POLITICAL - COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 862
• Publication Date: October 10, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
,'AID
The following article wan written by one of the pioneers of Communism in
Albania.
Prior to 1941 there was no Communist Party in Albania. There were
only three groups w; the Scutari group, the Youth group, and the Koritea rKorce'
group; which, while proclaiming themselves Communists, were perpetually quarrel-
ing among themselves. These three groups, through lack of experience and Markiet-
Leninlst 3ducation, were incapable o` determining a suitable political lice.
Bach group acted according to its own Id-.-e and impulses. The major part of
their activity was made up of polemic attacks upon the other two opposing groups.
At the end of 1941, with Rupsieli entry into the war, the Scutari and the
Youth groups felt the nee& of uniting and launched an appeal to the Koritsa
(tile Coup to which the present president of Albania belcnge4 Thin group re-
fused categorically to join the union.
Because the three groups were incapable of uniting thembdlves, and be-
cause t'iey'eaw the USSR which, in their opinion, was the citadel. of world Com-
munism, threatened by Bitlar'a armies, they decided to ask intervention of for-
eign comrades. In the Albanian province of Kosovo, which was and is under Yugo-
slav damnation, -were comrades of the Scutari and Youth groups who were in con-
tact with the Yugoslav Stalinists, Meladln Popovic and Dusam. The Albanian
c'm'ades in Kosovo explained the situation of the three groups to the Staliniete
and, with the consent of the directors of the three groups, invitdd the Yugoslav
Stalinists to Tirana to help form the Albanian Cccmunist Party and end past
dissension.
The two. Staliniete were soon escorted secretly to Tirana and, although
they did not have the official authorization of the Yugoslav Camounist Party,
they and their proposal were accepted.
NAVY
AIR
KI ps
CLASSIFICATION
NSRBi
FEI
i
- 1 -
CONF?IMV IAL _ONFIW'EN 1 IQt
I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
CLASSIFICATION CO, 'II7EM AL COWID[~1T Al
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPOR
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO SROADCASTS CD NO.
COUNTRY Albania
SUBJECT Political - C munism
HOW
PUBLISHED Bimonthly periodical
WHERE
PUBLISHED Paris
DATE
PUBLISHED Oct Nov 1948
LANGUAGE French
TN I/ DOCVNINT CONTAINS INFORMATION AIIICTINY TNL NATIONAL ANTENNA
01 TNl -TNN STATUS ATTNIN TN L' YLAMI NR OI IN PIOk AY 6' ACT X10
Y. i. C.. ZI AN lL, AR A NLMORO.' ITY TNANLMI ROIIM Ok Tl.L ONY ILATIO .
0! Iri COMTLMri IN AMP A,-. 11 TO AN UMA IN. ILRD..ll
MINN TLO LL L.. GYl.000GTI0. 03 TNIN .OR! RM l V ITRO !RO!llYl T:O
DATE DIET. /0 Oct 1949
NO, OF PAGES 9
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
SOURCE t iieame Internationale, 6th Year, Vol 6, 10-u, 190,3.
50X1-HUM
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
CONFIDENTIAL
x uely .ii?ac l:x oposas was to, call a meeting at which a certain number of
each group would act as representatives In addition to the Yugoslavs, 16
representatives of the three groups were present at the conference, the mis-
sion of which was to found the Albanian Communist Party,
cussion which became heated and degenerated intc personal attacks. The old
group spirit always appeared in the course of the discussion.
When the discussions were finally terminated, the Yugoslavs, who had
noted the revolutionary spirit and consciousness of the representatives of
the Youth group, took unfair advantage of the sincerity and modesty of theme
representatives to make the following criticisms:
b. The group has limited itself essentially to the formation of cadres
cud to the translation of Marxist books.
Anastase Lula and Ihepi, leaders of the Youth croup, supported by several
elements of the other two groups (like vaili Santoja), answered these absured
critic me as follows:
"We do not claim to have done all that we should have done; brt, on the
other hand, you must understand that it was not easy to do what you suggest.
You are not acquainted with the circumstances, the conditions, and the cue-
toms of our country, just as we'are ignorant of the same things in your land.
Caizunism is a doctrine which has been imported to Albania. It is not the
prodact of the development of the economic conditions of the society of our
eourtry. The Cmtu nict novament here is carried on by intellectuals and espe-
cially by the students in secondary iechools. Albania is a backward agrarian
country with no industry; we hav9 no industrial proletariat end, consequently,
there is no proletarian organization, or at least, none with an economic pur-
pose.
"Moreover, you should not commit the error of judging the present and
past conditions in the same light. The new conditions make a moucltery of the
old. During the first days of the occupation of our country '5y the feteciet
forces, open miss agitation was difficult for two reasons: (a) the success
of the Rani Fasciat amiss had caused our people to lose any hope in the even-
tual victory of the Allies; and (a) at the beginning of the occupation, fascism,
to further Its ends, temporarily improved the economic conditions of the masses.
Conditions had been worse ui,der the government of King Zog.
"In spite of all that, we did our beet to reach the massee_ We never
limited ourselves to the formation of cadres and the translation of books,
which is the accusation of the Soritea group and an example of the group's
old hate for as. We are not opposed to friendly criticia-oa; far from it, be-
cause the criticism of our old activity strengthens us and prepares us better
for the future. We are a Yoiyth group, full of enthusiasm but unfortunately
Inexperienced. The same can be said for the other twc groape, who, in their
reports, have exaggerated their past work.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
"Wehave never had bile intention of f,rming only cadres, which at a cer-
tain point in their formation would go out into the masses with flying flags.
There is no limitation to the formation of cadres; the formation of cadres
and work with the masses are two things which are closely tied toget'+r: the
more cadres we have, the better we can reach the masses; and conversely, the
more we penetrate into the masses, the more our cadres grow in rumber and
COI F'Il1EITTIAL
"As soon as we had finished our Studies, we went through the country- and
formed study groups everywhere. Every day the number of these groups increased.
We formed these groups in the interest of our cause and not for personal glory.
Now we can reach the masses an a large scale and act directly against the fascia`
plague and its servile functionaries,,
'In conclusion, what has been done, has been done, and cannot be changed.
Some have done more, others have done lase. Now it is a question of being cap-
atalinists looivediusfavornely upon them. Moreover, when they wished to ask more
detailed explanations. about the orders and the proposals, the Stalinists became
angfry and looked on them as intellectuals. Every time they were at lose for an
explanation, the Stalinists would use the term 'intellectualism" as aclinehina
argument.
but out of respect for the truth, they could not understand why the two Yugoslav
At the and of the discussion, Meladin asked the Corierence of Albanian Cm-
radee to permit him to name the Central Committee of the Party himself, The
Albaniartie readily agzeed to this, being totally Ignorant of the usual manoeuvres
of the Stalinists. Meladin also asked for the nan-oe of two or three candidates
from each group from whom he would choose the members of the Central Committee.
However, he imposed the condition that the candidates were not to be the :armor
directors of the groups since their past differa-icos would tend to hinder the
work of the Party, especially if new disagreements should spring up in the Inner-
most circle of the Central Committee. The Albanian comrades also considered this
argument to be valid.
A few Jaye later, the leaders of the Youth group learned that the Central
Committee had boen formed by the leaders of the other groups and a >ailitary dirc-
tar from theirs. The Youth group was disappointed in seeing the evident bad faith
and the manoeuvres of Meladin but, it made no objection. Actually, the group be-
lieved, since Meladin was an experienced foreign comrade, that he should have their
confidence and that he was acting in the interest of the Party. On the other hand,
the members of the Youth group did not want iieladin to think that they wished to
became members of the Central Committee at any cost. The leaders 'of the Youth
group were not seeking posts in the Central Committee; their only aim was the 'n-
terest of the Party.
The machinations of Meladin were perfectly natural; in his quality as a
Stalinist bureaucrat he could not act otherwise. The orders which he had re-
ceived from his superiors were to create only cliques of credulouc agents, cap-
able of being utilized to the fullest extent by the Kremlin. Meladin realized
that the leaders of the Youth group, inasmuch they were true Marxist-LenisisCa,
conscious of t:.eir mission, and revolutionibte in the true sense of tae word,
constituted an obstacle to the execution of his plans.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
material, such as propaganda books, typewriter3, money, etc., had been sent
to the Central Committee, one of the Yugoslavo (Pusan) and a member of the
Central Committee, his assistant, began to form coils in which the fighters
o" the three gronpe were mingled. Because they were afraid of the fighters
at tpe election or the regional committees. These sympathizers were introduced
selves a rpaaority?'they introduced people who could be persuaded to play a dou-
ble game. They were not afraid of people wha lacked education and character;
were unjust led.
of election, which he called "fascist". This comrade was indignant to see thatY
The dissatisfied comrades called on their former leaders, Anastas andvXhepi,
and voiced their dlo;~atent. These two constantly advised the comrades not to
come to them about .ea.tera which concerned only the Party and not individuals.
They advised the comrades to see the recponsibl: persons in their cells about
all instances of proven mistakes. They also counseled them not to revolt, be-
cause the Party was oung and mistakes werb naturally inevitable.
Despite the fact that Anaetae and Xhepi had done their beet to calm the
digeatiefied comrades by always speaking in favor of the Party, Meladin and his
Central Committee accused these two men of inciting disaffection. These accusa-
tions wounded them deeply because they had had the political courage to brave
the greatest dangers, not only during the fascist occupation but also under the
dictatorial regime of King Zog. They had the courage openly to oppose Meladin,
whom they themselves had liberated from a concentration camp and brought to
Tirana, where they had placed everything in his hands,
First Conflicts
Am soon as eieladin bad consolidated his position in Albania and formed
his own clique, he c_.lled a congress of the Albanian Communist Party for the
purpose of Jue4;ing Anaatae and Xhepi for their being im''-uad with factionism.
The resolution of the congress follows:
'.:c. proved that you two have not yet freed yourselves of fee-.ionisrt
and, rl t is core serious, you have been the main instigators of this pri:;rip e9
among the other comrades of your former group. You must admit that thin I'- :t,
obstacle for the Party. 7.ne congress demands that you confess your errors and
that you make your self-criticism."
Despite the fact that, in addition to Meiadin and his agents of the Central
Cammittee, there was also present at the congress an individual, whom 3 months
beforo Efeladin himself had accused of being an agent of the Intelligence Service,
Anastas and Ihepi did not protest and allowed the congress to follow its course.
The two men made the following answer:
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
"Whey thimgi do not go as they should in the Party, it is because there is
some obstacle. We agvee with you that this obstacle is the old group spirit.
But you must not consider this group spirit unilaterally. Since we are Marxists,
we must always solve our, problems with the help of dialectic materialism. You
by our comrades is the result of the group spirit which exists on an even higher
the Party. The disappearance of the group spirit in the comrades who are the
Zarty we can do nothing but close our eyes. We repeat that the group spirit will
disappear only when you give ircofe of impartiality and justice,"
The congress adjourned after the following statement of Comrade Maladin.
and at the same time, in consideration of your qualifications as former revolu-
tionaries, it deuidee to maintain contacts with you, are you ready to conform to
Party was a mere label and that the real Central committee was formed by Meladin
and Duesm themselves, everyone understands that the members of the Central com-
mittee were only the agents and executors of Meladin'e orders.
Anastas and %hepi, always hoping that things would improve, could not adopt
a hostile attitude; on the contrary, they agreed to be always at the beck and call
of the Party. later, while still accepting the collaboration which Meladin had
proposed, they began to fear that "is eystimatic attacks boded no good. His be-
hivior betrayed to them that ho use not a true Communist. They began to consider
him as a clever chauvinistic Serbian who, under the guise of Communism, wanted to
form a clique to serve better the interests of his country.
Nevertheless, leaders of the Youth group thought it best to leave the
responsibility of the consequences of this situation to the Central Committee.
They preferred to show themselves tolerant rather than to provoke a scission in
the Party. Although they were excluded from the Party, leaders of the Youth
group performed honestly and willingly all the tasks which were entrusted to them.
Unfortunntely revolutionary honesty and conscientiousness irritated the bureau-
cratic clique. 'The honest comrades and the good revolutionists, who were admired
by the fighters, had to be eliminated at all costs. To effect this, the directors
ordered their agents to keep close watch on all the true Communists and particularly
on the two COmr.3'.es, Anastas and %hopi. These two men, although they noticed that
they were under observation, did not protest because they knew that, in the Com-
munist Party, Party cont.-of of comrades is necessary. The thing which Sid gall
them was the use of people who had not yet had the minimum of Marxist education
and for -, is reason were unqualified for this task.
But worst of all, the Central Commmittee had ordered the agents to make unfavor-
able reports on the comrades whom they were to watch. The contents of many of the
reports are still unknown. The comrades under observation knew that the Communist
principle of Party control represented the desire of the Party to discover mistakes
and to correct them. However, this Party control should never be for the purpose
of trapping comrades. Unfortunately, in the Albanian Communist Party, the idea of
ensnaring the comrades outweighed the spirit of correcting the committed errors.
Lenin's theory of Party control from bottom to top was never even considered by
the Albe iaij Communist Party.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
50X1-HUM
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
I
sane from one village to another when he net a groozp of fascist militia. Instead
of showing himself worthy of the position which he held in the Party, he turned
even attacked by the ha;.?d of the cell and called a %hepiet, Trotskyite, saboteur,
etc. So, in order not to be looked upon unfavorably, the comrades no longer dares:
to criticize the mistakes which they noticed. Here is the criticism which one of
the comrades made of one of the members of the Regional Jemmeittee of 'J'alona.
If a comrade tried to critici'ze in his ce.ilthe uuei.aaue wmue uy a lender
CONVIDERIM
CONFIDENTIAL
In the face of conti.ual criticism and loss of ground, the bureaucratic
clique decided to extricate itself' from its unfavorable position. The only way
to keep its ground was to stifle as quickly as possible the revolutionary opposi-
tion, which was still in its infancy. The clique decided to eliminate by secret
assassinations all the inflexible revolutionaries. Once this decision was taken,
the execution was not long delayei. Lula Anastas, the beot??know Ma xiist'Leninist
in Albania, was brutally assassinated.
Xhepi in order to discuss this event with him and to decide what was to be done.
Difi was the political commissar of the battalion of Mallaxastra (at this time,
the battalion was the largest military unit of the partisans) and the de,;,oteo of
the revolutionary oprosition.
Lifi informed %hepi how the Central Committee had condemned him, Xhep1j as
well as Anestas to death. He described Anastas' aesassinatioh and warned that
Xhepi vas to be secretly killed in the nigii0 but would be buried with a great
funeral because of his popularity among the fighters and the people of Valona.
Saying that he realized he was committing a breach of Party discipline,
Difi declared that some way must be found to end the campaign against individuals.
He voiced complete confidence in Rhepi and accused the Central Committee of bei.ug
a more clique intent upcn monopolizing Party leadership. For this reason, he said,
they aimed at exterminating all worthwhile revolutionariee. H appealed to T,hepi
to advise, as an experienced Communist, how the clique's activities coil!- be ended.
Xhepi thought that the beat Communist way would be to call a congress, at
which at least two members of each cell would be present, along with all the
members of the Regional Committee of Valona and one or two members of the Central
Committee. (Since Valona was one of the most revolutionary centers, it was be-
lieved the first application of the ieninietic principles of democratic centralism
should take place there. Later, all the other centers would follow its example.)
The purpose of this congress would be to examine the mistakes and errors which hal
been committed and to condemn the guilty. If it developed in the course of the
discussions that the Regional Committee of Valona no longer had the full confidence
of the majority of the comrades, a new Committee would be elected democratically.
Despite the fact that 80 percent of the fighters wished the convocation of
this congress, the Committee of Valona and also the Central Committee were categori-
cally opposed to It. At first, they pretended to adopt tho idea of such a congress
so as to gain time and prepare a plan to eliminate the most active and conscientious
cowadee.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
CONFIDENTIAL
As soon as they had prepared their plan of terrorism, they secretly arrested
the political commissar of the Dukati commune. They also organized an ambush
to assassinate Comrade Xhepi, but he escaped death because hie comrades warned
him in ttae. They also treacherously arrested the political commissar Xhemil
Cakerri and Major Vangjo of the battalion of Valona. These two were taken to
a mill to be executed. The political commissar was brutally assassinated, but
the Major 'soaped with only a hand wound and took refuge in a village, where he
was received in a fr.end.ly manner by the inhabitants. Memet Shehu (today the
most famous criminal in Albania and a Stalinist commanding genera].) went to this
village and again arrested Vangjo, telling the villagers that the assassinations
had been comaitted accidentally by the escort and that now Vangjo was going to
be tried by the Party judges. Vangjo was taken to a house in the midst of a
forest and forced to sign a paper giving command of the battalion to Memet Shehu.
Vangjo was kept prisoner for 3 months, until he escaped and joined his comrades
of the opposition. In the meantime, assassinations of the revolutionary opposi-
tion had been increasing. Through newspapers and propaganda, the leader's tried
to make it appear that the demand that the congress be convoked was for the pur-
pose of destroying the Party and a conspiracy directed by Thepi.
If the revolutionary opposition had had the intention of plotting, the over-
thrown of the Staliniat clique, as the Stalinists pretended, this would have been
inevitable and easy, since the latter was in the minority at Valona. But the
comrades of the revolutionary opposition refused to use the terrorist methods of
the Stalinists and desired to act in the most legal manner in Party affairs. They
r~,*nd Could not be .._ ...,,c-.. of the FartY, 4L tl_e is ulnae clique had ceClded
to suppress them once and Pcr all by any means.
It is evident that the Albanian revolutionary opposition, has been the victim
of its scrrplee, scruples which permitted the systematic elimination of all the
fighters who had declared themselves in favor of the congress. Obviously, the
bureaucratic clique refused to convoke the congress because it could not justify
its actions, paiiicularly its deviation from the true Communist line. It was
easier to gain time by terrorism. If the Stalinist low Jere had been true revolu-
tionaries, they would not have been so afraid to call the congress,-the sole pur-
pose of which was to correct past mistakes and to elect the functionaries of the
Party in a democratic manner.
The Communists who had sacrificed so much to found the Party could not he
tempted to destroy tt,e work of their own hands. The Stalinists were quite aware
of this. The main reason for the Stallr.ist machinations was the fear of losing
control of the Party. But, ever if they had wished to accept the perfectly
juctifie'ule proposition of the revolutionary opposition, they could not since
they wer, nit Independent. Someone else was the real commander in Albania --
Generalissimo Stalin.
In any case, the tragic situation suffices to demonstrate that Stalinism
has not only replaced fascism but has surpassed it in its methods as in its
politics.
RVidently one could not expect much from the Albanian Communist party when
other Communist Parties, old Pai't'en with good revolutionary traditions like the
French Communist Party, for a long time have been the simple tools of the bureau-
cratic clique of the Kremlin. The Albanian Communist movement was stir in Its
embryonic stage when it was contaminated by Stalinism. Very few comrades had
even a rudimentary notion of Marxism-Leninism. All the others were sympathizers
of a sentimental plan expounding the justice of Communism rather than being trained
revolutionary fighters. Actually, it is difficult to become a Communist by decree.
which is what happened in, Albania. Cc aunistc are the products of special social
and economic conditions (the struggles of the classes) which had not reached suf-
ficient maturity in Albania. The Cxmiuniet Party had not even been in existence
for a year and a half and the Albanian Communists had not had sufficient time to
become indoctrinated and to ~evilop.
CONFICENTr [
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
struggle did not exist. What is admirable-le that the Albanian people, in
s
ite of th
p
e rrduous struggle for existndit th
ece an aganse oppression of
foreign powers, have shown an incomparable revolutionarl spirit.
After the refusal to convoke the congress and 1t, employment of terrorist
methods againat the revolutionary opposition, the Stalinist clique published
a long tract entitled, "Why We Have Separated From the So-Called Communist
Party," and signed it, "The True Communist organization," The purpose of this
tract was to inform the fighters of the Party and the entire population about
the treachery which was being hatched.
After publication of the tract, the movement of the revolutionary opposition
particularly in the center of Berati where the revolutionary fighters Resul,
M
ik a
d
am
n
1?atbardh were the leadr
,es,
Unfortunately, these mc.vemente were only of local importance because they
began at a period when the cureaucratic clique had consolidatad its position by
it
t
rr
s
e
orist and demagogic methods
.
action. The revolutionaries, however, proved by supporting facts that it was
th
al
e St
iniats who were deceiving the masses and Party sympathizers by using
terrorist methods against comrades who were known to all as having been revolu?.
tioaary rignters from the very beginning. The people could not hemp being
alienated from this Party when they witnessed the assassinations of the best-
known revolutionaries, such as Anastas Lula, fie.ki Hoxha (Vangja), Xhemil Cakerri,
Lazar Fundo, Resul Tothari, ldemik Nequemerja, Xhafer T.alarai
I.helal Hoxha
Nimet
,
,
Hitea, Kaki Telq, Duro Isn'na; Idajet Bolena, Zef Joja, and a hundred others
who had distinguished themselves by the L revolutiorary activIty.
(Lazar Endo and Halim Xhalo were the first Communist pr-pagandists
in Albania. Lazar Fundo was also a member of the Comintern for a long
time, but he left this when he saw that it had been transformed in':) a
more instrument under orders of the Kremlin's bureaucratic clique.
After he had left the Comintern, he denounced Stalin's treason. To safe-
guard the Communist tradition, he propagated Trotskyist ideas in Alba-
nia.)
The people could not help losing confidence in this Party when they learned
that a :fasole colonel in the Italian army fired three shots in the air as a sign
of his joy for the assassinations of these revolutionary heroes who had been
thorns in the sides of they fascists in Albania.
Pow coold the people help being hor:,ified on learning that tut most inflexi-
tole enemies of fascism and reactio' had been aoeeeosinuted by their own flirty and
that the most cherished desires of the fascists were in this way being fulfilled
by their worthy rivals, the Stalinists?
As soon as the Stalinist agents intervened, the .:Albanian Communist movement
degener-ted. The former voluntary respect, inspired by the cowrades who had given
outotending proofs of their devotion to the movement, was replaced by the forced
idolatry of :orthlees persons, of ignorant and vile bourgeois members suc'i as
Colonel-tieaeral lnve'e Hoxha and Company.
The majority of the Party's fighters, sympathizers, and the entire Albanian
population perceive more clearly every day the proving degeneration of Communism,
due to the Stalinist bureaucratic clique. The so-called people's courts render
great eervice by permitting the Albanian people to see more clearly and to under-
stand better the real intentions of the promoters of the new "People's Democracies."
COMPENTI-AL
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7
the recent death sentence of the well-imown old revolutionary Hagan Reci, the
Imprisonment of the revolutionary Sadri hoxha, the disfavor of the old revolu-
tionary SeJfullr. Afaleshova, the social and economic privelegee. of the bureau-
cratic caste, and above all, the oppression of the people by the dictatorship
of a ,'single clique, are the most outstanding features of the betrayal of the
Albanian Communist movement..
Haean Beci was condemned to death three times for being a Com-
munist; by the government of King Zug, by the fascist occupation
forces, and for `.,he third dime by the 8;:alinieta,
Kadri Hoxha, one of the most devoted revolutionary fighters,
did much for the Ccnmunist cause.
Sejfulla,Maleshava, a pioneer of Albanian Communism, spent a
large part of his life outelde of Albania trying ro coordinate the
Albanian movement with that of other countries. For a long ti.,ue
he was prof"tjar of materialistic philosophy at the University of
Moscow.
.
Nov and the question arises whether the Albanian people will remain eternally
passive this state of affairs as an incurable malady. No,?neverf
Having seen with their, own eyes the betrayal of their ideal as well as that of
the thonaaande of rrnernApQ r ed f^r this Ido ' th y Will mss. J orou ouaii~ ul'up 'LGd
crime of the Stalinlets and undti the banner of the Fourth Carmmunist Inter-
national will follow the road toward the enfranchisement of human society and
toward Socialism.
After this article was written, an important crisis developed in the
Albanian CcosAuniet Party as a result of the Yugoslav affair. Five me are
of the Politburo have been called on th.) carpet. Two of them, minister of
the Interior foci Xoxe, and Pandi Kristo, have lost Party membership and gov-
ernment position and have joined the underground opposition.
It to certain that this crisis will help the Albnaan revolutionaries
free th?jasclvee of the Stalinist domination which, as nas been seen above,
has had a disastrous effect on the young Communist movement,
CONFIDENTIAL
L Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600250862-7