HYPOTHETICAL INVASION OF NORTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600280349-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 349
• Publication Date: January 26, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/28: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600280349-4
CLASSIFHCPTION CONPIDEN"'I,IjgjJIVtIUEN1IM%r
CENTRAL INTELLCGNCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUM=NT OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
COUNTRY North Korea
SUBJECT Military
HOW
WHERE
DATE
PUBLISHED 1. Dec 1919
LANGUAGE Korean
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DATE OF
INFORMATION 1949
DATE DIST. ~fo Jan 1950
NO. OF FAGES 2
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
HYPOTHETICAL INVASION OF NORTH KOREA
50X1-HUM
Many attempts have been made to effect the unification of North and
South Korea, but all have failed miserably. The cnly way to erase the div-
ision at the 38th Parallel iw the use of force. We, therefore, propose to
discuss a hypothetical invasion of North Korea as follows:
First Stage -- Occupation of Pyongysng_in Three days
Our crack troops can occul.y Haeau the first day-and then advance on
Sarivon. Guarding the border In the Kangwondo area presents no problem be-
cause of the characteristic terrain of that territory. In the meantime, the
Air force would drop propaganda leaflets over Pyongyang., Wonsan, Sinui.4u, and
other cities, urging the populace to r:,o-- against the Communist regime in the
North. These air^raft shall drop no bombs. IOur Navy would make landings at
Chinnampo but leave Wonsan Port free so that the North Korean Con.runist forces
may flee through it. The propaganda must make it clear in no uncertain terms
to the public in the North that only the leaders of the puppet regime are-to
be punished but not the rank and file citizens.
r
On the second day, the Army would continue to advance to Ilsachon-ni
and to the suburbs of Pyongyang while the task force landed at Chinnampo
would penetrate to the west of pyongyang. At this moment the AirForcc, would
drop propaganda leaflets informing the public of the apprc.Aching National
Army as well as urEirg t'nem to cooperate in defeating the Communist puppet
regime. Moreover, one or two bobs dropped on the puppet regime headeuaroers
and Kim 11 Sung's official residence would bring about profitable psychologi-
cal results. The most important factor in the battle off the east coast will be the
submarine. If we are to invade North Korea, we must anticipate the appear-
ance of Russia-A submarines in the Sea of Japan. This would be the turning
point of the first stage action into the second stage. Also, it must be
plainly stated that the most difficult task that we would have to face, dur-
ing.the second stage of the campaign, would be-submarine warfare.
T ..
IIIAL
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL.
STATE HAVV hsRa DISTRIBUTION
ARMY 14 FAIR FBI
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in that rugged terrain. The tattle in the territory between Ch'ongch'on River
fextending from 39 54, 126 02 to 40 20, 126.397 and the Sonch'on area j9 48,
124 547 will be a very important one. The navy can bring re-enforcements to
would mark the beginning of second stage of the campaign. A real fight will
take place when our National Forces shall have reached the Yalu River region
because, as President Rhee indirectly relr.ted at the press conference on
16 October 1949, the enemy `rill certainly utilize the rugged Paektu Mountain
e It will alao be extremely difficult fur us to fight the enemy hidden
n
reg
have a cooling-off effect upon the China- Communist Army with the result that
on the side of the National. Army, it is fairly safe to assume that the Soviet
Army will also refrain frcm participating on the side of the Red Korean force.
However, it is safe to assume that the Chinese Communist Army will make its
appearance during the second stage of the campaign on the side of the Red Ko-
rean forces. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the success or failure
of the campaign will depend upon the outcome of the campaign in the Yalu River
on If we could hold our line firmly in the Yalu River region, it will
i
Third Stnge
The beginning of military operaticns in Hamgyong Province will usher
in the third stage of the campaign. it is not illogical to assume that most
of the Red Korean soldiers will be perfectly willing to surrender during the
third stage if they are not dyed-in-the-wool traitors. We n'_sc must scutinize
with extreme care Moscow's attitude after we enter the third st:.ge of the cam-
paign. In our pursuit of the enemy, we should elways have an opening for them
to retreat, and at the same time our planking movement must be such as to pre-
vent them from retreating into Russian territory.
The problems that would follow immediately after the unification of the
country by military force will probably be far more important. In pursuing
the enemy, we would employ two methods, namely, military force and public
demonstrations; but after the victory is won, it would be of utmost iL.pcrtance
to restore the public rind to normalcy. Once our country is united both phys-
ically and politically we remair a united country irr-epective of pressure or
interference from without.
CC~~vihiG~~dT~AL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/28: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600280349-4