SOVIET PRODUCTION PROBLEMS AIRED AS MACHINE PLANTS FACE HEAVIER SCHEDULES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600370778-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 778
• Publication Date: February 6, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600370778-8
COUNTRY USSR DATE OF
INFORMATION 1950 - 1951
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN L)OCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPOR1 50X1-HUM
CIASSIFICATION SECRET SECRET
SUBJECT Economic; Technological - Glass machinery
HOW
PUBLISHED Daily newspaper
WHERE
PUBLISHED Moscow
DATE
PUBLISHED 7 Dec 1950
LANGUAGE Russian
THIS DOCUNINT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFICTIND THIN NATIONAL DIFI$22
50
U. STN C.. SI AND SD. AS ANINOID. T ITS TRANSMIINSION OR TMIAOIVILATION
OF ITS ox ANY RANKS R TO AN ,U ,
;on
NINITID ST TL W. 1 O[FNOOUCTION OF THIS FORM OISI FRONINIITID. 1! FRO
SOURCE Moskovskaya Pravda.
DATE DIST. ' Feb 1951
NO. OF PAGES 3
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
SOVIET PRODUCTION PROBLEM AIRED AS
MACSINE PLANTS FACE HEAVIER SCHEDULES
The Moscow Steklomashina Plant is a small enterprise which is of great im-
portance to the national economy. It is the only plant in'the USSR specializing
in the production of complex machines for the glass industry. Its output is in
great demand by enterprises which produce construction materials, foodstuffs,
chemicals, electric bulbs, instruments, and other items.
Before the war, the plant had developed more than 50 types of machines.
During the first 4 years of the postwar Five-Year Plan, it put out many highly
productive machines. But this year its plan is not being fulfilled, output is
late, and economic indexes have sharply decreased.
For three quarters of 1950 the plant has failed to fulfill its plan for re-
ducing the costs of production by 3.6 percent,. and labor productivity was 5 per-
cent lower than planned. For 10 months of 1950, the plan for commercial output
t_.
was met only three times, -- in April, August, and o2p~~.1.b.....er. In the other months
it failed by 30-44 percent. Only 79 per of the entire 10-month plan in commer-
cial output was fulfilled.
The chief cause of this situation is the failure of the management to organize
the work of production properly. The shops work haphazardly, without proper appara-
tus and controls, and without checking blueprints.
The complex OM-12 machine, for example, was to be put out in November. How-
ever, the machine shop did not receive the blueprints until 5 November' or the tech-
nological documentation until 11 November, 2 months later than they were needed.
The directors were not prepared to settle, in good time, new and more complicated
problems.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600370778-8
SECRE1
A singular feature of the plant program this year is the fact that about
70 percent of the various types of output are new machines, never produced any-
where by anyone. It is clear that the Design Bureau and the Department of the
Chief Technologist at the plant, which must perform work of great volume and com-
plexity, should have been strengthened. The management did not do this. It did
not even fill out these departments with the number of workers provided for in the
official schedule of past years. If the Design Bureau lacks six of the 25 author=
ized workers, and the technology department has only two or three experienced men,
this small staff of workers cannot be expected to do all the designing and prepar-
ation for the production of 37 new items per year.
The workers of the Main Administration of Textile and Light-Machine Building
of the Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building are responsible along with the
directors of the Steklomashina Plant. The main administration has seen the plant
working feverishly for about 10 months, 'but has done nothing to correct:the situ-
ation.
Another reason for the poor showing of the plant was the fact that the main
administration acted bureaucratically in settling such a serious matter as organ-
izing the cooperation of SteklomLashina with other enterprises for the production
of a large number of parts which could not be made on the spot.
It is true that the main administration and the ministry distributed S'`ek-
lomashina's orders to other enterprises, but they did nothing to guarantee the
completion of the cooperative orders within the specified times. A number of
important parts either did not arrive at Steklomashina at all, or they arrived
greatly behind schedule. The Kiev Bolshevik Plant held up the production of
sprocket wheels, gears, and other heavy steel parts for 5 months. Shafts, and
gears, which should have come from Uralkhimmash (Ural Chemical-Machine Building
Plant) in March, have still not arrived.
Fulfillment of the cooperative plan is similarly affected by the fact that
a number of machines have waited months for completion, and uncompleted production
at the plant, according to data of 1 October, was 36 percent above the norm. This
production cannot be converted into ready output overnight.
In 1951, the plant faces fulfillment of a still larger and more complex pro-
gram. Above all is the question of filling plant technical positions with a suf-
ficient number of skilled workers--designers and technologists. The second task
is to fill out the machine tool park of the machine shop, and-to install hoisting
mechanisms. As a result of a basic change in the types and sizes of machines be-
ing produced, the machine tool park has ceased to conform to its assigned pro-
duction tasks in respect to the capacities and types of machine tools. There is
thus a definite need for very extensive cooperation.
The plant has a surplus of small machine tools, and a definite lack of large,
high-power machines. The gear shapers, for instance, lave only a 9-percent work
load. At the same time, however, a large quantity of gears must'be sent elsewhere
for machining, sometimes thousands of kilometers from Moscow. Gear-milling and
gear-cutting machine tools are only 23 percent utilized, yet all gear wheels must:
be sent to the Kiev Bolshevik Plant or to Tekstil'mash in Ivanovo for machining.
This year for the first time, the plant has had to deal with heavy parts
weighing up to 9 tots; but Steklomashina's heaviest crane has a' maximum lifting
capacity of 5 tons. It is easy to understand the complications confronting the
assemblers in maneuvering these heavy parts.
The third problem to 'be solved in connection with the 1951 plan is concerned
with assembly apace.. It is true that Steklomashina was constructed to produce pre-
cise and complex, but small-size machines, but next year it must produce a number'
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600370778-8
of huge mechanism: which, when assembled, are too large for the area in the assembly
shop. To assemble them in sections and send them to the purchasers without proper
testing is a dangerous policy in general, but would be even more dangerous under the
conditions which exist at the Steklomashina Plant. The question of expanding assem-
bly space has been placed before the ministry repeatedly by the plant, but it has
not yet been solved.
We trust that Glavtekatil'mash and the ministry will devote more attention
to this enterprise.
1
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