SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION IN THE BALTIC

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
R
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 14, 2011
Sequence Number: 
199
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 24, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7.pdf272.05 KB
Body: 
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 20 CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTF~ SECURITY II~'GRMATIGN C_tJTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT INFORMATION FROM FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO. SUBJECT Military - Har preparations, defense, naval, air, secret weapons HOW PUBLISHED Daily nexepaper WHERE PUBLISHED Copenhagen DATE PUBLISHED 27 Dec 1952 .? .. .a .... coot. i? wrote. [n [ .+ .~ m. . v . .rio. or i w o .. i .... u. ntro ?a.o. i no.nnco n u.. ..nt .aoucn aro. ..~. _. _. ..c?!.~.co~ DATE OF INFORMATION 1952 DATE DIST. oZ Jul 1953 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. Following is the full text of an article which appeared in the 27 December 1952 issue of the Copenhagen dail nexspaper Berlingske Tidende over the signature of V. K. SSrensen_~ The struggles for control of the Mediterranean and the Baltic have played important roles in the history of Europe. Gradually, as Northern Europe in- creased in importance, the importance of the Baltic increased correspondingly. World War I apparently forced the Baltic somewhat into the background, but only apparently. Up to and during most of World War II, Germany was master of the Baltic. World War II, which turned so many other things upside down, also changed this condition. As a naval power, Germany completely disappeared from the Baltic; with some Justification, it might even be said that Germany disappeared from the coasts of the Baltic, because the partition of Germany into zones moved Soviet influence so far westward that practically the entire German Baltic coast is nox dominated by the USS^.. The Baltic is fast becoming the USSR's most important naval area. The coastal areas have important air bases, and the coastline proper seems to be in the process of being fortified on a gigantic scale, far surpassing Hitler's 4a- mous Atlantic Wall. A11 of northeast Prussia is now hermetically sealed. Mili- tary forces of considerable strength, a netxork of airfields xith underground hangars, and a number of launching platforms for rocket missiles ere located in this area. East Prussia, itself a powerful fortress, is closely linked with the rest of the fortified Baltic coast by a new double-track railroad from Kaliningrad to Szczecin, a railroad built for the sole purpose of transporting troops and war materiel. The German population has been removed from large areas and has been replaced with Soviet troops, naval personnel, and secret police. During the past few years, great air bases and bases for V-weapons have been built by forced labor in the former Baltic republics. These countries form one of the most important military centers in the USSR. The port of KLaypeda has been provided xith colossal pens for submarines of the same type as those built CLASSIFICATION__ NSNB RESTRICTID DISTRIBUTION Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 ty the Germans in Brest, and the pens are protected against surprise enemy sub- marine attacks by large underwater nets. Klaypeda is nw the Soviets main sub- marine base in the Baltic. Lepaya is one of the largest Soviet naval bases in the middle Baltic area; military installations have been expanded greatly since the war, and important unite of the Soviet Baltic Fleet are normally stationed there. Like e11 other Soviet military installations, this naval base is heavily guarded, and merchant vessels are not permitted to enter the harbor without spe- cial permission. Tallin and Pyarnu have been made into important troop centers. The ports ^f Ventspils and Pal'diakiy are being developed as secondary fleet bases, and Riga also serves as a secondary base for Sovi??'. submarines. The Bal'ic islands of Khiumea, Rulchnu, Naysear, and Mukhu serve as bases for racket-missile launch- ing. The Soviet troop strength in the area is estimated at eight divisions, including many Mongolian units. The Estonian port of Pal'diakiy is today a purply Russian city, and over half the 30,000 workers employed in the shale-oil districts in northern Estonia are Russians, the native population having been deported. The coastal stretches east and west oP Tallin, especially, have bPCOme populated exclusively by Russians. Only Russian peasants are found today around ell the airfields in Estonia. If this policy is long contimied, the Baltic countries will lose their special clmr- acter and their indigenous populations. Since fall 1948, the Sovie*.e have reinforced their garrisons along the Finnish border. Soon after the conclusion of the armistice with Finland, Soviet minesveepera began a hurried removal of the minefield betxeen Tallin and Pork- kala. Porkkals, at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, was made into a strong fortress. At the acme time, the main base of the Soviet Fleet vas moved from Kronshtadt to Tallin. Typical of these developments is the Porkkala area in Finland. This large area of land, situated less than 40 kilometers from Helsinki, the Finns very forced to "lease" to the USSR in 1944 for a period of 50 years. Today the whole area is enclosed by s tight iron curtain and is under Soviet sovereignty, No Finn has access to, ~r any right in, this part of Finland. The airfield nt Murmansk has been enlarged, and. new airfields have been built in Karelia. Roads have been improved for the sake of military traffic, and a super- highway, Prom Murmansk via Bozharsk to Petrozavodsk, capital of the Karelo-Firul9h SSR, is under construction. It is a fact that one of the strongest chains of airfields in the world lies along the 1,500-kilometer-long stretch of the Baltic coast from Leningrad to Lue- beck, ai--fields that serve as bases for th_ Soviet air forces. Along the whole Baltic coast, from Wismar thrcugh the former Baltic republics and on to Porkkale, the USSR has radar stations which are directed from the city of Neuruppin. Fur- ther, two Soviet radar stations are located at Arkona on the island of Ruegen, from which the fairway from Lolland t~ Trelleborg may be scsnned. The radar sta- tions are all in close communication with all Soviet air, navy, and rocket bases along the Baltic coast. These means enable the USSR to keep a close watch on everything that takes place in the Baltic and to take steps aga'.nst unwanted guests. Another chain of bases, pointing toward Svalbard, extends from Lenin- grad to Murmansk. By means of these chains of bases, the Soviet Air Force encircles Scandinavia and reaches through Germany toward the Ruhr, the basis of Western European indus- try and defense. The Baltic .s rapidly becoming a Soviet lake. Day by day the USSR is con- solidating its hold upon, and fortifying, the 3,000-kilometer-long southern coast of the Baltic. The Soviets have extended to 12 miles the internationally accepted Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 3-mile territorial limit. The Soviet government, which claims the right to ex- clude from the Baltic warships of nations which do not border on this sea, con- currently claims the right to block the l~.reaund and the Danish Belts in case of xar. Possibly, these phenomona do not point to an immediate danger of war; in any case, however, their purpose is plainly, among other things, to frighten Swedish warships and aircraft away from the hitherto freely accessible Baltic xaters and to make the Baltic a cloned sea dominated by the USSR. Zt seems indisputable that a considerable war industry has arisen iu East ~ Prussia. The Sovfeta thus have put the German Dora armament plant ~ic] into use for the production of V-wEapons, employing mainly experts Prom the former German war industry ae engineers and cechricians. Theze are people who xere arrested in 1945 after the Soviet invasion. Frisonera from concentration camps in the Soviet Zone are employed, under clone giard, as laborers. The East Ger- man armament industry in general is working intensively for the USSR. Five thousand workers are said to be employed at Dora, and 9,000 at the Zeiss works in Jena. The Zeiss works produce bombsights and other aeronautical instruments for the USSR. The Buckau-Wolf works ir_ Magdeburg ~ow Schwermaschinenbau Karl Liebknecht], the Bruckner and Kanis works in Dresden, and the Skania works ~ic] in East Berlin produce parts for submarines. Raw materials for this production come from the USSR. The Junkers firm in Dessau and the Schaeffer and Budenberg firm ~ow Mesageraete and A.-matur?enwerk Karl Marx] in Magdeburg are producing a large number of Diesel engines for the Soviet Navy, Derunapht, the Soviet- owned oil company, which controls 55 p'?rcent oi' the East German fuel-oil busi- ness, has erected a number of tank installations along the Baltic coast, which seemingly serve strategic purposes only, i.e., as depots for units of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. New waterways are to connect the various Ba'.tic ports with East German in- dustrial centers. The Baltiysk (Pillaul Channel has been deepened, and landing craft are being constructed on a large ~^ale in shipyards on the Baltic. East German shipyards are building, also on a large scale, landing craft capable of earryinp six tanks and several hundre-a men.. Zn addition, the Soviets are bu a.ding a number of foztificao.~ons along the entire German and Polish coast?. of the Bait lc, and old German installations are being rebuilt and enlarged. The Soviet installations, however, do not resemble Hitler's reinforced-concrete Atlantic Wall The=_e fortifications car. hardly be seen from the sea. The beach is clear, and installations are placed in strategic spots at the edge of the woods or are otherwise hidden. The German forti^.icationa at the Ms.surian Lakes have been demoLlshed and material from them utilized in the building of this Soviet Maginot Line, which is to reach from the Dnepr to Klsypeda. It has been said that German sc.tertista cooperating with Soviet research workers in war research ~entera north of Moscow have be2n able to concentrate in- frared rays so strongly that, in a few seconds, they can generate a temperature of 4,000 degrees Centigrade at a distance of 10 kilometers. Since fall 1947, the USSR is supposed to have built a network of underground stations from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea which ran protect the border with a curtain of infxa^ red rays against an enemy advancing by land or through the air. This means of defense ie supposed to have been especially built up in the Riga area and in the oil districts of the ('aucasus. These rumo-s are still received with a great deal of skepticism, but it is a fact That work 1n this field is being done on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is also a fact that modest progress has been made, and, finally, it is worth remembering that in fall 1949, the British General Fuller reproached the Allied Command for not having made use of a similar weapon, known as an antitank weapon during World War II. Perhaps, some day, this weapon also will become a sinister reality Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 STAT Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 The island of Ruegen le being especially strongly fortified and made into a submarine base. It has become the Gibraltar of :he Baltic. This island now forma the central point in an extremely strong systea oP fortifications, the other main points oP which are situated as followso 1. The island of Usedom, with the reconstructed arms plant in Peenemuende, center oP extensive rocket research. The Rerik Lsi~ area. Kuehlungeborn. The island of Poel, an important submarine base. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/14 :CIA-RDP80-00809A000700120199-7 Installations un R>>egen include a naval base, probably in Wieck, where the building of a harbor for the Soviet fleet already had begun in 1950; two radar stations; an airfield; and various artillery positions. The harbor of GreifswaYi is being rebuilt to accommodate submarines and light naval craft. Launching platforms for V-type rocket missiles have also been built on Ruegen. There is also a large underground submarine base, built into excavations in the ch?Llk for- mations; and the harbor at Sasanitz has been deepened to an extent that enables it to accommodate the largest uniis oP the ~ovie] Baltic Fleet. Ruegen is, Yurther, abase for the newly built Soviet fleet of landing craft; and, finally, the 1st Army Group of the new Eaet German People's lu~my ~ic] is stationed en Ruegen and on the mainland near the Polish border. The USSR has a strong fleet at its disposal in the Baltic. Primarily, it consists of about 130 submarines, but it also has destroyers, cruisers, and some older types of battleships. Score of the vessels were originally German, but they have been repaired and rebuilt. Some ~f the sub.?sarinee are of the famous U-2i and U-28 German classes, but the greater number are hardly that modern. Never- theless, the Soviet submarine force in the Baltic is strong both in numbers and in striking power. Jane's Fighting Ships asserts that the USSR pions to have, within 2 years, ?00 submarines in the Baltic alone. Anew type is to be built with a very great range and with high speed when submerged. The USSR, the land power, seems thus to be following the naval policy of the land power, Germany. For Denmark and for the other Scandinavian countries, this development in the Baltic area is serious enough. $owever, the Soviet military preparations seem more to be part of a lcig-range program than preparations for immediate war. Furthermore, the Soviets are plainly attempting to make the Baltic a So- viet lake, as the Germans before them would have made it a Gelman lake. Outside Scandinavia, in England and the US, these developments are being watched with interest, developments which may become of importance to areas far beyond Northern Europe.