SKLP'S RASH ACTIONS DISRUPT UNIFICATION SCHEME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600270143-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 143
• Publication Date: December 2, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFIC..^,TIOI'I u
CENTRAL N(:LLIGLNUE AGtNCY LNU~cI
INFORMe TRJN FRO?S
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROA7_ CASTS CD NO.
CCUNTCY
SUBJECT
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
TN I0 OOCUNINT CONTAI55 INIONNATiON AI/NCTINS THE NATIONAL 0110551
Of THE UNITED STATE. W1101. THE $105100 Or 15110.0.. ACT AO
H. I. C.. S1 AND UI. AS A-ENOID. ITS TRAIMAINIION OR THS REM14ATION
OP ITS CONTENTS IN ART NANNES TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PRISON IS PRO-
1111110 .T LAW. NIPNODUCTION OP THIS PORN ID IIOHI.ITOD.
Political
Daily newspaper
See-al
31 Oct 2 Nov 19k9
STAT
DATE OF'
INFORMATION
DATE DIST. o' Dee 1949
NO. OF PAGES 3
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
SXLP'S BASE ACTIONS
DISRUPT gMrZMFN SCRIM
On the basis of Ien^_n'B Four Principles of Revolution, the South Korean labor
Party conspired in a series of revolts: the October Revolt, the Cheju Do Uprising,
the Toeu-Sunch'on Incident, and the recently attempted September Unification Re-
volt. To provide arms for these revolts, the SIIP bribed the workers of the Ahyon
Ils.Ln Company, Ryopeung Tongyang Bnterpriee, eta., to manufacture band grenades.
It also bribed pharmacists of a drug-manufacturing company to obtain hydrochloric
aagqid, sulfur, etc. The hand grenades were manufactured -d assembled at a secret
pt. It was planned to have a stock of 6,000 fine quality hand grenades by
1 September, in addition to 40 sticks of dynamite and 400 ampules to be used in
the September Revolt. The SKLP furnished over 10 million won for the manufacture
of these arse.
on 8 July 1949, ismediate]y following the Pyongyang broadcast announcing the
establishment of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, the Cenral
Rxecitive Cewittee of the SKLP announced a three-point plan to its hierarchy:
(1) seimpe of the South Korean government by 20 August, (2) unification election
on 20 September, and (3) establishment of a central government, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea in Seoul on 21 September. It was also announced that
the national chairman, Pak Run-young, would arrive in Seoul by 1 September to con.
duct the unification election. The KELP also instructed its members to submit to
the party, oefore the end of July, all of their personal properties except minimum
living expenses to tide them over until the "liberation" of South Korean bank., for
the purpose of financing the party activities. A. a result, the Seoul headquarters
alone collected millions of won from the members who sold their houses, furniture,
and other personal belongings.
The SILP issued all these announcements and instructions, on. Its. own. accord
without due authority from the Worth Korean Reds. The SKLP'e self-commitments
were the result of false conclusions and assumptions drawn from the Pyongyang
broadcast of 8 July. The only instructions they received then were to designate
the month of July for propaganda and August for disturbances. For the latter, pur-
pose the Military Affairs Department of the SELF received 6 million won. Rowvex,
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increased pressure by the police, notably the mass arrest of members of the Seoul
Standing Committee, on 20 August, disrupted the party's activities during August
of our loyal comrades rguerrillas7 are being killed in South Korea. The situation
urges your immediate execution of an armed revolt. The North Korean leaders shall
extend to you all possible support.'
The September Revolt planned by the SELP failed, largely because of the SKLP'e
misinterpretation of the orders issued by the North Korean leaders and the SKI.P's
failure to grasp the essense of the Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland.
of the country by means of a national election, the SKLP through a rash assumption
took it to be a revolution with violence. Consequently, the SDG.P made preparations
on the basis that it was ? ass'je the main role in the "revolution" and that North
Korea would extend full support. The fact seemed to be, however, that the North
Korean Communists' intention was to have the SELF concentrate on guerrilla activity
to divert national attention while the so-called "peaceful" unification was taking
place in Seoul. The 3ELP's hasty commitments appe!tred to have ruined the whole
scheme.
Even after realizing their mistakes, the SUP insisted on "September Revolution,"
in order to hold the rank and file together. However, at this stage it was too
late to deceive its rank and file any longer. The demoralized SSLP guerrillas were
turning to bandits and disgusted members were renouncing the party by the hundreds.
After August the authorities' pressure on the Reds became especially strong
in Seoul, and the Seoul Standing Committee of the SKLP had to give its overt
activities and limit itself to underground activities. This frustrated the rank
and file, who gradually lost faith in the SSLP. The Seoul Standing Committee of
the SKIP has not held a single open meeting since that time.
The spies planted in all levels of the Seoul Standing Committee by the police
not o..ly collected information but formed anti-SELP cello to bore from within and
reduce the organization to a hollow shell.
This weakening of the Seoul Standing Committee was a fatal blow to the SKLP
as a whole, since the former controlled 80 percent of the political power and 60
percent of the membership.
In early September, the SELF had 15,000 well-trained loyal intellectual mea-
bere to participate in the September Revolt. Of these, 12, COO. represented the
General League of the All-Korean Cultural Group which included nine unions of vari-
ous cultural occupations. The balance comprised representatives of the Industrial
Technicians league, which included 21 unions of industrial workers- According to
the plan, these men were to lead the September Revolt, which was to begin with the
blasting of the Ran Gang bridge in Seoul.
After the failure of the September Revolt, the SKIP resorted to military ac-
tivities along the 38th Parallel in its last-ditch effort to restore the c ale
of the guerrillas and regain its dwindling membership by demonstrating its mili-
tary strength.
The SELP's tenet of "right to :ill," as originally intended for revolutionary
purpose, was relentlessly applied to its own members as a force to hold them to-
gether. Bence, threat and fear permeated the hierarchy.
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Rffi7it1:(i'1'luta
STAT
AB the foul co)Jepse of tae party became imminent, the SKLP realized the
need for a drastic change from military to political activities. Realizing that
the neglect of political activity had given an opportunity to the sprouting of
what they termed w Titoism," the leaders made frantic appeals to the masses under
slogans of "Freedom of demonstration, speech, and assembly." Nevertheless, they
failed to check the mounting tide of desertion.
From the view of Nationalist converts who were formerly members of the SW,
the greatest weakness of the South Korean government lies in: (1) its political
ineptness in winning the hearts of the people, and (2) its failure to build a
healthy economic foundation with which to cope with the Red menace. During the
zenith of its power, the SKIP bad considerable influence over farmers and factory
.workers through the Farmers Dion and the Council of Ali-Korean Labor Won. It
succeeded in winning these elements through skillful political propaganda, against
which the South Korean government's countermeasures, were never effective. The Reds
blamed the aggravating economic hardships on the government in order to alienate
the masses. Here also the adds were in the.x favor because of economic conditions.
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