SOVIET MILITARY CONCEPT ON CONDITIONS FOR ACHIEVING VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700260101-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 101
• Publication Date: October 31, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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SOVIET MILITARY CONCEPT ON CONDITIONS
FOR ACHIEVING VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY WAR
[This report presents the full text of an article by Captain (Kapitan)
Svatoslav Gosman published in Obrana Lidu, central organ of the Czechoslo-
vak Ministry of National Defense, on 10 February 1956.1
In February 1956, Czechoslovak Army officers who are enrolled in the first
level of Marxist-Leninist training are studying the key question of Soviet
military science: constantly operating factors which determine the outcome
of war, and the role of temporary factors which influence the course of the
war.
A correct understanding of this question is of great importance in sci-
entific orientation of the command staff in the increasingly complex con-
ditions of contemporary war.
The February topic of the Marxist-Leninist training, which concludes the
series on Soviet military science, requires detailed preparation of leaders
of individual lecture and seminar groups.
Seminar leaders should direct their attention particularly to the fol-
lowing basic aspects of this topic:
1. The objective legality of contemporary war and conditions for achiev-
ing victory in contemporary war.
2. Economic, moral, political, and military potentials and their signif-
icance.
3~ The significance of constantly operating factors.
4. The significance of temporarily operating factors, particularly the
element of surprise.
5. The mutual relations existing between constantly and temporarily
operating factors.
In explaining the first question, the seminar leader will first show the
objective character of the processes which determine the progress and the re-
sult of a war.
Soviet military science, based on the scientific principles of Marxism-
Leninism, teaches that war, like all phenomena of social life, is not the
result of a combination of coincidences, even though in war the effects of
objective and subjective coincidences are much greater than elsewhere. The
preparation of war, its course, and its final result are conditioned upon
the effect of objective laws, the recognition of which is one of the primary
objectives of Soviet military science.
In establishing the conditions for achievement of victory in a machine-age
war, Soviet military science holds that the progress and result of a war are
determined by the mutual operation of all economic, moral, political, and
military forces of the nation.
Here it is necessary to emphasize the danger of fetishing objective mil-
itary laws. It is incorrect to think tnat because of the objective nature of
these laws, people are helpless in dealing with these laws.
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The objective side includes the economic moral it-r g raph
political, military, , geographic,
and international conditions and character of the given war. The subjective
side of war is a reflection of the subjective conditions existing in the minds
of the people and their informed creative activity aimed at destroying the
enemy and achievement of victory.
From these conditions evolve two important conclusions which the seminar
leader must stress:
1. Acknowledgement of the objectivity of the processes involved in the
phenomena of war does not in any way mean that the legal progress of war is
carried out fatalistically, outside the power and will of the people.
2. Acknowledgement of the objectivity of the processes involved in the
phenomena of war likewise does not mean that the people can rely upon the
automatic assertion of the given economic, moral, political, and military poten-
tials.
Victory can be achieved in contemporary war only on ti:e basis of the thor-
ough understanding and skilled utilization of the objective legality of war
by the people, who are the means whereby economic, moral, and military po-
tentials of the nation are converted to reality and into factors of victory.
In this connect,on it is necessary to stress the mobilizing significance
of established topics and the tasks of Soviet military science.
The study of specific objective legalities of war as an armed conflict is
one of the topics of Soviet military science. Expansion of the subject matter
of Soviet military science regarding the general legalities of war as social-
historical phenomena (these legalities are established in Marxist-Leninist
teachings on wars and armies) detracts Soviet military science from its real
purpose. The content of Soviet military science does not include only strictly
military operations (strategy, operational skills, tactics, organization, and
preparation of the armed forces), but also the understanding and appraisal of
the total economic and morally political factors (of one's own nation as well
as that of the enemy) in their order and mutual influence on military operations.
Explanation of the second question must be based on the well-known Len-
inist thesis that war is a general appraisal of all material and spiritual
forces of every nation, During World War II, J V. Stalin clarified the deep
meaning of this the?,i- by formulating the precept of constantly operating
factors which determine the outcome of a war. The formulation of these con-
stantly operating factors reveals the legalities of contemporary war and fully
answers the question regarding the basic conditions for achievement of victory
in machine-age warfare.
The constantly operating factors are the economic, political, and mil-
itary factors which determine the outcome of war. Therefore, to ensure vic-
tory over the enemy it is necessary to ensure that one's side enjoys a ma-
jority of these factors. That means that one's side has a greater economic,
moral, and military potential than the enemy.
The seminar leader will then call attention to individual potentials and
the possibility of achievement of these in a capitalist and a socialist nation.
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Marxism-Leninism provided the first scientific justification of the role
of economics in war, and revealed its deciding influence on the progress and
result of a war, on military art, on the organization of the armed forces, and
the like. At the same time Marxism-Leninism showed that the influence of the
economic factor on war has not always been the same, and that its influence is
continually increasing.
the economic potential includes primarily the total of all material po-
tentials of the nation to wage war, that is, the level of development of in-
dustry, agriculture, transportation, science and technology, raw-material
supply, national natural and mineral resources, and the size, political and
moral status, and class composition of the nation's population. In addition
the economic potential includes the nation's ability to utilize these material
potentials for victory. Here the seminar leader will point out the deciding
importance of the social and state system, the great social-historical advan-
tages of the socialist system over the capitalist system, the importance of
continual development of heavy industry, and the importance of the new Five-
Year Plans and their coordination in the socialist camp.
What is the importance of the moral potential?
Soviet military science teaches us that the moral and political po-
tential of the nation and the army is their ability to withstand all the
difficulties of war throughout its course. In other words, the moral poten-
tial is determined by the level of political enlightenment and unity of
the population, loyalty to the existing social order and the government's
policies, and the attitudes of the people toward the political goals of the
war. Here the seminar leader must point out the economic bases of the moral
and political unity of the population of a nation which has a socialist system
with social ownership of the means of production (the end of exploitation).
He will also explain the importance of the prevailing socialist ideology and
of honorable goals in the war being carried on by the socialist state. On the
basis of examples from the history of warfare, it is possible to show the
level of the moral potential which is directly dependent upon the political
goals of the war. The seminar leader will also stress the deciding role and
eff-cts of the organizational and political training activity of the Com-
munist parties, directed at strengthening the moral potential of the nations
of the socialist camp.
In explaining the military potential, it is important first of all to
stress the difference between the concept of military potential in our
camp and in the imperialist camp. It must be shown that military poten-
tial does not include all the potentials of a nation, but on the other hand,
it is not limited to the total of the military elements.
Military potential includes the following:
1. The military cadre which ensures the development of a mass army in
wartime,
2. The reserve of command and technical cadres which permit the creation
of additional units.
3. The number and quality of various types of divisions.
It. Arms and military technology.
5. The organizational capabilities of the command staff, the status of
military knowledge and its mastery by the command staff, and military schools
and academies along with their capacities and quality. The economic poten-
tial, the people, who are the prime mover in war, and the moral potential of
the nation are the bases for a nation's military potential.
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In concluding the explanation of this problem, it is necessary to call
attention to the fact that in establishing or appraising conditions nec-
essary for victory, a nation's economic, moral, and military potentials must
be considered together, along with their mutual interaction.
In explaining the third question, it is proper to direct attention to the
importance of the precept of constantly operating factors in ensuring the de-
fensive capability of our nation and of our entire camp.
The basic significance of the precept of constantly operating factors
lies in the fact that of all the complex conditions and forces which shape
the course and the final outcome of the war, Soviet military science stresses
the primary, essential, constantly operating factors. The stability of the
rear echelon, the morale, the number and quality of divisions, the arms of
the military units, and the organizational capability of the command staff
are the five basic constantly operating factors which when existing mutually
and in unity, represent the economic, moral, political, and military factors
that determine the course of the war. Here the seminar leader will consider
the stability of the rear echelon and will point out its major significance.
The rear echelon embodies the unity of the economic, moral, and political
potentials of the nation.
The importance of the precept of constantly operating factors cannot
be compromised. It provides the key to the recognition of the legality of
war as an armed conflict. It reveals the direct dependence of the prog-
ress and result of a war upon the economic and political development of a
nntior.. It shows a new road to understanding the topics of Soviet military
science. It permits efforts to be concentrated on these questions, whose
solution is the key to ensuring the defensive capability of the nation. It
aids in the scientific planning of the principles which will guide the build-
ing of the armed forces and their training and education. It also very con-
vincingly reveals the great advantages of the socialist system in ensuring the
defense of the nation.
The goal of the fourth question is to show the existence of temporarily
operating factors and to demonstrate their importance in contemporary war.
Among the temporarily operating factors are: the element of surprise, the
economic change-over of the nation to a wartime status, advantage in mobiliza-
tion of armed forces, superiority in some types of weapons, the level of com-
bat experiences, and the characteristics of combat at the beginning of the war.
Soviet military science teaches that the temporarily operating factors,
particularly the element of surprise, can have a great effect not only at the
beginning of a war but throughout its entire course. In this connection, it
is necessary to eliminate the false idea that surprise attack can bring
only temporary success. The history of warfare over the past 50 years con-
vincingly shows the growth of the significance of the element of surprise.
Here the seminar ler?der will show the reasons for the increasing importance
of surprise since World War II.
Soviet military science recognizes the great importance of the element of
surprise, not only at the beginning of war, but throughout its course. Now,
when the army's equipment is supplemented by hydrogen and atomic weapons, under
certain conditions surprise can be one of the deciding factors in achieving
success not only in individual battles and operations, but in the entire war.
Further, on the basis of activities of the Soviet Army in World War II, it
is necessary to explain the use of the element of surprise in battles and
operations and to show the manner in which this element of.surrprise was achieved.
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of an attack on Czechoslovakia (attack on
any boundary of the socielistc11yj
), the sinar will n
importance of continual combat rreadiness ofmthe armedeforces,eandathetmeanseat
whereby such readiness may be ensured. Further in this connection, it is nec-
essary to show the importance of the Warsaw Pact and the importance of the uni-
fied command of the member forces of the socialist camp. It is further nec-
essary to point out the importance of training the armed forces under the most
difficult conditions, on the assumption that both sides will use weapons of
mass destruction.
The fifth question involves the correct explanation of the mutual rela-
tion of constantly and temporarily operating factors. It is necessary to of the andpointemporarilyt out the
factorseverin-inacreasing
age warCe Thetseminar tleader
will explain that ensuring an advantage only in some permanent factors, with-
out considering the potentials of one's own rear echelon and the economic and
moral potentials of the enemy, cannot bring continuous success in the war.
The seminar leader will also explain the legality of the decline of strength
that occurs in unjust wars, and the legality of the gain of strength (which
is in keeping even with the objective legalities of contemporary war) that
occurs in just wars which are carried on by socialist nations. The seminar
leader will proceed to explain the distortion and dogmatic interpretation of
the true meaning of the thesis of constantly operating factors (the 23 Feb-
ruary L942 order of J. v. Stalin), which led to underestimation of the enemy's
potentials.. In reality, this order embodies the thought that the fate of the
war during its first months (conditions created by the unexpected attack by
fascist Germany) depended not only on the constantly operating factors, but
also on the serious circumstance created by the enemy's unexpected attack. The
order clearly proves that a sudden attack cannot be considered as a secondary
phenomenon which will automatically become ineffective. In order that the
results of such an unexpected attack may be eliminat-9, the enemy must not be
permitted to fully utilize his military advantage, but the most resolute battle
must be led against him,
Since the February topic concludes the course on Soviet military science,
it is recommended that the seminar leader shorten the seminar on the February
topic by one hour, and utilize this hour for a review of all the material which
has been covered. in the review, the seminar leader may call attention to the
following questions:
1. The importance of Marxist-Leninist training on war and armies in the
study of Soviet military science.
2. The essentials, theme, tasks, and content of Soviet and bourgeois
military science. The importance of constantly operating factors.
3. The character of contemporary war. The importance of the element
of surprise in a battle, an operation, and in the war in general.
4? The theoretical justification of the main tasks of the current year
of training. The importance of the morale of the army, the commander's au-
thority, and continuity of the training process.
The following literature is recommended for seminar leaders on the Feb-
ruary topic.,
1. V. I. Lenin, Essay on Warfare, pp 17-19, 87-92, 140-144, 199-201
2. J. V. Stalin, On the Great Nationalist War, pp 35_41
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3. P. Rotmistrov, "For the Creative Development of Questions of Soviet
Military Science," Obrana Lidu 7 Apr 55
4. E. Boltin, "On Soviet and Bourgeois Military Science," Obrana Lidu,
7 Sep 55
5. A. Cepiccka,"Address at the Graduation of Students of the Military
Political Academy 3Ad politicka adademie),"
Obrana Lidu 16 Sep 55
6. V. Kratochvil, "The Main Tasks in Military Science Activity," Obrana
Lidu, 17 Sep 55
7. B. Lomsky, "Important Tasks of Staff Commanders and Officers," Obrana
Lidu, 25 Jan 55
8. G. Fyodorov, "Dialectic and Historical Materialism, and Military Sci-
ence," Lidova Armada, No 21, 1955
9. V. Zubarev, "Lenin and Military Science," Lidova Armada, No 22, 1955
rX ?
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