A REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF UNITING OLD AND NEW CADRES IN THE NORTHWEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 143
• Publication Date: September 7, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
1
INFORMATIOI'' FROM
COUNTRY
SUBJECT Political
HOW
PUBLISHED Daily newspaper
WHERE
PUBLISHED Canton
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE
6 Jan 1950
TMU DOCESENT CORTAIMI U?OEMATI0N AP'll" MS THE RATIONAL OE-EtlI
Or THt uSITr7 STARE WITNU THE RGSISe OP EE/IOHME ACT EO
^. E. e., II AND EE. AE ASEPSIS. IR TRARENIUIOM OR THE NETRATION
Or ITS ColTEMn IN ANT HASHER TO AN OMGOT100IEEI PERSON U PR0?
RUINS O LAW. NAP20DUCTION Or THIS PONS IS PROHIBITED.
DATE DIST. -1 Sep 1950
NO. OF PAGES it
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
A REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF UNITING
OLD A1D NEW CADRES ;IN THE NORTHWEST
Elan, it January 1950 (Hain-hua)--In a report rendered to a meeting of the
cadres of the party in Sian on It November 1949, Ma Wen-ani'(. y , ), chair-
man of the organization department of the Northwest Bureau of the party, re-
ported on the habits of cadres and the probleim of uniting the old and clew ca-
dres in service. When many of the cadres moved into Sian, they had never had
any city experience. at all. Their strenuous efforts to carry out the party's
policies in spite of this ?nexperien..e merit our praise, and Chairman Mac
has. indicated his approbation by-saying that he hopes the cadres will continue
to carry on in the same fine manner. However, some of the old cadres, or those
not entirely new, have manifested certain habits and thinking that need men-
tioning and correction.
1. They do not put their hearts into, their work. A number of comrades
have failed to live up to our standard in long-term duties. Some cadres have
a desire to return to their native villages thinking that there they may be
able to advance fatter. Others, now that the u'ar is over, want to ahii't to
other occupations. Still others, who are advanced in years, are vorried'about
their fami'ies at home. Then there are those of rural origin who feel that
their capabilities are limited and fear assuming responsibilities on higher
government levels. Others are unhappy because they see the later cadres with
more education being advanced rapidly without going through the struggles the7
had to endure.
Whatever the difficulties, there are two basic reasons for most of
them. One is the lack of suitable leadership able to.explain conditions sat-
iafactorily,- and to arrange work commensurnte'with the capabilities and dis-
positions of the cadres. The other is that some cadres follow their own
erroneous thinking. They are not sufficiently cquainted with the princi-
ples of the revolution and spend their time thinking of themselves and their
treatment until they cannot concentrate on their work. If they do not over-
come'this habit, they will not be able to do good work, no matter where they
may be assigned, since a m:n?s personal advantage is not of the first impor-
tance to the pnrty.aud its work,
STATE
ARMY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
CONFIDENTIAL
2. Dilatoriness is the trouble with many cadres. They never get anything
done on schedule, although they are eternally busy. Again, leadership is at
fault in not having set up a scientific system for the cadres to follow, leav-
or patterns. can Some lac a sense of responsibility
hthem no etouf_o followsystem old
e
3. Some cadres are looking ofor ewant ase aandd ppllenty nowk that e heart things
over, and others are corrupt
easier, or the remuneration greater. The basic factor in this is that they are wpoin still capitalistic at heart; they have non absorbed the proletarian stepviein tint.
They fail to recognize that present attainments are only
long journey of the revolutionary movement. Such persons, if they do not
change, will not he cafe workers no matter where they are.
4. Some cadres have no political consciousness. They do not know how to
handle telegraphic messages or-military equipment. They are not careful about
who hears them talking. These people are a great danger to the party.
Without a change in these old cadres we cannot elevate the standards of
be uptaken,on leadership and
steps should tighten
thought k education.. Tnge foour llowing laders to
1. Official leadership and party branches should collaborate to coalesce
their work for this year and practice democracy and criticism and self-criti-
cism. There should be a careful consideration of the thinking of the cadres
and leadership methods. Each cadre should be led to express himself concern-
ing.; his own understanding and opinions. He should be taught to 'analyze and
summarize them. Standa~db for improvement should be set in order to elevate
both leaders and those led
Leaders should consider three things. (a) The wor'. of every period
should be planned and assessed. While every portion of the revolutionary
e
program is important, nevertheless, if no distinction ism iben
correct weight to the various parts of the program,
one who is continually busy and will lose his power of leadership. He will
do nothing well. (b) A system of investigation and summarization of work,
in order to effect, steady up (c) nt and to
tne should beg adopted
attainments should d b be set ., up. .
The. cadres" thinking and theoretiL.1. knowledgz: should be broadened. of le Leading the cadres in study thhouid become the most pb e tantiaxlt oft leaders
in official positions.
eradicate the weaknesses of the cadres in the higher echelons, or to improve
their work.
2. In the handling of cadres, leaders must be sure of having a suf-
ficient number of experienced cadres in each group to advance the work.
Changes may also be made in the interests of the work. Cadres unsuited for
official work may be transferred to work on a lower level or sent to a party
school for improvement. Furthermore, careful attention should be givenstoetc.,
reading, taking part in discussions, home conditions, working c
of the cadres, and a proper solution found for their problems so that they
can participate wholeheartedly in their work.
3. A strict system of rewards and punishments should be maintained.
Those who do well should be given spiritual and material rewards. ThosDise
fall into covetous or corrupt practices should be properly punished.
cipline must be maintained for the good of the work. However, the best
of ed-
treatment for these faults is education. Discipline is for the purpose
ucation. It should be maintained with discretion, and consideration should
be given to the attitude of the one at fault, whether- he is will ullyratuse
fault or only mistakenly so. Those who persist in awrong
an ours be dargfu;
to change will have to be dealt with by law. Only h
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
CONFIDENTIAL
at the same time, others will learn.. All cadres should have periodic examina-
tions and grading. All offices should have annual ratings in order to underd_
stand the condition of each cadre and to educate the cadres in meeting
At present, there are tnree tiype ~' -- official and tech-
cadres, new cadres drawn from among the intellectuals, and now
eh-
nical personnel taken over from the K MT regime. The latter two types up about 70 percent of the. present force in a number of governmeenntunits. In
some units the percenr.age is as high as 90. Consequently,
problem for us now is to know hew to train and integrate these new cadres into
+-he.effective service of the people.
Most of the young students now emplcyed in the border regions are grad-
Uni-
,pates of the Yenan school offinance, of
tthe he Ta Chung , or willing to learn
versities in Peiping. They are progressive,
from the older cadres, but they have not been refined in the crucible of the
revolutionary struggle and they are mostly from moTestlylcapital s~followtic
Their organizational experience is slight. They
own 't terests and place their ova ambitions above the thobstaclee
tion. They are often puerile in their thinking,
In their first experience in the revolution they suppose that everything in
the party is good. When they see defects, or are crossed, they 'become dis-ied and theirfold discourage. faintellectualfprideoandiarelunablelt hbe"humbleiinathed
face of hardship.
Among those taken over from the KML are real intellectuals and men of ex-
alted skills, and their vcrk from many aspects is of a high order. They
were formerly dissatisfied with the KMT, hence they Joined the revolution:
however, they are not inured to the revolutionary manner of the
spirit of service to the people is insufficient. Many
revolutionary movement for the sake of a livelihood: in their work they mani-
fest the hireling spirit, and e. desire to have their own way. They have car-
ried over from their old life a desire for being served, a desire for fame and
position, and other disagreeable tra0.s; but they are willing to progress,
so We have accepted them.. A large number of them can be made over into useful
revolutionaries.
During. the 5 months that we have he n in Sian, there haveunotrappeared any
great cleavages between the old and new cadre:, owing
attitude of the old and the. willing spirit of the new. However it be
said that there have been no problems. On the contrary, many of thc c,
cadres are insufficiently acquainted with the program foorcu ifyinegx, enduucating
reforming,'and using the new caares. Hence many of them proper influence of leadership toward the new; in some cases their demands are
too great and their assistance too slight, or.they do not assign their tasks
properly and thus hinder their progress. Other old cadres do not enter into
the lives of the new, maintaining an attitude of aloofness until the new workers
Ho _not feel at 'kiome- with them. Consequently, the old and new cadres con-
stitute two camps and have little in common.
The problem of how to integrate, educate, and employ the new cadres thus
becomes an important problem for us. We must seek to understand them, especial-
.y', those taken over from the KMr. They have received no revolutionary
training and their viewpoint differs from ours. They are unfamiliar with CCP
policies, principles, and methods of work. Therefore, we must depend upon our
old cadres to be a skeleton structure into wbich we can titeg"ahtte thheeenow
workers. They must take the initiative to guide, regorm;
new cadres. To this end the old cadrenmustaelevatcan ee their o pro standards end
change their thinking and habit and politicaliviewpoints and their habitshof simplicity and frugality. established
0W!11 ii ltM
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5
COHFIDEII AL
cadres may acquire skills and culture from the new ones. While,. in the begin
ning, these new workers must be strictly dealt with according to our princi--
?les, there must be no hint of a closed-door policy. Those chose political
attitudes are correct and who have ability should be employed. In helping them
to reform, attention should be paid to the practical features of their situa-
ttox$ they cannot be measured by the same standards as the old cadres. If, in
certain situations, the relations of the old and new cadres are difficult, the
old cadres should assume the larger responsibility. This is very important,
as Chairman Mao has admonished us, because the old cadres have had more train-
ing; and have-a better understanding of things. Nevertheless, we cannot coun-
tenet political obduracy in the new workers; we must insist upon reform.
Only thus can we place our program upon a higher plane.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600340143-5