THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A000400380003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 3, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/02/09: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA000400380003-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY
Rumania
The Ministry of Health
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
3 March 1953
medical affairs of t rmed force were not controlled in any way by the
NIinistr of Hea the Minister was replaced in March 1952.
Porje, a Communist, was the Ministry of Health officer in
rge o personnel appointments.
2.I medical schools in the universities were subordinate to 25X1
the Ministry o ea th. The Ministry of Health was responsible for furnishing
medical care to the population. There were only very few private practitioners
because taxes were very high for such people. Only avery good or very famous
physician with a steady flow of patients could afford to maintain a private
practice. Private .consultations were held 9nly after regular,, duty hours,
since the physicians had to serve as State-employed doctors.
3.. The Ministry employed the Government's administrative organizational pattern
for its structure of units supplying medical aid to the people. This organi-
zational structure for the country was set up in 1951 and, as of early 1952,
was gradually being enforced on the country from Bucharest.
4. Administratively, Rumania Was divided into the following: re iune, of which
there were approximately 30. Each regiune 25X1
was composed of several raions which were subordinate to the regiune. Sub-T.-
ordinate to the raion were the circumscriptie, the lowest organizational unit.
A raion was approximately equivalent to a county, and a circurnscriptie was
approximately. equivalent to a township, which had several small villages
subordinate to the town government.
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it had the following d .vi alone:
P'rephylAx iS "Maternity and Child Welfare, Ti beroulocis, ~Te ier al
Diseases' Malaria, Cancer, Education and Protection of Labor (a
political arm)
Each regiune had an office of the Office of the Public' Health
Service for the regiune (Serviciul Sanitar de Regiuune) which carried
out the'program of the Ministry of Health in the regiune. This
office was headed by a Medical Chief.
Each raion had an office of the. Raion Office of.the Public Health
5erviee (Seccia Sanjtar. de Raion). This office 'was also headed by a
Medical Chief.
Each eircumscriptie, the smallest governmental and Public Health
.Service subdivision in the gauntry, had a public health. representative.
This man was a general practitioner.
The system. worked as follows: a village patient seeking medical'a'are
was'expected to go from his village to the, nearest cirebmeoriptie
office. He knew Where this office was because his village Was an
administrative' tunit within a circumsoriptie. The physician there had
an"offic,e,, usually in a separate building. With his very meagre
supply of drugs'and'equipment, he did what he could for the patient
or referred him to the nearest 'polyclinic in the raion, presenting
the patient with a referral slip. In practice, the village patient.
had-little confidence: in the'circ u.scriptie doctor, who was
'frequently changed.. However, there was no other medical dare }
avai-fable to the villager,, who had to have a referral slip to obtain
the services of a polyclinic or hospital of the'raion.
10,. The oireumscriptie office might or might not have a separate waiting
room, and sometimes had a room to serve as a maternity ward,. -It,' was.
expected that the Ministry would eventually set up a maternitty'care
hospital in a building separate from the ciroumsoriptie.offioe.'?ThO"
physician.was sometimes supplied with a buggy, or obtained trensporta-
tion as, needed from the village authorities, since he 'had to: pay an
inspection visit to each'village.about twice a month.
25X1
.11. Normally, it was expected that the patient would present himse]fto
.the doctor at the oiroumecriptie office. If the doctor was required
to visit the patient at, ,home, the patient, had. to pay for the' cost of
the transportation.
12. Only Communist'Party members,or workers on collective, farms, received'
free medical care. Others had to pay for the consultation and for
,the drugs supplied. The physician usually had a male or female
assistant and a midwife. It was expected that each village'have a
midwife or'that there'be a midwife in a oiroumsoriptie town.
13. The ciroumsoriptie.doctor-was overburdened with administrative
details. He-was assigned by the Government, usually against his will,.:
and might be reassigned to another village, to a factory, or to a
railroad (CPR) medical position. There was a serious shortage of
physicians in Rumania,. a fact which added''to the burden of the
oircumsoriptie..physician.
14. In the larger cities, a patient ,.;ou'ld present himself for medical care
at a polyclinic. Both Cluj and, Brasov had a polyclinic. Sines all
doctors in Rumania had to work j'or the State, the polyclinics were
staffed.'by, State-employed physicians. The . polyclinic staff us?1
included specialists. Physicians served according boa duty.a s1
ment system, spending a definite number of days at a,jiolyoliniop
followed by a period of outpatient duty, and then working for a fixed .
.period of,,.time at a hospital.
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25X1
.15,.- The .rric ... dtactors who had a i edord of--the - availability .of'beds.
tht hospitals, ..could..." efer_ a patient "to a hospital for. fart iex?....
tre tthent,..._.or' db whs.teveP v is possible fo ? the patieh,t. at . t2 poly'
dlinid-.ar by' home . visits . Patiehts cattld enter hospitals"".upon
x'eferftl from pe lyclinies ... In. u? geh casee,, a Buro ? de-'Urge1 ta" of a
~.d~acce _ .. ,.. , ., .
hospital cou pt ., . apatient directly., e.g. in cases , , of accidents.
16. Zxa the.. hospitals, in addition to the" 'staff of physicians ,who were
rotated7ac6`oxding to"'the above system, there were doctors,.ustiially'the
chiefs of sections, who were permanently assigned to the hospital..
:17.. Factories had their own polyclinics to which the factory workers and
their families had to go for medical care.
18.. The system did not have the support of the doctors or the people.
Personalized care was impossible, and bureaucratic paperwork slowed
dO n "the entire system of ministering to t The ve
dOdtor received 500 to 600 lei per month, 25X1
Skilled workers receive a per.mon. .
Qa p ys 0 ans ha a second job, usually at a factory, to obtain,
more-money., since boo lei was not enough to live on.
19.-.The main cause for defective functioning of the, health service was
the political regime, which paralyzed the progress of medicine and
caused it to regress. A, secondary cause was that doctors in leading
positions were incompetent and did not know how to organize medical-.
assistance at the reglune level. 'Physicians were punished tor.things
over which they had no control, e.g., the occurrence of 'a contagious
disease. Doctors, therefore, worked in fear and in a superficial
manner;.they prepared false statistical reports. Besides the poor
wages., transportation was supplied irregularly, and cheo1c ups were
possible only in cases of grave illness., The physicians had scarcely
any medicines, and few western publications. Their morale was
very low.
20.- The. Ministry of Health was expected to carry on health :can aigne:,,
e.g. anti-tuberculosis, anti -ve %real disease, ?? laria,
prophyla :&s,' to nunization, etc . the : as nti- 25X1
tubdrouloeia campaign the best organ. zed ~, even at the oircumeoriptie
level,:' The Maternity and Child Welfare program also functioned
fairly well. Expeotant'mothers were given up to 45 days' vacation
for the birth of their children.. Vacations for children at: ;the saga-
:shore and in the mountains were arranged. :
21. At the re .une' level, the Ministry of Health maintained a Hy ieniaa, ~?,
Section rhiehwas charged with the responsibility of.enfoioing sari
'tation, This 'section was advised of the outbreaks of inteotious
disease and its doctors instituted counter-measures and prophylaxis.
The section was also expected to control.vermin'and all vectors of
disease. This .section was ntla?t,.,,very efficient. The Section had
mobile - service which took care of minor pest problems. larger Jobs
were supposed to be assigned directly by the Ministry of Health, but,:
in 1948s the, country suffered a plague of mice which remained
uncooked and which., seriously affected the crop ..yields. These mice
were destroyed only by the onset'of cold weather.
! ! Dia 1
22. This problem was controlled according to. plan by a Sanitary Service,at
the reegiune level. This service had the master plans ,for the sewage
systems, and was expected" to.'' 'set up ,regulations came rung'the ue 'of
wells and sewers or other disposal methods such as cisterns 01"
latr nee>,
the installlation - of new . se ra ge systems was. not supposed' to be -arz.
reglatimn was amt aa4dhered to or enforeed. - - _.~ --
23.
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