THE ATOMIC BOMB POTENTIAL OF THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600400463-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 463
• Publication Date: July 23, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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V~,CENTRALvINTELLIGENCE~AGENCY'w ~n'V'~iG10RT
I
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CAD NO.
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Military - Atomic xarf~TM
HOW
PUBLISHED Semimonthly periodical
WHERE
PUBLISHED Oslo
DATE
PUBLISHED 25 May 1951
LANGUAGE 1Yorwegian
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INFORMATION
1
DATE DI`' f.
23Ju1 1951
NU. ~F PAGES
3
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT N0.
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THIS IS UNEVALUATEq INFORMATION
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Militaer Orientering, Vol 7, No 10, 1951.
THE ATOMIC BOMB POTENTIAL OF THE USSR
It is estimated that the USSR produces two atomic bombs per month, and
that it entered the new year with a stockpile of 22 atomic bombs. With this
capacity, by the end of 1951 the USSR should have 46 atomic bombs. This is
sufficient to cause frightful destruction over great areas, but it is not
sufflc~nt to deliver a decisive blow and to win a war.
If this information is correct, there is no reason to fear a world war
this year. What then are Moscow's possibilities for producing many atomic
bombs?
The USSR began its efforts to master the technology of atoJaic bomb pro-
duction in the summer of 1946. At that time, Beriya, chief of the Soviet
secret police and the internal security organization, suddenly disappeared.
A few months later it became known that, on Stalin's orders, he was engaged
in organizing an immense apparatus for the production of the atomic bomb.
A chain of large research centers was established in Central Siberia,
the Caucasu.,, and Georgia. German .nuclear physicists were brought in from
Soviet Zone Germany and were put to work at these centers.
First Experimental Explosion in 1947
In June 1947, the USSR, for the first time, tested an atomic bomb in an
isolated part of Siberia approximately 75 kilometers from Lake Baikal. This
was only a small experiment. The explosion was noted within a radius of about
30 kilometers, but it could not be registered by .observatories outside the
USSR.
Two years went by before the USSR exploded the first real atomic bomb.
The explosion was observed immediately, and the nexs was made public in the
US in September 1949. It was known that the USSR's first real atomic explo-
sion took place on land and not under water. This explosion was a little less
powerful than the first atomic explosion in the US.
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Since September 1949, no other explosions in the USSR have been noted.
This hac: led to speculations that the USSR really has the atomic bomb ~1~.
Gordon Dean, of the US Atomic Energy Commisaion, stated very positlvely at a
press conference in Washington that the USSR does have the atomic bomb.
In addition to the USSR's first atomic bomb pleat in Tannu Tuva (the
Soviet Atomgrad, built in the wasteland areas between Siberia and Mongolia),
there are also three other main installations in the USSR: one in the vicin-
ity of Tashkent between bake Aral and the Afghanistan border, one in the vi-
cinity of Chelyabinsk, west of Tobolsk, and one near i,i1e Black Saa, at Eu-
khvmi in the Caucasus.
Aa %arge as Oak Ridge
It is estimated that the research station near Sukhumi is as large as
the US atomic city, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. A large force of secret police
and soldiers prevent unauthorized persons from entering or leaving the area,
and thousands of peasants have been evacuated from this region.
The USSR also has a research site under construction in the Urals, and
it is expected that it will be in operation in early 1952. It will be much
larger than any of the four previously mentioned, and it is believed that
these new research stations will increase the USSR's atomic bomb production
to ten bombe per month as of January 1952?
By the end of 1952 the Soviets will have 160 atomic bombs. If one takes
into consideration the sources of uranium and the possibilities available for
the production of atomic bombs behind the Iron Curtain, the USSR's stockpile
assuredly will be 300 bombe by the end of 1953? If these bombs can be de-
livered to their targets, the Soviets will be in a position to destroy the
armament industries in the US and Western Europe. Fortunately, no atomic
bomb will be of tactical value unless it is delivered to the right spot and
exploded at the right time.
By Merchant Ship or Submarine
The Soviet General Staff may perhaps attempt to ship the atomic bomb by
merchant vessel and explode it in port cities around the world. It may at-
tempt to detonate an atomic bomb simultaneously in ail important British and
US ports, something which would render these useless for many months. For a
while Anglo-American troops and military supplies could be sent to the areas
of operation only by air.
This, however, cannot prevent the US from reprisal raids. The USSR and
the Satellites could be paralyzed by atomic bombs which would reduce their in-
dustrial centers to piles of ruins.
The Soviets would be acting rather foolishly if they attempted to tran~-
port atomic bombs to Western ports by hiding them in ships. The Western au-
thorities are already on guard. The pilots guiding foreign vessels into port
are provided with Geiger instruments which will revegl the presence of radio-
active elements in the ship's cargo.
The Russians may attempt to send bombs by robot craft, launched, for ex-
ample, from submarines. It is estimated, however, that the USSR neither has
nor is likely to have in the near Future either robots capable of being launched
for this purpose or robots possessing the degree of accuracy necessary. More-
over, they do not possess submarines large enough to serve ea launching bases
for remote-control rockets.
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It is clear that the Soviets have worked very energetically on the V-type
rockets developed by the Germans. ~ t~thenntheovcan cau a enormouswdestruc~c
charges or with some degree of accuracy, Y
tioa in Burope and also in the US. But the experts working in the USSR do not
appear to be prepared to solve the complicated problems involved in the construc-
tion of "atomic V-bombs," and years may go by before :.hey are in a position to
solve them.
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This leaves only the orthodox method Of bombing. At the end of World War
II, the USSP. had no strategic air force, but in the postwar period they have
considered important and~have been working on the procurement of heavy bomber
aircraft, particularly a copy of the 8-29. At present they have about 300 such
aircraft,
The Soviet Air Force has 44 air bases in Eastern Siberia quite close to
Alaska. There are 15 runways large enough to accommodate four-engine bombers.
However, a strategic bomber force of 300 aircraft is insufficient to de-
liver a decisive and surprising attack on both Western Europe and the US. The
relatively slow Soviet bombers would be shot down long before the main force
could reach its objectives.
The Soviet Air Force, of course, will grow gradually, but so, too, will
the US and European air forces. To the same extent will grow the US' possi-
bilities for launching reprisal attacks with atomic bombs -- uranium, plutonium,
or hydrogen bombs.
It is obviously difficult to get an idea of the thoughts of the Soviet Gen-
eral Staff on these matters. It may be that they will not wait until the Soviet
Air Force and the stock of atomic bombs are large enough to deliver a decisive
blow against both the US and Europe. It may be that they believe that it would
suffice to destroy the US armament industry, after which Western Europe would be
forced to surrender.
It may also be that they believe a surprise attack could succeed as soon
as the USSR has a stock oP 100 atomic bombs. This they will have in July 1952?
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