1. CHINESE COMMUNIST RAILWAY INSPECTION 2. SSUFANG RAILWAY SHOP, TSINGTAO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A000700430006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 13, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/10/20: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA000700430006-1
CENTRAL INT_ELL.I.GEN.CE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contelna info4metlon afeottn$ the Ne-
ttonsi Defense of the United 8tetes, within the mean-
ing of Title 18.8ecttons 780 end 7K at the U.5.Oode. es
emended. Its trlnamiasioa or revelation of its oontenp
to or receipt by on unsuthoriosd pelt I* 8xohtbtted
by law. The reproduction of this farm is ptohthlted.
CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROL- U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
SUBJECT 1. Chinese Communist Railway Inspection
2. Ssufang Railway 6hopy.Tsingtao
REPORT 25X1
DATE DISTR. '3 ?I -1953
NO. OF PAGES 6
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES 125X1
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
a.group of Soviet railway specialists reported the yesults
of an inspection of the Northwest Trunk Line,l the Chengtai Railway, and 25X1
erections of the Lunghai Railway to senior officers of the Chinese Communist
Ministry of Railways. The inspecting party was made up of Cha-kang-te-yeh-fu
(2610/1481/6671/5102/1133), a consultant; Hsi-lin (6007/2651), a bridge
technician; Tsu-pu-k?o-fu (4371/1580/0668 1133), a depot and station
technician; and Ao-ni-shih-k'o-fu (1,159/1141/4258/0668/1133), an engineer.
LU Cheng-ts'ao (0712/2973/2347), the vice minister of the Chinese Communist
Ministry of Railways, accompanied the grapp. The principal mission of the
inspection group was a survey of the Paoch'i-T'ienshui railway and of
engineering projects in T'ienshui and Lanchow.
2. As a result of the inspection, the following criticisms were made:
a. Preliminary surveys of complex terrain features such as those at
Wuch?iao-ling (N 37-11) E 103-01) were inadequate.
b. Construction and maintenance were difficult because the original plans called
for a 1,160-meter tunnel with a gradient of five in 1,QOO; for a'90-
kilometer stretch just west of the tunnel, which included gradients of 20
in 1,000 and would requi'e the use of two locoiriotives; and for numerous,
high bridges, roadb s " rid 'funnels.
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[STATE ARMY ,~ NAVY I ,. I A I R I . I FBI I I AEC
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c. Existing roadbeds were not included in construction plans.
d. Engineers did not understand the earthwork problems in the construction
of high roadbeds, some more than twelve meters high.
e. Engineers did not follow the ministry's recommendations in building
roadbeds according to the "layers reinforced with piles" method.
f. There was a lack of coordinated development and planning. Only 38 percent
of the Northwest Trunk Line, 57 percent of the earthwork for the 1 enshui-
Lanchow Railway, and two percent of the housing construction had been
completed
g. There was no relationship between project development, investment, and
project value.
h. Project price lists (sic) were not organized and there were no cost
estimates.
i. The force of 60,000 laborers and the machinery on the Northwest Trunk Line
project were not used efficiently.
j. WU Ko-chin (2976/0668/0036), the deputy director of the Northwest Trunk
Line Engineering Administration, was unable to answer important questions
raised by the inspecting party and was unable to provide a project progress
chart.
k. Adequate data was not collected prior to the planning of bridge and tunnel
construction. Bridges were constructed with arches so small that water'
destroyed them immediately.
1. Engineering personnel authorized construction modifications at will.
The buttresses, structure, dimensions, and depth of the Weiho (N 3L+-, E 109- )
bridge were altered.
m. Engineers did not use construction material from the immediate area.
n. Engineers failed to construct embankments and structures for flood pre-
vention work in the proper sequence, to install sufficient railings and
ballast, to erect aqueducts before tunnel construction, and to provide
adequate mechanized equipment. Sixty persons, each manipulating a rope,
were used in place of a pile-driver to imbed reinforced concrete piles for
bridge foundations.
3. The following recommendations were made:
a. A special plan should be prepared for roadbeds twelve meters in height with
specific instructions regarding the gradient of adjacent land.
b. The ballast for sleepers on bridges should be 20 to 25 centimeters thick.
c. More attention should be given to the use of signal equipment, water
supply facilities, and other operational equipment.
d. Large depot and terminal planning should be centralized in one agency.
e. Engineering graduates should be assigned to large stations to study railway
operations.
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