 - Col'FIDMTMAL CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 1528 1932 1;18 2.' Passenger Transport Compared with the slight consideration which passenger transport receives in railroad traffic, inland, navigation is being used increasingly for tourist traffic. The rise of passenger traffic between 1932 and 1938 amounted to;:24 percent on the railroad and to 55 percent on the water routes, or approximately 18 and 52 percent, respectively, figured in passenger-kilo- meters. These figures show further that in inland navigation, tec, the average traveling distance has decreased, although not in the sane manner as on the railroads. Passenger Traffic on Inland Waterways Passers Transported CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 now ships under the Soviet regime was so slight that in 1937 the total tonnage CONFIDENTIAL 17.8 43.6 68.1 117 1.03 47 Inventory of Inland Merchant Vessels Self-Propelled Ships Ships Without Self-Propulsion Number Pr!vi.:; Pcve?? Number a a city 'p tin 1,000 hp (in 11,000 tons) 1913 5,556 1,700 24,153. 13,400 1928 1,898 463 7,000 4,960 1933 2,082 549 7,224 5,514 1937 2,514 687 7,477 5,786 In the figurce for 1937 the number of scrapped ahlps vac not cone'.dered, theraforo the actual number of available ships sho:l1 be somewhat lower. In 1938, the German fleet (without Austria) possessed 5,440 self-propelled sLIps with a total of 849 `aorso-power fsh7 and 12,441 ships without saif-propulsion, tusving is load capacity of 5.8 million tons. The majority of the USSR ships are very old, and repair work and the prod notion of spare parts claim the largest part of the total production. Since the repair shops are unable to meet the demands made on them at the heginbing of the nevi gition period, usually, a considerable paroentage of the ships (in 1937 approximately 30 percent) are not ready for use. Part of the newly built ships are large, efficient craft, the dimensions of which are considered in the blueprints for new canal construction, such as the cargo chip of 8,000 tons capacity and the naphtha tanker approximately 200 meters long, 20 meters wide, with 4.5 meters draught, and a water dis- placement of 18,000 to 20,000 tone. Some of them are small tug", so-called eriver'eobiles" which can also navigate small rivers. The corresponding barges are 8 meters long, 3 meters wide, and have a capacity of 3 to 10 tons and a draught of approximately 30 o,ntimetere. The standard TIS R ship, in accordance with the dimensions of present artificial waterwayi, has a capacity of 700 to 800 tons, is 77 meters long, and 8.5 meters wide. its maximum draught is 1.8 meters. Colliaiuns are quite frequent even in inland navigation. They may be attributed largely to the incompetence and unreliability of the perecanel. - 13 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 COIPFIDI?NTIAL 1 , GG 4I .' TI ,TIC Tasks of USSR Ocean Navi tion ?y Sea B9 Land 1913 78.3 21.7 60..8 1929 84.4 15.6 62,6 1932 94.0 6.o 82.3 1937 93.4 6.6 84.6 39.2. 37.4 17.7 15.4 make use of foreign tonnage. From the structure of USSR elgport trade it is easily explained why 'USU. ocean shipping is concentrating primarily or. import trade. The Soviet Union imports high-grade industrial products. Their trans- port is a source of relatively high revenaefor the Soviet fleet. Cheap bulk goods are exported, the transport of which must be left largely to other countries due to lover profits and lack of tonnage. A special circumstance is the fact that a considerable portion of the traffic load of USSR ocean sh.tppine sarves domestic traffic. The merchant fleet also assumes the task of eonaeoting with each uthei the widely separated water areas of the Baltic Sea, White Sea,Arotic Ocean, Black Sea, and Pa;?.fic Ocean. In 1936, a year of little foreign trade, domestic ocean traffic witu 23.2 million tons oven exceeded foreign ocean traffic amounting to 14.8 million tons. Thus it amounted, in 1936, to approximately one third of the inlard shipping traffic. larly in the avant of strong, traffic fluctuations which accompany the irregular development of its export trade, the Soviet Union is forced to itself mare strongly in the field of exports. For this reason and particu- eatoly 82 percent of the imports, bat only 30 percent of the exports, are B. Regional Distribution of Merchant Fleet he important industrial areas at the Dnepr, Doa, and Donate Rivers were 91 decisive in the development of USSR ocean navigation. The bulk of the :wean navigation is neutered in the Black and Azov Seas. In 1939 approximately two fifths of the merchant fleet, 150 merchantmen with 420,000 gross register tonnage and the tanker fleet with 28 units of 133,100 gross register tonnage, was located in the Black See through whose ports was channeled, primarily, the export of bulk goods produced in the adjoining industrial areas, of the grain from the Ukraine and of oil from the Caucasus. The Pacific Ocean was eecond until 1939. Over one fourth of the merchant fleet, 380,000 gross register tons, (sinoe 1939, 270,000 gross register tons) was at home there. The Baltic Sea occupied only third place. Barely one fourth of the USSR merchant fleet was anchored in 1939. Primarily the Baltic Sea ports transship import goods. A total of 80,000 gross register tonnage was accounted for by the White Bea and the Arctic Ocean. CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 TiAL The Most Important Seaports Odasea 572 128 1,375 356 Baku 31 2 148 1,528 1217 191-3 L911 Leningrad 4,008 336 2,648 2,720 Arkhangel'ek 123 1 1,060 1,908 Murmansk -- 107 - 756 Vladivostok 280 404 43 ii Batumi 31 2 1.,1.48 1,528 Mariupol' 117 36' 740 Nikolayev 24 2 1,796 5'41 grad and Odessa were almost.equal. Under the Soviet C.overciment, however, grain shipments were stopped but shipments of petroleum and manganese are were in- creased. Today Batumi is the most important Black Sea port, even ahead of Odessa. The transshipment volume of Batumi is said to exceed 5 million tons while that of Odessa is said to have diminished +o barely 4 million tons. A transshipment rolume of apj.rnximate ly 3 million tone each is given for !4nriupol' and Taganrog, and of over one million tole each for Astrakhan and Baku. Sevastc- pol' is reported to be handling a traffic volume of more than 4 million tons, and so is Ma;.mansk. Ae present Loningrad is handling the largest volume of transshipments, which is, stated to be above 5 million tons. Formerly the volumes handled by Lenin For years the Soviet Government has been turning its attention to the Arctic sea route with a view to setting up e connection between the Far Eastern regions and European T1 Sn which would be shorter than the .oote through the) 1sdian Ocean. According to Soviet sources a few ehipa eucoes~;fu:lc urilei ins Arctic Boats in 1937. Some ships got as far as the estuaries of the Indiglrka and golyma Rivers. The problem of coal supply causes great difficulties. Formerly the requirements were filled at Spitsbergen or Sakhalin. However, since these distances are too great, the coal deposits on the Chukotskiy i'eninsula are to be opened. it is not known to what extent these plans have been realized. The Soviets were anticipating that this year (1941) the Arctic fleet could be supplied by these coal mines. In addition, other coal deposits in Northern Siberia, the miring of which has not yet beers otarted, are to be utilized. By the and of 1942, in accordance ;ith the Third Five-rear Plan, a scheduled connection with the Far East via the Arctic sea route was to be ensured and a transport load of 158,000 tons attained, According to a pee- phlat issued by the USSR Commercial Attache in Berlin in 1930, a load of 10,300 tons was shipped from Siberia to Arkhangelsk via the Arctic Ocean in 1920. The total turnover had become 12 times greater (i.e., 120,000 tons) by 1930 as compared with 1920. All transshipping operations of the Ob' region it was stated, were effected at P.oviy Port in the Oh' Bay, and those of the Yenisey region in the port of Igarka. According to the pamphlet, the port of Igarks is a calm, deep-water port protected from f1bating ice and winds and accessible to ocean steamers having a maximum draught of 7 meters. It is called the "future Siberian Arkhangel'sk." In the situation created by the CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL ver, con ids ptirni,! telnr C1 er to the r-5~-rb171ty ,f I er,,an drllre_ri.c of war materials by this route via Arkhangoi2sk. Judging from the present state of affairs it remains, however, very questionablo whether any scheduled traffic of sizeable extent can ever be accomplished by means of the Arctic route. E. Performance of USSR Ocean Shipping Ocean Shipping of USSR (coastal Goods Transported Passengers Trans orted in million tone in millions 1913 36.9 1929 8.8 1.5 1933 16.3 3.3 1938 30.4 3.1 1942 (plan) 44.5 Under the Soviet regime the traffic volume has again closely approached the prewar level. In Spite of this, the quotas provided in the five-year pl ns have not been attained. In 1937, for example, the plan was only 69 percent fulfilled and in 1938 the traffic vuluate decreased from 37 billion to approxi- mately 34 billion ton-ki1cmeters. F. USSR Merchant Fleet The merchant fleet is operated by eight State Shipping Companies of which the Baltic Line ir. Leningrad, the Black Sea Line in Odessa, the Northern Line in .Arkhangel'ek, and the Far Pastern Line in Vladivostok should be emphasized. The largest part of the merchant fleet consists of Steamers having an average tonnage of 1,7v0 gross register tons. Approximately one fourth of the fleet is made up of motor vessels of an average ;,onnage of 2,470 gross register tons. In 1939 the merchant fleet possessed 560 steamers with 960,000 gross register tone 139 motor vessels with 346,000 gross register tone 17 sailing ships with 10,000 gross register tone i.e., a total of 716 ships with 1.3 million gross register tons. The steeper tonnage consists mainly of used units purchased abroad. The motor vessel tonnage, however, is comprised of new ocnetructione. Ten shipyards are at present available fur the building of now ships. It is estimated that their maitmum annual production was around 60,000 gross register tons. The main center of ship construction is Leningrad with five shipyards Nikolayev has two shipyards, Sevastopol', Vladivostok and Astrakhan, one each. In order to be able gradually to operate without foreign tonnage even in the field of export, the attention o.' the Commissariat for Ocean Shipping is centered at present on the construction of merchant vessels suitable for the transport of bulk goods. Number of Ships Gross Register Tonnage Available in 1,000) 1913 7k7 852 1928 222 336 1933 352 867 1937 -- 1,258 1938 -- 1,281 1939 716 1,316 CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL There 1s a lack oi" special ships,tuga, oll and grain ilgncera. _'h F' number of svailable.pilot boats and is;e-brcakersis likewise insufficient. T7 MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC A. Hi e There are two types of USSR highways, namely, chauseeee, i,e , improved and surfaced roads; and roads, i.e.., somewhat graded but nonsurfaced field and wood roads. Great cross-country connections are called highroads. They consist in part of chaussees but most of them are merely ordinary roads. In spite of the expanse of the country there are no continuous road systems. . The majority of the roads connect individual localities or ropreec-t approach roads to railroads or waterways. There are only few bridges. Most of them are made of wood and are very narrow. As a rule, fords are found satisfactory for croseing small rivers, and punts for larger ones. During the rainy season in the fall and the melting of the snow in the spring the roads are completely impassable. In summer they, are passable, although rough and dusty.. In winter they can be used only with sleds. Generous plans strive to match the Western European road net. For the time being, however, the most sensitive gape in the road nets must be closed and existing roads improved.. A real road network, executed according to a uniform plan covering the whole country is nonexistent. TLe total length, of USSR roads ii-approximately 3 million kilometers... Approximately one half thereof are passable and only 4 percent of this half had paved surfaces in 19)4. The following estimated figures show the develop- ment of the continually passable roads, i.e,, those provided with stone or ?ephalt surfaces, or the paved runways now preferred by German motorized units. 1928 25,000 kilometers 1932 37,000 1934 56,000 1937 63,000 It may be assumed that .he total length of the ohauesees today approxi- mates 80,000 kilometers, i.e., approximately 3 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometers. Germany without Austria, in 1938 had 392,000, i.e., approximately 63.2 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometors. The above figures are rough estimates. Somewhat more exact information was given regarding the new con?- struotion of paved highways in the First and Secona Five-Year Plans. During the First Five-Year Plan, approximately 12,000 kilometers.of roads were paved, and during the Second Five-Year Plan, 26,500 kilometers. At any rate, the net- work of ohaussees is still smaller today than the railroad network. Only within a radius of 60 kilometers around Moscow are all roads paved with concrete or asphalt. Long and well-constructed road systems connect Moscow with Leningrad via Kalinin-Novogorod; with Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov via Tula-Orel; Voronezh via Tula; and with Gor'iiy. Shorter roads extend from Moscow to Yaroslavl', Rahev ,"I Ryatan', A continuous road links Leningrad with Kiev via Pskov-Vitebsk- Gomel' and it is to be exoonded as far as Odessa. A road was planned to lead from Kharkov to the Crimea. N ring the Third rive-Year Plan a total of 210,000 kilometers of roads were to be newly ccnetruoted or improved. B. Performance of US3t Motor-Vehicle Traffic Like all other means of transportation, in the Soviet Union the motor vehicle is used primarily for freight traffic. Quantitatively, 56 percent of the freight traffic load is said to he carried by motor vehicles. From what wan said it is understood, however, that the average transport distance for motor-vehicle traffic is eoasiderably shorter than that on railroads and orate-ways; therefore, In ton-kilometer volume the share of trucks in the total freight traffic in 1937 amounted to only 2 porc'r,-, The main achieve- ments lie in the field of local traffic. Detailed information regarding rl o$FI'DEATL+L C8NFf OENTI 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 o N IAL CONf quantities transported ie 1,.t %r 116.LLe.' i.,~ tc l' a Ii. c i Ci i Plan, the volume of motor-vehicle traffic is to be raised from 8,.7 b1? ion ton-k":laneters in 1937 to 4'0 billion ton-kilometers in 1942. C. Production, and Stock of Motor Vehicles 1. USSR Automobile Industry The emphasis of the USSR automobile-industry is placed on the prc?. duction of trucks. In 1938, in contrast to a production of only 27,000 passenger automobiles, 184,000 trucks ire, a manufactured. The truck pro- duction of the Soviet Union thus rani:ed directly behind that of the US and topped that of Great Britain. In 1938 the USSR built almost as many truoke as Germany, Fngland.end France combined; but, as a whole, i.e., including passenger automobiles, it did not quite reach the total production of France. Manufacture of Motor Vehicles in Largest Producing Countrieo in 1938 Country Total Trucks Passenger Automobiles (1 OW unite) (1,000 unite) (tn %) 1,000 unite in United States 2,190 498 19.6 2,001 8o.4 Great Britain 445 l04 23.3 341 76.7 Germany 346 65 18.8 281 81.2 Prance 227 27 11.9 200 88".1 USSR 211 184 87.4 27 12.6 Only under the Soviet regime did the country turn to the production of its own trucks and, finally, its ova passenger automobiles. The Stalin Plant in Moscow and the Molotov Plant in Gor'kiy should be stressed particularly. The Stalin Plant has a daily capacity of 280 trucks, 30 passenger autorwbilea and 7 omnibuses; the Molotov Pfau'., a total of 580 motor vehicles. Year Trucks Passenger Automobiles Total 1928 - 29 1,200 100 1,1'00 1932 23,800 30 23,900 1935 77,700 19,000 96,700 1937 171;500 18,500 200,000 1938 184,400 27,000 211,400 1942 (plan) 300,000 100,000 400,000 Stook of Motor Vehicles of USSR (in 1,000 unite) 1928 a-1 19 8 1942 len Jiotor Vehicles 16.7 75.4 570 760 1,700 Trucks 7.5 54.6 475 635 -- Passenger automobiles a:d omnibuses 11.2 20.8 95 125 In 1939, Germany, Including Austria, possessel a stock of 471,000 trucks and 1.6 million passenger automobiles. OOP !1IIENTIAL 50X1-HUM - 18 - CONFIDI7V'!;:._k Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 Sh iRpod Received ~ (in 1,000 tons) (in 1,000 tong) White sea 19 187 Baltic Sea 48 269 Black Sea 0 2 operation. The number of vehic''es undergoing repair was larger than the new production. Repair facilities remained inadequate even during the following year. Fuel, lubricants, and rubber tires, in comparison to uther countries, are of poor q' iilyand expensive. A rubber tire, which abroad lasts for 30,000 to 40,000 kilometers, can be driven only 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers in the bad condition of the roads. The material wear is great even on vehicles capable of crose-counie travel. Before the war the repair trade and the spare- parts industry could no longer keep up with the heavy material wear. There was exist either in the construction of roads or in the accessories manufacturing industries. Prior to World War I, freight traffic between Germary and the USSR was largely over the sea route, i.e., the Baltic ports. Around t.a turn of the from Paldiski and Tsllin to Leningrad, and a connection from Ventspils to ;elgava were established, which carried the goods imported by sea into the interior of the USSR. The port of 7laypeda was not used as heavily as the Baltic ports since from there the railroad had to pass two borders, When the Baltic States were made independent, following World War I, part cf th.e Cerroan Soviet sea traffic was shifted to the ports of Leningrad and Murmansk. As a result of the creation of the little states between Germany and the USSR, by virtue of tho Treaty of Versailles, the re-establishment of railroad connectives between the two oouLtrlee was delayed for a long period. For political raa,ons Poland wished to prevent a rapprochement of its two neighbors. Thus a railroad connection could be established only via the Baltic countries. When the traffic cn this route assumed large proportions, Poland did not want to forego Its share of the transit revenues and shoved readiness to permit transit traffic through Poland. German-Soviet traffic increased rapidly there- after arl'reaohed its maximum In 1931 faith more titan one million tons, of which 680,000 tons were transported through Poland. Prior to World War I, railroad shipments from Germany to tho area of present day Russia (i.e.. minus ship- mentA to that Part of Poland which wac ceded to Russia at the Congress of Vienna in 1815) amounted to approximately 750,000 tone, and shipment to Germany from this area amounted to approximately 1 1/3 million tone. Starting in 1932, the German-USSR railroad traffic again rbceded heavily. Except for express transports, the exchange of goods was accomplished via the Baltic Sea. German traffic statistics reveal the following quantities for ship- ments from Germany and receipt of goods from the Soviet Union over the sea route in 1937: COL in 1937 a total of 243,000 tons are said to ha-e been shipped by rail thro*h Poland in both directions. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL The Railroad and Transit Agreemznt of December 19)9 created again the . prerequisites for the revivai of mutual raixoad traiflc. Iot..owing'tne sub- jugation of Poland, Germany had a common border with the USSR for almost 1,000, kilometers. Whereas prevlouely there has been only two railroad lined between Germany and the USSR, now nine border crossings were set up of which two were located at the border between East Prussia and USSR, namely, at Szczepki-AUgustovo and Prostken-Grayevo. Of the remaining crossings, those at Zurawica-Peremyschl and Terespol--Brest -IAtovek were the most important. From the start, tariffs with special rates were established for the most im- portant conmodities, i.e., grain, mineral oil, yarns, cotton., iron and man- ganese ore, iron, steel, and iron and metal goods. Az before, a considerable part of the goods went via the Baltic Sea, In addition the route via the Black Sea and the-Danube was used or the goods were shipped from Black Sea ports by rail to Germany via Rumania and Hungary or Slovakia. Additioaxl possibilities for German-Soviet goods traffic would hare opened up had the inland shipping route Dnepr-Bug-Pieta been improved example, the Volga System which handles the transports to the Baltic Sea; and the Dnepr -Viola route via time Dnepr-Bug Canal. Moreover, transport vta the Black Sea will expand. ,The 'conditions regarding railroad transport between Germany and the Ukraine are relatively favorable. The USSR railroad network attains its greatest density in the Ukraine and also the largest number of double-tracked lines are found there. The difficulties stemm.'_ag from the wider gangs of the Soviet railroads have been eliminated in part. In the be- ginning of October of this year already more than 15,000 kilometers had besn converted to the German gauge. It is anticipated that gradually the entire rail network of the Ukraine will be converted. It will be more difficult, however, to solve the problem of space utilization on the return transports, ei'oe the finished products shipped by Germany to the USSR will occupy less space. CONFLUEN'I'IAL r~Ff E4EN i ~A1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600240738-6