REPORT POLISH REACTION TO KOKOSSOVSHIY APPOINTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600290662-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 662
• Publication Date: March 22, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600290662-5
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COUNTRY
SUBJECT
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL CUNFICr+,TIAAI~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY R~PQRT
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
Political - Internal
Thrice-weekly and daily newspapers
Mannheim, Stockholm; Warsaw
23 Nov 1949 - 5 Feb 1950
vu uocou+r co+uw uro+uno+ urucn+u rxr x.noxu Duran
er au u+me mnu nvu r+u mn+o or one+m
?. u. c. n .+o n.r m+ou m n.+ruuuo+ a+ rxr ununo+
or m com+n n ur u+u ro a +.urxouxuo ruso+ a no
Homo n .u. nnoeucno+ or rxn rou a r+onnnr
DATE OF
INFORMATION
The atmosphere was so tense that the older ie~lle, who are more level-
headed, feared that the underground organizaticns would attempt a coup d'etat.
This could have happened very easily since the organization is comprised of
young girls and boys between the ages of 15-2L years, those enthusiasm and
devotion to their country outweighs sober JudUment, end of ;eople whose only
occupation is underground activity.
Tito's example created some confusion in the PZPii (Polish United Workers'
Party). It is true that Vice-Premier Gommulka has for some time fallen into dis-
favor and was thrown out of the party's administration, but hundreds of members
of the same opinion as Gomulka remain in office. Even if they are not opposed
actively to Moscow, Moscow cannot trust them, since the incidents in Yugoslavia
indicate that it is possible to be a good Communist and not be subject to the
USSR. For party members to whom Communism is not only a question of belief but
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600290662-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600290662-5
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CONFIDENTL-
a career, this is a very important factor. Lore and more friends of Tito have
been found in the ranks of the Polish Communist Party. In the face of such a
situation and surrounded by popular hatred, the leader of the Wnrea. r
feel increasingly insecure Government buildings are surrounded with permanent
Juards armed with machine pistols. The guard is composed of soldiers, militia,
and, particularly, the Security Police. In addition, access to offices of high
government officials is controlled by special agents. For vacations, Warsaw's
high officials choose only those places which are well policed.
In regard to this situation, Jakub Berman, secretary of the Politburo, was
called to Moscow where it was resolved that, in order to consolidate the Polish
Communist Party, it must be rigorously purged. The opinion in Poland is that
Berman would like to remove approximately 15 percent of the present members from
the party either by a purge or by some other method. It is well known that for
complete domination of Poland, which will be an important area in case of war,
Moscow must have the army in its power, all the core since for some time yreDa-
rations have been made for its increase. Early in the summer of 1949, regi.-
tration of both officers and enlisted reservists began. The registration covered
officers between the ages of 39-54 years. Particular attention was given to
reservists studying medicine and technical subjects and those who during the
last war served in motorized divisions. At this registration, information was
obtained on the family origin, family status, occupation, and way of life of
each reservist. All this information was carefully recorded. In addition, all
who possessed maps of Poland in a scale of 1:25,000 had to report them and as-
sume personal responsibility in case o_ hiss.
The USSR has assumed control of the Polish Armed Forces for some time.
The chief of intelligence is Genera]. Komar, a iiussian of Jewish parentage, who
participated in the Spanish Civil dar. All ray positions are filled with Soviet
officers. By July 1949, Polish Air Force officers were already an insignificant
minority. Among them are mostly young lieutec_?ts between the ages of 20-22
years who enjoy the greatest confidence of their superiors. They are trusted
with the most important assignments becauso the;; have been trained in the Com-
munist school and are the safest risk politic 'ly. 'tevertheless, the Soviet
circles are of the opinion that in case of ccnf]ict, they cannot depend on the
Polish Army. For this reason, it has been _)nsider^:1 a rossibility that, in
case of war, the greater nuober of Polish divisions would be moved to the
Asiatic areas to guard the supply lines. Oe_ent in-iaents in Albania, where
the army was infiltrated with Coviet officers, have increased the Soviet's dis-
trust.
The reorganization of the army is c :ratter of utmost importance to the
Soviet Union and this task has been entrusted to Marshal :fokossovskiy. in arma-
ment, organization, training, and dis:ip]i1:e, the army will be adapted to the
Soviet model. Cadres are to be filled =ompletely by Co;:.runists. Rokossovskiy
will also control political life in Poland. For a long time, Soviet General
Halinov was the actual governor of Poland. His orders and reports to the Kremlin
were of more importance than even those of Ambassador Lebedev. Today, Rokossov-
skiy assumes the dominating position.
According to information from Warsaw, aokossovskiy's appointment does not
mean a change in the Kremlin's relation to Poland. Not even the methods will
be changed. The process will only be accelerated so that it can be brought to
the earliest possible completion because of international tension.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600290662-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600290662-5
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CONFIDENTIAL
Germans who still live in Poland are required to sign the following decla-
ration if they desire to acquire Polish citizenship: "I am ashamed of being
German. I shall break off all contact with my relatives in Germany. I recognize
the Oder-Neisse border. I am willing to be evacuated to Pastern Poland. I shall
leave the church."
Tae Security Act prohibits private conversation involving the disclosure of
information useful to Poland's enemies. This information covers morale, aims,
plans, inventories, clearing facilities, volume of expenditures rnd receipts,
bills of lading, texts of agreements and contracts. wage and price policy,
protocols, recommendations, assignments, status of raw materials and semimanu-
factures, quality of production, transportation difficulties, procurement and
distribution, exposure of weak spots in organization, labor difficulties, oc-
cupations, import and export figures, details on new production and new in-
dustrial projects, etc.
Commerce is of particular interest to Poland's enemies. It is clear that
the act must be made stricter and must be unconditionally enforced.
CONFIDEr3TiAl
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