YUGOSLAV VIEW OF AGRICULTURE IN THE USSR, HUNGARY, AND POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700170384-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 384
• Publication Date: April 26, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION CON'IDLIITIr,L
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
COUNTRY USSR, Hungary, Poland
SUBJECT Economic - Agriculture
HOW
PUBLISHED Daily newspapers
WHERE
PUBLISHED Zagreb
DATE
PUBLISHED 17-20 Dec 1953
LANGUAGE Croatian
DATE OF
INFORMATION 1953
DATE DIST. ~(, Apr 1954
NO. OF PAGES 7
SUPPLEME,' 4T TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
YUGOSIAV VIEd OF AGRICULTURE
III TIiH USSR HUNGARY AND POLAND
LComment: The following report on agricultural planning
and policies in the USSR, Hungary, and Poland indicates
Yugoslavia's unfavorable view of Soviet methods.
Numbers in parentheses refer to appended sources
Agriculture in the USSR
Central state funds of farm products :ire established by the Soviet govern-
ment through contract purchasing, compulsory crop delivery, and surplus pur-
chasing and by payment in kind for LIPS services. In a broad sense, the first
three methods are representative of the Soviet purchasing system.
Farm products obtained by the state in return for biPS services are
increasing steadily. In 1937, cereals obtained by payment in kind for Id'S
services amounted to 50 percent of the central cereals fund.
New agricultural measures, introduced by decrees issued by the Party
Central Committee and the government in September 1953, provide ibr increased
lilS activities, an indication of still larger centralized state funds. Despite
stronS resistance to MPS services by oil:hozes, the government finds it easier
to increase agricultural funds by this method than through compulsory crop
purchasing, because crop purchasing has been very much despised r.nd the govern-
ment has continuously encountered difficulties in its implementation.
The three methods of purchasing, have varied in significance in the
different phases of Soviet economic development. In the early period the
basic method was contract purchasing. In the ensuing 30 years this method
was gradually replaced by compulsory crop purshacin;;. IIo,,ever, contract
purchasing remains in force for the principal induztr.i..'. products, such as
cotton and sugar beets.
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In accord with sowing and production plans at the beginning of each
economic year, state planning agencies dictate to kolkhozes not only pro-
duction quotas, but also prices /at which products are to be sold to the
state7. The total fsic7 production must be turned over to the state. In
exchange, farmers mostly obtain consumer goods at prices, quality, and type
as designated by the market, which in turn depends on industry. Recent
measures have not made any changes in the contract purchasing system.
Compulsory crop purchasing applies to cereals, sunflowers, potatoes,
other vegetables, livestock products, and hay. For agricultural products,
amounts subject to compulsory purchase are determined according to arable
area, and for livestock according to total agricultural area. At the
plenary session of the Communist Party of the USSR in September 1953, it was
stressed that this principle has not been applied, but that crop purchasing
has been governed by the principle of who has more should contribute more,
regardless of the agricultural area involved. Such a practice leads to lncc
of incentive. Tt was stress
c,a . at the plenum that it led to lack of interest
Lin increasing production] among producers and to sluggishness in production.
Crop purchase quotas, which have been steadily increasing, have resulted
in sluggish and sometimes even decreased production. From his small plot,
the kolkhoz member has been obliged to deliver to the state designated
quantities of meat and milk, even in cases where he has had no cows.
Although Soviet official publications have stressed not only how annual
crop purchase plans have been fulfilled and overfulfilled, it was stressed
at the plenary session that there were considerable shortages in deliveries,
not only by members of kolkhozes but also by a large number of kolkhozes.
According to Soviet regulations, nonfulfillment of crop purchase obligations
involves not only material but also criminal liability.
Nonfulfillment of crop purchase obligations is one of the strongest
manifestations of fsoviet7 resistance; the decision by the Plenum to cancel
all outstanding crop purchase obligations indicates a significant defeat for
the bureaucracy.
The new Soviet measures provide for a reduction in crop purchase obliga-
tions, but an increase in crop purchase prices. Beef and lamb are priced at
almost six times their former price; pork and poultry, four; milk and butter,
two; while wool is priced at 2 rubles more per kilogram. This would seem to
point to considerable price increases. However, a comparison of crop purchase
prices with retail market prices points to the opposite. as follows (in rubles):
Crop Purchase Prices Sale Prices in Moscow Sep 1953
Before Sep 1953 After Sep 1953 State Sector
Ko.lkhoz Market
Beef, per
kilogram 0.25 1.5 12 - 15
20 - 25
Pork, per
kilogram 0.8 3.2 19 - 21
20 - 22
Milk, per
liter 0.25 0.55 2.5
Butter, per
kilogram 4.5 9.0 29.
Eggs, (10) 4.o 6.o 9 - 11
13 - 15
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Formerly, purchasing prices for livestock products in comparison with
selling prices were very low. By the enormcus differences between purchasing
and retail prices, the state accumulated vast funds.
However, the new crop purchase prices provide only a moderate modification
in the relationship between purchasing and selling prices.
Kolkhozes and kolkhos members avoid delivering their products to the
state, and resort to all means possible to sell their products on the kolkhoz
market, because prices on the kolkhoa market are considerably higher than
,tate store prices. By selling their products on the kolkhoz market, they
obtain from 3 to 16 ti.r.:es more than they would at new crop purchase prices.
The new decrees do not decrease crop purchase obli?otions or increase
crop purchase prices of cereals or sunflowers. Sono sources cite the crop
purchase price for a kilo;~r_um of first-elr;ss wheat 6 kopecks, while others
cite it as 10 kopecks. In September 1953, a l:ilepu . of wheat flour in Moscow
stores cost 3.25 rubles, or 32--53 time:; more than tl:?.: purchase price I-of
wheat7. The ratio between the purchase ;rice of sunflowers and the o :al
price of sunflower oil is 1:240.
The USSR, partially realio!r.: the fu:luu'c of its crop purchase policies,
in its September dec:ees is accelerating surplus purchasing, particularly of
potatoes, vegetables, and livestock products.
In surplus ptu clmci;;,, the 'overt m_:.t cont. acts for delivery of products
remaining after crop purchase ebli;.tions have been fulfilled. Inasmuch as
the government rosy pay for 4hese products in consumer goods rather than money
(the manner in which these surpluses will be patch for is not kne::n), surplus
purchasing would lead to the applic..tion of Stalin's plan to abolish ecuodity
production /on small plots7.
Surplus purchase prices are even three times as high as compulsory crop
delivery purchase prices and should doubtless act as a stimulus to production.
The plan of the Soviet government is clear: decrease crop purchase
oblirrations and increase prices and cue..ntities of farm and livestock products
obtained by state surplus purchasing. In comparison with 1952, centralised
state funds should increase in 195h :a follows: meat, 37 percent; milk, 43
percent; eggs, 65 percent; and wool, '1 :erccut.
.fl;othcr this -r4-11 be carried out at the c ,cnse of the state fund or at
the e sense of the consumers, only timea.rill tell .(I)
;: __ i culture in iinn ;ary
ftu ;1zi:Ln agriculture Itas deteriorated, with the aver::,;e Lrop7 yield
considcrbl;,- lower 'a:.n before ;;oriel 5Tar II. This has re::ulted fron. adminis-
trative pressure rtg .iara peas: nts, compulsory crop purchasing (which includes
every branch of .,ricultural productio:.). forced colic c;,ivication, and
;ersecution of kulaks (who in most ccaee are not k:la,;s but peasants who in
nc way or rnothcr have caressed diss_itisfaction with the re i,4e). In
.ddition, masses of payw; nts have beer. flock!,,' lato industry, 'and gifts.
of land have been contributed to the i;C;.nr:11CCLt. IhC.^,CI'OL?L: ;deP_Lthy neas_attc
have saved themselves fe' .u being entered on 'iallaib lists' by these gifts
;is a result, a vast reserve of genc_:,11y uncultivated land hoar been created.
In villages, on a.cuatc shoe e of msnnowor e5iste i.n eontr,: ent.^ Bicsut'$ report demonstrates that in
the first 4 yearn of th= '2?l:.n 191
increased by 115 percent while, p,ri.cultus ,1 _>roductlonnwar, increaseduonlyn ?.r:e
9 percent.
The plenwn issued proposcas ,,hick cr.li :br cli.1iuation of these disproportions
within the next 2 years, by nrovidinf; a transfer of res
agriculture. The plans call for a 45-percent increase in ar ancs Ori from cultural industry to
invest
ments in 1955 over those in 195;. However, these percentages mean very little,
because total agricultural production is far behind prewar production. The
plenum's plans call for 7.9 million livestokl; by 1954, whereas livestock in
prewar Poland totaled 9.9 million. Phethes the plan will be achieved is
questionable because of the peasants' resistance to government policies.
The production of wheat ??e;- :?;ectarc is the
the tot tl nrociuctior. is Me : " before the :r_1r, but
arch 1o;rer. I; ndo. :ors '
m vimum is 100 hectares) 1G- cul`iv- tc -12 .main t the
pecu;ants.^ ,rasp rent -portion to noo
2'
and allo?.a the rest to be urtcullihr .r cod. Or 3 raillion vill:de Earns,
t, quarter of ,. million belong to :realti:. ^.:?r.tr_.s; tlte.e^nt?-, it is ? ::y to
visualize ho?.r low ?d.p'icultu:ea production i,.
Sluggish and decreased al;ricultur.' rroduction is the result
of excessive e.,:mitais en heavy industr , but is costly the result of
bureaucratic ::drinistr.tion of ..drict;lttsc. In Poland, :_ efforts --re
directed toward the decel.orlent of heavy irdarerv, nr.rticularly smelters
-nd steel pl:tntr, ahilc the nrcductio:: of c'. u-u:;cr oodn is thorou-;hl?
nc,;leetod? It is prcble;;: for the at procure a ':es ->itchforkc,
,lows, and even tin pails. :ec.r ats 'react :nubnit petit-:Gran, to the powic.t
uthorities for constructlun c ?;te;?i
clorc :: netitlon is ceted to. ases -r?ilta ceei'r-1 3ronthc 8o by
the l u-ton; in some Osea i t Imo occ;; 2-3 /cars. At
pitta, bare::uc c
critici~;?d bee .use ^l it. ,c;+ 's or, 7cu e,je rc, .;o wz~s severely t1lo 5. t CO' u' i c t trt. ore .,crdin2
while bricks ccrc c ?u.nlrt in e-.
reduiree petiticr .a-i. .::. - c,!'. O cement
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Discussion at the plenum demonstrated that Poland cuapuiscry crop nurcha e
policy and the attempt to place agriculture under state jurisdiction by means
of collectivization have met with the Cenral resistance of peasants, and have
thrown small and medium farmers directly into the arms of wealthy farriers. III
some vojewodztwos, 25 percent of the equipment in government machinery stations
is not utilized. In 1953, 50 percent of the threshing machines, ant 20 percent
of the automatic binders and reapers in the amina machinery stations were not
utilized. Jerzy Tepicht, director of the Institute of Agricultural Economy,
stated that farms, which in 1950 and 1951 utilized the grind machinery stations
quite extensively, reverted in 1952 to using kulak-owned equipment in return
for their labor or wheat.
In Poland, 1.5 million or 50 percent of the farmers have 3 hectares of
land; the majority do not have any draft a::i:r_ls or draft equipment. In Warsaw
Wojewodztwo, 105,000 farts do not have a horse; in Kielce Wojewod::two, 30,000;
and in Rzeszow Wojewodzt'o, 80 percent. Asa result, ._ large number of these
peasants turn to wealthy village farmers to avoid utilizing goverrr..ent machinery
st::t ions .
Government policies have resulted in complete lack of interest in production
and have brought neasantr to the level of day laborers. Accorui
official economic periodical, Zycse Gos? cal rc c, the average value of aitworkday
to a peasant with 5-10 hectares is a little over 13 ::lot c.
an average of 200 days a J ` If a zlotys; thass
Is less than the cost of yecadyialtdensuit e, which u costs would
nbe 21600 proximately t2,70Chis
zlotys.
Measures called for by the latest plcrwa will improve the situation to a
point of being just be^rable. For example, production of cereals is to be
increased 600,000 tons in the next 2 years, but this only corresponds to the
amounts lost through poor cultivation.
The measures currently planned are basically bureaucratic. Crop purchasing,
which included approximately 30 items, is temporarily limited to cereals,
potatoes, milk, and meat. Contract purchnsing has been extended so that nothin-
is really changed.
Organizational measures called for by the plenum will lead to further
bureaucrat '.:,at ion. As in the USSR, plan: are bein ; male to transfer specialists
and party officials to riculture, _nd to nation::1i.:c %-;ricultttrc. For cxa,a lc,
the plenum decided tii::t the ::;p-icul:tun.1 .ad forestry sections of the wojewod:.tmo
people's councils should be turr,ca inte :rojc:ou.a.ro c .ainistr tienc for ;iriculture
so that agencies for direct of ? ::.icultural production mi, ht be
created. A decision of this t;_:e indicates
bureaucracy to ll on the sail ll' the
Y find a way out of ti;e U1inG :;lle:? In s it finds itself, for
it tries to solve its problem- b.? iurtl:o:? Lureeuc_-etizatsen. This bureaucracy
is copied from the Soviet bureaucratic a
Soviet agriculture is co?:._tletely nation a eii ^hirehile leless Poland tof std a ht that
sector of private owner-.(3) illl 'r s a large
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1. Borba,
17 Dec 53,
SCUBCES
article signed by I:,c Pelican,.
2.
Ibid.,
19 Dcc 53, article signed b;;
3.
Ibid.,
20 Dec 53, article sued by
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