POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ATTITUDES IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A000100620002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 20, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/17: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA000100620002-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
USSR (Kalinin Oblast/Germany)
Political Developments and Attitudes
in the USSR
This Document contains information Affecting the Na-
tionai Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
DATE DISTR. 20 March 1953
NO. OF PAGES 2
25X1
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
25X1
!LTE LOAN CAMPAIGNS
1. The administration of Branch No.1, Institute 88, Gorodomlya Island,carried
out yearly campaigns for subscriptions to state loans. In 195% workers and
employees were expected to contribute "voluntarily" an entire month's salary.
In 1951 plant authorities called for 110 percent and in 1952 they intended to
"ask for" 120 percent of a month's salary. Theoretically, the Soviets were
supposed to volunteer their contributions, but in practice they were under
considerable pressure to do so. A sector'ohief initiated the loan drive by
calling on all employees in his sector to contribute the required amount.
Those who failed to respond were called to the sector chief's office,where
they were given a private lecture. Individuals who still hesitated were
subject to the pressure of Party and WD (MCIB) officials.
2. Although there were a few Soviets who consider it their duty to contribute to
the state loans, the average person thought that it was unjust to demand so 25X1
much money. There were many complaints about this point and the compulsory
-nature of the loan drives.
STATES ARMY x NAVY x lAIR
(Notot Washington Distribution Iadkahd "y 11X111 Ptdd Distribution
P
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/17: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA000100620002-3
SECRET
3. "In 1954 about ten Soviet workers and. employees +~-~~-- -_
the required contributions. After unsuccessful appeals by the sector chief,
they were visited by a commission from the Party committee and security
section,which talked to each one separately. They all donated the required
amount afterwards. None of the workers was subject to reprisals for his
opposition.
SOVIET ATTI!L'tTDES ~_CVPARD PQLITIC~T, PROBLEMS
4. Stalin was frequently discussed by Soviet workers in connection with Lenin.
Comparisons between the two were always disadvantageous to Stalin. Such
opinions as "Lenin would have done things differently (that is, better) than
Stalin if he had lived" or "Lenin was a far greater person than Stalin" were
frequently expressed. A few persons even suggested that Stalin had done away
with Lenin by some foul means.
5. Stalin is probably neither loved, nor greatly respected by the
Pn,.ty
a..44P4ea b
y
e tithe
O
al
. ?,..-- . -
n th
Soviet populativxa.
propaganda. The average Soviet swallows the Party propaganda line, as he has
no opinion of his own. The mass of Soviet workers is like a herd of cattle
thi h f nllowa its leaders complacently and without thought.
6. dn3y a small percentage of the Soviet
population is opposed to the regime. The older generation is the only group
which can be singled out as oriented politically against the regime.
7. The Soviet population was not noticeably fearful of the possibility of a new
world war between the Soviet Union and the West. However, they seemed very
certain in their belief that such a war would come. They were even more con-
vinced that the Soviet Union would win this war. In comparing the strength of
the Soviet Union with the West, the Soviets pointed to the size of the Soviet
Union and noted that the USSR had never lost a war. The topic of a possible
war was generally brought up by the German specialists. Soviet workers and
employees apparently did not discuss this point very frequently.
8. All Soviets were certain that the United States had begun the war in Korea.
The general opinion was, "What is the United States doing in Korea? The
Americans should go home and let the Koreans live in peace.". Chinese and
Soviet charges of ba were also firmly accepted by the 25X1
soviet Population.
9. The average Soviet,worker?s opinion of the United States seemed to conform to
the official propag&ada line. there was neither 25X1
much respect nor fear of the fighting qualities of the American soldier. The
Soviets were more fearful of Japanese and German military prowess.
SPglmiGN BA I? BRCADCA TF S 25X1
there was a interest anion the Soviets in buying radios
from the German specialists
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/17: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA000100620002-3